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FOREWORD 
This Report has been prepared by members of the University staff 
under the sponsorship of the Institute for Development Studies, as a result 
of a request from the Ministry of Finance and Planning to undertake a 
comprehensive evaluation of the Special Sural Development Programme for 
the period ending December, 1971. A draft of the main Report was made 
available to the Government in August, 1972, for a meeting of the officials 
involved with the SRDPs The Report has been revised as a result of the 
discussions at the meeting and in the light of comments received subsequently 
from University colleagues and Government officials, 
It should be stressed that the Appendices form an integral part of 
the Reports those who read the main Report without its accompanying 
Appendices may find it somewhat abstract and pitched at a high level of 
generality® The Appendices provide not only a fuller analysis and supporting 
arguments for many of the points made in the Kiaic Report but they also 
capture the fHavourand spirit of this pioneering effort in accelerated 
rural development. 
The University through the Institute for Development Studies has 
been closely involved with the SRDP from the very beginning. It played a 
key role in the planning and organisation of the Kericho Conference which 
first stressed the need for an experimental, innovative effort at 
integrated rural development. The subsequent survey of rural areas on 
the basis of which the six SRDP areas were selected, was also carried out 
by the University staff. They have continued their involvement in the 
Programme, as this Report shows, by direct participation in some of the 
strategies devised for rural development, and through their evaluative 
role, first as Area Evaluators and subsequently as a centre-based multi-
disciplinary team of researchers and evaluators. At the same time, 
numerous papers have been written on various aspects of the SRDP and a 
number of workshops have been organised to discuss its principles, 
objectives and strategies„ 
It is appropriate, therefore, that the Institute should have 
been asked to undertake this important evaluation* The present Report is 
an outcome of a team effort, involving specialists in a wide range of social 
science disciplines and drawn from various departments in the University. 
The multi-disciplinary approach to research on development problems is 
an integral part of the basic philosophy of the Institute for 
Development Studies, It is hoped that the value of this approach 
will be fully demonstrated by the Report. 
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This Report has been prepared under an enourmous pressure 
of time by individuals most of whom had already full-time teaching 
and research commitments. 
The team consists of the following: 
Dr. J. Ascroft Dr. P, Mbithi Mrs, M. Baily 
Dr, N. Roling Dr, J, Keyer Mr. J. Kariuki 
Dr, G- Gwyer Mr. F. Hay Dr, E. Baum 
Dr, M. Mutiso Miss S, Almy Mr. G. Ruigu 
Mr- W, Oyugi Dr, M, Gachuhi Miss C. Barnes 
The Institute is greatly indebted to them, and in particular to 
Dr- J, Ascroft who was co-ordinator of the study, for the enormous 
amount of work they have put into this Report and for their persistence 
and dedication. In addition, the Institute acknowledges the assistance 
of'Dr, J: Nellis and Mr, P, Moock in the initial stages of the evaluation 
proj ect, 
The main conclusions and findings of the evaluation are set 
out clearly in the Report and speak for themselves, but it may be in 
order to make a few points here. Perhaps the single most important 
conclusion that emerges from a reading of this Report is the need for 
better and more imaginative planning in all phases of the SRDP -
in establishing objectives and targets, in selecting strategies and its 
individual components, in designing the pilot projects, in eliciting 
local participation, and in implementation and evaluation. Most of the 
faults and failures of the Programme can be traced to deficiencies 
m various phases of the planning process. 
Some of the persons involved in the organisation and operation 
of SRDP may feel somewhat discouraged by the critical tone of the 
Report, It should, however, be remembered that one of the purposes 
of the :: valuation was precisely to highlight the deficiencies in the 
objectives, strategies and implementation of SRDP, In order that 
these might be avoided in the future. A report which failed to do It 
would hardly have served that purpose- But more important, failures and 
drawbacks are inevitable in the early stages of an experimental 
programme like the SRDP. Any attempt to bring about dramatic improvement 
in the incomes and welfare of rural people through new approaches 
is by its very nature an extremely complex and arduous undertaking. 
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Not only is there need to think up new ideas, strategies and 
projects, hut new organisational structures must he created, 
the bottlenecks caused by the ministerial structure and bureau-
cratic procedures overcome, and the energies and enthusiasism of 
the local people engaged in the development process. Judged by 
these exacting requirements, the SRDP has achieved a number of 
notable successes. Its basic principles and objectives 
continue to be valid. It is hoped that the present Report will 
make a valuable contribution to the improvement in the planning 
and operation of the SRDP in particular and the rural development 
programmes and policies in general. 
Dharam Ghai 
Director, 
Institute for Development Studies, 
University of Nairobi. 
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THE TERMS OF REFERENCE 
The terms of reference of this evaluation are contained in. 
a letter from the Director of the Institute for Development Studies to 
the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Finance and Planning, of which the 
following is an. extracts 
"The Permanent Secretary,, 
Ministry of Finance and Planning, 
po0B Box. 30561, 
M1RQBI, 
For the attention of Mr„. Mbindyo 
Dear Sir, 
Bes: Overall Evaluation of S»RCD.P^ - Eeriod Ending 
December, I971« 
le. refer to, your letter, EDP/SC- 237/012 -t dated 22nd Feburarys 
1972,, and subsequent series of discussions which we had with you0 
We have already had a meeting during the course of which the 
terms of reference you gave us were thoroughly discussed* In principle 
we are satisfied with the terms but we believe that these may need slight 
modification as a result of the experience gained during the actual conduct 
of the ^valuationG Accordingly, at the initial stage, we have slightly 
modified your terms of reference and the following suggested framework is 
presented?~ 
1® General Evaluation of SBDP Principles and Objectives 
To evaluate the extent to which the principles and 
objectives have been so far achieved, 
To. determine whether the processes and procedures 
evolved and applied have been right or wrong, use-
ful or not for planning and implementation and 
whether these processes can be improved or corrected 
for future planning and implementations 
To determine the degree to which the SRDE programmes 
axe tending to reach their designated goals, and if 
not, what needs to be done to get them on target and 
to accelerate the process. 
The above considerations might well lead to a re-statement of the SRDE 
principles and objectives along the following liness-
To distinguish between principles and objectives and 
between levels of objectives. 
To formulate more precise, less ambiguous definitions of 
principles and objectives, possibly making a plea for 
general acceptance of a standard set of definitions. 
In defining objectives, to consider not only making them 
more detailed, but also to distinguish ultimate objectives, 
from intermediary or loxrer level objectives. 
Specific Questions for Evaluation 
Is the planning framework developed for SEEP 
adequate or effective to meet its principles and objectives? 
In planning the SEDP, was the unexploited potential for 
development of each SEDP area adequately assessed? 
7Jere the probable constraints preventing this potential from 
being maximally exploited adequately assessed? 
To what extent are the strategies and approaches designed 
to accelerate rural development in SEDP area, newer and 
more effective than those which they replace or supersede? 
Are the implementation stages effective enough to try out 
these new strategies and approaches? 
Were the extra funds, staff, expertise, administrative costs, 
special training, equipment, etc., estimated for and provided 
to SEDP areas inadequate, adequate or more than adequate? 
To what extent are the procedures, strategies and approaches 
devised for SEDP projects replicable in this country as a 
whole? 
How effective has the role of the Area Co-ordinators, District 
Development Committees and the Ministry of Finance and 
Planning in its capacity of overall SEDP co~ordinator been? 
To what extent have local communities been adequately 
involved in the planning and implementation of SEDP and to 
what extent has this involvement been premature, timely or 
too late? 
To what extent are SEDP projects integrated or co-ordinated 
with on-going programmes and to what extent have on-going 
programmes been labelled SEDP? 
In answering these questions, our evaluation will pay specific attention 
to '.ne degree to which the procedures and processes utilized adhered to 
SEDP principles particularly with regard to SEDP goals®. Eecommendations 
for improvement will also he made0 
Ills Particular Projects for Evaluation 
To evaluate the progess and strategies evolved for 
the following specific programmes 
Migori Master Earners and Eoads Progratmae 
The Mbere Cotton Programme 
The Tetu Extension Pilot Project, Earn Management 
and Club Programmes 
The Yihiga Maize Credit Eackage 
The Eeporting Oyster 
In evaluating these specific programmes, we shall again, pay particular 
attention to questions of adherence to SEDP principles and the achieve-
a,ent of SEDP, goals» In addition^ recommendations for improvement will 
be made*. 
STe Overall Assessment and Summaiy of Beeommendations 
To_ provide an overview of the degree to which SEDB: 
in general is adhering to the SED? principles and 
objectives and how far these objectives are being 
achieved*. 
Tcu provide general recommendations for improvement, 
giving some idea of priorities® 





Yerbal agreement was reached between MEBI- and IDS on these terms of 
x i 
THE EVALUATION TEAM SUGGETS THAT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN 
A QUICK OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT THE READER SHOULD PAI 
PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING THREE BRIEF 
SECTIONS; IN: THESE AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO PLACE SRDP 
IN ITS WIDER SETTING, TO OUTLINE THE CONTENTS OF THE 
REPORT, AND TO PROVIDE A SHORT BUT THOROUGH RESUME 
OF ITS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSs 
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THE BOLE OF SRDP IN HPEAII BEVELOPIMT 
are «-
The terms of reference of the IDS SRDP evaluation, teacy're quest for 
an assessment of SRDP" s achievement an the ground in terms of SRDP principles 
and objectivesj They do not ask for an assessment of the role of SRDP 
in the Government0 s development machinery. Therefore, the main body of 
the report focuses on an evaluation of SRDP8 s achievements on the ground, 
and it is often critical of the achievements, not because it failed to 
take into account the short time SRDP has been in operation;, but because 
SRDP has often lost sight of its own principles and objectives<> 
Nevertheless it would be a great mistake to conclude from our 
rather critical evaluation of SRDP achievements on the ground that we 
feel SRDP has failed» In fact, we share a firm belief that SRDP can 
marie a very important contribution to the acceleration of rural 
development in Kenya^ To explain the apparent contradiction between 
our sometimes critical attitude and our firm recommendation that SRDP 
is not only worthwhile but should be continued and strengthened, we have 
inserted this brief note to explain the crucial role of SRDP in Kenyr• 
rural development machinery as we perceive it. 
The aain product of the development; machinery is development«, 
The main product of SRDP is development of the development machinery. 
The capacity of a government to stimulate development is limited 
by the availability of effective and efficient development programmes 
.and projects„ A development oriented government must therefore take 
active steps to increase their availability0 Essential activities for 
enlarging and improving the arsenal of effective and efficient development 
programmes ana projects are? 
(1) applied re search; activities which increase 
scientific knowledge for a specific practical 
purpose, and 
(2) prototype testings systematic development and 
small-scale testing of programmes and projects, 
prior to their wider application,, 
Together these activities comprise "Research and Development" 
(R&D)S R&D absorbs a great deal of money and skill in industry, but is 
often neglected by the governments of developing countries, although its 
potential benefits for them are no less than those which industry obtains. 
The authors of this report regard SRDP as a truly remarkable 
and innovative programme because its seeks to build the functions of 
Research and Development into the Government machinery concerned with 
promoting rural development;, SEDP is indeed "Special" because it- performs 
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R&D„ not because it rapidly develops a few Divisions0 Its funds are 
primarily designed to test the prototypes of promising programmes and 
projects and not to finance accelerated development of a few areas, 
although that may be an outcome of area-based prototype testing0 
The main thrust of SHDP is to develop innovations in the 
administration of area-based programmes, in types of development projects, 
in methods of implementing them and so on0 It seeks these innovations 
to develop projects, programmes and administrative capacity which are 
more effective and efficient in reaching the Government objective of 
raising the quality of human life than those hitherto in use0 Once 
developed by SRDP these more effective and efficient programmes and 
projects can then be replicated on a wider basis, improving the develop-
ment capacity of Governmento 
The R&D function of SRDP described above is not well understood. 
Some people believe, for instance, that the new District Planning exercise 
has replaced SHDP, while in reality SRDP is, of course, the prototype 
testing machinery for replicative District Planningo In fact, we 
recommend that mechanisms be developed for feeding SKDP results into the 
District Planning machinery,, 
The R&D function which SRDP performs is defined by the SRDP 
principleso If these are not respected, SRDP does not perform its R&D 
function,, The first principle, experimentation,, requires the conscious 
allocation of resources (experimental costs) to finding new or better 
programmes and projects for achieving desired objectives0 These 
programmes and projects must be replicable in other parts of the 
country0 Replication must be feasible., takinginto account existing 
Kenya resources 0 and without vast infusion of external aids, Research 
and evaluation of each step in the planning and implementation process 
ensures that principles are adhered to, objectives are obtained and 
practical lessons are learnedo Taken together these sound principles 
give specific content to the R&D function of SHDP* It is our conviction 
that adherence to these principles, and therefore, a sound performance 
of the R&D function by SHDP, can lead to accelerated rural development 
in Kenya0 
Despite its short life to date, SRDP has already demonstrated 
the possibilities of areap=based planning and development administration. 
It has therefore given a strong impetus to the recently initiated 
District Planning Policy, and has encouraged further decentralisation 
of development administration0 SRDP has also initiated new systems^ 
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for programmings monitoring and reporting on area programmes, systems 
which appear to have potential for country-wide replication0 Much 
effort has also been devoted to developing prototype projects which 
promise more efficient and effective methods for achieving Government 
objectivess although9 for reasons discussed at length in the 
Appendices, only a few of these projects have yet reached the 
replication stage0 Nevertheless, lessons have been learned0 
So far SRDP has concentrated narrowly on a small number 
of areas0 However this is not a necessary component of SRDP except 
where the testing of programme prototypes (area co-ordination, 
area-based planning efforts, for example) is concemedo There is 
no reason why project prototype testing should not be distributed 
widely to different strategic parts of the country0 Not all the 
benefits need accrue to a few areas0 Making SRDP less concentrated 
on a few areas than it has hitherto been will allow it to focus 
less on a rapid comprehensive area development and more on. develop-
ing and testing methods for overcoming specific problems encountered 
in rural development© 
Specific recommendations have been made in tie body of the 
report and it is not appropriate to repeat them here, but in examining 
SHDP in its wider setting we feel that it is important to note that 
the potential value of SRDP is diminished by its lack of authority •> 
Therefore we make the following suggestions in order that SRDP might 
be strengthened, and its value more widely appreciated! 
(1) SHDP be administered by a top Kenyan of Deputy 
Secretary rank with the authority and credibility 
among field officers to make co-ordination of 
SEDP a realistic function^ 
(2) SHDP appoint a Kenyan Programme Officer with high 
qualifications, field experience and a thorough 
understanding of SRDP principles, especially that of 
experimentation, who has the duty of 
(a) ensuring that SHDP programmes and projects 
adhere to SHDP principles, 
(b) identifying new approaches for prototype 
testing, and 
(c) ensuring that SRDP optimally performs its 
XV 
MD function for accelerating Kenya's rural 
development 0 
(3) SRDP seek assistance from an international organisation 
for the development of a multi-purpose proto-type test-
ing unit to support the Programme Officer mentioned in 
(6)0 Such a unit would 
(a) provide documentation and expert guidance 
for identifying and developing new approaches 
for pro to-type testing,, 
(b) identify and give incentives to local entre-
preneurs 8 who have pioneered agricultural 
and industrial enterprises which promise pay-
off for rural development, to make their 
experience availables 
(c) establish capacity and linkage to mobilise, make 
available and co-ordinate expertise for systematic 
experimentation and to assess the suitability 
of testing ventures such as crop/loan packages, 
methods of family planning extension, eto0, aad 
(d) help disseminate SRDP results for replication 
and train Government officers in implementation 
of these programmes and projects0 
In conclusion, we recommend that SRDP be judged on the usefulness 
of its R&D function, or its principles, and not as another form of area 
developmento The substantial criticisms contained in this report should 
theft be used to strengthen the programme by encouraging it to become 
the innovative arm of the Government's rural development machinery« 
Achievement of this promises to make a fundamental contribution to rural 
development in Kenya6 
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UTEODUCTIOH M P OUTL1HE OP THE EBPOBT 
This evaluation report differs from those which hare preceded it, 
Earlier Special Sural Development Programme (SHDp) evaluation reports for- the 
Ilinistiy of Finance and Planning (HPP) have been of three main types? 
1 e The Chronicle of Events Beport» such as the SEDP background 
reports from the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) detailing 
the sequence of events from the Kericho Conference onwardsg 
2 3 The Erogrsfflmie Progress Beports9 such as the MFP and donor agency 
reports detailing the visible signs of SEDP projects and their 
rate of progress5 
3a The Eesearch Report^ such as the IDS reports describing surveys 
undertaken,, their findings and implications for strategy-
modification or developments 
The i"eason for its exclusion from the above categories lies in the 
ems of reference of the present evaluations These require the report to 
,; ocus on those aspects of the SSDP which make it " Special" , and to check whether, 
in the process, of implementation,, the Programme is continuing to be "Special"« 
These unique features of SPJDP emanate from the principles which are intended to 
guide the formulation and implementation of the Programme, influencing both 
hat is attempted and how it is attempted» Only rarely have preceding evaluations 
systematically reviewed the extent to which the underlying principles of SEDP 
are being observed in the specification of its objectives and the choice of 
strategies of the Programme* The present report seeks to redress the balance 
by paying particular attention to evaluating the progress of SHOP in terms of 
its designated principles and objectives, and in so doing seeks to explain these 
principles and objective in as clear a way as possibles It is intended that this 
evaluation should remove any doubts as to the reason for distinguishing this 
rural development programme from all others, and give some measure of the 
considerable value to be attained from continuing to do so0 
The report is divided initially into two separate parts; the "body" 
of the reportj and the Appendices 0 The former contains the main evaluation in 
response to the terms of reference of the study, while the latter provides the 
grater part of the vast amount of information on which the main evaluation is 
jased. In the interests of brevity these two have been kept separate, so that 
the discussion of SEDP principles and objectives could be considerably 
simplified® However, as a consequence, an unavoidable de&xee of abstraction 
characterises the former part. But abstraction has its uses, provided it 
clearly draws on field experience, and in turn provides conclusions which 
relate to that field experience; the Appendices are intended to show these 
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relationships in the form most relevant to field officersa Although each 
field officer will be most interested in the Appendix relating to his 
own areait is strongly recommended that the Appendices be considered 
as a whole„ Many lessons can be learned through the comparison of the 
experience in one area with that in another© 
In turn the "body" of the report is divided into three sections0 
Part I contains a detailed elaboration of the principles of SEDP, a 
precise reclassification of the objectives of SEDP, and an attempt to 
associate the strategies of SBDP with the developmental bottlenecks they 
are intended to overcomes This centres around a functional model of 
SEDP, designed to aid discussions the model is summarised in tabular 
f orcic In Part II are presented a. number of case studies of important SEDP 
projects; these are intended to provide illustrative examples, of the extent to 
which these projects are consistent with the principlesof SEEP, and are 
attaining their designated objectives,, In short they provide a first level 
of information on the field experience with particular strategies; the 
Appendices provide the second and more detailed levels Each summary contains 
abbreviated recommendations on the manner in which the project should be 
modified in the light of the relationship which it has attained with the 
principles and objectives of SEDP; these are developed in detail in the 
Appendices8 Part III contains the general conclusions and recommendations6 
It should be stressed that these sire of a general nature - ise0 they do not 
relate to specific aspects of individual projects, but instead seek to identify 
the common elements of all the projectss They are organised around specific 
questions contained in the terms of reference Q The analysis in each of the 
Appendices has also been organised around these questions, though less, 
explicitly so in the majority of the eases; the specific area and project 
conclusions are therefore contained in the Appendices,, 
It should therefore be apparent that considerable effort has 
been devoted to keeping strictly to the terms of reference of the 
evaluation, and to keeping the report as brief as possible* The 
Appendices exist as testimony to the impossibility of simultaneously 
achieving this and doing justice to the SBDP projects in the individual 
areass 
Several modifications have been introduced; for various reasons 
it has not been possible to provide appendices on the Tetu Parm Management 
Programme, or on the Reporting System., though a case study of the latter 
is included in Part II® However, appendices and case studies on Kapenguria 
and Kwale, and a further appendix on local participation, have been added, 
although these were not requested in the terms of references, 
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SUI.1IM5: 01? COIIGLUSIOITS ALID KSCail.IEIIIlAl'IQITS 
This section attempts to provide a review of the main findings 
and recommendations which emerge from the evaluation,, It must be stressed 
that these conclusions and recommendations relate to the terms of reference 
of the studyj which set the broad limits of the evaluation, together 
with certain specific questions about the achievements of SEDP0 Consequently 
It Is not the function of this section to summarise all that has been 
achieved in SBDPj or to criticise or praise aspects of SEDP which are 
outside the terms of reference. Since the terms of reference concentrate 
on the adequacy of the specification of the principles underlying SPDI, 
and the formulation of the objectives of SEDP, the following conclusions 
and recommendations are similarly specifica 
THE PSIITCIPLES 
The evaluation concludes that the principles of SEDP axe not being 
faithfully observed because they are not well enough known or understcoda 
The four principles of SPDP - experimentation, replication, use 
of existing resources., and research and evaluation - are both necessary 
to ilistinguiFii- 3EDP from other rural development programmes, and sufficient 
to guide all types ol planning within SEDP; they also appear to be operational® 
Ho1/ever, there are varying extents of understanding, and varying 
interpretations of these principles* some projects observe some of the 
principles, while others observe hardly any of the principles. Where the 
principles are ignored there is a tendency to concentrate on developing 
SEDP areas to their maximum, destroying the uniqueness of SPDP, at the 
expense of developing replicable programmes to benefit the country as a 
whole through the process of experimentations 
The prevailing approach In many sectors of SEDP is strongly 
reminiscent of a sports club which states its principle as " sportsman ship" 
and its objective as "the development of healthy minds and bodies" , 
then assumes that all its activities adhere to its principle and promote 
.its objective in some vague yet incontrovertible way» seldom if ever 
stopping to check the validity of this assumption critically and objectively,, 
It is strongly recommended that the four principles of SRDP be 
explained clearly to SEDP personnel at every level of Government from the 
top officials down to the lowliest junior field assistant and also to the 
rural folir. themselves in SEDP areas« 
Knowing the "rules of the game", the principles of SEDP, is 
the essential first step towards generating widespread involvement in 
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GlLDP, whether as active participants or interested spectators,, The 
following simple definitions of the principles are suggested as a 
starting-point for developing the necessary knowledge; they are developed 
at greater length in part I, pages 3 to 10 0 
Seper amenta tion means tiying out alternative strategies for attaining 
particular objectives, the trials being organised in ways which clearly 
show if the strategies can work (their feasibility), and, if they can, 
how well they work (the extent of their pay-off)0 
Replication means the extension or reproduction of successfully tested, 
strategies elsewhere, under similar conditions; it follows the development 
of blueprints and prototypes of the successful strategy0 
Use of Existing Resources means employing additional resources to meet 
only the extra experimental needs, scaled down progressively during 
subsequent replications to the level of normally-available on-going 
resourceso 
Research means, in this context, gathering and interpreting information 
relevant to pinpointing experimental objectives and strategies, while 
evaluation means gathering and interpreting relevant information about 
hoVi well the strategies have worked to attain their objectives„ 
TEE OBJECTIVES 
The evaluation concludes that the objectives of SFLDP as presently 
formulated ("ultimate" and "primary") do not provide clear-cut direction for 
SRDP projectse Some are too vague and general, some are wrongly classified 
as "ultimate" or "primary", and the present list has some notable omissions^ 
It is recommended that the following reclassification and elaboration of the 
SRDP objectives be adopted; 
Immediate Project Objectives 
1C To increase agricultural, industrial and commercial 
output in SEDP arease 
20 To reduce unemployment in SRDP areas by increasing wage 
employment in private enterprise and public works© 
3® To improve the extension, education, health and social 
public services in SEDP areas0 
4«> To increase decentralization of decision-making authority 
and responsibility in the SRDP areas „ 
- XX 
Ultimate ^ rograrr-e Objectives 
1, So generate incor.es through agriculture, comerce and 
industry o 
2, To generate physical, mental and social welfare3 
3- To increase self-generating development of rural people 
through increased self-determinism, self reliance and 
cap£~"ty to sustain continuing growth and development« 
The above scheme appears to provide an adequate set of goals to 
provide clear-cat direction of S2DP projects,, The scheme is developed 
in detail in Part I, pages to 25 e 
ILd evaluation lias readied the following general conclusions on th€.' 
extent to which S?J)P projects are -presently achieving the ultimate objectives 
cf S5EP; 
1 „ Achieving Income Generations SPUP to date has concentrated heavily 
upon pulling together programmes of agricultural projects with immediate 
objectives of increasing agricultural output0 The master farmers project, 
the extension pilot project, the maize credit package, the cotton projects, 
the 4Z clubs, farm management projects, and the holding grounds are cases 
in point® IT one of these is anywhere near fulfilling its objectives on a 
self-generating basis but this is because none of them has reached maturity 
yet» The emphasis upon the agricultural sector seems appropriate in view of 
the fact that it includes the majority of rural inhabitants* 
A few projects are aimed at increasing commercial outputs The loans 
to input stockists in Migori is the most advanced and experimental of 
these. Also included, however, is the involvement of local input stockists 
in the maize credit package and the Partnership for Productivity efforts. 
The Tetu extension pilot project is only now proposing to involve input 
stockists along the lines of the Migori project. 
Hardly any experimental activity appears to be aimed at increasing 
• trial output0 Efforts are being made through Partnership for Productivity 
and the construction of Rural Industrial Development Centres (PIDC) at 
Ilyeri, hakanega, and Embu, but these are margins, o the SPDP and lack 
clear-cut experimental content* 
The achievement of reduced unemployment appears to be lagging. 
Information is lacking on the extent to which wage employment lias been 
generated in the course of implementing projects to increase agricultural 
output; there is no monitoring procedure to check on this, Similarly, 
although experimental labour intensive techniques were planned:~for the 
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purpose of- infrastructure construction, in the implementation process 
changes were made so that only insignificant numbers of wage earners are 
involved0 Still to be implemented is the Vihiga labour-intensive road 
construction programme which, on paper, appears to be a more determined 
drive to reduce unemployment through public works9 
2e Achieving Welfare generation<, (That is, improving the physical, 
mental, and social well-being of the inhabitants in ways other than directly 
increasing money incomes). Hardly any SHEQ? activity of a clear-cut 
experimental nature Is discernible in this area® There are projects concerned 
with building and expanding educational, training and health facilities? 
but none of these appears to be testing alternative strategies for generating 
Yjelfare development;, except in so far as construction of facilities 
constitutesa supportive or integral part of experiments to increase output0 
The extensions to the Wambugu PTC may be regarded as connected to the 
extension pilot project^ and the HIDCs may be preludes to focussea 
experimental activityo On the whole, SEDP is responsible for only hastening 
the implementation of projects aimed at generating this type of welfare0 
The major exception to this generalization is the sequential 
implementation project in Kwale which places priority on water development,, 
Provision of clean water for human and animal consumption has greater 
implications, at least in the short run, for generating health and welfare 
than for generating incomes,, Almost all SEDP areas have water development 
projects, some supported through U1TICEJ?0 On the whole, however, they lack a 
clearcut experimental design and are more appropriately regarded as on-going 
projects® 
3® Achieving Self-generating Development0 
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goal of achieving self-generating development has not been attained, and is_ 
absent from .many of the projects,. 
It Is fair to say that this ultimate objective, which seeks to ensure 
that those projects which are Implemented enable or stimulate the spontaneous 
emergence of further development effort from the local societies, is the 
hardest of all to attains At the moment the benefits of many of the projects 
will end with the completion of the project, rather than the project successfully 
eliminating the constraints to "natural" development by the local peoplee 
There appear to be at least three reasons for-this; in the drive to show 
visible signs of SSDP on the ground projects were implemented with undue haste; 
in the process of designing programmes and projects very little attention was 
paid to the long-run development path of an area; local participation in the 
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planning process and implementation of the projects was not sought to the 
necessary extent. 
0elf-determinism, or the capacity of the local people to select the 
most satisfactory development path and combinations of projects, has been 
given some attention in Tetu (the planning and implementation of the extension 
pilot project) and in Iligori (the project advisory committee), but generally 
there has been a small degree of local participatione Even the DDCs are 
still largely instruments of Government. Self-reliance„ or the ability of 
local people to find the necessary resources - apart from those to overcome 
bottlenecks - lias not been encouraged, even although building up the local 
ability to plan could relieve the pressure on planning experts and avoid 
the mistakes of centralised selection ana design of development projects. 
In general It appears to be the case that local abilities and ideas 
have been ignored, not to mention their misunderstanding and complaints0 
On-going growth and development is the target of successful bottleneck 
identification and elimination; once the obstacles have been removed the 
special effort is withdrawn as the area should now be able to develop 
spontaneously. However, the very short planning horizon which has been 
adopted in most cases - related to the cursory assessments of both potential 
and constraints - does not extend beyond the life of the component projects, 
The lack of a long run view, and in particular the absence of an attempt 
to view the areas in. a national context lias contributed to an over-emphasis 
of agriculture, despite its relevance in a rural area, For example, without 
considering whether there was a need for a permanent general credit-providing 
institution in Vihiga, and experimenting with alternative forms, a narrowly 
specific and temporary credit scheme was instituted, little effort has been 
put into the development of commercial, industrial, and other non-farm 
employment opportunities, although these might have been better integrated 
into a national policy to lessen the pressure of urban migration. If no 
effort is put into the attempt to bring about on-going growth and 
development, the only alternative to the status quo is prolonged welfare 
dependence on the central government, ¥ 
It is recommended that efforts should be made to tap the 
considerable local resources for development through the training of 
leaders of local interest groups, and experimenting with different types of 
local responsibility in projects, 
Finally it is recommended that attention should be distributed 
equitably across all objectives, sincc SPIff essentially involves the creation 
of en integrated programme of projects designed so that together they will 
achieve the overall ultimate goal of SHIff, 
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TIE STEATEG-IES 
The evaluation concludes that the S1IDP strategies which are being 
tried are confused partly because ox the confusion among objectives of 
SPJDP but also because no systematic attempt _has been made to categorise 
the potential bottlenecks to development which the strategies are intended 
to overcome^ In general the majority of strategies so far developed and 
currently being tested are familiar more-of-the-same old strategies rather 
than tailor-made strategies to fit the requirements of specific perceived 
bottlenecksa 
What are the possible areas of bottlenecks? This question has 
often been asked in SPDPf but so far not answered with a systematic 
classification of bottleneck areas, which would make it evident to all 
where the search for likely strategies to overcome the bottlenecks would 
be most fruitful,, It is i-ecommended that the following classification of 
bottlenecks be adopted as a means of ensuring that strategies are selected 
in relation to an assessment of the obstacles to the greater attainment of 
objectives through existing strategies% 
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Project Bottlenecks; Searching for alternative area based strategies 
for overcoming; 
10 lack of knowledge and skills through education, training and 
extension, and research,, 
2„ lack of financial and material inputs of money, supplies and 
equipmento 
3a Lack of internal and external markets to absorb surplus outputo 
4a Lack of infrastructura.1 facilities and amenities0 
59 Lack of people-involvement in project planning, design and 
executionc 
60 Lack of employment opportunities through labour-intensive 
work schemes„ 
Programme Bottlenecks; Searching for administrative strategies for 
overcoming; 
1 „ Lack of organisation through co-ordination and integration 0 
20 Lack of control through intercommunication, monitoring and 
reporting systems, 
3o Lack of planning resources through increasing problem solving 
capacities of area planning teams, 
4, Lack of implementation resources through extra funds, equipments 
staff, and a stable team of experts and technicians needed for 
experimentation s 
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Thor;e bottleneck areas should assist planners to identify 
those bottlenecks which are present in a particular area, and to 
concentrate on searching for strategies which can over cone them, and in 
so doing attain the SPJE objectives0 This search must be distributed equitably 
across all the bottleneck sectors, and not just those associated with 
agricultural output or administratis organisation and control, as is the 
present work in 8ZDP, An elaboration of this classification will be found 
in Part I, pages IS to 22 . 
GEESUAL GdTCnJSIOlT 
She general recommendations outlined above have emerged from 
the development on a "Punctional Hodel' of 3PDP; this is discussed in 
detail in Part I« It is intended as a compact, handy summary of the 
principles, objectives, and strategies of SI£DP, a ready reference for 
planners interested to know what SUIL- is all about. But it can only 
be useful if skills are acquired through training in how best to use the model, 
and through practice iiiactuallyusing it. It is therefore recommended that 
area teams take time to study the model carefully, to explain it to interested 
parties in the SPDP areas themselves, and to hold brain-storming seminars to 
elicit and develop feasible high pay—off strategies for overcoming development 
bottlenecks, to implement them in ways consistent with the principles of 
S^BI, C' as to benefit the country as a whole. 
In Part II of the evaluation a number of case studies of 
individual projects are listed® In reading them the reader should ask 
hii'-solf, in the light of the above conclusions and recommendations: 
7 ere the SrDP principles observed? 7ere the objectives stated clearly? 
Were all the likely bottlenecks taken into account? Are the strategies 
useful and replicable on a larger scale? 
PART _I 
PBBICIPhES, OBJECTIVES, ALID STRATEGIES 
GElffiEAL COMMENTS . 
Short term wonders are rare events, miracles even rarer. 
It would have taken nothing short of a miracle to render SEDP a roaring, 
unqualified success after "barely one year of full operation. Therefore, 
only the most unmitigated optimist could possibly have hoped for an SEDP 
unfolding on the ground in ideal fornu On the contrary, it is only 
natural that its early days may be fraught with scepticism and controversy, 
for seldom is the birth of a new idea easy and effortless. But 
consider that five donor governments and many other international 
agencies have seen-fit to support SEDP, and that so much unprecedented 
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activity and change ha^ebeen generated by SPDP, and that formerly 
half-hearted and uncommitted ministries are now. being galvanized into 
SEDP action, and one gains some appreciation of just how far SEDP has come. 
1b2 Let us suppose now that SEDP as a whole was divided into two 
phases, as indeed it originally was® Suppose further that the express 
and unavoidably necessary function of the first phase was to set up and 
test the SEDP administrative machinery, to see how well the methods and 
procedures envisaged for SEDP operated in practices, to determine 
whether -unanticipated gaps and bottlenecks still remained. Then'finally 
suppose an SEDP having systematically evaluated itself, corrected its 
errors and focussed itself more clearly upon attaining its objectives in 
a business-like wayc Given these suppositions, then it cannot be denied 
that the SEDP has been remarkably successful in revealing its own short-
comings and now stands ready to move forward into its second and potentially 
most profitable phase with renewed zeal and confidence. ¥e therefore 
recommend in all sincerity that this be the view adopted by all parties 
concerned in the development and promotion of an SEDP which promises to 
become a unique and valuable contribution in the world today, rather than 
merely a unique funding system. 
lo3 To be a useful constructive exercise, however, the present 
evaluation must be unreservedly critical when necessary while also paying 
due credit where deserved. ¥e learn both from failure and success and we 
would be remiss in our duty if we glossed over either result. 
184 By its very name SEDP is in some way "Special", that is 
different from other rural development activitiese What makes it different? 
Hot its ultimate aims, which are the same as any other development effort, 
nor the means which will be employed, as these may duplicate the measures 
adopted In other schemes„ The essential contrast with other efforts lies 
in the motives behind the Programme which may be summarised as finding 
planning and implementation procedures of general relevance throughout 
Kenya for hastening development. These motives are given substance by 
the principles of SEDP, the related objectives, and the strategies which 
emanate from them0 
lt>5 In this largely methodological section an attempt is made to 
e25>Iain the principles, objectives, and strategies of SEDP as clearly and 
concisely as possible. Because this is a complicated issue the evaluators 
have developed a functional model of JSEDP, to systematise the discussion and 
analysiso It is also hoped that the model forms a framework to provide clear 
guidelines for planning and implementing SBDP projects and programmes. It 
has been called functional because it emph&sikeg the different roles, of 
principles, objectives, and strategies in the operation of SEDP, and examines 
the relationships between one and the other, normally such a model should 
be prepared before the event, as would^th^ plans for the construction of a 
houseo This one, however, is an ex joosTpTslueprint, prepared to evaluate 
on-going "construction". Since SEDP is still young enough to change this 
is not a considerable drawback; it is hoped that the model will prove useful 
in indicating the modifications required to ensure that SEDP has a more 
disciplined up-bringing. The model, in tabular form, is presented on 
page II and it is suggested that during the following discussion reference 
be continually made to it. 
THE EELEYHTGE OP PBUJCIPLES, OBJECTIVES, AND STBATEGIES 
106 At this stage In the discussion it is appropriate to insert a 
few words on the general relevance of principles, objectives, and strategies 
to the issue of hastening rural development. The most useful way may be by 
analogy with various sporting activities. Any sporting activity, if it is 
not to degenerate into chaos, requires rules. These perform two functions: 
they impose discipline, indicating specifically what kind of behaviour on 
the part of the participants is permitted, and they differentiate one game 
from the other - football and hockey are quite different because their rules 
are different. The counterpart here is the principles of SEDP; at one and the 
same time they indicate the kinds of activities which will be permitted within 
SBDP, and show how different, or "special", it is compared with other 
development programmes. Hence a lot of stress is laid on acquiring a knowledge 
of the principles of SBDP, in order that the "game" may be played well. 
1.7 Participants in sporting activities usually have a variety of 
aims: the footballer may seek to win the game in which he is playing at the 
moment, and, less immediately, he may seek to keep fit through playing 
football. He is only liable to attain the second aim if he participates in 
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many games of football. It should also be noted that he puts effort into 
winning the game, because it is an objective of the rules of football - the 
winner is the one who scores more goals. The aims of the sporting activity 
find their counterpart in the objectives of SRDP - these have to be consistent 
with the "rules" or principles of SEDP, and two different levels of objectives 
may be distinguished, corresponding to winning the individual game (the 
immediate project objectives of SEDP,) and keeping fit (the ultimate programme 
objectives of SRDP)o 
lo8 Finally the participant in a sporting activity is always trying 
out new strategies which will help him to win the game. For example, the 
long distance runner may choose from setting the pace for the other runners, 
bunching with his competitors, or trailing behind the field with the 
intention of sprinting past near the end of the race. But he will not indulge 
in strategies which are inconsistent with his aim of winning flat out at the 
beginning of the race, or in strategies which though they might permit him to 
finish the race first will lead to his disqualification under the rules of 
the game, such as striking his opponents or taking a short cut. So, too, 
in SRDP the selected strategies have to be both consistent with the objectives, 
and permitted by the principles0 
1<>9 But the runner^s choice of strategy depends very much on what 
he considers to be the principal obstacles to his winning a particular race, 
as repetition of the same old strategies may not always be successful. So he 
selects his strategy in response to what he considers to be the main threat -
a particular competitor, or the condition of the track. In the same way the 
SRDP strategies should be selected in relation -to perceived difficulties, or 
bottlenecks? in order to overcome them. 
lolO The ensuing discussion attempts to set out precisely the rules 
of SEBP, the kinds of targets it has, and the kinds of strategies which may 
be employed in SEDP to get round the typical obstacles to rural development. 
THE SEDP PRINCIPLES 
1®11 The Development Plan 1970-24 states three guiding principles 
of SEDP experimentation, replication, and the use of existing resources; 
a fourth, research and evaluation is implicit in these. Eegarding experiment at i on, 
the Development Plan notes that SBDP 
"is an experimental programme, that it is intended to 
provide experience in conception, design and execution of 
comprehensive rural development'" 
Of replication, the plan states that one of the 
"fundamental principles of the whole programme is that 
projects and methods that are proved successful in the 
pilot areas can be reproduced in other similar areas 
subsequently." 
On using existing resources, the Plan contends that a 
"fundamental principle is to utilise existing resources of 
staff and finance as far as possible, and to seek external 
assistance to support what will, in effect, be a large 
scale self-help effort." 
The fourth principle, research and evaluation, is implicit in the preceding 
three because they necessarily involve research and evaluation if they are 
to become operational® It was also given explicit emphasis by the National 
Rural Development Council, an emphasis which led to the IDS being allocated 
the task of research and evaluation® 
1®12 If these four principles are to effectively guide the development 
of SRDP they must be clearly known and understood by all those involved in the 
control of SRDP. The following discussion is provided to ensure that this is 
so® 
The Principle of Experimentation 
1®13 Experimentation is the most important of the SRDP principles; 
if it is not fully understood the importance of adherence to the others cannot be 
adequately grasped. Furthermore, the "special" quality of SRDP may be seen 
to hinge on the principle of experimentation: if there is no experimentation 
in SRDP, then it is no different from other programmes which seek to maximise 
the development of particular rural localities® Experimentation involves 
testing alternative strategies for the attainment of particular objectives, 
in order to show if the strategies can work (their feasibility), and, if 
they can, how well they work (the extent of their pay-off). Thus far it is 
an innocuous concept. Nevertheless, it appears to be little known in SRDP 
circles, and those who know of it are uncertain or sceptical of its 
applicability in field situations. This appears to be because ; • 
feasibility-testing and measurement of pay-offs involves more planning 
and systematisation of experimental procedures than at first appears to be 
necessary. Experimental testing involves comparison of one strategy with another 
to find out which works best under specific conditions. New, different, or 
improved strategies may be compared with existing ones, or compared with 
each other; labour-intensive construction methods may be compared with 
machine-intensive methods, or sequential implementation with integrated 
implementation, or the provision of credit with the provision of extension 
advice. But the essence of comparison of such processes requires the following 
three preconditions: 
(1) it must "be possible to distinguish between the strategies 
being assessed, and to attribute outcomes to separate 
strategies; 
(2) the strategies must have clearly defined objectives, 
to give meaning to "success" and "failure";. 
(3) if possible the objectives should be stated in forms 
which are measurable, so that the extent of their 
success may be assessed. 
1.14 If these three preconditions are not met, the principle of 
experimentation has been neglected; it will be impossible to carry out any 
effective comparison of strategies, and a choice from amongst them would 
virtually be a random selection. If the effectiveness of a new fertiliser 
were being tested the planning procedures to ensure that objective results 
could be attained would be obvious; there does not appear to be any reason 
why planning procedures to attain the same objective assessment cannot be 
devised for field testing of more elaborate strategies, such as the 
effectiveness of a particular method of introducing credit, or a particular 
method of encouraging the adoption of a new technique. The only factor which 
makes this task more difficult is that human response to the strategy 
is the focus of attention, rather than the merely technical response of a 
crop to a fertiliser® 
1.15 Attempts to meet these three preconditions encounter varying 
degrees of difficulty, depending on the nature of the objectives and the 
strategies being tested. For example, the level of success attained by a 
strategy (or combination of strategies) to introduce a new agricultural crop 
may be more easily ascertained than the success of one seeking to increase 
the adoption or output of an existing crop, already being actively encouraged 
through a variety of measures. In the latter case it is considerably more 
difficult to attribute results specifically to the newly-introduced strategy 
(or combination of strategies). A case in point is the Vihiga Maize 
Credit Packages there it is not possible to attribute increases in hybrid 
maize output specifically to the strategy being tested (the provision of 
a combination of.jiied credit and extension supervision), rather than to 
the factors which were already contributing to increased output, such as 
the demonstration effect from already-successful innovators, of local 
fertiliser trials® 
1.16 Targets or objectives must be stated clearly and 
unambiguously; it is poor experimentation if either too many objectives 
are stated, or if they are stated in too general or idealistic terms® The 
Mbere Cotton Blocks Project was guilty of committing the former fault -
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it was difficult to see which objective of several was "being aimed at, 
while the Tetu zjl£ Club Project fell into latter trap; 
The Principle of Replication. 
ld7 Replication is the extension or reproduction of successfully 
tested strategies elsewhere, under similar conditions; it fellows the 
development of blueprints, and prototypes of the successful strategy. 
The blueprint is the documentation of the procedures used to attain the 
selected objective, while the prototype of the strategy is the final 
improved form, implemented and in operation, the teething troubles having 
been overcome. Possession of the blueprint, and the ability to observe the 
operation of the prototype, strengthen the likelihood of successful 
replication. Replication may involve increasing participation within the 
pilot area, as well as extending the .strategy to other areas. 
l.l8 The ease with which replication may be achieved can be 
exaggerated, for the follo\j"ing reasons: 
(a) it is not always easy to know at which point an experiment 
becomes ready for replication, i.e. a successful prototype 
has been developed. This is particularly true where several 
strategies have been combined in a single project, and it may 
be necessary to delay replication until it becomes possible to 
tos'c the effects of each element of the package; 
(b) it is not always easy to ensure that the area for replication 
possesses the same conditions as those of the experimental awuj 
(c) it is not always easy to separate the direct experimental 
input from the successful prototype: it is only the latter 
which is to be replicated, and not the trial and error 
processes and specialised inputs necessary for the creation 
of a successful prototype. However, there may be confusion 
between them, as, for example, in the case of wide publicity 
accorded a project: has it materially contributed to its 
success - and therefore should be replicated as part of the 
prototype - or is it just one of the special experimental 
inputs: Indeed, replications immediately succeeding experimentation 
may have to employ some of the specialised experimental inputs, 
and only after successive replications will the experimental 
costs come down to manageable levels. 
E - 19 
THE MAIZE CREDIT PACKAGE. 
'There are "two distinct parts of the maize credit package which are 
discussed separately; (l) the encouragement of hybrid maize production 
(2) the use of tied credit provision as a means of encouragement« It is 
felt that the appropriateness of the emphasis on hybrid maize is quite 
separate from the issue of whether or not the provision of tied credit was 
the right way to encourage it. Before examining these two separate issues, 
the objectives of the maize credit package are considered. 
The Objectives; 
The immediate objectives of the maize credit package have been 
variously stated ass 
1. "Promotion ofao intensification of smallholder production 
of,sa,, hybrid maize (through improved availability of seeds and fertiliser 
and demonstration of proper planting techniques) to raise yields and reduce 
total maize acreage" (2, p.2)5 
2o "To achieve self sufficiency in maize through increased yields; 
to reduce acreage for transfer to cattle and pig production" (2? p°8); 
3® maize should be encouraged only to the point of self 
sufficiency for the family. This would require about 15 bags per year 
(per farm)" (6, p03); 
4® "Its primary purpose (is) to make Vihiga Division self-
supporting in maize" (l5s P»l)$ 
5c "»» self sufficiency of the area in the production of maizeV,. 
(12, P*5)l 
These objectives need further clarification. The question of self-
sufficiency is confuseds is it envisaged that'each family will be self-sufficient, 
or that the Division as a whole will achieve self-sufficierxy through specialisation 
within the Division^ or is self-sufficiency envisaged on a x-iider or narrower 
basis than the Division^ the 8area8? Secondly, there is the question of the 
reduced acreage of maizes Is it intended to reduce the maize acreage because 
it is not profitable to produce a surplus beyond that required for self-
sufficiency however defined? This is related to the question of which alternative 
products are to accompany maize; that is the rest of the programme which so 
far has been insufficiently developed® 
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The instrumental objective of the package has been stated as; 
To create " e e. an experimental small-holder credit scheme,0»(the) loans 
to be secured by the harvest of the borrowers*' (13, P©5)* backed up by 
an intensive extension effort. 
It has already been pointed out that the practical problems of initiating 
such a scheme have led to the emergence of a marked divergence between the intended 
form of the package and its actual achievement,. The experimental features of 
the package have been lost, partly due to a failure to spell out the implications 
of the instrumental objective at an early stage. Had this been done, it would have 
become clear that there was a conflict between an experimental package, and a 
package that could be justified on grounds acceptable to the agencies chosen to 
implement the scheme. These points are discussed further below0 
The ultimate objective is also worthy of consideration; 
"optimising the level of income received by the average farmer in 
Vihiga" (14). 
The link between attaining self-sufficiency in maize requirements and 
improving the level of income in Yihiga is not elaborated upon explicitly in 
any of the documents. Nor is any attention devoted to the distributional aspects 
of the package. The stated objective of attaining self-sufficiency for each 
and every individual farmer has a clear distribution association, but there is 
no analysis of the likely outcomes of the programme and whether they are 
consistent with the distributional, intentions of the package. The alternative 
formulation - self-sufficiency through the specialisation of the few - evidently 
has a very different implication with regard to the distribution of the gains 
from the package, though in the long run it is not necessarily less equitable 
than the other approach® 
It is evident that the objectives of the maize credit scheme have been 
imprecisely specified, a deficiency stemming in part from the poor factual basis 
available to the planners, but also from their apparent disinclination to examine 
the wider implications of the project in terms of individual and overall behaviour. 
The micro aspects of the project have been poorly bonded to the macro dimensions 
of the objectivese 
The Choice of Maize; 
Three reasons appear to underlie the choice of maize: Vihiga is 
considered to be a deficit area; it is considered to possess a physical 
environment suitable for hybrid maize; and it is felt that a densely populated 
area should feed itself,, In the first place, the basis for considering Vihiga 
a deficit area has not been stated in any of the documents. 
The most satisfactory way of establishing whether a deficit exists is through 
the collection of simple market information. Possibly the Division imports 
maize from other areas to make up for a shortfall in its domestic production, 
but there is insufficient information to establish this® Sources, quantities, 
prices, and the market mechanisms which effect this are not mentioned,, It is 
possible that maize is sold at one time of the year and bought at another, and 
there would be no deficit at all if adequate maize storage facilities were 
available in Vihiga® The alternative way to calculate the deficit is from 
estimates of the consumption requirements of the population and actual 
production in the Division, but this approach raised serious problems. It 
involves a strong assumption regarding the desirable proportion of maize in 
the diet of Vihigans, and it is critically affected by the accuracy of the 
estimates of maize acreages and yields. In section II it was suggested that 
there may be a deficit estimated in this way, but the weaknesses of this method 
of estimation were also stressed. The collection of appropriate market infom-
ation is recommended to establish whether or not there is a maize deficit. 
Vihiga does appear to possess a physical environment that is well 
suited to the production of hybrid maize. What Is questionable, though, is 
the desirability of focussing so heavily on maize at the expense of other 
alternatives. 
The question of self-sufficiency is most perplexing! should a 
densely populated area feed itself? It has been argued that because Vihiga 
is a 'bedroom9 community, and Vihigans are interested in farming to satisfy 
only their food requirements, it is logical to devise a programme to encourage 
food production, enabling Vihigans to produce their food instead of purchasing 
it® However this confuses the desire to increase the availability of maize or 
other foods in the Division with the objective of achieving ibis through 
increased maize production. Apart from the question of whether it is additional 
maize or additional foods of other kinds that are needed, there Is the question 
of whether it might be cheaper to import maize in exchange for other farm produce 
than to produce it directly. It is not always worthwhile to produce all of one's 
food supply locally. The alternative of producing more of other products that 
can be exchanged on the market for maize, is generally open, and may increase 
the availability of maize more than by increased maize production. It is 
possible that there already is a substantial trade in maize between Vihiga and 
other Divisions and Districts; this may be the most economic way of obtaining 
maize for consumption. If it is to be worthwhile for Vihiga farmers to produce 
more maize8 returns to both land and labour must be attractive relative to other-
alternatives. Simple comparative return figures for alternative possible products 
do not appear to have been estimated at any stage, although they are crucial to 
farmers' desires to expand maize rather than other lines of production. Unless it 
can be established that maize offers one of the most attractive labour and land 
returns, it should not be encouraged. 
P - 22. 
If it is worthwhile to produce inaize for domestic consumption, it 
msy also he worthwhile to produce for other markets in Kenya or elsewhere, 
rather than drawing the line at local self-sufficiency0 However, once the 
local consumption market is satisfied it is to be expected that the price 
will, fall to take account of transport and other costs involved,, If export 
is involved then the price would fall to the export parity price; if the 
utilisation of maize for stock feed is contemplated then the price would be 
even lower-, What level, of production of maize - and therefore supplying 
which markets - will provide a sufficiently high return to land and labour? 
She prices -vary considerably over time and between markets0 At the moment 
local prices are said to range between Shss 70900 and Shss 30o00; the buying 
price of the liaise and Produce Board is at present about Shss 35*00°, the 
export parity price might be about Shss 20e00; the -value as stock feed 
could be as low as Shss 15®00o The range is sufficiently wide to suggest 
that at the same price level within the range alternative products will 
become more profitable s> 
There is also the question of whether all farmers should be encouraged 
to grow hybrid maize or only some; the objectives of the maize credit package 
are not sufficiently explicit as to whether Vihiga is expected to become self-
sufficient through specialisation or individual self-sufficiency on each farm,, 
At present an average of one acre of maize per farm is grown, but the 
productivity increases were envisaged as sufficiently high to allow self-
sufficiency to be achieved on a smaller acreage than at presents The loan 
for the recommended inputs for one acre of maize amounts to shs; 105a00s 
The price of maize at the time when the loan has to be repaid is apparently 
shss 30,00 or less.. Thus, at least 3o5 bags of maize are required to repay 
the loana If self-sufficiency is to be achieved, at 15 bags per family, 
18e5 'bags per acre need to be produced on the present acreage, more if the acreage 
is to be reduced0 This represents an increase of 10-12 bags per acre over the 
present mean of 6-8 bags, without reducing the acreage® This requirement is 
reduced to the extent that maize requirements per family are overestimated at 
15 bags, and to the extent that a second crop makes some contribution to the 
maize supply0 However, it is clear that very much improved husbandry techniques 
would be required to achieve individual self-sufficiency, and this requires a 
level of labour and skills which not all farmers have0 
The second formulation of the objective requires rather different 
responses,, Self-sufficiency for the Division could be achieved through a 
higher degree of specialisation (though not the creation of a. monoculture) of 
some farmers in the production of maize for sale in addition to home consumptions 
It is quite likely that some farmers in Vihiga are already doing this0 The 600-
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farmer survey show, that a minority of farmers have very high, maize yields (10 
per cent had yields over 16 hags per acre in the 1970 long rains), and a 
minority grow relatively large acreages of maize (ll per cent grew more than 
2 acres in the 1970 long rains), (l, Tables 34 and 37)® If these two groups 
coincided, and if the means for this group were 3 acres of maize and a yield 
of 18 hags per acre, a farm belonging to this group could provide sufficient 
maize to meet the subsistence requirements of 6 families (at 15 bags per 
family per year) including the farm family itself» If 16 per cent of the 
farms fell into this group, Vihiga could be self-sufficient with no maize at 
all on other farms, provided that the surplus maize could be purchased by 
those not growing maize on their own farms® In practice of course some maize 
would probably continue to be produced on most farms, for some time, reducing 
the required degree of specialisation,. The implications of this approach 
might include the need to devote more acreage on the specialising farms to 
the production of maize instead of reducing the acreage; it might also 
involve the encouragement of the specialising farms, i.e« possibly an 
acceleration of a process which is already going on® Unfortunately, there 
is very little information on the existing pattern of grain movements in the 
Division, consequently it is not possible to assess the extent to which there 
are already incentives towards specialisation in maize production® However, 
it is evident that the approach to meeting the maize deficit through the 
specialisation of a minority of farmers is a distinct alternative that would 
require very different policies on the part of the Government® 
Finally, there is the choice of hybrid rather than local or synthetic 
maize® Hybrid is not necessarily superior to local or synthetic maize varieties 
for all farmers® Hybrid maize needs a high standard of husbandry and an intensive 
use of complementary inputs to be a successful competitor to local maize® It 
may be a suitable product for skilled entrepreneurs and for those with ample 
resources® It may not be suitable for others® In 1.970, 47 per cent of all 
farmers in Vihiga grew hybrid maize, and 59 per cent tried it at one time 
or another (l, Table 23, 24)® It could be that 47 per cent Is about the 
proportion for whom it is worthwhile, (although there may still be some room 
for expansion). Perhaps the remaining 53 per cent would do better to continue 
with the local maize variety or take up synthetic maize. Synthetic maize, 
which is less demanding than hybrid maize in terms of husbandry and complementary 
inputs, and which has the advantage of meeting its own subsequent seed requirements 
appears not to have been seriously considered recently (33)• The possibility 
that for quite a large number of farmers local maize might be superior to hybrid 
maize appears not to have been considered in Vihiga SRDP discussions. It may be 
that hybrid maize has now reached most of the farms on which it is worthwhile, 
and. that it would be a more productive use of resources to turn to something else 
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that the hybrid maize "plateau" has been reached. This possibility should 
be seriously considered. 
In .summary, it is recommended that hybrid maize continue to be 
encouraged in Vihiga9 but not for all farmers and not exclusively® The extent 
to which the production of hybrid maize is to-be encouraged should be reconsidered, 
and several other products should be added quickly to accompany maize. Promotion 
of hybrid maize alone is unlikely to benefit all farmers, and even for those who 
are encouraged to grow hybrid maize it may be appropriate to combine it with 
other products; these are also in need of encouragement. It is strongly 
recommended that the active promotion of additional products of relevance 
to large numbers of farmers in Vihiga should become a central component of 
agricultural programme. These additional products could bo identified 
iai'bially through the collection of farm profitability estimates, and through 
consultations with agriculturalists familiar with Vihiga conditions, a point 
developed below. 
The P.ecorr,mended Input Package; 
The husbandry and input practices recommended in the maize credit 
package appear to be satisfactory, apart from the fact that the rates of 
application of fertiliser are substantially lower than those recommended 
by ICitale. The overestimation of acreages compensated in part for the use 
of the lower rate in the first yes.rs but in the second year acreages were 
more accurately measured and the error may have been more serious. The 
Kitale recommendation was 60 lbs, P^O^ and 75 lbs, N per acre; the loan was 
for approximately 1-6 lbs. of each per acre. This meant that low application 
rates were achieved, but it also meant that farmers may have been seriously 
misinstructed over use of fertiliser, and this could be regarded as a 
very damaging criticism, although it is possible that the economically 
efficient package dees indeed involve lower rates of application than the 
technically efficient package that might emerge in recommendationsfrom an 
agricultural research station,' This possibility should be actively 
considered. 
+ Technically efficient recommendations are often geared to maximising 
yields per acre whereas economically efficient recommendations involve maximising 
returns to other factors as well as land. 
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Questions should also be raised as to the extent to -which the 
recommended inputs are already being applied by farmers, and the extent to 
which further encouragement is needed. In the 1970 long rains, 47 P®r cent 
of Vihiga farmers were growing hybrid maize as already mentioned! 41 per 
cent were using chemical fertilisers, not necessarily both the recommended 
ones and not necessarily the recommended rates; and 20 per cent were using 
insecticidess (l, Tables 239 24s 29 and 31). Thus, both fertilisers and 
insecticides were already used by substantial numbers of farmers. The 
advisability of encouraging the extension of their use is not open to 
question9 but this has been overemphasised in some of the Vihiga documents, 
and relatively little attention has been paid to the fact that substantial 
numbers of farmers already use these inputs. Therefore it is recommended 
that the emphasis be shifted awav from the most progressive farmers who 
already use the inputs« to the less progressive farmers who do not. 
The Mechanism for Getting the Package Adopted; 
The second major issue is the use of tied supervised credit , 
provision as a means of encouraging the adoption isf l^riil tHSMtel and "the 
recommended inputs. Assuming that it is import att% tO get mere peo^e 
growing hybrid maize and using the recommended package of inputs (which is 
questionable), there are alternative methods of achieving this. Should the 
emphasis be on extension (what kind of extension?), farmer training, demon-
strations, subsidised inputs, or credit (what kind of credit?) provision5 
or on a combination of these and other alternatives? The Vihiga programme 
relies heavily on tied - credit provision and intensive extension contact 
for the few. There are also fertiliser demonstrations -which are part of a 
larger programme organised by FAO. Most of the discussion relates to the 
credit programme as there has been no opportunity to look into the extension 
programme at all fully. 
Is the provision of credit the most appropriate method of encouraging 
the further adoption of hybrid maize? It always seems to be popular with 
those who want a tangible agricultural development programmes and it seems to 
be a favourite with donors who want to spend funds. But it is rarely made clear 
what credit is, or under what conditions a lack of credit constitutes a constraint. 
The essence- of credit is that it provides an opportunity to defer payment for 
goods arid services, an opportunity which is attractive because the incurring 
of costs has to precede the receipt of revenue by the duration of the production 
and marketing processes (in agriculture a relatively long period). It is a 
cash-flow problem, a problem of timely availability of funds which gives rise 
to the need for credit, and since this is common to virtually all agricultural 
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~rocesoest it may "be inferred from the active pursuit of existing enterprises 
iYl'iiga that many cash-flow problems are somehow surmounted. Possibly the 
producer retains a larger cash balance between sale of one crop and purchase 
of the inputs for the subsequent ones; possibly he may ensure that remittances 
of non-farm income coincide with these expenditures; possibly he borrows; 
possibly he reduces consumption® However it is invalid to infer from the 
mere fact that an innovation has not been adopted, or that a higher level of 
output has not been attained that the cash-flow problem, and therefore lack 
of credit, is the operative constraint® The further information has to be 
provided that the farmer is sufficiently confident that additional resources 
will yield a positive not return in a particular use, taking due account of 
the risk and uncertainly, and that lower-cost or more attractive internal 
solutions to the cash-flow problem are not available® One reason for the 
non-provision of credit may be the lack of demand for it due to the producer's 
perception of the non-profitability of an innovations or of the non-profitability 
of an expanded level of output of a particular product3 
There are other reasons for the non-provision of credits one is the 
absence of effective security. (it has to be effective; a land title may not 
be effective security if it is unlikely that the creditor will be permitted to 
dispossess the owner in the event of non—repayment)« Generally credit of the 
Mse©$,-tisne to harvest" type - i®e® tc meet current outgoings3 not capital 
salami® - requires little ig, the way of security9 but much in the way of 
efficient adtai4e&8tTaiiSfte Security is confidence, and reputation is the 
eomreatianal guide to confidence where there is no history of credit repayment. 
But this can only be put to effective use if there is an intricate network of 
credit agencies capable of assessing credit—worthiness. 
Another explanation of the apparent absence of credit-provision is 
that there is no market for it - not simply that there is no demand for it, 
but that there is no demand at commercial rates» and therefore no incentive 
for the creation of the network of outlets necessary to establish the optimal 
allocation of available funds. This brings the argument back to the profitability 
of the enterprises which could potentially be users of credit. Due to the many 
alternative uses of funds the provision of credit to a particular use is not 
without its costs; the concept of free or subsidised credit is a distortion of 
reality, and is certainly not replicable on a national level. It is a moot 
point that where a network of credit agencies has not become established the 
subsidisation of credit provision may be an appropriate measure, but such a 
subsidy should be directed towards the lender^ not the borrower, if a replicable 
scheme is to be developed*, Prom the above discussion the following conclusion 
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emerges? the provision of credit in Vihiga is justified if it is directed to 
those producers for -whom the cash-flow problem Is the principal reason for not 
taking up hybrid maize and for whom hybrid maize production is sufficiently 
profitable after allowing for the cost of the credits It goes without saying 
that if the immediate objective is the increased adoption of hybrid maize then 
it should go to the producers in this category who have not yet grown hybrid 1.:.. 
maize0 This may not be necessary if the objective is simply to increase the 
production of maizec 
There is a second justification of the provision of credits if the 
constraint is the lack of appropriate husbandly skills, and the strategy to 
make good this deficiency is intensive extension supervision, it may improve 
the impact of this input if credit is also offered. It is argued that credit 
provides the excuse to concentrate on a few farms, that it gives an entree 
into the farms and a means of putting pressure on the farmers, and that it 
raises the morale of the extension officials and farmers involved. These 
may be sufficient grounds for ignoring the requirements of the preceding 
justification^ and giving credit where there is in fact no credit constraint. 
In addition to the increased impact of the extension services achieved in this 
way, there are also benefits to be derived from the fact that the credit provided 
probably displaces other funds and permits their allocation to other uses® So 
the second conclusion is that the provision of credit in Vihiga is justified 
if it is directed to those producers selected as being likely to benefit most 
from intensive extension supervision, i 9e. those for whom the principal constraint 
in the production of hybrid maize is the lack of the appropriate knowledge, and 
who are likely to respond to the "bribe". 
There is no evidence to show that either justification of the provision 
of credit guided action in Vihiga. The absence of any profitability estimates 
regarding the adoption or increased production of hybrid maize has been remarked 
upon already 8 so those for x^ hom the lack of credit was a constraint could not 
be identified. Credit was obtained by some who would not be regarded as experiencing 
a shortage of internal funds - though that in itself is not positive proof that 
they do not "need" the credit, since it is in the nature of things that "when 
individual's command over resources is limited the offer of more, particularly 
when it is free, is rarely refused. However, it is quite clear that some of 
those qualifying for credit had already adopted hybrid maize and were already 
applying the recommended practicesj their inclusion in the scheme is certainly 
not justified on the grounds of their need to obtain the extension supervision., 
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The inevitability of this outcome is discussed below, in the course of examining 
the details of the schemee 
The type of credit chosen for Vihiga is short-term "seed-time to harvest", 
and it is tied to the purchase of specified inputs® The implications of this choice 
should be considered,. Firstly there is the assumption that the constraint is the 
absence of funds to meet current outgoings, and not to purchase capital assets 
(storage facilities, for example)® The implication is that such an injection 
would have to be repeated annually, but in fact this issue was never discussed. 
Indeed it may be that the rationale underlying the project was to permit the 
producer to raise his productivity to a new higher level which would permit him 
to be self-sufficient after the first injection. If this were the case it may 
well justify the provision of credit at less than commercial rates, and this 
arrangement might be replicable over the whole country, a small area at a time. 
It is strongly recommended that this issue be given consideration, in order to 
establish whether the credit should be provided on non-commercial terms (as in 
the first year when no charge was made) or commercial + terms (as in the second 
year). 
Secondly, it is tied to material inputs of specified types (as well 
as to intensive supervision), and is not available to finance other current 
expenses such as t h e hiring of labour. These complementary inputs have to be 
found and paid for hy the farmer himself® This reveals the implicit objective 
of the project, and the particular interpretation of the resource endowment of 
the areas 
Its purpose is to "benefit farmers with a surplus of family labour 
but with insufficient funds at planting time to purchase..... 
seed, fertiliser, and insecticide" (l6, p.l). 
It should be pointed out that the original proposal by Harmon 
(US AID) included labour as eligible for credit5 this was later ignored or 
dropped® 
Thirdly, the loan is in kind but repayment has to be in cash implying 
that at least part of the crop must be sold for cash, or cash must be diverted 
from other uses to repay the loan. This conflicts with the idea of individual 
self-sufficiency and nil dependence on a local maize market, but not with the 
idea of self-sufficiency for the Division through individual specialisation. 
+ Strictly speaking^ less than commercial terms! there were apparently 
no attempts to cost the exercise or to compare interest rates with those 
determined under commercial conditions® 
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Fourthly, the concept of a growing crop as security for a loan is 
self—contradictory § the crop must he consumed or sold, and either way the 
security can disappear while the obligation to repay remains. Only if the 
crop is marketed through a parastatal authority is control retained when the 
crop is disposed of on the market? and only then can the crop he employed as 
security against a loan. Under these conditions a broadly—based credit 
scheme is possible, paying little attention to selection criteria, but even 
then there are problems of black markets. and what to do if output fails. 
However, in the Vihiga case no control is maintained over the marketing of 
the crop; consequently alternative means of enforcing or encouraging repayment 
are required. To this mistaken view of the security offered by a growing crop 
may be attributed the restriction of the credit scheme to producers who satisfied 
fairly stringent and restrictive criteria, and the emergence of a group of 
recipients for a proportion of x-jhom the provision of credit appeared to be 
justified on neither of the grounds discussed above. The minimum maize acreage 
requirement of two acres eliminated a large proportion of Vihiga farmers from 
the schemes only 61 per cent of the farms have a total acreage of two or more 
acresj and only 13 per cent grew two acres or more of maize in the 1970 rains 
(ij. Tables 13? 34)« Some farmers may have been able to increase their maize 
acreages and therefore qualify for inclusion, but for the vast majority the 
two acre minimum must have been either uneconomic or physically impossible„ 
P. Moock pointed out that "The average self-declared farm size of loan 
recipients is nearly seven acres*.ec" (32, p.5)® Among the 22 farmers 
selected in the first year from outside the 60C~farmer sample were one chief, 
two sub-chiefs, three AAs, and several teachers and traders. In the second 
year both the selection procedures and the outcome of the selection process 
were criticised by P. Moock. The sub-chiefs and the AA's were supposed to 
publicise the fact that loan applications would be received from anyone 
wishing to apply, and to make known the days on which loan applications 
would be accepted at the locational or divisional offices, but according to 
Koock few farmers knew of the yearns programme or the opportunity to apply 
for loansj let alone the particular days on which applications could be made. 
Among those selected were several "farmers who clearly do not suffer from any 
financial constraint in the purchase of maize inputs, (and who are not) in our 
opinion,»e«®®o in most need of the intensive supervision extended to credit 
recipients" (19, p.l). wlvo Moockfls impression was that a number of sub-chiefs, 
and some AAs as well, exercised their discretion about who should be informed« 
Considerable screening also apparently took place at an informal level before 
applications were presented to the formal committees„ 
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As would he expected from the great selectivity of the scheme as it 
was implemented a high proportion of the loan recipients had already adopted 
many of the hybrid maize recommendations. 
"Of the 56 farmers who signed loan agreements and (were among the 600 
initially surveyed); 
(i) os 79 per cent had already adopted hybrid maize 
(ii) ., 61 per cent grew hybrid maize in the 1970 Long Rains 
(iii) .a j0 per cent were already using chemical fertilisers 
on hybrid maize 
(iv) .• IS per cent were already using D.D.T. on hybrid maize" 
(16, P°2) 
Fifthly, in the first year of the scheme no attempt was made to 
recoup any part of the cost of the provision of credit, but in the second 
year this was amended to an interest charge of 12 per cent per annum (lS. p.2). 
Fossibly this reflected the conflict of views on subsidised credit noted above; 
"The provision cf loans o»» must be recognised as necessarily 
containing a large element of Government subsidy. (Stops should 
be taken to ensure that it) does not amount to a waste of public 
funds" (16, P.2) 
"Subsidisation of credit is not recommended £eo3VlSe^it tends to 
produce an enterprise that may not be able to stand on its'Own 
feet" (17, p.40 A donor report!) 
The earlier discussion suggested that subsidisation of credit was a 
wrong strategy where annually repeated injections wore envisaged, on the grounds 
that such a strategy was not replicable on a national level, but that there 
might be a place for it if a once-and-for-all injection could lift the producer 
permanently onto a sounder economic footing, having implemented the other part 
of the package. However, just as the question of whether the injection should 
be repeated or not was never thoroughly examined, neither was the issue of the 
subsidy element in the loan - ignoring for the moment the even greater subsidy 
involved in the intensive supervision. This issue is directly related to the 
concept of credit-worthiness, which, as one of the selection criteria, has taken 
on considerable significance. Ideally it should mean "worthy of receiving credit 
that is, being rated a low risk of non-payment. In deciding who qualify there 
is obviously .in inherent bias in favour of the already-successful, and against 
1"he mtpntiall.V'--sncc^ D2f>xl producer if creditworthiness is the tost. However, 
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the choice of the "non-progressive" and the low productivity producer as the 
target of the scheme does not necessarily imply that non-creditworthiness 
(i.eo the likelihood that the producer will default) should become the 
criterion; instead it requires the introduction of a procedure which will 
identify the potentially - creditworthy among the present "non-progressive" 
and low productivity producers. So again the critical issue is the producer's 
view of the profitability in use of the inputs and the husbandry skills 
provided by the package. However, if the credit is subsidised then there 
will be a distortion of the profitability of the crop and more will be 
encouraged to grow it than market cost/return relationships allow, is pointed 
out already, if the credit is a one-shot "funds for take-off" type which will 
not be repeated in subsequent years then the distortion will not be considered 
and those who are on the margin of profitability will presumably revert to 
traditional crops and practices in the subsequent season. But if the provision 
of subsidised credit is to be a permanent feature of the production system the 
distortion may become considerable, and the production of high-cost hybrid maize 
become a problem to be encountered in the future. It has also been pointed that 
the continuous provision of subsidised credit is a non-replicable strategy, and 
therefore inconsistent with the principles of SRDP. 
A final comment is due on the failure to see credit as only one of a 
number of alternative ways of encouraging the adoption of a hybrid maize package. 
It would appear that the alternatives, such as different types of extension,. 
demonstrations, farmer training, production grants, have not been considered, 
still less subjected to experimentation. A discussion of alternatives was 
initiated by Harmon, but appears not to hav^ been taken seriously by anyone 
else responsible for the development of the Vihiga programme. The exclusive 
concentration on credit provision may explain the reluctance to amend the 
scheme in the light of the results of the performance in the first year, 
despite signs of apparent ineffectiveness of credit cf the type provided. 
Of the 76 farmers whose applications to receive credit were approved, 63 
used the credit - two refused the loan after signing, six received inputs 
but invoices were not submitted by the stockists for repayment, and for the 
remaining five the reason was not known. The repayment rate as of May 1972 
was 72 per cent (31, p»l)?a low figure despite the fact that the loan was 
interest free; in October 1971s after the harvest when the loan was to have 
been repaid;, the repayment rate was only 2(6 per cent (15, p«6). To this may 
be linked the fact that the actual increase in yields attributable to the 
application of the package may not have been very large, though it is 
difficult to be conclusive in this.respect. Yields of first year recipients 
ranged from 11 to 33 bags per acre, averaging 21 bags; yields achieved without 
credit by an admittedly non-representative group of "progressive" farmers 
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surveyed "by P. Moock, the Area Evaluator5 averaged 18 bags per acre using the 
two fertilisers recommended8 and 16 bags using only one of them® It is signif-
icant that five of this group used local seed plus nitrogen,top-dressing and 
achieved an average of 19 bags per acre (32, Po5)« Of course., it may be 
appropriate to argue that the poor improvement in yields which can be attributed 
to the credit package was a direct result of the selection criteria-picking out 
producers who were already growing hybrid maize fairly wello However8 that does 
not then permit the conclusion that had the ^ on-progressive'' producers been 
selected their yields would have reached these levels0 It is likely that producers 
already involved in hybrid maize found it profitable, and had no serious difficulty 
in finding the appropriate complementary inputs; it has yet to 'be established 
that this is true of the producers who are not involved in the credit scheme 
at the moments or of the so-called "non-progressives"o The lack of success of 
xhe maize credit scheme.to date underlines the need to develop the experimental 
nature of the programme, and, if hybrid maize has still to be encouraged, to 
test other strategies for encouraging Its adoption., The fact that there is 
some evidence that neighbours of farmers in the credit scheme have adopted the 
whole of the package without credit suggests that, apart from the obvious point 
that for them the constraint was not credit, there may be a role for simple 
demonstrations as a means of encouraging those who feel that hybrid maize is 
profitable to commence production® In addition it is also questionable whether 
the distribution of extension advice was the optimal ones the considerable extra 
burden which the extension staff has to bear in servicing the loan recipients,. 
many of whom patently do not need their services, must have been ^  the- expense1 
of applying their.skills elsewhere® It has been said that the Vihiga extension1 
services,were so under-utilised before that the other farmers are not losing 
anything, and the introduction of the credit.scheme has mobilised this resource; 
howevers the opportunity cost of this particular allocation of their time should 
be assessed not in relation to what they once did, but what they could now be 
doing instead® 
A principal conclusion is that considerable lessons can be learned 
from the experience since the inception of the maize credit package„ It is 
vitally important that the lack of success in terms of the objective of the 
project is not made a justification for writing off this experience, even if 
the project itself is discontinued® It is better to learn from experience 
than,to discard the project and pick up another in which the same errors are 
rnade^, once more to no avail. The following are suggested as topics for carefully 
considered reflection on the Vihiga experience; 
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Ho strategy can be blamed for wrong selection of the objective of a 
project - the profitability of maize production has to be examined, 
the appropriate level of production of maize for Yihiga selected, 
the group of producers considered to be the target identified,.and 
the availability of complementary inputs, in particular labours 
within that group verified. 
Much of the experimental nature of.SRDP stems from the,willingness. 
to consider a number of strategies, and combinations of strategies, 
rather than to depend on a single change agent. Though much of the 
foregoing discussion has centred on credit - since this was the 
chosen strategy - the possibility of using various strategies 
simultaneously within a particular area in a way designed to 
establish which are the most suitable for replication should not be 
overlooked. The use of a variety of measures necessitates careful 
experimental design in order to be able to ascribe results to particular 
strategies. In the project as.it is currently implemented it is not 
possible to establish whether credit or the extension advice which 
is given to credit recipients is the more effective. 
The choice of the provision of financial assistance should be seen 
to emerge frpm the identification of a short-run or long-run cash-
flow problem, which in turn nec?9ssj,|l#te» an examination of the. 
present "internal" sOu3»c6S. of. funds for the purchase of inputs, and 
principal expenditure flows which might compete with agricultural uses. 
It may be necessary to reconsider lending money to enable producers 
to hire labours 
The need for loaned funds having been established and the potential 
recipients identifieds the next consideration is. the choice whether 
to create what might ultimately become a permanent facility through 
which credit or other types of loans would be offered, or provide 
one-shot "take-off" injections of finance. This would include a 
review of the most appropriate repayment schedules, in the light 
also of (3) above0 
The final area of choice concerns the alternative ways of introducing 
the loaned funds into the production system, bearing in mind that if 
the ultimate requirement is,a fairly permanent; credit structure 
adequate effective security, not to mention administrative competence, 
is required. Should it be',flannelled directly to the producers over 
whom, in. the case of maize, there are no sanctions in the event of 
non-repayment, or should rfc be provided via the marketing or input 
supply commercial channels, over whom there may be a greater degree 
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of control? Even if credit extended to input stockists was not passed 
on to the producer the availability of supplies of inputs might well 
be improved® Indeed the improvement of commercial services cornplernentary 
to agricultural production would have important consoquences in that 
sectore 
OTHER COMPONENTS OP THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PROGRAMME. 
One of the serious problems with the Vihiga agricultural production 
programme is its emphasis on a single product , hybrid maize. It .lias certainly 
been the intention throughout that other products will be added, but in the 
third year- cf the programme, 1972/73 , the only product that is being added to 
maize as an SRDP activity is tea. Other products under discussion or somewhere 
in the process of planning include cattle, vegetables, poultry and pigs, but 
none of these has yet reached the final planning stage. The failure to develop 
additional production programmes, and the limited range of alternatives presently 
under discussion are sources of considerable concern. In 1970 Harmon stressed 
the need for simple farm profitablity estimates to enable the development of a 
broader programme.. At that time it.was understandable that these estimates did 
not exist, but now, two years later, there is less excuse for these figures still 
not being available. Given the crucial importance of farm profitability calculations 
to assist in the selection of additional products for the agricultural programme, 
it Is disturbing to note that 110 attempt has been made to start collecting this 
information0 Substantial quantities of survey data have been collected in the 
600 farmer survey, but no parallel exercise has been undertaken to provide farm 
management information. It is recommended as a matter of urgency that attempts 
:c -lade ';Omistart collecting simple fsirm management information^ perha'DS with the 
assistance of the Farm Management Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture, which is 
just starting a national recording system for similar purposes. 
In addition to farm profitability estimates, there is a need for further 
discussion with agricultural scientists familiar with the Vihiga environment to 
see if there are any additional products that might be worth developing. The 
current discussion is confined to the products listed early in the planning of 
the Vihiga programme. There is a need to widen the range of alternative products 
under discussion«, This should be done with the assistance of agricultural 
scientists and those involved in the collection of farm management information® 
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Among the products under discussion at presentg none looks promising 
for more than, a small group of farmers with above average entrepreneurial skills, 
and above average resources of other kinds. There are the farmers also eligible 
for the maize credit package. There is little indication that any of the production 
programmes currently under discussion will help the majority of Vihigans. Unless 
the majority is consciously planned for, it does not look as if SRDP will be 
significantly different from what has gone before in emphasising the small 
minority of well—endowed farms and leaving the majority alone. 
There are some problems with the proposals for tea and dairy cattle, 
and with those for other products that are at earlier stages of planning. 
However, the main criticisms are those given above; many others are similar 
to those already spelled out for the maise credit package; for example, to 
encourage the development of tea through the provision of credit again ignores 
the labour problem* It is not intended to pursue any further evaluation of 
the other individual production projects in this paper. 
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EVALUATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ABRANGEMEMTS 
FOR MARKETING AID CREDIT 
The following comments are directed at the institutional arrangements 
chosen to he the vehicle for the provision of credit to selected maize farmers. 
Earlier in the report it was pointed out that the information available on the 
institutional framework of the Vihiga economy is limited, and this is now 
discussed in relation to the marketing arrangements. The central theme of this 
section is that the maize credit package has not been grafted onto the existing 
,arket structure; instead it forms an over-lay largely independent of the local 
marketing system® For this reason it may be a less efficient system than one 
which uses existing marketing resources to the full. 
CUTLIKE CF THE INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE 
The institutional arrangements chosen for the provision of credit to 
maize producers in Vihiga involve selected existing stockists of agricultural 
Inputs as agents of the Government rather than as profit-maximising enterprises 
in their own righto This results from the nature of the credit instruments or 
"Authority to Incur Expenditure", issued to successful loan applicants, which 
entitles them to specified quantities of hybrid maize seed, fertiliser, and 
insecticide up to maximum monetary value free of charge© On being presented 
with this document the stockist is expected to supply these inputs to the farmer. 
He then submits signed invoices for the inputs supplied to A.F.C. Kakam,§ga for 
verification, and repayment is subsequently made through the A.F.6.-Office in 
Nairobi. The administrative tirnelag which results from this procedure means,that 
the stockist is obliged to provide free credit to the producer (or to A.F.C., 
depending on how one looks at it) between supplying' the inputs and receiving 
payment from the AoF.C. In the first year of the scheme„ 1970/71, the 
producer was not required to pay interest on this credit, but in the second 
year a charge of one per cent per month was introduced. But although the 
credit is provided by the stockist until he is paid for the inputs - at which 
time the A.P.O.. effectively makes.a loan to the producer - none of this interest 
payment accrues to the stockist, even though it is charged for the entire period 
between the producer accepting.the conditions of the scheme and receiving the 
authority to incur expenditure,and repaying to the 4.F.C. It is little wonder 
that some stockists refused to honour the authority, and complained.that the 
time taken to effect payment (apparently 30 to 60 days) tied up their limited 
capital for an excessively long period of time (15, p.6). 
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The selection process, and the means whereby the stockists obtained 
supplies do not appear to have been discussed at alio The incentive to encourage 
stockists to take part in the scheme is presumably the potentially higher level 
of sales of the iaputs which they could realise, though this can/Se^chieved 
through the carrying of a higher level of stocks; it^Lsnot clear whether these 
are obtained on cash or credit terms® If they were responsible fotr obtaining 
these additional stocks on cash terms then their availability of capital would 
be an important factor influencing both their willingness to participate and 
their degree of co-operation. Presumably proximity to the participants in the 
scheme was also an important consideration, rather than other characteristics 
of the stockists such as efficiency or size. It appears, however, that their 
co-operation involves a modification of.their normal commercial behaviours in 
the first year of the.scheme "the total value of the loan was calculated at 
standard input prices, but as there are apparently no list prices for fertiliser 
supplied in small lots up-country, there was substantial variation in the prices 
charged by different stockists. Although this may be a normal characteristic 
of the inputs market, it was considered to be a deficiency of the scheme since 
it meant that lower application rates resulted for those producers who were 
obliged to purchase inputs at higher prices than those at which the credit 
requirement had been calculated. (The fact that input price variation alters 
the economically-optimal package appears to have been overlooked)o Therefore 
in the second year stockists were expected to supply inputs at specified prices, 
Irrespective of cost differences and variation in profit rates among different 
types of fertiliser. 
Howevers there appears to be room for improvement in the service 
provided by the stockists. Some appear to have little knowledge of the 
appropriate fertiliser application rates (15, p.9-)9 and the apparently wide 
range of bag.sizes and fertiliser analyses is probably an inefficient mix. 
nevertheless, where co-operation is sought it is inappropriate to endeavour to 
make good these deficiences by edict rather than through the creation of the 
necessary incentives * It is 'understandable that stockists were not happy about 
participation in a scheme which showed such disregard for their interests. 
THE EXISTING MARKETING STRUCTURE. 
In suggesting fuller participation by the existing marketing institutions^ 
it is recognised that planners are handicapped by the limited amount of information 
which appears to be available on these institutions. There are apparently several 
different types of participants in the Vihiga marketing structure for agricultural 
inputs and outputs; (l) agents of the Maize and Produce Board; (2) shopkeepers 
who buy maize, store it, and sell it in Vihiga again; (3) input stockists*'4) coffee 
cooperatives® 
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(1) The agents of the I'aize and Produce Board are supposed to step into 
maize market to purchase at the Board buying price (the floor price) when 
there is a surplus of maize® However-, it is frequently stated that Vihiga is 
a maize-deficit area, and that the role of the Board is therefore very limited 
in this respecto In 1971 no maize wastblivered to the Board and according to 
the Beard this is the normal position. If the area is a deficit area, the 
Maize and Froduce Board might be expected to meet the deficit by selling 
maize in Vihiga once a ceiling price is reached. There is little evidence 
of the Maize and Produce Board9s activities in this respect, although one 
would not normally expect them to use their buying agents for the sales. 
(2) The shopkeepers who buy maize, store it, and sell it again perform 
two functions-. They provide a ready cash market for the crop at harvest, 
when cash requirements are apparently high, and they store the maize crop 
until it is required for consumption, at which time it commands a premium 
reflecting the,producer's desire for ready cash, the cost of storage, losses 
during storage, and the cost (including transport) of obtaining supplies from 
elsewhere when necessary® Apart from that there is little information on , 
their functions® It is not clear whether all farmers sell at harvest time, 
whether those who sell buy back later, or how the flows go® Nor is it clear 
whether,the price differential would be reduced by.the provision of more 
storage;, either at shops or on farms. Furthermore, it is not clear whether 
they would benefit or suffer from a substantial increase in maize output. 
These questions require investigation® 
(3) As has been pointed out above the role of the input stockists is 
an important one but very-little analytical work appears to have been carried 
out; indeed there Is a paucity of information even of a descriptive .kind -
how many stockists are there, how big are they in terms of turnover, how many 
customers does each have, what are the capital requirements of their businesses, 
with which other activities in the agricultural or commercial sector.are they 
integrated? Few of these questions can be answered, and therefore little can 
be said about the determinants of their performance. It would appear that 
since their function is to derive a living at least partially from the sale of 
agricultural inputs they are potentially in a position to both estimate 
the probable extent of the market for fertiliser, and identify those 
producers who are considered to be worthy of credit e Indeed they may already 
provide inputs on credit, but it is open to question whether they can adopt 
a more risky policy of identifying the potentially creditworthy, rather than 
those who are already successful, and therefore good risks. 
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(4) An existing marketing channel vJiich provides some of the envisaged 
functions such as credit and input provision is the coffee co-operatives9 
which should be mentioned as an alternative form of institution which may 
have a role to play in the development of the maize package. There are four 
such co-operativesj concentrated, naturally 9 in the coffee producing part of 
the Division. At least one of them already provides hybrid maize inputs as 
an alternative to cash for coffee deliveries. Howeverv in relation to the 
large indebtedness of members to the co-operatives and in turn the indebtedness 
of the,co-operatives to the co-operative union, and the very low sales per 
member, the following comments were mades 
"000 it would appear the existing co-operatives are not financially 
capable and do not have satisfactory management to handle the 
business of making and collecting loans now or in the near future. 
The societies have a bad reputation of losing the members8 money, 
something most.undesirable for a society making loans;©r accepting 
deposits." (l5» p®l6). 
Both their location and their own internal, problems make them dubious channels 
for the maize project, but there are lessons to be learned from their experiences 
It would be extremely useful to have a more detailed knowledge of how 
the Vihiga agricultural marketing structure operates.. To what extent is the 
provision of inputs an integral part of the crop marketing arrangements? Are 
inputs already financed by credit against the maize crop? The- Division is said 
to be a deficit areas as we pointed out in Section II additional marketing 
information would establish whether this is so. Are additional supplies 
channelled into the area? At what prices? When and where from? How are 
fertilisers supplied to the area at present? And so on. 
THE ENVISAGED MARKETING STRUCTURE. 
The eventual, enlargement of the scheme to include very many more 
farmers (600 in 1972/73 and 6,000 eventually) is intended to be accompanied 
by the development of new cooperative societies (15* p«12). This proposal 
implicity rejects the present marketing structure for this purpose, without 
seriously considering the reasons for which it is inadequate. The only 
justification for new cooperatives seems to be the .usual textbook argument 
which presumes the instantaneous and cost-less creation ?f an efficiently 
managed a#d versatile structure providing credit, inputs, savings bank 
functions, crop storage and marketing services -.all the services 'necessary3 
for the up-take of the production scheme which the farmers are unable to 
provide themselves® No attempt has been made to cost this proposal® It is 
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interesting to note that the principal comments made about the inadequacies 
of the present market structure relate to its poor performance as,an instrument 
for the provision of the inputs under the maize production scheme, hut as has 
been pointed out there is no evidence that the functions the marketing system 
was required to perform in this respect were commercially oriented in the 
first place. 
In the absence of any critical evaluation of the existing marketing 
system it is not possible to assess the merits of the proposed new cooperative 
structure®. The functions which it is expected to perform are comprehensive 
(15» p«14)» hut there is no indication of the steps necessary for the creation 
of such a structurej the resources that are required, and the management 
organisation necessary for its efficient operation® The proposal appears not 
to have benefitted from the experience of the coffee societies in Vihiga, and 
others elsewhere attempting to organise marketing and provision of credit and 
inputs on a cooperative basis® There is an implicit assumption that the 
injection of funds, and a small amount of supervision,from the is-
sufficient to engender a strong spirit of cooperation, and an unlimited 
supply of mangerial talent from among the farmers themselves® The words of 
caution in an earlier donor report appear to have gone unheeded; 
"For some reason developing countries are always excited by the idea 
(of cooperatives)® Theoretically, they appear to be such a simple 
and practical solution to their problems® It is enough to look at 
their record® Even in countries where qualified managers are 
available and where farmers are sophisticated, it has not been good® 
6®« The Vihiga Program makes reference to 'organising farmers9 to 
do various things, but current evidence is that they resist this® 
Their past experience with, such organisations as the Coffee 
Societies provide ample reason for them to be wary® The F.A.O. 
Fertiliser Program has had no success in organising groups in the 
Division to purchase fertiliser and maize seed® The reason for 
this needs further study before attempting to create marketing or 
purchasing cooperatives", (l?, pp.37,38). 
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It is not, of course, assumed on an a prioribasis that cooperatives 
are the wrong form of marketing organisation® The principal point of the 
argument is that too little attention has been devoted to,the mechanisms 
Involved in the creation of a completely new organisation, and that too 
little consideration has been given to the possibility that the development 
of the existing marketing structure, possibly including existing co-operatives, 
might provide a cheaper and more efficient alternative to the creation of a 
new one* 
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EXPERIMENTATION IN MARKETING. 
Although the approach adopted to problems of marketing inputs and 
outputs has displayed certain novel features, none can he attributed directly 
to a desire to experiment® Indeed, the novel features appear to emanate from 
a reluctance,to devote effort to the analysis of the existing, institutional 
arrangements, and a reluctance to design the package in such a way as to 
involve the intricate system of suppliers, and marketing intermediaries 
which appear to exist in Vihiga. Par.from attempting to employ appropriate 
incentives to encourage the desired conduct and performance of these institutions, 
the adopted approach has been to regard them either.as an adjunct of the „ 
extension services, to T?ehave in accordance with Government direction (or, more 
correctly, expectation), or as redundant institutions, to be replaced at the 
earliest convenience by totally new structures to perform their functions® 
(1) Inputss It has already been pointed out that stockists of inputs 
were obliged to carry the burden of part of the credit extended ^  the producer, 
due to the administrative organisation of loan financing. They were also expected 
to stock the appropriate inputs, and charge uniform prices. They were expected 
DO bear the risk of financial loss if the increase in demand for inputs did not 
materialise. The "experimentation" may therefore be identified as the dependence 
on the goodwill, rather than the commercial judgement, of the stockists in 
question. The economics of supplying inputs is nowhere analysed® 
(2) Outputs? The lack of attention devoted to any analysis of.the maize 
marketing system in Vihiga is regrettable as this .could have firstly, quantified 
flows and prices necessary for planning, purposes; and secondly, identified, 
functions and performance of different types of intermediaries, and the kinds 
of obstacles which they encounter. In turn this could have led to the package 
being directed to a more-appropriate group of producers, and to incentives being 
built into it to guarantee the supply of supporting services in the marketing 
field. Analysis of this area could have provided, clear evidence as to the 
overall desirability of a maize programme in the first instance. 
An explicit form of experimentation would of course be involved in 
the replacement of the existing marketing- framework with some new cooperative 
body performing its functions® The trouble with.this proposal is that it lacks 
any evaluation of its likely success on the basis of available:managerial resources 
and expected levels of member discipline. It is an experiment insufficiently 
checked as to likely success or failure in the first place® 
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The adoption of a more experimental approach with regard to the use 
of the existing market structure is recommended. This could have two functions; 
firstly to indicate the most appropriate type of production programme required 
in Vihiga? and secondly to act as a commercial vehicle for bringing innovative 
packages to the producer. It has already been pointed out that the understanding 
of the present structure,of the market in Vihiga is very limited. However, if 
this were to be improved, and the various intermediaries in marketing and input 
provision employed as a source of the requisite.information on product and input 
flows - instead of relying, as so often happens, on the producer to provide all 
the necessary information - then it might become possible to talk more meaning-
fully about the "maize market" in Vihiga, and to identify opportunities to be 
exploited (such as marked differences in supply and demand conditions between 
areas within Vihiga leading to different recommendations regarding increased 
and decreased production of maize), or bottlenecks to be removed. A lack of 
storage facilities may be an important issue, and one in which existing 
intermediaries have a vested interest; possibly there is scope for longer-term 
loans to them for the provision of storage, the organisation of which could 
incorporate a producer credit scheme, if such were to be necessary following 
the emergence of a more rational price profile during the year. 
In the same way as the maize credit scheme encourages producers to 
respond to the incentive of credit by adopting hybrid maize, the improvement 
cf the various services offered by the intermediaries could be effected by the 
introduction of a system of incentives operating in their part of the market. 
The provision of credit to input stockists through the fertiliser market or 
the hybrid seed market could be a welcome development; its effects could be 
various? extension of credit to producers, improvement in the stocks of inputs 
available to the farmer, or cost reductions and improved efficiency in the 
distribution of these requisites are some of the possibilities. Indeed there 
may even be scope for trying out subsidised inputs to test the effects of the 
existing overall marketing organisation for fertilisers and seeds. It is also 
likely that any measures which heighten the degree of competition in the local 
market between intermediaries are likely to benefit the producer;.on the other 
hand it might be possible to devise measures to bying about a reduction in the 
number of participants in this part of the market, and the amalgamation of 
particular functions (such as maize buying and input provision) in order to 
foster the development of normal trade credit, and in turn a more prosperous 
commercial component of the area which would be attractive to financial 
institutions. It may also be possible to.explore experimental ways of 
bringing these functions closer to those of the Maize and Produce Board, 
whose involvement in Vihiga appears to be of peripheral importance at the moment. 
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A particularly simple development might "be the organisation of the 
provision of market information to the producers and to the. intermediaries; 
that a system of sorts exists is undeniables reports of considerable amounts 
-Qf: maize being sold green from the field, and much early mature maize being 
taken to markets at some distance by taxi in 1971•suggests that there is 
already a fair flow of market information. The question concerns its adequacy. 
The idea of involving the marketing and the input-supplying inter-
mediaries is not altogether new; the. local maize speculators have already been 
proposed as a group which could become the channel for credit offered by the 
K.F.Ac (18). However, as long as the objective remains to increase the output 
of maize, it may be necessary to seriously question the compatibility of bhe 
three functions they are envisaged as performing - maize speculation, supplying , 
fertiliser, and supplying credit. A sulsst^ tltal increase in the output of maize, 
brought about through increased adoption of hybrid maize and increased utilisation 
of fertiliser bought on credit, could upset the balance struck at the moment 
between the level of output and the speculative function. If there were no 
floor in the market, both the post-harvest price and the end-of==season price 
would fall — the former more than the latter if there was a shortage of storage 
facilities — and the speculative earnings would remain the same. But since there 
is a floor in the market made effective by the Maize and Produce Board purchasing 
maize when the price reaches the intervention level, the outcome might be a very 
much reduced turnover for the speculators, and a narrower price range throughout 
the season as the Board would be required to perform the storage and resale 
function provided by the speculators.' Therefore if the Maize and Produce Board 
were to become of-more importance in the maize market in Vihiga, it would be at 
the expense of the present maize speculators - they would therefore oppose this 
trend by refusing to encourage a substantial increase in maize output* The 
alternative would be that they would be forced tc keep the price above the floor 
by competing wi^h the Board.for supplies, but this could lead them into an over-
bought position, the end-of-season price would, reflect thSfe (due to the need to 
find other markets at that time) and a drop in price would lead to a diminished 
economic performance by the speculators. 
A further sensible experiment would be identify the principal local 
and more distant markets for agricultural produce, to collect price information 
on a range of crops, those already grown in Vihiga and these not, and ascertain 
the extent to which there is an untapped market for Vihiga produce at these prices, 
This in turn implies an ability to evaluate the profitability to both the producer 
and. the merchant of a particular line. .There may well be opportunities to -x- tion-
nlise the organisation of these markets, even providing existing intermediaries 
with incentives to extend their functions beyond their present range. 
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HECOMMETOTIQNS 
There arc many recommendations implicit in this report; only the most 
important are listed here* As far as Vihiga is concerned it would appear that 
those mvolyed in the planning process are either out of touch with the principles 
and objectives: of SJUDoP*, or too willing to relinquish control over the design 
of a projec"'s,leaving,it to the donor. The need for outside financial assistance 
may well he pressing, hut there is a clear divergence of interest between., the 
Kenya Government in S^RJ^Pc and the normal objectives of donors. As has been 
shown in the main body of the evaluation report, the essence of S®R«D,F. is to 
discover effective development strategies of wide application and minimal 
dependence on external resources through a process of experimentation. 1 ors, 
on the other hands usually wish a project to be a successful development in its 
own right. A successful experiment mar not be a successful developments the 
criteria of success are quite different. The former is judged by the aipount 
which is 'learned about a g^ven situations the resources involved in it, the 
way in which It works, and, above all, the ways in which it can be changed in 
a given direction* The l atter is not concerned with this knowledge per, se but 
with the attainment of immediate goals such as increased output or incomes. 
It is vitally important that this distinction is borne in mind when considering 
the recommendations which follow® 
It is recommended that the Vihiga experimental maize credit package 
-_'s sue st-ant la^Iy modified the light, of the experience of the .last two seasons 
before_it_xs extended to more producers. 
It is evident from the preceding sections of this report that at the 
moment the experimental design of the maize credit package leaves a lot to be 
desired; nevertheless the experience of the last two seasons can be made to 
yield much of value for the future® The components of ,3, well-organised 
expo.rimon-; LICUM zoiv be much c I carers 
(1) an understanding, of the principal inter-relationships 
affecting the selected area - not simply the collection 
of a voluminous quantity of data, but an assessment of 
+he resource base sufficient to suggest possible objectives 
and strategies for specific projects; 
(2) careful and precise specification of the ultimate and 
Immediate objectives appropriate to the needs of the area; 
(.3) careful and precise specification of the most appropriate 
strategy or strategies that can be expected to lead to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
PL » 45 
(4) the- formulation of the strategies as consistent experimental 
projects from "which lessons can he learned; 
(5) a monitoring procedure to check on the experiment tos 
(a) check during implementation that the understanding 
of.the-resource base8 production and marketing 
processes is correct; 
(h) check that the perception of the needs of the area 
is correct; 
(c) check that the strategy is.not modified in the course 
of implementation to the extent that it loses value 
as an experiment or becomes divorced from its original 
objectives; 
(d) identify and.effect the necessary "running repairs" 
to the project, in the light of the information 
collected under (a), (b), and (c)„ 
(6) collect and analyse the results of the experiment, and draw 
conclusions regarding the success or failure of the project 
in terms of the SJLDoP® principles and objectives® (See 
Recommendation 5 below)® 
One of the most.obvious practical problems is the extent to which the 
donor can be expected to co-operate. in the modification of the project now that 
it has become apparent that the.project is deficient in terms of. the SfflR®D®P. 
principles and objectives® It would be understandable if a donor resisted 
modification on the grounds that the project is already successful according 
to its own criteria (which, might Include criteria such as numbers of farmers 
receiving credit) and that a proposed change.is likely to lead-to a deterioration 
in performance according to its own.criteria® If. it were not.possible to count 
on the willingness of the donor to co-operate in extensive revision of the project 
in line with the principles and objectives of S0R«D*P® then its future as an 
integral part of S®R„3)eP® would be In jeopardy® It is not anticipated that this 
difficulty will arise with regard to the maiae credit package, though detailed 
discussion will be required as to the specific manner in which the package is 
brought in line with S0R®I)..sP0 aims.- Specific recommendations need to emerge 
from, deliberations involving the Government and the donor; here it is appropriate 
to elaborate upon the ways in which the project could be modified to make it 
more consistent with the objectives and principles of S.RoDeP® 
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A= The Objectivess 
The maize package requires a more specific production objective8 
to replace the ill-defined "self-sufficiency in maize"® For example the 
original spirit of the objective of the.maize package was to increase the 
: ncoro.es of the existing low-inoome producers through improved maize husbandry 
and increased-maize' production.® If the attempt is .made,to recapture this 
spirit and develop a specific objective for the project* the relationships 
between farm-and non-farm income, between maize and other enterprises, and 
between production and marketing of the crop will all need to be considered.. 
All of these affect resource availability and resource allocation decision-
• laid.iLgs Resource use-. production, and sale of out pat i must all be * a . o f 
the objective0 
B< The Strategyg 
It follows from the above comments on the characteristics required 
the objective that the chosen strategy (or strategies) should relate to 
t ..e perceptions of resource bottlenecks among those producers to whom the 
project is directed® Doubt has been cast on the general validity of the 
"labour surplus" interpretation of the resource endowment - of Yihiga; 
consequently a strategy of providing assistance for the purchase of. material 
inputs may be frustrated by the. lack of complementary labours In the absence 
of mora precise information on the nature.of the bottlenecks it may be fruitful 
to experiment with various, strategies representing different interpretations 
of producer resource constraints® 
ELthe.v the strategy should remain as it Is in broad outline, but 
attempts be made to identify those producers for.whom credit and extension 
supervision are bottlenecks to hybrid maize production, i*e* producers for 
whom hybrid maize would be profitable and.who. have surplus labour resources 
c oupled with a cash-flow problem and a. lack of hybrid maize knowledge* At 
this.moment It Is not possible to tell how big.this group-might be (it might 
be quite small)8 but further analysis of the 600-farmer survey may assist here® 
If solutions were to be found to such problems as lack of.security and. ineffective 
distribution, of material inputs 9 
solutions which still satisfied the requirements of replicabiiity on a larger 
scales this would constitute an important breakthrough in the provision of 
producer credit 0 
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1.19 Part of the reason for this principle not "being widely 
understood is that the foregoing principle of experimentation is not well 
understood. A true experiment must pay attention to the replicability of 
its results; otherwise costly experimentation will be a never-ending 
exercise, failing to provide successful strategies. Therefore the introduction 
of non-replicable strategies, such as continuous intensive extension 
supervision, or annual interest-free credit, is not consistent with the 
principle of experimentation. In the absence of comp irison of different 
strategies - which is the essence of experimentation - a non-replicable 
course of using SPJ)P funds to finance on-going development has often been 
adopted, and the "special" nature of SEDP has been permitted to disappear. 
The Principle of Using Existing Resources 
lo20 Using existing resources involves employing additional resources 
to meet only the extra experimental needs, scaled down progressively during 
subsequent replications to the level of normally available on-going resources. 
Additional resources include trial and error expenses, additional supportive 
staff and expertise, extra vehicles, equipment, and supplies to sustain the 
experimental phase of SRDP® Blue print and prototype development are usually 
very expensive undertakings and cannot be managed entirely out of normally 
available resources. It should be stressed that these additional resources 
are needed in addition to, not instead of normal on-going resources. 
Otherwise, the ceiling for Incurring experimental expenditure is limited 
only by the availability of those additional resources. 
Ie21 The only justification for additional resources in 
experimentation however is to facilitate the development of more effective, 
productive and profitable strategies for reproduction elsewhere. Therefore, 
these experimental costs must be progressively scaled down to fit normally 
available resources during subsequent replications. Thus, if SRDP resources are 
being used to hasten on-going projects rather than to develop replicable 
strategies, then this may be an inappropriate use since- the projects may 
not be replicable on a wider scale. It therefore serves little useful purpose to 
relabel anything developmental in an area as SRDP unless it forms a clearly 
specified (not merely self-evident) integral part of an SRDP experiment. 
For instance, renaming a water project "SRDP" merely because it is an 
existing project is misleading unless it is also an integral part of an 
experiment such as testing more effective waysSimilarly, a self-help dip-
construction project may be taken over by SRDP only if it is part of an 
experiment to test more effective strategies for upgrading cattle, but not 
if it is a normal on-going development. 
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1022 External experts have a special role to play in filling 
gaps in existing resources. Local staff and. people may have useful 
development ideas, hut lack knowledge and skills of experimental planning, 
design and execution to turn their ideas into viable experiments. Due to 
the rapid turn-over of external experts problems can emerges the proposals 
of one set of experts may often be followed by conflicting proposals from 
the succeeding set. Furthermore it is vital to ensure that such experts 
are conversant with the principles and objectives of SEDP, and that their 
advice reflects this; otherwise they may tend to concentrate on developing 
the area for which they are responsible. 
1.23 Vihiga is a good example of an instance where the involvement 
of foreign experts both materially influenced the design of the project and 
created certain conflicts with its experimental content. Some areas -
Ewale, Migori, and Kapenguria - currently have little access to experts; 
others - Tetu, Mbere, and Vihiga - do, but the teams are not always sufficiently 
interdisciplinary. Frequently there is no time for counterpart training, and, 
when there is, there are no counterparts to be trained. As a result, the 
experts tend to take over the ' management of the programme, rather 
than contributing only in their specialised field0 
The Principle of Research and Evaluation 
1.24 Research in this context involves gathering and interpreting 
information relevant to pinpointing experimental objectives and strategies, 
while evaluation means gathering and interpreting relevant information 
about how well the strategies have worked to attain their objectives in 
order to derive more suitable strategies for future use. Experimental 
design incorporates research and evaluation. Since experimentation is not 
well understood in SRDP, confusion exists about the functions of research 
and evaluation. These may be clearly identified if an experiment is first 
broken down into three component phases: 
specifies 
1.25 The Project Planning Phase„' -T'xen objectives and appropriate 
strategies O a i ; o : - A likely objective might be increase agricultural 
output. But from what present state to what future state? To answer this 
question "baseline" information is required to show and if possible measure 
the extent to which the objective has already been attained and the 
further extent which could be expected to be reached through existing 
strategies. If increased adoption of a new technique is the target, the 
current level of adoption has to be known, and the probable future level of 
adoption in the absence of the intended strategy. Establishing this present 
state or baseline of goal-attainment permits an estimation of the potential 
remaining for attainment, and an assessment, through subsequent evaluation, 
of the degree of progress as a result of using the intended strategy. 
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1.26 But strategy selection depends on an interpretation of which, 
factors are at present holding hack more full attainment of the objective 
in question. For example, why is it that the new technique has not been 
adopted to the extent which appears to be possible? ¥hat obstacles are there 
to its adoption? In other words the bottlenecks hindering the uptake of 
the new technique have to be identified; once the bottlenecks have been 
identified it is then possible to select strategies with the express aim 
of eliminating the bottlenecks. Consequently, the information which is 
gathered must be of a kind which will assist in the identification of 
likely bottlenecks. 
1.27 Gathering these kinds of information can range from being 
very simple to inordinately complex. Many people, however, presume 
research must, be complex, probably because of familiarity with the term 
"survey research". Surveys are indeed often very complex, involving large-
scale sampling, structured questionnaires, computer processing and 
voluminous statistics, all of which demand high expertise which is rarely 
readily available. They also take time, delaying projects so much that 
many are inclined to view them as unnecessary luxuries. All too frequently, 
they become wasteful luxuries either because they are inexpertly or 
unreliably conducted, or because too much irrelevant information is gathered, 
or because interpretive skills are lacking. Frequently, information is 
gathered and never used because of undue haste to get on with the project. 
The maize credit package, for instance was implemented before already -
gathered survey information could be analysed. Nevertheless, many projects 
need survey information. Some, like the extension pilot project, profit 
from them, basing project planning and design upon the survey results. 
1.28 More often than not only simple fact finding research is 
required, but even so elementary research can be overlooked, with 
disastrous results. A critical assumption for the success of the Mbere 
cotton blocks project, that local people would be willing to make land 
available for the blocks, was not tested, and contributed to the failure 
of the project. It is not always easy to know when simple research suffices 
or when a survey is indicated. This is an area where expert advice and guidance 
is probably needed. 
1.29 The Strategy Testing Phase is addressed to the trial 
implementation of the selected strategies, to check that they can attain 
the designated objectives. The research component of implementation is 
monitoring, continuously watching progress to ensure that the project 
remains on target. It involves issues of timing, phasing and pacing, and 
of introducing modifications to account for unforeseen developments. 
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At present the function of monitoring is largely performed "by the 
reporting system. 
1.30 The Effects Evaluation Phase in vhieh-it-is determines, how 
well the selected strategies are overcoming bottlenecks and attaining 
designated objectives. While the research and evaluation embodied in the 
preceding two phases are no less integral parts of the experiment, 
evaluation of the outcome of the strategies being tested is essential if 
the principle of experimentation is to be respected. If there is no 
objective assessment of results it cannot honestly be said that there has 
been an experiment. For instance, if the 4K Club project9s objective is 'X @ S S - w 
to influence progressive; parents to adopt agricultural innovations by 
following the example of their children (the strategy), then sooner or 
later information has to be gathered to see how far the strategy has worked. 
1.31 One perennial problem is to find sufficiently unbiased 
evaluators with an expert grasp of the guiding principles and objectives so 
that their pronouncements regarding the validity and effectiveness of 
strategies being used are credible and meet with general acceptance. 
Conclusion 
1.32 The "rules of the game"! the SEDP principles, should be 
understood by all participants, not only a few officials at the top. 
The evaluation has come to the conclusion that at present this not so, hence 
the above elaboration on the principles of SPiDP. These need to be carcfully 
and clearly explained from the top down the line to the lowliest JAA, and to 
the rural people themselves. Gaining a knowledge of the rules of the game 
is the first step to generating widespread involvement in SEDP, if not 
as active participants then at least as interested spectators hoping for 
a successful outcome. 
THE OBJECTIVES OF SBDP 
1.33 An objective is a goal which strategies are designed to 
reach. In view of the idealism and vagueness which may be observed in the 
stated objectives of the SEDP projects at present, this simplicity must be 
deceptive. There appear to be two reasons for the difficulties which are 
being experienced in expressing clear-cut objectives: firstly, there are 
really two sets of objectives each of different levels of generality, 
and secondly, the official SEDP objectives' are confusing. 
1.34 Of the two sets of objectives one is addressed to individual 
projects, the other to the programme as a whole. This distinction is 
held to be important. A project objective is the direct outcome of 
experimentation with strategies designed to attain them more effectively. 
A programme objective is the indirect outcome of the prior attainment of 
A FUNCTIONAL MODEL OF THE SPECIAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 




Trying out alternative 
strategies for achieving 
desired objectives to see 
if they work (feasibility) 
and how well they work 
(extent of pay-off) in 
pilot areas. 
2. REPLICABILITY 
Developing blue prints 
and prototypes of success-
fully tested strategies 
for wider-scale reproduc-
tion elsewhere. 
3. USING EXISTING 
RESOURCES 
Utilizing additional 
resources only to meet, 
extra experimental needs, 
scaled down progressively 
to available on-going 
resources during subse-
quent replications. 
4. RESEARCH 8 EVALUATION 
ULTIMATE PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES IMMEDIATE PROJECT OBJECTIVES PROJECT BOTTLENECKS PROGRAMME BOTTLENECKS 
RAISING QUALITY OF RURAL LIFE 
THROUGH ACHIEVING: 
1. INCOME GENERATION 
Raising incomes from 





d. Wage Employment 
2. WELFARE GENERATION 
Raising levels of: 
a. Physical Well-being 
b. Mental Well-being 
c. Social Well-being 
3. SELF-GENERATING DEVELOPMENT 
FILLING PRODUCTIVITY X EQUITY 
GAPS THROUGH ACHIEVING: 
1. INCREASING OUTPUT 
Raising levels of surplus 
marketable or re-investment 
output in: 
a. Agricultural Enterprises 
b. Commercial Enterprises 
c. Industrial Enterprises 
2. REDUCING UNEMPLOYMENT 
Increasing wage employment 
in: 
a. Public Works Projects 
b. Private Enterprises 
3. IMPROVING PUBLIC SERVICES 
Increasing impact of the: 
a. Extension Services 
b. Training Services 
c. Social Services 
d. Health Services 
e. Education Services 
4. INCREASING DECENTRALIZATION 
SEARCHING FOR AREA-BASED STRATEGIES FOR 
OVERCOMING: 
1. LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS 
By testing alternatives of providing: 
a. Mass and Interpersonal Extension 
b. Formal and Informal Training 
c. Formal and Informal Education 
2. LACK OF FINANCIAL, MATERIAL INPUTS 
By testing alternatives of providing: 
a. Loans, Credit, Bursaries, Grants 
b. Supplies, Tools and Equipment 
3. LACK OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNUTI ES 
By testing alternatives of providing 
a. Labour-intensive Work Schemes 
b. Under or Unemployment Relief Work 
'4. INADEQUATE MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
By testing alternatives of providing: 
a. Internal Markets, Holding Grounds 
fa. External Markets, Policy Adjustment 
5. INFRASTRUCTURAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
By testing alternatives of providing: 
a. Roads, Transportation, Water, Dips 
b. Electrification, Communications 
c. Education, Health, Social Amenities 
e. Land Adjudication, Re-settlement 
6. LACK OF PEOPLE-INVOLVEMENT 
By testing alternatives of providing: 
a. Information-gathering participation 
b. Project, Strategy Planning, Design 
SEARCHING FOR ADMINISTRATIVE STRATEGII 
FOR OVERCOMING: 
1. LACK OF ORGANISATION 
By testing alternatives of providing: 
a. Area, Central, Donor Coordination 
b. Project Integration into Programme 
c. Staff Assignment, Deployment 
d. Local Development Committees 
e. General Administration 
2. LACK OF CONTROL 
By testing alternatives of providing 
a. Monitoring, Reporting Systems 
b. Exchange of Ideas, Information 
3. LACK OF PUNNING RESOURCES 
By testing alternatives of providing: 
a. Problem-solving Skills, Expertise 
b. Training and Training Skills 
c. Interpretation of Priciples, Goals 
4. LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION RESOURCES 
Increasing local staff and 
people capacities for: 
a. Self-determinism 
b. Self-reliance 
c. On-going Growth and 
Development 
Information-gathering 
research before; progress 
monitoring during; and 
effects evaluation after 
project and programme 
implementation. 
By testing alternatives of providing: 
a. Extra Experimental Funds, Staff, 
Equipment and Special Training 
b. A Stable Multidisciplinary team 
of Experts and Technicians 
Increasing feild staff and 
local people participation in: 
a. Decision-making 
b. Project Developaent 
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several project objectives, the latter being the preconditions for the 
former., For example, increased agricultural incomes is stated to be a 
programme objective because it may be "once removed" from the attainment 
of a project objective, such as increasing output. TJhile increased output 
is a necessary step towards higher incomes, a second project may be 
required to ensure that the increased output becomes increased incomes. 
Increased output of a cash crop could lead to a reduction in incomes, due 
to a consequential decline in the market price of the crop. To prevent this, 
a second project with the objective of maintaining or raising the market 
pricc is required. Hence the income-increasing programme constitutes two 
projects, neither of which is sufficient of itself to produce the desired 
outcome. The objective of an output-raising project may be mis-specified 
if it is claimed to be income-raising and yet the necessary complementary 
parts of the programme to ensure that increased output becomes increased 
income are absent. 
1.35 Bearing this distinction in mind, an examination of the 
official SSDP objectives reveals that they arc- somewhat confused. At the 
moment the SEDP objective are divided into "primary" and "ultimate", 
corresponding closely to the distinction between project and programme 
objectives. Since the word "primary" implies that others are secondary, 
it is suggested that a more useful term is "immediate", which relates more 
closely to the project objective. However, although there is agreement as 
to the names of the boxes, there is disagreement as to their content. SEDP 
objectives as currently formulated are: 
Ultimate Objectives of SRDP: 
Increased rural production and productivity; 
Increased rural incomes, hence higher standards of living ; 
Increased rural employment opportunities and better rural life. 
Immediate ("primary") ? • j Objectives of SRDP: 
To identify and concentrate, on critical development gaps and 
bottlenecks; 
To establish procedure and techniques for self°-generating 
rural development which can be repeated elsewhere in the -country; 
To improve the development and training capacity of government 
staff ; 
To generate active participation in the planning and execution 
of SRDP0 
These appear to be inadequate for the following reasons; 
10 Some objectives appear to be in the wrong categories; 
2. Some important objectives are not mentioned at all; 
3. The immediate objectives are too vague and general for 
practical purposes; 
4. Some immediate objectives are actually long-term objectives 
1.36 In the following discussion an attempt is made to reclassify 
and clarify the SEDP objectives. It is summarised in the "Functional 
Model of the SPLDP" on page 11 and reference should be made to this during 
the course of the discussion. 
Ultimate Programme Objectives 
1.37 Present SEDP ultimate objectives tend to cause confusion 
because some are misclassified, and because the list is incomplete. 
(a) it is confusing to relate increased incomes to higher 
standards of living, and increased employment opportunities 
to better rural life, ignoring the contribution of higher 
incomes to better rural life, and increased employment to 
higher standards of living. 
(b) increased incomes result from increased production and 
employment, SMfi is therefore an ultimate objective, while 
the others are immediate objectives. 
(c) not specifically mentioned, though probably implied in 
"better rural life" is an ultimate objective addressed to 
increasing non-economic welfare. 
(d) one of the immediate objectives - self-generating development-
should be among the ultimate objectives. 
1.38 To get round these problems, a general and overall ultimate 
objective has been introduced - Eaising the Quality of Rural Life. This 
permits the combination of higher standards of living and better rural life, 
and in turn is sub-divided into three ultimate objectives. Firstly, 
income generation, which has a sense of on-going dynamism; the main sources 
are self-employment and wage employment in the agricultural, commercial, 
and industrial sectors of the economy, and wage employment in public works. 
Secondly, welfare generation, adds the need to improve physical, mental, 
and social health and well-being of rural folk to the need for higher 
incomes. Thirdly, self-generating development, indicating that instead 
of providing poor relief and free welfare services (which may in themselves 
have a role to play as strategies), stresses the development of a capacity 
for self-determinism, self-reliance, and self-directed 
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promotion of growth and development, 
1.39 In short, improvement of the quality of rural life involves 
achieving income generation, welfare generation, and self-generating 
developments Each of these is just as important as the other, and, 
accordingly, they should be given equal attention in planning. 
Immediate Project Objectives 
1340 Experimentation without immediate objectives is pointless; 
it makes little sense to test a strategy intended to achieve an objective 
more effectively when that objective is either not specified, or stated 
in sucb vague terms as to remain unspecified for all practical purposes. 
Yet, as far as the present immediate project objectives of SRDP are 
concerned (see above), this appears to be the case® 
lo41 The main problem is that these objectives are less concrete 
th^n the ultimate objectives. It is easier to know what is meant by 
increasing incomes than what is meant by "development gaps," "self-generating 
development," or "active participation." Yet it is through achievement of 
these rather general immediate objectives that it is hoped to meet the 
ultimate ones. They need, therefore, to be reformulated more clearly and 
simply. 
1®42 First., the notion of development gaps and bottlenecks 
appears to apply to all possible project objectives, since they are all 
intended to fill some "gaps" in rural development by overcoming bottlenecks 
currently preventing those gaps from being filled,. Productivity, for 
instance, may be deemed to be too low in a given area, that is a gap 
exists between the existing productivity and the potential productivity of 
that area. Similarly, an equity gap may exist, meaning that the benefits 
of rural development are presently not being spread to as many rural people 
as possible; they need to be equitably distributed. Thus, filling productivity 
and equity gaps is the overall immediate objective of projects. 
1.43 Second,, none of the present SRDP immediate objectives is 
specifically addressed to increasing output in agriculture, commerce and 
industry. This objective was included under ultimate objectives. Yet 
the bulk of the effort in the SRDP areas has been towards increasing output, 
especially in the agricultural sector® This emphasis is because increasing 
output is seen as a major way of ultimately increasing incomes. Therefore, 
increasing output is considered as an immediate project objective, which 
serves also to increase self-employment0 
- 15 -
lo44 Third, increasing employment opportunities was also 
included under ultimate objectives. But this is a more immediate project 
objective since it too leads ultimately to increasing incomes. The term 
"reduced unemployment" is used, as it tends to focus attention squarely 
upon the problem rather than "opportunities" which may be created only 
to lie vacant. ITote, however, that reduced unemployment through wage 
employment either in public works or as a function of increased output in 
private enterprise is involved. 
1.45 Fourth, no mention is made of improved public services perhaps 
because welfare generation was not specifically mentioned. Nevertheless, 
increasing the effectiveness and impact of such services to the public as 
extension, health education, community development and social services also 
increases the likehood of achieving all three programme objectives, 
especially the generation of physical, mental and social welfare. 
1.46 Fifth, the present immediate SEDP objective of generating 
active participation in planning and executing SEDP appears to be addressed 
more to seeking strategies for increased decentralization of rural development 
decision-makingo The objective is to increasingly shift decision-making 
responsibility from central government to both area-level staff and rural 
peoplethrough their leaders and local organizations. Increasing decentralization 
is a major way of producing self-generating rural development. 
1.47 Finally, the present SEDP immediate objective of "improving 
the development and training capacity of government staff" is more addressed 
to administrative strategies for overcoming bottlenecks, .and is therefore 
included under programme strategies. 
1.48 The main ways of achieving the overall project objective of 
filling productivity and equity gaps and, hence, of achieving the ultimate 
programme objectives are through the achievement of increased productivity, 
reduced unemployment, improved public services and increased decentralization. 
Note again that all four immediate objectives are of equal relevance to 
planning. 
Conclusion 
1.49 fbe classification system outlined above and summarised in 
the chart should ensure that each development project has a clearly defined 
focus, and is therefore provided with the necessary measure by which its 
pay-off might be assessed. 


STRATEGIES TO OVERCOME BOTTLENECKS 
lo50 The foregoing objectives are generally already attained to 
some extent by existing rural activities, and the task of development is 
to achicve the objective to a greater extent. The existence of some 
bottleneck hindering the attainment of the objective to a greater extent 
is therefore implied, and the task of SRDP is to experiment with new, 
different, or improved strategies (or combinations of strategies) designed 
to overcome bottlenecks. Unlike principles and objectives, which are 
limited in number, strategics for overcoming bottlenecks are very numerous, 
and, in the long run allowing for technological developments at present 
unforeseen, probably without number. Therefore it is easier to provide a 
listing of potential bottlenecks than it is to provide a listing of possible 
strategies for overcoming the bottlenecks. The value of such a list is that 
it systematises the search for viable strategies to overcome the bottlenecks, 
and at the same time ensures that a comprehensive view is taken of the likely 
problems to be encountered by development projects. 
Two main types of bottlenecks are listed: 
Project Bottlenecks - area based constraints on the 
achievement of objectives; 
Programme Bottlenecks - administrative constraints on 
the achievement of ultimate programme objectives. 
Project Bottlenecks 
la51 Project bottlenecks are constraints likely to be preventing 
immediate objectives from being achieved to a greater extent. For instance, 
what is preventing agricultural output from being increased? Is it because 
people do not know about more productive seed varieties or husbandry 
techniques? Do they lack resources to acquire necessary supplies and inputs? 
Are there no markets to absorb surplus output? 
1.52 If there were a list of the main bottleneck areas which 
might in one way or another be acting as a constraint on goal achievement, 
planners could check each one in order to.find those which are critical. 
Only then does it become possible to design strategies specifically addressed 
to overcoming the critical bottlenecks. An experimental project to test 
the feasibility and extent of pay-off of these specifically designed 
strategies can then be carried out.. To this end, therefore, the following 
list of potential bottlenecks relevant to the SRDP areas is presented. 
(!) Lack of knowledge and skills of agricultural, commercial and 
industrial techniques and technologies, suggesting strategies associated 
with formal and informal education, training and extension of all 
kinds, and further technical research. 
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(2) Lack of financial and material inputs to exploit the unexploited 
potential, suggesting strategies associated with loans, credit, 
bursaries, capital grants, input supplies and equipment, aimed at 
producers and suppliers. 
(3) Inadequate Market Development to absorb surplus output, suggesting 
strategies associated with generating internal consumer markets and 
adjusting price and market structure polices to create external 
marketso 
(4) Underdeveloped infrastructure suggesting strategies associated with 
roads, transportation, water schemes, dips, electricity, communications, 
land adjudication and education, health and welfare amenities. 
(5) Lack of people-involvement in planning, designing and executing 
development projects, suggesting strategies associated with organizing 
and integrating people and area staff into the project and programme 
planning machinery® 
(6) Lack of gainful employment opportunities in the private and public 
sectors, suggesting strategies associated with labour-intensive methods 
of construction, "make work" schemes and block systems of farming. 
1.53 Doubtless, this list will be added to as time goes on. It is 
important to note, however, that one strategy by itself is not usually 
sufficient to overcome any one bottleneck and so achieve the designated 
objective. To focus, for instance, only on credit as a means of overcoming 
financial bottlenecks is to imply that none of the other bottlenecks is 
important. The truth of this must be verified through research. Usually,-
it is a combination of bottlenecks which forms the obstacle to goal 
achievement, though the mix may differ from one area to another. 
1.54 A cross-tabulation .of project bottlenecks against project 
objectives is provided on page 16C Its function is to ensure that 
planners give due consideration to all possible sources of bottlenecks 
constraining achievement of a particular objective or sets of objectives. 
This approach prompts the planner to scarch for possible strategies to 
fill each of the squares under every type of bottleneck. In the first table 
the cells are filled with those SEDP activities which' are currently being 
tried, and in the second table hybrid maize promotion has been used as an 
example to illustrate the use of cross-tabulation for an individual 
project. 
Tables such as these invite planners to choose relevant strategies 
from among those indicated in the various cells, although the tables are 
not intended to be exhaustive lists of all possible strategies. Effort is 
required to devise altogether new strategies, possibly based on some 
- 20 -
technical innovation. Choice of strategy is nevertheless a serious 
operational problem, and one on which some comment should be made. First 
of all, once the objective has been selected, the range of choice may 
be much less than would appear from the tablej there the objectives and the 
bottlenecks are stated in very general form, and any of the strategies in 
each of the cells looks like an alternative to any of the others. However, 
careful specification of the objectives and the bottlenecks restricts the 
choice to those strategies which are genuine alternatives for each other^ 
in that they fill the same specific gaps® normally choice between genuine 
alternatives would be based on some kind of cost-benefit analysis, relating 
the expected benefit over some future time period to the costs of introducing 
the strategy0 But the necessary information is rarely available for this 
kind of calculation. This highlights the role of SRDP, and in particular 
its principle of experimentation: the comparison of alternative strategies 
through the organisation of different types of pilot trials is what SRDP is 
all abouto It therefore offers a unique means of obtaining, under field 
conditions, the kind of information on which cost-benefit analyses for the 
future replicabi^irty of the strategies can be based. This very important 
function df providing the rationale for the application of a particular 
strategy (or combination of strategies) on a national level can only be 
performed if SRDP adheres to the principle of experimentation® 
1<>55 As a training exercise area planners could attempt to make 
similar cross-tabulations of all the SRDP projects in their areas to 
check on the extent to which development gaps may have been overlooked. 
Already it is evident from these tables that SRDP has been concentrating more 
on overcoming output bottlenecks, especially agricultural bottlenecks, and 
improving public services, especially extension services, than it has on 
reducing unemployment and increasing decentralization. If each project 
were planned with this cross-tabulation in mind, planners would find 
themselves forced to take more factors into account, than they are presently 
doing. Suppose, for instance, that increasing hybrid maize output is 
intended as an immediate project objective. Clearly, planners are forced 
to consider what knowledge and skills, what financial and material inputs, 
what market and infrastructural development, what people-involvement appears 
to be required, and how unemployment relief is likely to result from 
increasing hybrid maize output. 
1.56 In addition, the cross—tabulations require the planner to 
consider the implications for all four objectives of any one strategy 
which he selects. For example, in what ways can providing knowledge and 
skills in order to increase output also involve improving the public services, 
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increasing decentralization and reducing unemployment? 
Programme Bottlenecks. 
I®57 Programme bottlenecks are administrative constraints 
preventing the ultimate programme objectives from being attained to 
a greater extent. For instance, individual ministries may be simultaneously 
pursuing the same objective, but from different directions. Strategies 
therefore may be duplicated, or"in conflict, or out of step with each other®. 
Yet they may all be aimed at the same target groups. Thus,.while many 
individual projects might have great merit, when looked at collectively, 
they may constitute a discordant, unconcerted confusion, serving only to 
disgruntle the rural pecpl% What could the likely bottlenecks to achieving a 
streamlined, integrated rural development programme be? Here too, the 
attempt has been made to compile a list of the major administrative bottlenecks 
to focus attention upon finding and testing strategies to overcome them. 
These are: 
(1) Lack of organization for the conduct of the SEDP, suggesting strategies 
associated with co-ordination of policy and action within and between the 
area, the government ministries and the donor agencies. 
(2) Lack of control over project and programme development and execution, 
suggesting strategies associated with monitoring and reporting systems 
and intereommunications. 
(3) Lack of planning resources for designing experimental projects which 
are integrated into a programme of projects, suggesting strategies associated 
with increasing planning, training and problem-solving capacities. 
(4) Lack of implementation resources for executing a planned programme of 
experimental projects suggesting strategies associated with staff, financial, 
and material allocations and deployment. 
1.58 Up till now, as overall co-ordinator of SEDP, MFP has 
necessarily spent much of its time providing an increasingly viable organisation 
and control system, through area co-ordinators, ministerial lihkmen, district 
development committees, and the reporting system. It has also spent much 
time in providing many implementation resources, particularly with respect 
to facilitating release of funds. Still lacking are adequate planning 
resources, particularly specialist expertise, and a monitoring system which 




1.59 The attempt has been made to categorize project and administrative 
bottlenecks that might be constraining the achievement of SEDP objectives, 
in order to facilitate and systematize the search for viable strategies to 
overcome the bottlenecks» It is recommended that these classifications 
be clearly explained to all parties involved in SEDPj knowing the rules 
and objectives of the game and having some idea of the bottlenecks to be 
overcome to gain the objectives to a greater extent constitutes a giant step 




CASE STUDIES OP INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS 
2e1 The terms of reference request the evaluation of certain 
specific projects, for the most part the leading, most frequently mentioned, 
SRDP projects® Because it is impossible to do justice to these projects in 
a limited space, the greater part of the material is provided in the 
appendices to this report® In order to illustrate the way in which the 
planning and implementation of these SEDP projects have been related to the 
principles, objectives, and strategies of SRDP, the material for each project 
has been highly summarised and presented here as a case study0 A standard 
format has been employed to facilitate comparison of one project with another, 
in terms of the essence of SRDP® 
2®2 Two case studies additional to those requested in the 
terms of reference have been added, on the grounds that they illustrate 
points which do not arise under the other projects® These are the livestock 
marketing development project in Kapenguria, and the. sequential implementation 
procedure used in Kwale® It has not proved possible to evaluate the Tetu 
Farm Management and Planning Project; there is therefore no case study on 
thiso 
THE MASTER FARMERS (SELECTIVE EXTENSION) PROJECT (MIGORI) 
2®3 The Master Farmer Project aimed at increasing the output of 
selected above-average farmers via increased extension inputs, so as to make 
them models for other farmers® That project never reached the implementation 
stage but a similar project, the Selective Extension Project, currently 
exists® 
Objectives To increase agricultural output of all types of 
farmers ® 
Perceived Bottlenecks; 10 Lack of knowledge and skills of agricultural 
techniques, 
2a Lack of financial and material inputs. 
Implementation; 1® Each of the 63 extension agents in the area 
selected the ten "best" farmers known to them in their 
sub-locations® But they have yet to be "highly trained" 
due to lack of information regarding agronomic 
suitability of agricultural enterprises 
« 24 
2d Loans to farmers were not readily available„ As an 
alternative measure, commercial bank cooperation was 
secured to provide 13 locally appointed stockists with 
loans to carxy agricultural inputs^ Hope was that 
stockists would extend credit to their customers, thereby 
substituting for the abortive loans programme0 
Evaluations The original Master Farmers® Project was based on a 
classification system for dividing selected farmers into 
groups according to their level of progressiveness; the 
farmers in the scheme were to receive special attention from 
extension agents. There was no assessment of the likely 
response to the proposed reward system, or of other alternative 
criteria,, Under the new Selective Extension Project the 
sub-strategies to train the model farmers are not adequately 
defined, due to the lack of agronomic research into crop 
possibilities for the area, or into the present state of crops 
and husbandly on the selected farms. Because of lack of 
information on the latter for either the selected group or 
their neighbours, evaluation of improvement in the agricultural 
skills of either will be difficult when implementation takes 
place0 The Bank extended Sh 28,000 as loans to input stockists. 
With the entire amount now repaid, ..the bank is seeking to 
expand th®i^s@ of stockists for repeated loaning. However, no 
information as yet has been gathered regarding the degree to 
which stockists extended credit to farmers. The Loans to 
Input Stockists sub-project seems to have potential lro2r 
replication elsewhere 
Hecommendation; We are not convinced that, by themselves, selected farmers are 
likely to serve as effective models0 We recommend that the 
selected group should include some less progressive farmers 
to serve as control and comparison groups0 The Loans to 
Input Stockists appears to us to be a co-project, not a 
sub-project of the selective extension projects, It should 
be carefully documented. We also recommend research to find 
out what effect extending bank loans to stockists is 
having upon agriculture in the area. 
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THE! ROADS PROJECT (MIGORl) 
2„4 The Migori SRDP emphasised road construction, as did all 
the other SRDPs. The project is more advanced in Migori, and incorporates 
many of the features of the other roads projects. 
Objectives; 1„ To increase agricultural output* 
2„ To reduce unemployment" 
3„ To improve public services. 
Perceived Bottlenecks; 10 Lack of access to markets« 
2e Lack of employment opportunities • 
Strategies; 1Build 215 miles of feeder roads, 8 ft. wide, to improve 
access. 
2* Use labour-intensive means of clearing, earthmoving, 
and maintenance, employing 200 -unskilled labourers 
at a time0 Use machinery only for road finishinge 
Implementations 1 e Over 50 miles of carriageway were constructed, to a 
width of 12 ft0 to encourage MOW to take over 
maintenance-
2„ The labour force was reduced to 10 persons from the 
sub-location through which the road was being constructed. 
This labour was used only for bush clearing; heavy 
machinery was used for the rest0 Wages of Shs. 200o00 
per month were paid® 
Evaluation; The strategy to increase local employment was new to Kenya, and, 
had it been implemented, its costs could have been compared with 
those of normal road-building methods. The strategy to expand 
markets and improve public services through improved access is not 
new. Local officials claim improved access to markets for rice 
growers, and easier surveillance of cattle smuggling across the 
Tanzania border into Kenya0 Ho significant employment has been 
generated in road work; a few people are employed for 3 month 
terms at reportedly high wages compared to MOA rates. External 
resources went beyond the point of experimentation: heavy 
equipment was used which MOW cannot afford to employ intensively 
under normal conditions<, The method finally employed to build the 
roads is not an experimental new strategy; it is only a replication 
of an old prototype. The effectiveness of road-building as a 
strategy to increase agricultural output or improve public services 
will not be established until it has been evaluated over several 
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seasons® 
Recommendations Efforts should, be made to assess increased output resulting 
from infrastructural construction,, The feasibility of 
labour intensive road building remains untested since 
the strategy was changed during implementation. This 
strategy if followed could provide valuable results. 
THE GOTTOCT BLOCKS PROJECT (MBEBE) 
2„5 There was, at the time of planning the Mb ere programme, a 
paucity of information about the agronomic performance of crops best suited 
to its different ecological zones,, This paucity was recognized in the plaxu 
Nevertheless, pressure to show visible signs of SRDP resulted in premature 
implementation of the Cotton Blocks Project, cotton being a crop for which 
experimental trial though not actual practice yields were available 
Objectives; To increase cotton output and reduce unemployment. 
(We have identified ten statements of objectives, 
reflecting the uncertainty of planning of this project. 
We have boiled them down to the two above) 
Perceived Bottlenecks; 10 Lack of agronomic information about crop 
potential and performance,, 
2. Lack of cotton husbandly "knowledge and skills. 
3. Lack of gainful employment opportunities (even 
though the plan characterizes Mbere as a labour-
scare-land-abundant area)0 
Carry out agronomic research trials to obtain 
information on suitable crops for the aree. 
Develop cotton blocks - centrally administered, locally 
managed, and using hired labour - on rented land, for 
demonstration purposes. 
Improved extension coupled with training, and demonstration 
effects from cotton blocks. 
1« Cotton blocks started in the absence of information on 
environmental suitability for cotton,-and in face of 
expert advice against the project. 
2. Target acreage reduced from 500 acres to 280 acres due 
to unwillingness of the clans to lease land for the 
project 
3. 178 acres cleared, 169 ploughed, and only about 48 acres 
planted. Despite lateness of the rains the "optimal" 
planting date was rigidly applied so (a) what was 






ploughing stopped before it was really necessary. 
4. The project was declared a failure, and the land was left 
unused. 
Evaluation! Research into the technical, economic, and social factors was 
insufficient. Indications of the economic infeasibility of the 
project were not followed up. Cost-benefit evaluation should have 
halted the project prior to initial implementation, as would 
have seeking the opinion of the local inhabitants as to their 
willingness to part with land for the blockss There is strong 
probability that external inputs exceeded the experimental level, 
and could not be replaced satisfactorily by local resources. 
The agronomic research trials have high replicability potential. 
Recommendation: We recommend experimentation to focus on agronomic research 
trials. The idea of cotton blocks should not be revived for the 
Division. 
THE EXTENSION PILOT PROJECT (TETP) 
2.6 The Tetu SHDP focussed on increased agricultural output, 
especially hybrid maize output, of all types of farmers via experimentation 
with extension techniques. Local planners commissioned IDS to cany out 
baseline research to identify extension-related bottlenecks. The extension 
pilot project is based on the survey findings. 
Objectives: Starting with hybrid maize and less progressive small-holding 
farmers, to increase agricultural output of all types of farmers. 
Perceived Bottlenecks: A. Farmers 
1. Lack of knowledge and skills of husbandry 
techniques. 
2. Lack of material inputs for hybrid maize 
cultivation. 
3« Lack of finance to pay FTC fees. 
B„ The Extension Staff 
1„ Lack of knowledge and skills of communication , 
curriculum development. 
2. Lack of differentiation procedures for 
selecting farmers as to progressiveness level. 
3. Lack of functional linkage between PTC and Field 
Staff. 
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Strategies: A. Farmers 
1. FTC training according to level of progressiveness 
and field follow-up initially9 225 farmers to be selected » 
29 Loans by way of inputs forg- acre trial plots of hybrid maize, 
secured by the crop0. 
3. Bursaries to attend PTC for hybrid maize training, 
B, The Extension Staff 
1» Training in communication, curriculum development 
techniques , 
2 . Progressive index to differentiate farmers for PTC 
training selection, 
3. Field staff to attend FTC with their clients, to act as 
resource men, and ensure adequate follow-up. 
Implementation; A. Farmers 
1. FTC training with follow-up for 217 farmers (about 25 from 
each of five sublocations) but not according to 
progressiveness level. Farmers make their own cost/ 
benefit analyses of adopting hybrid maize. 
2a Loan inputs provided through FTC, to be later changed to 
Yihiga-type voucher system. Farmers volunteered to supervise 
loan repaymentsc Belated proposal to establish revolving 
fund for loan financing. 
3. Bursaries and free transportation to FTC provided. 
B. The Extension Staff 
1. FTC staff received communication training. Hybrid 
maize curriculum developed and "stretched out" to cover 
3 days of training. 
2C Index developed but not used. Selection left in the 
hands of sublocational JAA and subchief. 
3. Field staff attended courses with their clients, thus 
also being exposed to the new curriculum. 
Evaluation: Perceived bottlenecks were identified through a process of 
formal research and informal discussion with extension staff and 
local officials, and a new set of strategies showing experimental 
promise was developed in relation to these bottlenecks. Since a 
large number of treatments were simultaneously implemented, it is 
impossible to identify which one(s) led to the successful 
recruitment of farmers and possible success in 
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reaching the project objectives. Replication of the inputs on 
credit will only be justifiable if loan repayment is good, 
permitting a revolving fund to be established. It appears 
that continued experimental inputs will be necessary to 
develop curricula for each new crop or livestock practice! 
included in the project. All farmers except one accepted the 
loan and have planted -J- acre trial plots of hybrid maize. Some 
used their own funds to increase the acreage. Diffusion 
effects are claimed to be about 3 additional farmers influenced 
per each participant who attended the PTC course. 
Recommendation; It is recommended that further testing be carried out in 
order to determine which of the several strategies used are 
the most critical; those which are unnecessary could be 
eliminated. It is also recommended that further testing be 
done to establish methods of recruiting less progressive 
farmers 0 
THE SPECIAL 4K PROJECT (TETU) 
2.7 The Tetu Special 4K Project apparently evolved separately from 
the other SRDP agricultural projects in the division, and made no use of the 
Tetu baseline surveya The objectives of the project as it has been 
implemented are increasingly divorced from its original objective. 
Objectives; 1. To increase agricultural output by the next generation 
(the youths), and to attract them into farming. 
2. To increase agricultural output o-f> less progressive adults 
through the demonstration effect. 
3o To increase the production of nutritious (high-protein)foods. 
Perceived Bottlenecks; 1. Lack of knowledge and husbandry skills 9 
2C Lack of material inputs for new techniques. 
Strategies: 1. PTC training for 300 youths between 14 and 18 years of age 
annually in hybrid maize and bean husbandry, nnd 4K JAA 
follow-up on each 4K club course participant» 
2. Input loans in the form of seed^fertiliser, insecticide, 
and too]s for one half-acre plot (to be supplied by the 
parent). 
3. Demonstration effect of home plots on parents and neighbours 
of the youths. 
Implementation: 1. PTC training for 3 weeks for 300 children of between 10 and 
14 years of age annually, in hybrid maize only, plus 
4K JAA follow—upi 
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2. Input loans as above, of which only 42 per cent were repaid 
6 months after harvest0 Apparently all grew hybrid maize, 
but an unknown number of the crops failed„ 
Evaluations The project as implemented overlaps with the Extension 
Pilot Project, although the latter aims directly at the adults. 
The nutrition objective was forgotten during implementation. 
The Tetu baseline survey, had it been consulted, would have 
shorn that 60 per cent of 4K members8 families already grew 
hybrid maize; a different crop should have been chosen. The 
half-acre requirement tends to favour the children of the 
more progressive farmers, thus not involving those for whom 
the demonstration effect upon parents might have pay-off and 
for whom the project was originally intended. The desired 
effects on the children cannot be measured until they leave 
school some 4 to 10 years hence. Existing resources cannot 
cope with the 58 per cent default on the loans. No attempt 
at evaluation was made, beyond confirmation of the hybrid 
cultivation, and yet the project is being replicated. One 
can question the wisdom of allocating so much extension staff 
time and loan resources on small children, while neglecting 
real young farmers. 
Recommendation; It is recommended that the project as presently conceived 
be changed, that efforts be made to determine the characteristics 
of 4K members and the problems or rural youth more clearly, and 
that the project be evolved to fit these. 
THE MAIZE CREDIT PACKAGE (VIHIGA) 
2.8 The Vihiga SoR„D„P. originally identified maize, fruit 
and vegetable, and dairying as the appropriate products for the main 
thrust of the agricultural programme, coupled with experimentation with 
extension aimed at reaching all types of farmers. With donor involvement, 
a credit package focussing on hybrid maize and backed up by intensive 
extension supervision evolved,, Inadequate use was made of the available 
data on the resources and needs of the area, and the choice of both objective 
and strategy was strongly conditioned by an over-simpl: fied interpretation 
of the resource endowment, and therefore of the development potential and 
the probable bottlenecks in the area, and by the donors concern for a 
project yielding immediate and visible results. 
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Objectives; To attain more widespread adoption of hybrid maize, and to 
release land for alternative uses. 
Perceived Bottlenecks; 1«, lack of finance to hire labour and purchase 
material inputs for hybrid maize cultivation. 
2e Lack of husbandly knowledge and skills appropriate 
to hybrid maize cultivation. 
Strategies; 1. The provision of credit, secured by the crop and to be 
repaid in cash, to purchase material inputs (though not to 
hire labour) in quantities appropriate to attain recommended 
application rates, through a system of vouchers to be 
honoured ty input stockists and redeemed by the A.P.O. 
2. Intensive extension supervision. 
Implementation:1. Concern to achieve a high loan repayment rate led to 
creditworthiness of the borrower replacing the crop as 
security for the loan, and the introduction of a minimum 
maize acreage of two acres as a further criterion for 
entitlement to the loan. 
2. Seventy-six farmers were selected from a total 
exceeding 50,000; sixty-three used the credit. 
3. Frequent follow-up supervision was provided by extension 
personnel. 
Evaluation: The initial fact-finding was not oriented towards identifying 
bottlenecks related to the project which was initiated; consequently the 
project bears little relationship to the resource availability of Vihiga. 
The project had little experimental content. There are doubts that the 
resource requirements of the intensive extension supervision are too great 
and the attention devoted to institutional aspects of the provision of credit 
and inputs too little to permit replicability. As a general means of offering 
credit against a crop not marketed by a parastatal body its replicability 
has not been established. The project changed substantially in the course 
of implementation, becoming highly selective in contrast to its more general 
initial objectives. 
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Becqmraendations; 1 ® The future of the project should be clarified; 
although the number of participants is increasing the 
specific benefits which it has brought have not yet been 
identified*. The project should be modified to permit this, 
to re-align it to SHE? principles® Institutional 
problems have still to be solved before the project can 
be replicable, even if positive benefits are found® 
2e An alternative interpretation of the resource situation in. 
Vihiga, pointing to the possible labour shortage, should 
be used to develop a wider range of products to be 
encouraged, with attention being paid the diversity of 
the resource base® 
3 e Experimentation with methods of inducing methods of 
change should be pursued« 
4® Consideration should be given to the possibility of 
using the existing institutional structure in Vihiga to 
a greater extents 
THE SEDP EEBOETIIIG- SYSTEM 
2,9 The reporting system consists of an administrative procedure 
to programme (phase), monitor,, control and report the implementation of 
individual SEDP projects® The officer responsible is the SEDP Area 
Co-ordinator who uses the system for "operations control"® Large phasing 
charts on the wall in his office enable easy monitoring of the extent to which 
objectives agreed upon in monthly meetings with Divisional staff have been 
achieved and allow the AC to push operations which have lagged behind® 
The phasing charts form the basis of a monthly report® The system, introduces 
network analysis and detailed action planning into field of rural development 
procedures® 
Objectives; 1® To increase the capacity of the Divisional Government 
machinery to programme, control and report project 
implementation,, 
Perceived Bottlenecks; 1® Unsystematic implementation procedures, leading to 
delays because implementation plans have not been 
properly phased, 
2S Absence of co-ordination and steering mechanisms 
in project implementation. 
3o Lack of a systematic reporting system. 
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Strategies; 1. Annual meeting of Divisional officers of different 
Ministries and Nairobi sectoral Ministry officials 
(the "lihkmen") to break down budgeted projects into their 
component operations® 
2® Enter these operations into "Annual Phasing Form", 
together with officer responsible, resources required 
and starting and completion dates® 
3® Transfer data to "Programming Chart" which functions as 
wall time-planning calendar® Planned operations are marked 
in with black ink® 
4® The programming charts become management tools, 
transforming the Area Co-ordinators office into an 
operations control room® At a monthly meeting of 
Divisional staff, monthly targets are written on the 
chart. At the next meeting, the AC marks progress on the 
chart, projects which lag in red ink, projects which are 
ahead or on time in green® This procedure allows him to steer 
the operations, and to prod lagging; operations without 
having to become commandeering. 
5® The monthly record provides the basis for the monthly 
report. This report keeps officers in the field and Nairobi 
informed and acts as a record of proceedings® 
Implementation: Over 30 major SEDP projects have been phased and are being 
controlled and reported upon according to the system,, 
The reporting system has been hailed by all Area Co-ordinators 
as a useful tool for co-ordinating and guiding the implementation 
of projects in a situation where they have little formal 
control® It allows systematic network analysis procedures and 
greatly facilitates action planning and implementation but a 
weakness is the time taken in producing and distributing the 
monthly report. The breakdown of budgeted projects into 
component operations is a difficult task which might require 
continuous services of more qualified personnel than 
available in the Division (meanwhile a checklist of component 
operations of projects has been prepared). It is not always 
easy to shoos© measurable but relevant indicators of 
progress® Some, especially self-help projects,are difficult 
to control with the system. Moreover, it does not evaluate 
the effect of implementation, but the implementation itselfo 
Efforts are now underway to develop an annual evaluation 
which tries to take account of effect. 
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The Reporting System seems eminently replicable9 especially 
in view of the newly established District Development Officers 
who will play a major role in implementing the recent District 
Planning policy of the Kenya Government0 
Recommendationsg The present system concentrates especially on individual 
projects® Methods of expanding the system to allow 
co-ordination of a programme of projects for achieving 
ultimate programme objectives have been explored, but need 
to be evaluated,, We further recommend that the system be 
modified to reflect the SRDP principles so as to monitor 
violations and infringements® 
THE LIVESTOCK MARKETING PROJECT (KAPENGURIA) 
2*10 This project encompasses more than the SRDP division; it was 
designed to serve the entire District, as well as to channel cattle coming 
from Turkana® 
.OJb,iectiyess To increase cattle trading and circulation of money in the 
range areas, as the prelude to gaining the acceptance by the cattle 
owners of organised ranches® 
Perceived 3_ottleneckss 1 ® Quarantines due to disease preventing regular 
livestock sales. 
The rangeland people5s dislike of organised 
ranches, 
3® Lack of adequate infrastructure, e.g® roads, dips, 
etc. 
Strategiess - 1a Setting up a series of sale yards and holding grounds 
equipped with fencing, water supply, and dip/spray 
facilities. 
23 Linking locational holding grounds with the main holding 
ground by fenced stock routes, with water points where 
necessary 
30 Acquisition of Mwisho .ADC farm, as the main holding ground, 
by the Veterinary Department-
4C Improvement of the roads to tne sale yards, for use by 
cattle traders, veterinary staff, and produce traders, 
5» Provision of water supplies, both for livestock and human 
consumption^ in the range areas. 
6s, Intensification of disease control. 
Implementation: 10 Implementation was slowed down by delays in the release 
of funds, staff, and equipment* 
2. There were difficulties obtaining adequate amounts of 
land from the Country Council and or local inhabitants 
for some holding grounds. 
3. Control by the Country Council hinders properly equipped 
sale yards. 
4. Control of Mwisho farm was obtained in July, 1972. 
5. The burden of holding ground fees, paid by the cattle 
traders, is being passed back to the cattle owners through 
lower selling prices. 
6. The system was put into operation in July, 1972, 
although work was yet to be completed on all the holding 
grounds. 
Evaluation: The system of holding grounds appears to be well organised, but 
there seems to be no basis for the assumption that improved 
marketing facilities will lead to a significant increase in 
cattle saleso Information on the consumption and spending 
patterns of the people is lacking, and therefore it is not known 
what would seirve as an incentive to increased sale of cattle, 
where overstocking exists. At present the project does not 
strongly adhere to the SEUP principles, but if redesigned might 
turn out to be a "breakthrough" strategy for pastural 
development. 
Recommendation: A careful monitoring of the cattle owners® reactions to the 
newly devised system should take place with a view to learning 
what modifications might bring more beneficial returns to 
the owners, and which might in turn stimulate cattle sales. 
Secondly, fact-finding and consultation With the rangeland 
peoples need to be carried out to permit the re-design of 
the project in accordance with the SRDP principles, and 
moreover, to learn new ways to gain the support of the people 
in this and other projects. 
THE SEQUENTIAL IMPbTWENTATIOU PROCEDURE (KWAhB) 
2,11 Kwale SRDP was launched a year later than other areas. 
Therefore it was able to leam some lessons, the most important being to 
avoid premature mobilization of people. Thus, mobilization was planned 
to be followed immediately by a project. This notion forms the cornerstone 
of the Sequential Implementation Procedure. The idea was locally bom 
and bred from common sense. We merely came along, recognized it as 
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valuable, and gave it a name. Though not formally requested in our terms of 
reference, we are reporting the procedure because it has high potential for 
replication,. 
Objectives To generate widespread public support for, and involvement 
in SEDP, 
Perceived Bottleneck; It was believed that existing public opinion was 
skeptical of G overament programmes and thus might 
constrain acceptance of SBDP. 
Strategy; Launching of SEEP to be followed by a popular, ready-to-go 
project which; 
(a) Meets with immediate widespread approval-
(b) Visibly involves and benefits many people at once-
(c) Has highly predictable short-run pay-off. 
It is reasoned that a project with such qualities 
following immediately upon mobilization will generate public 
goodwill, and increase & ivemment credibility, thus facilitating 
introduction of later less popular projects. 
Implementation; Projects were sequentially ordered for implementation 
according to the strategy criteria® Infrastructural 
facilities headed by water then roads satisfied the criteria 
well and were given priority of implementation. Agricultural 
activities, especially AI, fell at the bottom ~f the list. 
They will be implemented later. 
Evaluation; An experiment was made in trying out new criteria for selecting 
and scheduling projects in SBDP0 Greater use of existing 
resources was permitted through flexibility in phasing projects.. 
The reception of the first project has indicated the feasibility 
and the high pay-off of the criteria; the self-help enthusiasm 
shown for the water project is unprecedented. Flexibility in 
phasing has been used to ensure maintenance of the momentum. 
The blueprint and the prototype are simple and potentially highly 
replicable. 
Beeommendati011 s Thorough documentation and continued testing of this 
procedure is recommended. 
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III. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS POB EVALUATION 
10 IS THE PLANNING PBAM07OBK DEVELOPED POE SEDP ADEQUATE OE EPPECTIVE TO 
MEET ITS PBINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES? 
3a1 To assess whether the planning framework developed for 
the SBDP is adequate or effective to meet its principles and objectives, 
we must of necessity begin by outlining the planning framework thus far 
evolved for SEDP0 
3*2 The current (1970/74) Development Plan states that the 
planning of SBDP.. will be jointly done by field and headquarters officers 
(pp 174—175)o The planning framework developed immediately after the 
formation of the National Sural Development Secretariat (EFp) seems no 
have taken account of this declaration. In 1969 the National Rural 
Development Secretariat circulated to the Provincial Planning Officers 
(P.P.Os) a memo entitled "Checklist of Procedures to be used in 
Preparing Area Projects for the Special Sural Development Programme" . 
This memo was supposed to be the blueprint for preparing area based plans. 
Below we identify its principal tenets. 
3«3 In Initial stage of the planning process a survey of the 
area was to be carried out to identify: 
(i) the potential of the area; 
(ii) constraints preventing the potential from being 
realised; 
(iii) the programmes and actions to be taken to overcome 
these constraints; 
(iv) the resources needed to carry out these 
programmes. 
The survey was also intended to identify the existing programmes and to take 
account of the history of development in the area. 
In Stage _II, on the basis of information gathered in Stage I, the officer 
responsible for planning would draw up a draft strategy for the area. 
This draft was to be discussed with the District (technical) heads of 
department and their approval secured. Stage III was to consist of 
the P.P.O. preparing a draft plan, based on discussions with District 
heads, which he would forward to the NEDS (now the Begional and Physical 
Planning Unit). 
1 This memo was not dated, and had no reference number. 
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3«4 The NRDS had developed a method for assessing whether the 
procedures laid down for project identification had been adhered toj the 
process was explained in "Special Rural Development Programmes Procedures 
for Processing Proposals for Area Programmes" (EPD 237/01 of 11/8/69). 
According to the criteria specified in this document the Secretariat would 
check the draft plan during Stage IV. In addition, the draft plans would be 
circulated to the concerned Ministries as well as the "Sectoral Officers" 
in the Ministry of Planning for specific and general comments. On the basis 
of these comments, the Secretariat would prepare programme summaries 
(these came out as Outline Programmes) which were returned to the P.P.Cs 
for clearance with the District and Provincial Development Committees. 
Stage V was to consist of working out the details of the programme such 
as work plan, estimates, etc. after clearances were secured. The programme 
details were to be forwarded to the Secretariat which would secure departmental 
approval at the headquartersa In Stage VI implementation was to commence after 
these processes had been successfully completed. 
3o5 The planning framework described above was used mainly 
in the formative days to produce the 1st Draft Plans for five of the six 
phase 1 areas. There were however variations. In the first place, no 
surveys as called for in Stage 1 were made by the P.P.Os* . Instead the 
P.P.Os made use of the 1968 data where available and/or relied heavily on 
the material provided by the departments. 
3.6 Instead of actually planning the developments of the 
areas, some of the P.P.Os edited the departmental proposals in their 
respective areas which were ultimately forwarded in a single document to 
the 1IRDC Secretariat as the Draft Plan for the area. There were, of course, 
obvious limitations on the amount of time the P.P.Os could devote to this 
task since they also had to cater for routine development of the entire 
provinces they could not give SRDP the kind of attention it demanded. 
In some areas (e0g0 Migori, Vihiga, Mbere) the situation was further 
complicated by the presence of expatriates. In Mbere, for instance, the 
Government officers played only an informational, role in the initial stages. 
The Norwegians did the bulk of the work. That was later true of Migori and 
Vihiga where the local level officers abdicated their planning functions 
as soon as the technical assistance teams from respectively PAO-SIDA 
and USAID arrived in the area. The use of technical assistance in 
SRDP planning is regretted because it decreased the value of the lessons 
learnt from this first effort at decentralized area-based planning about 
local capabilities to carry out such planning
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3*7 The Ministry of Planning specifically introduced new structures 
into the SEDP planning process? the NEDC Secretariat and the linkmen system 
in the various Ministries® The linkmen system did not work well at the 
beginning because of the delay in selling the SEDP principles to the 
operating Ministries. Even today a number of linkmen in the Ministries 
continue to function only nominally. And in some cases, they are both 
inexperienced and lack "political" strength in their respective Ministries 
to get resources firmly committed to the SEDP. 
3*8 The role which the NEDC Secretariat has played since 
the start of SEDP is in many ways commendable® It deserves special 
mention for its probing role which made Ministries act even when 
initially reluctant. However, its planning role might have been 
better performed if the Secretariat had enough specialized manpower to 
allow it to release individuals on a routine basis to visit the programme 
areas, explain the principles and objectives of SEDP and advise on how 
to incorporate them in area plans® We have, in the main report, identified 
this to be a major bottleneck in the evolution of the SEDP. 
3o9 The role which the existing structures, especially the 
District and Provincial Development Committees, have played varies from 
one area to another. In general however, the Development Committees 
have mainly played the "approval role" being relegated to an inferior 
position on SEDP affairs. Such areas now have their own Development 
Committees at the Project level; this development has come about, not 
as a directive from Nairobi, but mainly as a result of initiative taken 
by the newly appointed Area Coordinators® The Migori set-up is the 
most remarkable we have encountered® Compared to the D.D.C., it is 
more adequate and effective, in that most of the SEDP proposals are 
now being developed by the local committee® Although we do not believe 
that the basis for planning should be the Division, we wish to draw the 
attention of the MPP to the Migori set-up because we feel it could 
function as a model for an effective District Development Committee. 
3.10 At this stage in the evolution of SEDP, a systematic 
planning framework for project planning and implementation could prove 
helpful® We feel it would be useful to provide a model which illustrates 
the step-wise procedures in project planning, design and execution based 
on the information contained in the Functional Model. To this end, we offer 
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the following problem-solving procedure for identifying and overcoming 
bottlenecks constraining the achievement of such objectives as increasing-
output, "employment and decentralizations 
f m PROBLEM SOLVHOPROGEDimE OP PROJECT PLAUITIITG AMP BiPLEMSHTATIOIT •• 1 " — — — — . — , — — -••• • . 
Is ?Phe Objsctive 
a: Determine through research the extent to which the objective 
has already been met as a result of existing strategies. 
b0 Estimate the greater extent to which the objective can be 
potentially achieved® 
c0 Formulate the objective on the basis of the gap needing to 
be filled between the present and the desired output, thereby 
specifying the magnitude of the problem to be solved® 
The Diagnosis 
a0 List all possible bottlenecks likely to be constraining the 
achievement- of the objective to a greater extent® 
bo Determine through research which are the most critical bottle-
necks.. .... .by formulating the diagnosis of the problem® 
ae Brainstorm to elicit ideas of strategies likely to overcome 
the critical bottlenecks0 
b® Check the feasibility and extent of pay-off of each idea on 
paper and by gathering opinion information from potential 
recipients® 
Co Formulate the strategy on. the basis of ideas which can be 
shown in principle to have high feasibility and pay-off« 
4° The Implementation 
a.® Design a,n experiment to test the feasibility and pay-off of 
the selected strategy, thereby also creating a visible 
prototypeo 
bo Execute the experiment using a step-by-step phasing, pacing 
and time planning framework, such as the reporting system, 
5o The Evaluation 
a0 Monitor and report progress to ensure that it remains on 
target, taking account of unforeseen developments® 
"b0 Evaluate the results of experimentation to determine the 
extent of success or failure in achieving the objective® 
c9 If failures review each step in the procedure one by one 
to see where you might have gone wrong before concluding 
that the strategy selected, does not work0 
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6 ® The Replication 
a<, If success, document step—by-step the strategy develop-
ment and testing procedures in order to create a blue-
print: to aid replications 
be Repeat the strategy on the same group, (if feasible) 
and on a wider scale within the experimental area to 
determine: ease:-and extent of replicability e 
ce If failure, back to the drawing-board;: if success, 
replicate elsewhere in the. country0 
We recommend that this problem-solving procedure be adapted and tested 
further- in developing SRDP projects0 
20 HI P1AMBTG- SRDE,, WAS. THE UHEXPLOITED POTENTIAL POR DEVELOPMENT.' OP 
EACH AREA ADEQUATELT ASSESSED? 
3«11 "Potential"1 is an ambiguous term w&ich refers to the possible 
resultant interaction between (l) natural resource; endowment, (2:), available 
technology^ (3) available capital,, (4) expected profitability, and 
(5), possible local acceptance® As such, the term "potential" does not pro-
vide a very useful concept for planners® Por instance, to an Israeli, with 
his ability to produce juicy apples from the desert, the low lands- in Kapen— 
guria.may be full of potential, while we usually call them low potential,, 
3*12. Given the. ambiquity of the. term, it would be unfair to casti-
gate SRDP for not having systematically and thoroughly assessed the poten-
tial of each SRDP area® However, a few. remarks can be made.' which might 
assist SRDE efforts in the future 0 
3®13 (l) It is not enough to assume that potential for develop-
ment- is vast: and self-evident so that a cursory review can replace a 
thorough consideration of possibilities,. Local people, who have to live 
off an area, are usually wise enough to optimally use existing resources. 
However, there are. major new technologies, new and useful bodies of know-
ledge. and sources of capital of which they are not aware or have no access 
to and which could be made available in a development effort® 
3014 (2) It is not enough to assess possibilities in view of. 
technical feasibility. Ill Kenya the individual producer still retains 
primacy as decision-maker and it is unlikely that he will be convinced of. 
the usefulness of a technical standard when it is not in his own interests:: 
in relation to the resources currently at his disposal an externally select-
ed technical target is quite likely to be uneconomic0 But he may bes open 
to being convinced that he should alter the existing allocation of his re-
sources in a particular direction, or to learning a new. technique provided, 
it is to his benefit, Thus, feasibility should also take; into account the 
relative advantage of an innovation for local people and acceptability of 
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•an innovation in terms of local aspirations, values, and norms0 In this 
connection, xt may be stated that SZDP projects have given too little 
attention to profitability for the rural family (,e«g0 cotton blocks, Mbere) 
and too little attention to consultation with local people in the plan-
ning stage^  Instead, attention was focussed in. many project areas on tech-
nical! , For example, in Vihiga, the "potential" for increasing 
hybrid maize yields appears to have been based on the difference between 
an average yield of, say, eight bags per acre, and what was considered to 
be. technically feasible, say, thirty bags per acre0 
5*15 (3.) Although technical feasibility is, as said, not, suffi-
cient • for potential assess..- ;nt, it Is necessary for ite Potential assess-
ment of an area should be based on thorough knowledge of available technol-
The attempt made in Si£DP to identify available technologies has been 
insufficients Especially in an experimental programme like 8EDP, an effort 
should at least be made to Identify methods, techniques, projects and pro-
grammes which have worked elsewhere0 As it .is, veiy few new technologies, 
except for such regulars as hybrid maize, have been identified,, It is 
new technologies that determine the possibilities of an area over and above 
those which the local people are already exploiting. For example, the intro-
duction of tea, pyrethrum and grade cattle gave value to the high and cold 
areas of the Aberdares and Mount Kenya®. 
3£.16 (4) It is recommended that. "potential" be broken up into 
its component parts of (a) technical potential, (b) profitability, and 
(c) acccptancc by the people; and that future efforts to estimate potential 
take account of all three0 
3ol7 It is further recommended that SPDP make a major effort to 
identify new available technologies and incorporate them into projects. 
An example is the new high yielding cow pea which has been developed by 
Leakey at I.Iakerere0 It is for identifying such possibilities that expertise 
should be used, not for implementation of projects. 
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3o WERE THE PROBABLE CONSTRAINTS PREVENTING THIS POTENTIAL PROM 
BEING MAXIMALLY EXPLOITED ADEQUATELY ASSESSED? 
3ol8 The answer to this question is very closely related 
to the previous question® If assessment is conducted in accordance 
with the recommendations elicited hy the previous question, then the 
assessment of the constraints goes on simultaneously with the assess-
ment of the potential. Identification of perceived needs and identifica-
tion of the perceived constraints are two aspects of one process. 
3.19 There appear to he two appects to the assessment of 
constraintss identification, and measurement. The former process can 
he assisted hy a systematic classification of bottlenecks such as 
that provided in Part 1, pages 18 to 22® The absence of such a 
classification to date is one reason why the search for suitable 
strategies to overcome bottlenecks has lacked focus; perhaps the 
bottlenecks were considered to be self-evident, like the potential 
for development. The emphasis on the shortage of capital and lack 
of know-how — typical panaceas - would appear to bear this out. A 
systematic listing, however, forces planners to examine the relevance 
of other types of bottlenecks, and assists them to appraise each one 
critically before selecting those which are the most important to be 
overcome. In relation to encouraging local participation in planning, 
the best use for the cross-tabulation of objectives and bottlenecks 
is in searching for local interpretations of the bottlenecks to local 
development initiatives. The classification system should be used 
as a prompting device in the process of identifying local assessments 
of potential and constraints. 
3o20 It is recommended, therefore, that SRDP personnel be 
made familiar with the bottleneck classification system, and become 
competent in the use of it for the purpose of identifying constraints 
on the attainment of the potential of an area, and selecting experimental 
strategies to be tested® 
4® TO WHAT EXTENT ARE SRDP PROJECTS INTEGRATED OR COORDINATED WITH 
ON-GOING PROGRAMMES AND TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE ON-GOING PROGRAMMES 
BEEN LABELLED SRDP? 
3®21 So-far, most SRDP programmes, and all of those included 
in the case studies in this report, except, perhaps, Mbere, are being 
treated as separate entities over and above on-going projects. They 
are squeezed in or added onto, rather than integrated with, on-going 
projects® 
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This becomes evident at the junior field staff level, with junior 
field assistants complaining, justifiably, that SRDP has simply 
been added onto their normal duties. This condition may be relieved 
by accepting some re-arrangements so that SRDP programmes replace 
other programmes which are cut down or eliminated® This calls for 
considerably more support from operating Ministries than SRDP 
currently appears to get, Ministries being prepared to consider 
reducing other activities in order to augment the resources put 
into SRDP., It also calls for SRDP programmes to be considered in 
conjunction with on^going programmes to see how they can best be 
integrated. Integrating SRDP projects with each other and SRDP 
projects - . ? are both essential if the 
projects are to constitute a programme of project strategies 
designed to achieve ultimate objectives to the maximum. Wot even 
within SRDP are individual projects always integrated. In Tetu, 
for example, the extension pilot project, the 4K Club project, and 
the farm management project operate quite independently of one 
another although they seem ideally suited to integration; all are 
SRDP. 
3022 The extent to which on-going programmes have been 
relabelled SRDP is another question. In nearly all SRDP areas all 
development activities are labelled SRDP® There is some justification 
for doing this; label everything SHDP to gi"3 an impression that 
SRDP is moving 9 to get more commitment to the total development effort, 
and so on. But it is important to resist this temptation for several 
reasons. If the "special" characteristics of SRDP programmes are not 
recognised they tend very quickly to disappear, and most of the 
value of SRDP is lost® The SRDP principles offer clear guidelines 
for determining what is and. what is not SRDPo If a project or programme 
is labelled SRDP it should be made to adhere to SRDP principles and 
objectives. Relabelling is permissible if an on-going project is a 
supportive or integral part of an SRDP experiment. 
3023 There is a side to the argument; whether a 
project or programme is funded by SRDP or not® A project should only 
be eligible for SRDP funding if it adheres to the principles and 
objectives of SRDP or is a supportive project. But there is no 
reason why a project not funded by SRDP but adhering to its principles 
and objectives should not also be labelled SRDP® 
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3o24 We strongly recommend that the SBDP label be kept for 
projects that adhere to SHDP principles and objectives, and that 
greater effort be made to integrate SRDP projects with each other,, 
5. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES TO ACCELERATE 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SRDP AREAS NEWER OR MORE EFFECTIVE THAN 
THOSE WHICH THEY REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE? 
3®25 Bottlenecks exist because existing strategies are 
proving inadequate to overcome them0 SRDP came into being as a result 
of acknowleding this fact® It was intended to "identify and 
concentrate on critical development gaps and bottlenecks". This 
implies that SRDP should focus upon developing and testing alternative 
strategies for overcoming bottlenecks and filling gaps to determine 
which of them are more effective replacements of existing strategies0 
This is usually not an easy task. It has been made more difficult 
in SRDP because the SRDP principles and objectives have not been 
sufficiently understood and clarifiedo 
3026 Even so, SRDP has been responsible for a number of 
striking innovations in the development of completely new strategies 
and approaches to rural development. The introduction of Area 
Coordinators, linkmen, and the reporting system have filled important 
development gaps, and are acting to overcome a number of administrative 
bottlenecks. Several of the area-based agricultural extension schemes 
(Migori Selective Extension, Kwale Model Farmers, Tetu Extension 
Experiment); the Migori and Mbere schemes for credit to input stockists; 
the Vihiga maiae credit programme; labour-intensive road building; 
sequential implementation in Kwale; and the Mbere agri-service station 
are all examples of strategies and approaches that are new0 One of 
the problems is that some of the strategies that are new do not look 
very promising, as the appendix papers indicate. Yet, if most of the 
projects falling in this category are reassessed, by those concerned, 
in light of recommendations in this report, modifications, amendments, 
etc. in the strategies could put these projects on the path to effectively 
accelerating rural development. 
3027 Other strategies and approaches are not new, but they 
are made more effective than before by SRDP. Many of the cattle dip 
projects are likely to be more effective because of complementary 
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SRDP activities. The PAO fertiliser demonstration programme in 
Migori and Vihiga, the water development programmes, and many of 
the agricultural production programmes are examples of programmes 
likely to he more effective with SRDP, although none of them is newQ 
3s28 SRDP experience has shown that one of the most 
difficult problems is to get new, potentially successful strategies 
and approaches developed® This is a problem that still has to be 
faced. Although it is possible to list items that are new, the 
overwhelming impression is 01 programmes that are predominantly more 
of the same. We recommend more effort to try to get new approaches 
developed. One way of doing this is to have brainstorming sessions 
within and between areas, Ministries and donors to identify and 
develop viable strategies to replace those presently being used to 
try to overcome critical development bottlenecks. In this brain-
storming, it would be crucial to involve the rural people in the SRDP 
areas for they, more than anyone else, know what they will and will 
not accept. 
6. ARE THE IMPLEMENT ATI Oil STAGES EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO TRY OUT THESE 
NEW STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES? 
3®29 In the early days of SRDP, there were many implementation 
problems delays in releasing resources, inadequate attention to sequencing 
and phasing, and the modification of programmes out of all recognition 
in the implementation process. The delays in releasing resources have 
already been mentioned and in some Ministries is is a problem that 
is still far from being solved. Inadequate attention to sequencing 
and phasing were particularly mentioned in the Mbere report. The 
influence of the implementation process on the whole character of a 
programme was illustrated in the Vihiga case where the consequences 
were particularly serious. The whole character of the Vihiga maize 
credit programme was altered beyond recognition in the implementation 
process. Changes in the implementation stages made in light of the 
field situation may be positive. The criterion must be9 however, that 
modifications are made in adherence to SRDP principles and objectives. 
An example of some positive changes occuring in the implementation process 
appears in the Tetu Pilot Project (see Appendix E). We would still stress, 
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though, the need for carefully planning the implementation stages 
when designing a project0 
3o30 Many of the initial problems have been rectified by 
the reporting system® Implementation stages are being defined, 
responsibilities are being specifically assigned, and timing and 
phasing are being more carefully planned® Many of the problems that 
have occurred through the inadequacy of implementation stages are 
being solved® 
3®31 We recommend continued development and streamlining 
of the reporting system which hopefully could be modified to incorporate 
the problem solving procedures presented earlier® We further recommend 
that the system be modified to reflect the SEDP principles so as to 
monitor violations and infringements® 
7® WERE THE MMDS, STAFF, EXPERTISE, ADMINISTRATIVE COST, SPECIAL 
TRAINING, EQUIPMENT, ETC. ESTIMATED FOR AND PROVIDED TO SRDP 
AREAS INADEQUATE, ADEQUATE OS MORE THAN ADEQUATE? 
3®32 In a sense one can never have enough of these resources; 
nothing ever seems adequate® A distinction between resources required 
to make the programme experimental and those required to operate the 
programme without its experimental content has already been recommended 
in this report® The use of local resources to operate the programme 
itself, and additional resources only in so far as they help to make the 
programme experimental has also been recommended® During experimentation, 
the ceiling for incurring expenditure to make the programme experimental 
is limited by the availability of resources and the extent to which 
the strategy being tested has a likelihood of success® For operating the 
programme on a continuing basis, more care is needed to ensure that 
resource demands are replicable0 
3o33 In the early stages of SHDP there have been frequent 
delays and much red tape to cut to secure the release of funds, staff, 
equipment, etc. These delays have created a feeling of inadequacy of 
funds when they are most needed. Apart from complaints about delays and 
inflexibility of red tape, we believe that the resources so far budgeted 
and released have been adequate for the purposes of operating the SHDP 
projects and programmes, but not always adequate to make them experimental. 
More generous assistance may be required in the future as the experimental 
aspect of SRDP is more widely understood and implemented. 
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3034 The use of expertise needs special mention® Tetu, 
Vihiga and Mbere have regular access to a variety of experts from 
outside, many of them resident in the areas concerned® Migori, 
Kapenguria and Ewale have to make do with locally available expertise, 
and occasional visits from outside experts who are not resident® 
The opinion of area-based local personnel leans to having an advisory 
team of centrally based multi-disciplinary experts to be on call to 
offer specific advice and assistaiice when requested. Many have voiced 
reservations about resident advisers, on the grounds that they take 
over rather than assist in programme and project planning, design 
and execution, and that they have a negative influence on local 
initiative e.nd involvement. We concur with 1hese views and recommend 
more use of centrally based teams of experts,and less reliance on 
experts resident locally or assigned exclusively to one particular 
area0 
8. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES DEVISED FOR SRDP 
PROJECTS REPLICABLE IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE? 
3035 This evaluation concludes that this question cannot 
be answered definitively at present, partly in view of the insufficient 
time for which projects have been in operation, and partly in view 
of the deficiencies of particular projects with respect to the other 
principles of SRDP 
In Part I it was stated that replicability was the hoped-for 
outcome of finding a successful strategy, developing a prototype, and 
forming blueprints of it® None of the strategies so far being tried 
has reached the stage where it can be said unambiguously that it is 
sufficiently successful for it to have achieved prototype status, 
with the exception of the sequential implementation procedure (Kwale)® 
Nevertheless, there are several ideas and parts of projects which 
have been extended and other aspects proven effective enough to be 
replicated® The Tetu re-training project for PTC teachers has already 
been used for FTS teachers from other parts of the country; SRDP 
experience with Area Coordinators was partly responsible for the 
introduction of the 1)D0 on a national basis; the idea of credit for 
input stockists which first developed in response to a local, implementation 
problem in Migori is now being used in Mbere and Tetu as well; the 
maize credit package in Vihiga is being extended to large numbers of 
farmers within Vihiga Division© The inputs to stockists and. Maize 
Credit Package are being extended before a successful prototype has been 
developed® 
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3o37 With respect to certain other projects, evidence 
that the principles and objectives of SRDP are being respected gives 
some guidance as to the likelihood of their eventually attaining 
replicability9 once they reach the stage of prototype and blueprint 
development. The staff retraining and curriculum development strategies 
of the extension pilot project (Tetu), and the loans to input 
stockists (Migori and Mbere), may come into this category. 
3.38 Other projects require substantial reassessment and 
modification in terms of the principles and objectives of SRDP before 
this stage can be reached; the 4K clubs (Tetu), the farm management 
project (Tetu), and the selective extension - formerly master 
farmers® — project (Migori), amongst others. 
3®39 Certain strategies to overcome programme bottlenecks 
appear to have reached the point where limited testing of their 
replicability is appropriate, for example the notion of area 
co-ordination and the reporting system. 
3.40 It is recommended that all project and programme strategies be 
reviewed and, where necessary, modified, in the light of ther*requirements 
for replicability discussed in Part 1; only then will it be possible to 
make clear statements about the feasibility and extent of replication. 
It is also recommended that mechanisms for replication, especially by 
DOC's, are developed. 
9. HOW EFFECTIVE HAS THE ROLE OF THE AREA C0-0RDINAT0R, DISTRICT 
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES, AMD TIIE MFP IN ITS CAPACITY OF OVERALL 
C 0-0RDINAT0R BEEN? 
3„41 The Area Co-ordinator seems to have become the executive 
officer for the SRDP areas in spite of formidable problems he has 
had to face. He co-ordinates without the powers of administrative 
authority; he is the co-ordinating arm of MFP, yet he is located 
in the Office of the President; his terms of reference are rather vague 
and ill-defined. Nevertheless he has managed to turn these weaknesses 
into strengths usually by the force of his own personality and diplomacy. 
The very indeterminateness of his position enables him to move fairly 
freely within the administration where others would be constrained 
by their positions. He has facilitated the speedy release of resources 
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many times because of this flexibility0 In his hands the reporting 
system has been turned into a powerful instrument for overcoming 
administrative bottlenecks by spurring laggardly officials, both 
local and central, to more decisive SRDP action® These achievements 
have been interpreted by others as signs of his authority and 
importance in the government administration® He represents a 
successfully filled gap in the organization of SHOP® 
3®42 The District Development Committees have not as yet 
lived up to their potential.- Par from being instruments for 
involving local people in SRDP areas, they have served largely as a 
forum for district and provincial officials, and for local MPs® The 
DDCs do not adequately represent the local community® They might be 
able to achieve some degree of local representation by including 
leaders of harambee committees, school and church committees, local 
work groups, progressive farmer/trader associations, cooperatives, 
etc®, which really are close to local community interests in a way 
which politicians are not® For local participation to be meaningful, 
local representatives who have close ties with the local community 
must be allowed the chance to influence decisions® 
3=43 Discussions at DDCs are often guarded and formal, and 
frequently not associated with issues that are important to SRDPf 
the principles and objectives of SRDP are not well-known or salient 
to thera, thereby failing to provide them with useful criteria for 
assessing SRDP projects and project proposals® One development is 
worthy of consideration in this;- context® The local project advisory 
committee being tried out in Migori appears to be fulfilling the 
role originally envisaged for the DDCs0 
3o43 The Ministry of Finance and Planning as overall 
co—ordinator has been responsible for some considerable achievements 
despite lacking the administrative and political power to direct 
the operating Ministries, many of which have been lethargic in 
fulfilling the role envisaged for them as part of SRDP® One of the 
problems is the fact that the JTPDC (which was set up to provide this 
authority) does not function very effectively; MFP is responsible 
for planning and implementation without having effective control over 
the policies or actions of the operating Ministries0 It lacks the 
flexibility and freedom of movement within Government enjoyed by the 
Area Coordinators® Yet it has had considerable success in overcoming 
some of the main bottlenecks of SRDP organisation and control through 
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the area coordination system, the reporting system, the lihkman 
system, and the maintenance of good donor relationships® It could 
have had much more success if the existing machinery for the 
direction of programme, in particular the NEDC, were used more 
fully o 
3„44 So far, MFP has heen more concerned with evolving 
a viable system of SEDP organisation and control than with enforcing 
SEDP principles and objectives® This has been no mean task since 
the system had to be developed from scratch, often in the face of 
outside scepticism® It is understandable, therefore, that MFP has 
often turned a blind eye to infringements of SEDP principles® This 
tendency receives additional impetus from constant outside pressure 
to show visible results on the ground® 
3®45 As MFP overcomes the bottlenecks of organisation 
and control^new bottlenecks emerge® The SHDP areas are beginning 
to feel the pinch of inadequate planning and implementation resources, 
which seemed less important before® In particular, SRDP areas are 
beginning to feel the lack of adequate resources for experimentation 
rather than on-going operations® MPP is strong on administration, 
but weak on providing those extra resources crucial to making SEDP 
experimental® 
10® TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE LOCAL COMMUNITIES DEEM ADEQUATELY INVOLVED 
IN THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OP SRDP AND TO WHAT EXTENT 
HAS THIS INVOLVEMENT BEEN PREMATURE, TIMELY, OR TOO LATE? 
3®50 The general conclusion of this evaluation is that 
local involvement in planning and implementation has been virtually 
absent 0 This area has suffered more than most from the over-riding 
problem of unclear principles, objectives and strategies® Local 
involvement appeared twice in the original primary objectives of 
SRDP (active participation, and self-generating rural development), 
both times vaguely® Little attention has been devoted to the 
creation of strategies to achieve involvement in the past, and in 
absence of pressure from the centre, area teams have tended to ignore 
the objective® Areas where the problem was tackled met with widely 
varying degrees of success. 
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3.51 A large part of the full report addresses itself 
to the problem of how to gain maximal level, of involvement for an 
effective planning system and implementation process. Too often 
the question asked has been "what can be done to involve people 
meaningfully without making it impossible to proceed with development? 
rather than "how much involvement is wanted". An attempt is made in 
the following remarks to answer the former question. 
3052 Some local involvement is absolutely necessary, in order 
to avoid local, ignorance and alienation, which may cause sabotage of the 
development work through? 
(a) miscomprehension of the use/maintenance of a new structure; 
(b) suspicion of the motives of the developers; 
(c) opposition to project aims or even minor aspects of them; 
(d) growth of dependent populations who expect that the 
government will always see what is needful and do it for 
them, thus defeating the possibility of achieving self-
generating development. 
A second objective of local involvement, achieved through the training of 
local leaders and their groups, is the elimination of government planning 
bottlenecks such as: 
(a) planning with insufficient data; 
(b) failure to anticipate local resistance or support; 
(c) failure to maximise the use of local resources. 
3053 In this context "local people" are defined as resident 
non—officials together with low-level indigenous field staff at locational 
and sublocational levels. After much consideration it was decided that 
the maximum achievement of involvement objectives, with the lowest level 
of interference with other development objectives occurs when the 
involvement effort concentrates on the "local interest group". This is 
a group of local, residents or temporary emigrants organised around a 
common factor, ecg0 Harambee committees, school and church committees, 
local work groups 1 nd on age or sex, progressive farmer/trader 
associations, co-operatives, regional city-based migrant societies, etc. 
It is believed that these purposeful grass-roots interest clusters 
have great potential for identification of needs, area-based bottle-
necks, strategy feasibility, and even innovative strategy creation. 
Furthermore they can be identified fairly easily, and drawn into 
planning and implementation: local field staff (especially Community 
Development) can be asked to list the groups, and the leaders can be 
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trained briefly in planning techniques and SRDP principles and 
objectives, and then brought in for consultation thereafter. 
3.54 The greatest effort to fulfil the involvement objective 
has centred everywhere on Informing the people through gigantic 
introductory barazas in each SRDP area. Except in Kwale, the effects of 
this were gravely miscalculated; Kwale, beginning later, benefited from 
the failures of the others. Public announcements should not occur 
until at least one large project is through the planning phase, and 
then the conditions under which the local boom is to occur should be 
stressed, to avoid raising expectations unrealistically. But without 
publicity how is local involvement to occur in planning? The compromise, 
based on the frequent finding that informal communication is much less 
regarded as a committment than formal communication, is unofficial 
consultation. As yet, it is only after local leaders have been recruited 
to training programmes that they are directly informed of the possibilities 
which may exist, given their hard work; during the preliminary stages the 
possibility of extraordinary development is not mentioned to them. 
Unofficial involvement and indirectly that of their groups in planning and 
allocating their own scarce resources among various semi-local projects 
should rapidly reduce their aspirations to a realistic level, a further 
benefit. Thus the malfunctioning of involvement attempts in the past 
in SRDP is to be remedied by more involvement, not less. 
3.55 Self-help involvement in implementation opens both dangers 
and possibilities of accelerated (and locally generated) development. 
Self-help is ideally a grass-roots phenomenon, and when divisional-level 
and higher politicians take over it degenerates into a load of unofficial 
taxes wiich stultify local initiative and consume local resources for 
political ends. SRDP should work on strategies to solve this problem, 
and some have been suggested in the full report„ There is also a 
tendency for SRDP planners who find a strong self-help movement 
(for dips, water, etc.) in their area to capitalize on it by taking it 
over, with or without providing additional support. Not enough attention 
is paid to whether: 
(i) that project is consonant with SRDP principles and objectivesj 
(ii) the local effort is already sufficient to finish the job; 
(iii) the local initiative and enthusiasm to continue self-
help efforts or ability to maintain the completed project 
might be destroyed by government involvement. 
~ 54 -
3«56 It is recommended, that efforts be made to encourage 
greater involvement in the form of training and consultation of local 
interest group leaders, facilitated by greater de-centralisation of 
decision-making to the staff at the Divisional/District level; that 
only informal consultation should be pursued until the first 
implementation phase is ready* but thereafter full use of all possible 
media; and that special consideration should be given to the role of the 
self-help groups in both SRDP and on-going development. 
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BACKGROUND HFOEMATIQEI 
The location of the people, the ethnic composition of the population 
and geographic factors all need to be accounted for and constantly kept in 
mind when evaluating SRDP plans and projects in Kapenguria Divisions 
GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
Extremes of geographic conditions prevail in the Divisions high-
potential highlands and low-potential lowlands, divided by steep escarpmentse 
Approximately one-fifth of the Division consists of the fertile highlands, 
altitude ranging as high as 119 000 feet*, with rainfall averaging 50 inchess 
These higher areas comprise Lelan*, Linage! and to some extent Sook location, 
which is separated from the others by the lowlands® All of Mnagei and lelan 
consists of steepj broken hills and valleys, some valleys lending themselves 
well for mixed farmings In the higher areas of Mnagei and lelan, soil erosion 
and destruction of the water catchment present an ever dangerous possibility 
1 of reducing the farming and grazing potential® 
The lower region, comprising Riwa? Kipkomo and part of Sook location 
receives approximately 30" of rainfall a year in some areas, but as in the 
highlands unpredictability of rainfall restricts development potentials In 
addition evaporation, run-off, and a sandy soil in most parts preclude the 
possibility of developing agriculture to any great extent. However, the 
Suam idver running along the extreme edge of Riwa presents possibilities 
for agricultural development with the establishment of an irrigation system. 
2 
Sook location presents good potential for both cattle and some agriculture 
but its isolated position in addition to the general lack of information 
about the area hinders development of its potential® 
The geographic factors impinge on the ultimate achievement of SRDP 
objectives® Firstly ? the division represents two diverse geographic areas, 
each of which require different strategies. The isolated nature of the low-
lands, with at least part of its population being migratory, presents 
difficulties in improving services and extending knowledge, Secondly, the 
isolation of the Icelanders has kept them in a state of parochialism, 
unreceptive to change® Thirdly * the rather harsh conditions mitigate 
against systematic collection of information, thus little factual 
information exists on which strategies can be based0 
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PGPUIATIGtl 
The people of the division number 46?075» according to the 1969 
Censusi, One half of these reside in the two highland locations of Lelan 
and Linagei9 the latter containing slightly over one-third of the entire 
divisional population0 In these two highlands locations it is estimated 5 that about one-third of the population are non-Pokot immigrants® 
The inhabitants of the highlands (herein referring to Lelan and 
Mhagei) seem more inclined to accept changes than the lowl/i'hdero and in the viian one jr'okci; * 
highlands the immigrants more Care must be taken to make certain that 
the opportunity to derive benefits from the SBDP programme are distributed 
in an equitable matter among the ethnic groups in the highlands® Currently 
most officers are abiding by this9 but with pressure to get projects on the 
ground they should never lose sight of this goal® Attention should also be 
given to ensure that the Icelanders*, such as around Cheperaria and Kongelai, 
are given ample opportunity to be drawn into projects such as maize demon-
stration plots and women® s clubs0 Moreover, special projects must be 
designed to meet the needs of the pastoral lowlanders<> If constant care 
does not occur, the programme will benefit only a certain portion of the 
peoples of Eapenguria Division| this would violate the objectives of SRDP 
which aim at a more equitable distribution of income and welfare generating 
activitieso 
P3MPII6 PROCEDURE 4 
Kapenguria Division was selected in March 1969 as one of the six 
first-phase SRDP areas? representing a "pastoral" area0 This decision was 
announced at a West Pokot District Development Committee meeting in late 
March by the Provincial Planning Officer® The following month the District 
staff were "asked to prepare detailed and costed proposals for each of the 
locations" © They brought these forth in rather rough form at a meeting on 
5 
7th Maya The presented proposals were then reviewed by the PPO, Provincial 
Sural Development Adviser^ and an agricultural economist on loan from the 
Ministry of Agriculture® 
In mid-July a draft plan providing an explanation of the proposed 
projects was submitted to Nairobi by the PPO and detailed appendices were 
sent in the following weeks® By September the Draft Programs was completed 
and during the next two months comments were forthcoming on the Draft 
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Programme § leading to its slight amendment, Then the Draft Programme was 
shortened into an Outline Programme by the 1TBDC Secretariat staff, and it 
was this brief Outline Programme which was approved by the NBDC In January 
1970e6 
The Outline Programme closely corresponds to the proposals set 
forth in the Draft Programme^ with minor changes in sequencings But the 
interrelationship between the crop production - trade programme slated 
for the highlands and the programme to develop cattle sales in the low-
lands appears only in the Outline Programme, The description and 
evaluation herein refers to the Outline Programme since it was the one 
officially approved for the District 9 though the Draft Programme is 
regarded by Headquarters as of equal status and importance in providing 
the details for the Outline• 
The involvement of the West Pokot District Development Committee 
in the effective planning process was marginal. As the PPO stated, 
"Original ideas for projects were put up by members of the West Pokot 
District Development Committeee In the process of preparation these 
ideas have been drastically out short, reduced, amended, etc0 until in 
7 
some cases they no longer bear much resemblance to their original", 
But while the PPO was preparing various facets of the plan, a feedback 
system with members of the WEJ)DQ was maintained, The key role played 
by the PPO and the secondary role of the WPPC must be assessed in light 
of the demands placed upon the District staff to produce detailed plans 
within a two week period® Given such little time for careful, well-thought-
out ideas in the light of SBDP principles and objectives, their proposals 
were little more than a non-integrated list of projects to be pursued. 
This thrust the burden of the planning onto the PPO who was pressed by 
Headquarters for "quick action".'' 
LIVESTOCK MARKETXffG M P CBOP PRODUCTION 
TEE PHI 9 
The plan for the Division rests primarily on increasing the sale 
of livestock from the lower areas9 and increasing crop production, dairying 
and sheep keeping in the upper zone. It was hoped that increased sale of 
stock in the lowlands to a national market would lead to greater opportunity 
for marketing foodstuffs from the higher areas in the low areas. The 
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incentive for the Icelanders was to be the provision of better stock marketing 
facilities, viewed as allowing "a greater off-take of animals for the national 
market, if it is accompanied by a reliable inflow of foodstuffs from the higher 
areas, for many of the lowland people do not enjoy a surplus of stock and would 
fall below subsistence level if they sold stock in any quantity© The incentive 
to improved animal husbandry lies on successful stock sales and a reliable 
alternative food supply from the higher zonec In turn, the incentive to better 
10 
agricultural production lies in a steady market in the lowlands" 0 It was also 
pointed out it was important for traders to be located in the lowlands 0 
To help facilitate increased marketing of cattle the Progrsame calls 
for the acquisition of a large holding ground/sale yard (Mwisho Farm.}, 
reorganizing existing holding grounds and sale yards and improving facilities 
on each, and the establishment of new holding grounds ® In addition an intensive 
effort to organize regular livestock markets in collaboration with KMC buying 
agents was to take places 
Increased crop production was to be encouraged by a concerted effort 
in establishing farm demonstration plots, promoting soil conservation, intensified 
extension work, and extending and improving the existing tractor hire services® 
These activities were phased so that the effort would be concentrated in one 
location at a time* The erop(s) to be promoted and the organization of the 
project were to vary according to the conditions prevailing in each location^ 
EVALUATION OF THE PLAN 
The strategy is based on the strong assumption that better market 
facilities for cattle coupled with the availability of upland food products 
will automatically lead to the lowland Pokot selling more cattle® No systemat-
ically collected information exists to validate this assumption,, • 
The problem is that very little factual information exists about 
the lowlanders, such as the average family size, the size of the herd a 
family needs for subsistence, the number of families entirely dependent upon 
cattle for their subsistence9 the number who have land for arable cropping, 
consumer and food items desired, the existing informal marketing system of 
food products etc, It is generally known that cattle play very significant 
roles in Pokot socie-ty, e^ gc ritual purposes^ to create social support, and 
11 as legal tender^ which tend to mitigate against the selling of thems 
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The Programme calls for a surrey to be conducted during the 
preparatory stages: "a sociological survey in the lower area of the 
social structure and values as a prelude to determining, patterns of 
livestock husbandry for the future". But this was never undertaken. 
Until fact-finding is carried out In the lowlands and the people" s 
views of needed projects are ascertained, the plans for the region and 
the projects implemented are based on assumed outcomes. 
The basic minimum required research on which planning could be 
based is twofold® Firstly, information on the community leadership 
structure should be obtained so that a viable plan to introduce innovations 
through and by •'"hem can be devised® As shown in the Comilla Project in 
12 
East Pakistan 1 ' and serving as a basis for proposed modern ranching Axi 
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Sukumaland, in more traditional communities introduction of innovations 
can occur at an accelerated rate if community acceptance is gained® A 
primary explanation for this is that traditional structure usually does 
not sanction individual achievement unless the members of the group 14 
perceive that they can benefit®" " Secondly, the felt needs of the lowland 
Pokot must be learned, say from their formal and informal community leaders. 
That is, what do they perceive as the major problems of their area? Problems 
related to health, education, subsistence, inadequate infrastructure, social 
or economic conditions? Then the people must be involved in seeking solution(s) 
to their problems, (Here enters SEDP and a viable programme for the lowlands;, 
There must be a felt need for the people to be motivated to adopt a new 
behavioural pattern and to accept a new infrastructure. If this procedure 
is followed, it holds great possibilities for designing a programme which 
could serve as a major breakthrough in reaching the lowland Pokot, 
The possibility of increased selling of food crops on the national 
market is dismissed in the Programme, The justification, given for focusing 
on increasing intra-district trade is that agricultural produce grown in 
neighbouring Trans Nzoia "enjoys lower opportunity costs in crop production. 
Thus there is limited scope for national marketing of agricultural produce 
from the higher areas of Kapenguria" e This matter should have been 
investigated more thoroughly for although transport costs are higher still 
an adequate profit margin could make the growing of certain crops worthwhile. 
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LIVESTOCK MARKETING- PROJECT 
The details of the livestock marketing project based on a system 
of sale yards and holding grounds were worked out by the local officers. 
The new system was put into operation in June 1972, although some of the 
holding grounds were not yet completely equipped. Therefore at this time 
I can only report on the reasons for the system, its organization, and 
intended outcome in addition to the reasons for the delayed completion 
of the holding groundse 
Under the previous system innoculation and sale yards were under 
the control of the County Council® In the past, individuals wishing to sell 
cattle had to have their cattle innoculated 21 days prior to an auction® 
The owner paid a Shs;2/25 innoculation fee per animals Then he was obliged 
to keep the innoculated cattle in isolation during the 21 day innoculation 
'Ml 
period, although this practice was seldom followed. The innoculation of 
cattle in time for sale rested on ample notice being given of auctions, and 
being able to get to the proper officer for the innoculation« When the cattle 
were brought forth at an auction, if the owner did not receive a bid which he 
regarded as a fair price, then he would withdraw his cattle from the sale® 
Thus there were many factors which led to insecurity in marketing one® s 
cattle. The new system was devised to rectify these things and, moreover, 
to alio?/ for continuous local selling of cattle® Formerly, livestock 
marketing has been hindered by closure of the market for as much as a year, 
due to foot and mouth disease. 
Under the newly devised system, if a quarantine exists, auctions 
can still take place and the cattle will remain on the holding grounds® 
Currently a rotational procedure will ensure that sales are held at each yard 
at a 3-month intervals 
The livestock marketing project covers more than just the SRDP area® 
The intention is to funnel livestock coming from the Turkana region as well 
as inside West Pokot District through a series of holding grounds® From the 
sale yards (a few of the holding grounds have their own sale yards) 
cattle a.; moved on hoof or lorry immediately to the nearest holding ground® 
As the cattle proceed through the series of holding grounds they are 
umoculated, dipped, sent through spray races and grazed® The holding ground 
fees are paid by the traders, Shss3/-= per head per month in addition to a 
Shss2/25 innoculation fee per heads 
Establishment of the newly devised livestock marketing system has 
been hindered in some instances by lack of support from the local people , 
At times requests from West Pokot District Development Committee to set 
aside land for extending the holding grounds system were not fully granted 
by the County Council, Another time the County Council allocation was 
rejected by the people in that regions for the Pkopoch holding ground the 
County Council agreed to grant 1700 acres but the local people would agree 
only to give 700 of these acres® When a fresh attempt v as scale ten months 
later to enlarge the same holding grounds*, the request "sparked off sharp 
15 reaction from the local men who were politically motivated" * 
The issue of control over sale yards and innoculation has also 
caused difficulty« In the past sale yards and innoculation fell under the 
control of the County Council which derived revenue from, these aetivxcxes* 
When the livestock Marketing Officer approached the County Council about 
taking over some of these responsibilities, he "received a very Insulting 
reply® The Agricultural Department complained that it had been blamed 
16 profusively by the County Council" 0 
The County Council continues to be responsible for running the 
sale yards and collects a cess of Shss10/- per head of cattle® But, 
because of the poor financial state of the County Council almost none of 
this money is channelled into maintenance of or new building on sale yards® 
Overall, the sale yards appear in bad conditions 
Completion of the holding grounds has also been hindered by delays 
in obtaining necessary staff, labourers^ equipment, and a lorry® Requests 
for such were made early in 1971 but action on the requests was slow* 
EVALUATION OP THE LIVESTOCK MARKETING- PROJECT 
The local staff has carried"out the establishment of the new holding 
grounds system in a highly commendable fashion, 
Although various difficulties have been encountered, none so far 
has been a major, insurmountable barrier. It "would be hoped, though, that 
requests to Headquarters for approval of projects and issuance of AXEtewould 
receive more immediate attention, or that the reasons for delay would be 
conveyed to the district officer in charge,, The difficulties which have 
arisen from lack of support from some of the local people should be regarded 
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as expected since the project's request for control of two revenue-deriving 
County Council activities and for land conflicts with vested interests. It 
is understandable that the local people are unwilling to have large tracts 
of land taken away from their normal pattern of use age, especially if the 
people are not convinced that the proposed utilization of the land would 
bring them any benefits® But if the holding grounds a,re not large enough, 
and. their carrying-capacity limited, they will not be fully effective if 
a quarantine exists for an extended period of time, 
Under the newly initiated system the cattle owners reap 
minimal benefitsfrom the holding groundsThat is, they are not required 
to have their cattle innoculated 21 days prior to the sale and to pay the 
Shss2/50 innoculation fee; they can sell cattle in times of quarantine; 
and they can use the spray or dip facilities on the holding grounds at 
any time0 On the other hand, during the past two auctions, the traders 
offered a lower price for the cattle arguing that they had to pay the 
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holding ground fee, thus shifting the holding ground fees payment onto 
the cattle owners, i'rom the viewpoint of the cattle owners, do the 
benefits outweigh the lower price and loss of land? Undoubtedly the 
newly devised system improves upon the former metho'd but the degree to 
which it will facilitate substantial increase in sales is questionable. 
As agreed by the PPO and Livestock Officer, the time 
may come when restructuring will be desired by the people: that the people 
pay the holding ground fees, fatten their cattle on the holding grounds 
and then are able to sell the cattle at a higher price. Or, as the D.C. 
and the former Project Advisor suggest, establishment of a meat buyers 
co-operative among the potential sellers could provide greater returns 
to the owners. At this stage, however, the principle of flexibility 
should be adhered to and alternatives kept in mind. It is recommended 
that the cattle owners views of the present system be monitored to learn 
what modifications or changes might bring more beneficial returns to the 
owner and which might stimulate increased selling of cattle® 
Much attention has been given to the livestock marketing project 
but the Programme-proposed complementary project in the lowlands has received 
little consideration; no action has been taken nor do plans appear to have 
been made for the coming financial year to encourage produce traders to 
increase their activities in the lowlands. Although the results are 
unpredictable an effort should be made on a small scale to have a trader 
or traders around the sale yards on auction days and a record should be kept 
A ~ 10 
of the items sold and the total amount of money spent, But the former 
Project Advisor reports that the local entrepreneurs are 'unwilling to 
take up trading activities in the lowlands because they feel that the 
County Council traders' fee is too high. It is recommended that an 
investigation be carried out on the constraints to produce trading 
activities in the lowlands and if possible these be remedied0 
CHOP PRODUCTION PROJECT 
A maize demonstration/trial project was designed by the local 
agricultural staff* The SRDP Crop Officer's initial aim was to select 
the "poorer" farmers who had not adopted the practice as demanstration 
farmers. But he encountered an unwillingness on the part of these farmers 
to offer land for a plot. Twenty-eight farmers were eventually selected; 
2 from Lelan; 8 from Mnageij 5 from Riwa; 8 from Kipkomo; and 5 from Sook.-
Three Katumani demonstration plots were planned for Kongelai area (Riwa 
location) and hybrids were planted on the other plots0 The project which 
began during this season includes the holding of field days. 
Both the number of farmers and the acreage of each was determined 
by the amount of funds released from II.0,A, Launching of the project was 
hindered by MQAJ s initial lack of response to the proposal and then by a 
delay in the release of funds. Only because of the lateness of the rains 
was the maize planting able to occur this season, 
EVALUATION OP CROP PRODUCTION PROJECT. 
Ho control plots i.e. growing hybrid maize without fertilizer, 
Wfere made because of the limited funds available for the entire project. 
This is a progressive step in the entire approach to demonstration plots 
since both agricultural staff and demonstration farmers frequently complain 
about the uselessness of attending to such control plots* Land, labour and 
time are needlessly spent on these control plots when the utility and 
benefits on the full-demonstration plot can be assessed in relation to the 
farmer*s previous practices, and in relation to the results of his neighbours 
who have not adopted the recommended practices, 
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The Crops Officer is to be highly commended for allocating demon-
stration plots in all of the locations0 It is regrettable that in Kongolei 
where three Eatumani plots were planned, only on one was land prepared in 
time for planting and that on this plot rats and squirrels have destroyed 
most of the crop® Renewed efforts should be made for this area during the 
next season^ and instructions should be given to farmers on protective 
measures against vermin® 
At the end of this season the staff should ensure that all the 
farmers in each area? e0ga those attending field days, wanting to plant 
hybrid or Katumani maize will have easy access to the necessary input 
supplies® Moreover, it is advised that the extension staff should have 
a list of the farmers in his area planning to plant improved seed during 
the next season® These farmers could be called together for group 
instruction before each stage, e0g9 planting, top dressing, to reinforce 
the proper procedures to be followed® A list of new adopters would also 
assist in evaluating the effectiveness of the demonstration plots® 
Lessons should be learned from this first SRDP maize demonstration 
project and the project should be continued, with modifications where 
necessary, during another season® Although plans could be made for the 
introduction of demonstration plots for other types of crops, the strategy 
devised for the maize project should be proven successful before the efforts 
of the staff are diversified® 
OTHER PROJECTS: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
IAHD ADJUDICATION AND ROADS 
Community Developments Women's Clubs and Cattle Dips 
The Outline Programme stresses the need for the co-operation and 
support of the peoples "at each stage, the Pokot people will be fully 
associated with and involved in the programme by discussion^ education and 
training and by self-help assistance to suitable projects such as rural dairies 
dips e9<>"o Stages 3, 4, and 5 call for establishment of cattle dips® 
With the delay in the release of SRDP funds, community development 
work, needing little or no special input of funds, provided the initial thrust 
beginning in mid-1971® Construction of cattle dips and organizing women's 
groups, (which were never mentioned in the Programme) became the focal point 
of the SRDP community development program® 
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In July 1971 a course for women leaders "was attended by twenty-eight, 
Follow—up visits were made to these women and club applications were received. 
When an evaluation seminar was held in January 1972, 16 women attended, revealing 
the declining interest which was currently evident in the number of women 
attending club meetings. However, at a Divisional Women's Seminar in August, 
1972 renewed interest was displayed by the approximately seventy women attending* 
These women's groups fall under the auspices of the Community 
Development Officer (SEDP) but the actual organization and co-ordination of 
their activities is the responsibility of a local woman paid by the County 
Council. Fifteen clubs exist, each having approximately twenty members0 
Except for the group in Chepararia, the others are located in the highlands -
11 in Mnagei and 3 in Lelan location^ In addition to hearing lectures on 
hygiene „ nutrition and agricultural matters, these clubs. make traditional 
items to sell, e0g0 baskets, necklaces. They are planning to erect a duka 
themselves on a market plot in Makutano (the largest market centre) which 
they have been allotted by the County Councils, They intend to stock tradi-
tional items to sell to tourists; they wish to secure a sewing machine to make 
items to sell to the local people. 
Their traditional items will find a limited market in the district 
and no attempt has been made at this time to find a steady market in a tourist 
centre? e.g, Nairobi, A most crucial aspect is that the enthusiasm of the 
women should be supported and directed by sound financial advice. If the 
activities of even a few women can be directed into profitable channels, 
it could provide an incentive for others to join the clubs and for new 
clubs to form for the degree of commitment to a group is based on the 
expected benefits derived from participation. Once membership is regarded 
as reaping a financial reward, the long term benefits, i.e. educative aspects, 
may be pursued without a substantial loss of participation. 
The clubs organized by local initiative are providing, and can 
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provide at a more rapid rate, a channel for answering and solving felt needs. 
Each club decides its own agendas for example, if the women of a group want 
information on establishing vegetable gardens, they request the District 
Agricultural Officer to address their group. The women and district officers 
feel that development of their area will proceed at a rapid pace now that the 
women are determined to bring this abouts This zeal, which should not be 
underestimated, should be supported by providing specialist advice when 
needed so that the activities can proceed along viable paths0 Therefore, 
at this time, it is strongly recommended that a specialist be asked to 
provide the clubs with sound financial guidance^ 
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Cattle Dips 
The Programme calls for focusing dip construction, and accompanying 
water development where needed, on Mnagei location during Stage 3, then on 
Lelan and the two lowland locations of Riwa and Kipkomo in Stage 4, and 
continuation of dip construction in the lowland locations branching into 
Sook in Stage 5. 
The activity on the ground focused on dips which had been already 
planned for the district rather than tackling an entirely new set under 
SRDP. Three dips which had been begun previous to SRDP but whose construction 
had lapsed were incorporated into the programme. CARE financing had been 
slated "for these dips; this aid was extended to two other dips. Activity 
was suspended on those dips planned before SRDP which were to be entirely 
self-help financed but not eventually cited for CARE financing. 
Effectiveness of the dips, the frequency of usage, and the extent 
to which more are needed are points debated by the local staff, indicating 
that these questions need further attention. In addition the extent of 
knowledge possessed by the people about the usefulness of effectively-run 
dips is unknown although it is known that a major concern of the people in 
the lowlands as well as the highlands is to keep their cattle free from 
disease. If the lowlanders indicate their desire for dips to be built, 
experimentation in restructing of self-help funds, labour, dip fees etc. 
might eventually be entertained. 
LAND ADJUDICATION 
In the early 1960s when land adjudication orginally began in the 
district, there was so much resistance by the Pokot, out of fear of the 
legal rights to land holding which would be gained by non-Pokot, that the 
project had to be abandoned. But when the Programme was being drawn up, land 
adjudication was viewed as a crucial element which needed to be tackled again 
as a "first prerequisite for organizing farming". In the phasing, land 
adjudication was to be planned and arranged for Lelan and Mnagei, both 
highland locations, in the first stage and to commence in the second stage. 
Later registration of group titles was to begin in the lower areas after a 
sociological survey was carried out. 
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However, land adjudication is considered as a supportive SEDP 
project since no SEDP funds are provided for staff, equipment, etc. 
Land adjudication staff we re posted to Kapenguria in July 1971, 
Since that time, sub-locational boundaries were marked and adjudication 
has been completed in two sub-locations of Mnagei - Kerenget and Sioyij 
both of these regions have a large immigrant populations As of 1 June, 
1972 approximately 1,000 plots had been adjudicated. Only 36 cases were 
taken before the Land Committee, of which 12 have gone on for appeal eases. 
During the next financial years adjudication will commence in 
Charlet and Kongalai0 If more staff is provided, the adjudication will 
also begin in the sub-locations of Lelan, The Land Adjudication Officer 
reports many areas in the district are requesting adjudication but the 
rate of progress is hampered by shortage of survey equipment, number of 
staff and transport for staff. 
Land adjudication exemplifies a project which when originally 
planned was viewed as a "problem project", i„e. one which would be difficult 
to implement, because of the difficulties In obtaining support from the 
people. But through a carefully initiated campaign of discussing the Issue 
with the people and by using an argument found as reasonable by the people, 
support was gradually forthcomings Thus, after an initial thrust, the 
project has proceeded well without any major hindrances and extra inputs0 
EOADS 
The need for a good road system, to facilitate communication and 
transportation receives emphasis in the Draft Programme and is reiterated 
in the Outline Programme, Firstly, road reclassification needed to be 
carried out by MOT* Then improvement of primary and secondary road network 
was cited for MOW to carry out. Stage 5 called for MOT gradually taking over 
and improving the minor road system and Stage 6 designated subsequent 
classification, take over, and improvement of additional roadsQ 
The road project was one of the first to begin in Kapenguria, 
With existing maintenance votes, the crew worked on lightly grading tracks. 
Much of the work so far has been on repair, grading- and straightening of 
existing roads. Currently major work is being carried out on the Cheperaria -
Chepkopegh - Ptoyo road (46 miles) which runs through the heart of lowland 
Kipkomo and Sook locations. Previously a "track", in the reclassification 
process this was listed as a secondary road3 
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Both self-help labour and hired labour have been used at various 
stages® Due to absence of machineiy and the speed and successful work 
demonstrated by labourers on the .Cheperaria-Chepkopegh-Ptoyo road, recommend-
ations for expanding the hired labour force were made by the Sub-District 
Development Committee (SEDP)o 
This attention towards a hired labour force instead of machinery 
ori the. -roads is commendable and should be expanded wherever possible® (See 
D-29 for information on the Migori roads project)® Although this 
opportunity for income is of short duration, it is better than having 
machinery carry out all the work, and may provide work experience beneficial 
to finding employment elsewhere in the future® Much of the road work is 
being carried out in areas of low population density where organization of 
self-help labour would be almost impossible^ When feasible, though, self-
help labour should be used? otherwise the attitude that self-help should not 
be required on SBDP projects; since so much money is available from Government 
for development of Kapenguria Division^ will become even stronger and more 
wide-spread® 
Prom conversations in the district and written reports, at least 
twice news has reached district headquarters that the local Pokot were 
threatening to disrupt the work of the road crews The April-May Monthly 
Report states that it was alleged that "a group in Sook had slaughtered 
goats on the road (Ghepereria to Ptqyc) to impede its progress"® There 
have also been rumours of Pokot planning to attack the road crew0 The 
DcC® reports that the latter emanates from the D,0e and other staff 
members in the area not informing the people of the reasons for the machines 
commencing to clear the bush0 
This failure to inform the people of forthcoming road building in 
their area only leads to confirming their suspicion; the people in the more 
extreme parts of the district believe that the roads are being built so that 
the APs or GSU can better patrol cattle raiding® They are not convinced that 
the roads will bring positive benefits to them, and this view may be justifiable® 
It is highly recommended that plans for using the newly constructed 
roads should be made, e,g« mobile health units, traders, etc® to bring positive 
benefits to areas newly opened up. Implementation should occur soon after a 
new section of a road is completed. The purpose here is to help counter the 
fears of the lowlanders that the roads are being constructed to enable the 
police^to better control cattle raiding, etc® Secondly, care must be taken 
by the officers to ensure that prior to commencing road construction in any 
given area the people of that area are informed of the purpose, benefits, etc. 
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COMMITS PI EEGAED TO SBDP PRINCIPLES AHD SOME 
EVALUATION TEEMS OP BEFEBENCE 
Experimental Nature 
At this stage it is difficult to label any project in the division 
as experimental® If markets are established near the sale yards and if they 
perform their hoped-for function, then this could be experimental® Or, if 
the women's clubs are given additional assistance and their scope enlarged 
this would be experimental for such an area® It must be remembered that 
it is through fact-finding and monitoring that a project can be classified 
as experimental. 
At this time, a positive aspect of the programme is showing the 
initiative of officers in such an area® As a key officer in the district 
pointed out, up to the point when support and attention were given by 
National Government to the launching of SBDP in Kapenguria, the officers 
were discouraged from making proposals to Headquarters since they were 
usually ignored or otherwise turned down® (After all Kapenguria was 
considered a second class area.) Now project proposals, requests for 
supplies, equipment etc are receiving attention in Nairobi and the officers 
most frequently receive positive replies since special funds are available 
for Kapenguria® Thus, SBDP has brought a moral uplift to the Officers who 
feel that their efforts are no longer being thwarted by Central Government® 
The programme is showing what local officers can do if given the proper 
backing, e®g® financial, from Government® 
ojB, SEDP project has not been impeded through lack of 
initiative by the staff but because of the "normal" bottlenecks in Central 
Government, e®g® approval of a project, receiving AIEs, receiving supplies. 
Yet the latter has not hampered the faith of the officers since they know 
that Kapenguria, being a SEDP area, is to receive special attention to 
enable the Division to develop. 
Beplicability 
The Project with the greatest potential for replication is the 
women's clubs for these may prove to be a viable channel through, which 
innovations - new ideas - are accepted and adopted in less developed 
regions of the country® If a strategy can be devised for a breakthrough 
in developing the pastoral area, it would have'.fgyefetf/o potential for 
replication® 
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Unless projects receive careful documentation and monitoring 
none will be capable of replication,, 
Existing Machinery of Government 
One of the SEDP principles iss 
So utilise existing resources of staff 
and finance as far as possible® 
In an area like Kapenguria where the staff was sparse on the ground 
and where the ground is difficult to traverse, additional staff members, along 
with their supportive staff, were necessary to launch and direct SHE? projects. 
More staff meant the need for additional housing and offices; these are in 
the process of being built® 
An expatriate Project Adviser working in the District has supported 
what is primarily a local effort and has provided links with people in high 
positions in Nairobi® The presence of a Project Adviser has not been 
detrimental to local initiative as in areas with advisory teams e It might 
be hoped that the Project Advisor and the Area Co-ordinator might assist the 
SEDP staff in learning the use of problem solving techniques (as outlined in Q1 
. „ / overall report) „ , . „ Part 3 m our/and devising projects to meet SEDP principles and objectives* 
Research and Evaluation 
As has been pointed out elsewhere, no major systematic collection 
of information has occurred® Pact finding must be built into the preparation 
stages of planning projects and continuous recording of ^treatments' must lie 
made by the local officers, 
In carrying out this evaluation exercise, opinions on evaluation 
were expressed, with which I concur® The PPO expressed the view that evaluation 
and its emanating recommendations should be accompanied by persons who axe 
willing to help and advise further on implementing the recommendations.^  
Scepticism was expressed by the PPO, DC and DO (former Area Co-Ordinator) 
about the soundness of an evaluation exercise such as this if it is only 
to be carried out once a year by evaluators who spend such a short time in 
the district,. Yet it must be remembered that local officers once trained 
in fact-finding and monitoring can be of great assistance to the evaluators? 
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In plannix.,: the SEDP. was the unexplo.lted potential for development of each 
area adequately assessed? Were the probable constraints preventing this 
potential for being adequately assessed? 
The answer to these has to be qualified? in some cases "yes"„ 
Examples of proper assessment of the development potential appearing in the 
Draft Programme are agricultural training in regard to a Parmer® s Training 
Centre, irrigation, and the emphasis upon road constructions 
The Draft Programme proposes that to increase cattle trading and 
circulation of money in the range areas the strategy to be adopted is a 
system of holding grounds, sale yards and stock routes,. Pointing out 
previous difficulties in establishing group ranches the Draft Program ? 
concludes this would be the inappropriate strategy. A system whereby 
cattle auctions may be held regularly even in times of quarantine will 
undoubtedly increase cattle trade® But, to what extent? The constraints 
preventing this increase in. selling of cattle and the circulation of money 
in the lowlands ware not adequately assessed due to a lack: of facts regarding 
the cattle owners. 
Another illustration of inadequate assessment appears in the 
assumption that increased crop production should be geared towards an 
intradistrict market. The possibilities for expanding the external 
marketing of crops was improperly dismissed. 
To what extent are SEDP projects integrated or co-ordinated with ongoing 
programmes and to what extent have .c^g^^j&rgS^^8-^-^5^ labelled SEDP? 
All SEDP projects are well integrated and co-ordinated with ongoing 
programmes, priwarily because they focus on development per se rather than on 
developing replicable new approaches. 
All projects in the Division have been labelled SEDP purposively 
by the officers to gain support and enthusiasm for the entire SEDP programme. 
This has led the officers and local people to regard SEDP projects 
as regular development projects designed along "normal" patterns, thus leading 
to a disregard for SEDP principlesa 
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To what extent are the strategies and approaches to accelerate rural 
development in SBDP areas newer and more effective than those which 
they replace or supercede? 
Since the major projects in the area have just begun to function, 
it is impossible to assess if the strategy adopted is going to affect the 
expected outcome, thus rendering it more effective than, those they replace0 
At this stage3 though, it appears that the holding grounds project in itself 
is well-organised and will solve some problems® The maize demonstration plots 
appear headed in the right direction® So far the most success has been 
apparent in the women's clubsf they seem to provide an effective chancel 
for accelerating development® 
The availability of a grammar bock to teach adults to read and 
write the Pokot language seems to be a boost to adult education classes^ 
Agains this project has just begun so it is impossible to evaluate the 
success,? 
Are the ^ implem^tatio^ stages effective enough to try out these new 
strategies? 
The sequencing given in the Programme focuses primarily on the 
type of projects and the region where each was to occur® Given this general 
framework the local staff has had to devise the implementation stages® The 
former Project Adviser assisted some officers in working through the various 
implementation stages for this financial year's projects® More systematic 
planning for implementation as recommended in the overall report would be 
quite beneficial® 
How effective has the role of the Area Co-ordinator, District Development 
Committees^ and the MFP in its capacity of overall co-ordinator been? 
Until quite recently the role of Area Co-ordinator has been hindered 
by his dual position as District Officer® This has limited the amount of time 
he has been able to devote to SBDP activities® Moreover, when he speaks to 
the people it means that he carries a dual image, that of District Officer 
transmitting messages of a law enforcer and placing him among the higher 
echelon local government officers® These have been corrected with the recent 
posting of a full-time Area Co-ordioator0 
The effectiveness of the District Development Conmittee is 'undercut 
by the SBDP sub-committee, which has no local representation® This sub -
committee performs well as a co-ordinator between the various department® 
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To what extent have local communities been adequately involved in the 
planning and implementation of SBDP and to what extent has this 
involvement been premature, timely or too late? 
In the drawing up of the Draft Programme, some of the formal 
community leaders® views were sought, and in the initial stages the 
officers held several barazas informing people of SEDP, its projects, 
and asking for their comments. The latter appears to have played a 
positive role in leading to the acceptance of land adjudication. 
Currently, though, community participation is seriously lacking. 
At times the people of a given area are not even informed of project 
implementation in their area, as explained in the section on roads. 
At other times, after plans are made, the community is informed through 
formal meetings at which a few questions are permitted whereby the 
officers justify their plans but modification is not considered. This 
procedure must be corrected. Involvement of the people should begin in 
the planning of projects. (The report on Community Participation shows 
the various stages and levels where this should occur). As proposed 
above in the section on Livestock Marketing and Crop Production -
The Evaluation of the Plan, for a major breakthrough to occur among 
the lowlanders, community participation in identifying needed projects 
is essential. 
It appears that continual effort should be made to convince 
the County Council of the benefits of the SBDP projects. Difficulty 
has arisen on some issues, such as land adjudication, because the 
formal leaders would be adversely affected. When this occurs, and if 
the people support the SEDP project, then the formal leaders should 
be ignored. Eut, in other cases, the support of the formal leaders 
may assist in gaining the support of the wananchi. 
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General 
Constant care be maintained that the opportunity to derive 
benefits from the SPDP programme be distributed In an 
equitable manner among the ethnic .groups in the highlands 
and among the highlanders and Icelanders, 
Fact -finding be conducted in the lowlands and the peoples' 
views of needed projects ascertained. 
Continual consultation with the people be made to ensure 
support from the local leaders and people. 
That the local staff receive training in data collection and 
analyses to facilitate monitoring of projects and planning 
of new projects. 
Specific Recommendations 
Investigate constraints to produce traders engaging in trading 
activities in the lowlands. If possible, remedy situation,, 
Encourage produce trade around sale yards, 
A careful assessment be made of the cattle owners reaction 
to the present system with a view to learning what modifications 
or changes might bring more beneficial returns to the owner and 
which might stimulate increased selling of cattle. 
The agricultural staff should ensure that input supplies for 
hybrid or Katumani maize are available for next season, A list 
of fanners planning to plant hybrid or Katumani maize should be 
made to help assess the effectiveness of the season® s demonstration 
plots. Group instruction next season should occur before each 
stage, e,g0 planting, to reinforce the proper procedure to be 
followed0 lessons learned from the first maize demonstration 
project - SRDP should be built into the continuation of the 
project. The strategy devised for the maize project should be 
proven successful before the staff undertakes introduction of 
demonstration plots for other types of crops. 
An experimental approach should be given to the women's groups. 
An adviser needs to provide them sound financial guidance, eeg, 
market possibilities for traditional Items, 
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Specific Recommendations 
Assessment be carried out on the effectiveness and efficiency 
of cattle dips and the need for 4diti©m.>dipss 
That the district staff makes sure that prior to commencing 
road construction in any given area • .J the people of that 
area are informed of the purpose, benefits etc of the road 
buildingo 
Plans for using the newly constructed roads be made, e,g«. 
a^l&i health units, traders, etc and implemented immediately 
after a section is completed. The purpose here is to help 
counter the fears of the people in the lower areas that the 
roads are being constructed to enable the police to better 
control cattle raiding, etc, The people must be shown that 
the roads will bring a positive benefit to them. 
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SUMMARY HEOQMMBNBATIONS 
SRDP Kwale general 
a) Departments should assign SEDP duties to staff a3ready familiar 
•with the area whenever possible as Agriculture has done0 
"b) The process for spending budgeted money by Provincial or 
District level officers should be accelerated® 
Local Level Leadership and,Administration 
a) Chiefs and sub-chiefs should be involved in SRDP work by 
impressing on them the utility of development activities 
outside the office0 
b) New chiefs/sub-chiefs should be recruited from the younger, 
more development-oriented wazee-vi.iana category (as discussed). 
They should be from the indigenous groups® Expansion of the 
number of sub-chiefs is desirable. 
c) The new committees should be encouraged at the expense of 
the traditional village council, which probably will 
continue to handle personal life matters. These committees 
should be brought together under an SRDP Development Committeea 
d) The Area Co-ordinator should ua« ^fche SRDP Development Committee 
in mobilizational work which will be basically agricultural. 
This presumes M s greater familiarization with the area and 
rejection of the command model of Do0» behaviour,, 
e) Any future planned SRDP courses should not only include work 
on agricultural technology but also social technology skills 
for the wazee°-vi.i3nai) chiefs, sub-chiefs and all field officers 
involved in SRDP0 
Family Homesteads 
a) Ways should be found for extending credit for building homesteads 
on private plots away from the villages0 The land should be 
used as collateralo 
b) District level officers should be allowed to change the phasing 
of projects to facilitate adjustment to ethnic9 political 
agitation which tends to become a serious bottleneck The 
specific examples are collapsing of Kikoneni water project 
phases? initiating the road projects and dips in Mwereni 
before organizing the ranch| and introducing cattle 
improvement techniques,, 
Roads B - 3 
a) Work on sugar roads should be carried out first since they will 
be needed for marketing of this years sugar crop. 
b) All classified minor and primary roads construction phasing 
should be changed to focus first on the minor roads. These 
will link with the completed A-14° 
c) Self—help communal labor techniques should be introduced at 
location/sublocation level to construct farm roads. 
Kikoneni Water Project 
a) Greater use should be made of self-help labor for non-skilled 
aspects of the construction. 
b) Collapse Phases I, II, and III together so as to diffuse the 
inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic rivalry and to create a visible 
success. 
c) Speed up materials supply (local material substitution). 
Land Adjudication 
a) Given the political sensitivity of land holding, adjudication 
work needs positive political inputs from the M.Ps, D.C., P.O. 
and District Councillors. This should be stressed to these 
persons by the DoCo 
b) In conjunction with the Group Ranches Unit of the Ministry of 
Lands and Settlement, all the District level officers ought to 
plan the adjudication of Mwereni Ranch to take into account 
membership problems raised below. 
c) There appears to be no case for land consolidation since the 
pieces are not terribly small; probably they will be passed on 
to sons in another generation. 
Education 
a) Serious reconsideration of the plan to include a mass literacy 
campaign related to the agricultural programs is advocated. 
This may be a worthwhile experimental addition to rural 
development® I.D.S. and I.A.S. could act as consultants in 
developing a completely new program suited to Kwale. 
b) Drastic government action to encourage parents to retain 
their children in school is highly recommended. It may have 
to entail forced collection of fees since parents 'obey the 
law' by sending children to school but refuse to pay fees 
even when they are able to do so. 
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c) Relegation of Mandarasa to the realm of personal life and 
the use of self-help for the construction and maintenance 
of Mandarasa schools should he the future policy*, This 
should he a useful -way of introducing self-help techniques 
to the indigenous population. 
8. Mwereni Ranch 
a) Land adjudication of the area he carried out. 
b) Membership (stock quota) be allocated equally to every 
person who can show land rights in Mwereni Location. 
c) Stock allowed in the ranch be strictly as per stock quota. 
This will force cattle owners (the minority) to either sell 
their excess stock or negotiate extra grazing quota from 
clansmen/others. It will also ensure that cattle-users 
have tradeoffs with cattle owners. 
d) Subsistence agricultural areas either be specifically 
adjudicated within the ranch or outside it. It is not 
adequate to leave it hazy as to whether subsistence 
agriculture will be allowed in ftte ranch, The proposal 
in the plan for settlement in Jombo Forest does not seem 
to be known even at the District level. The Jombo forest 
area is rapidly being filled with non-Duruma migrants. 
e) It is imperative that home sites be specified during 
adjudication. It may be worthwhile to plan villages 
rather than scattered homesteads since most of the land 
will be open ranch. 
9. Agriculture-General 
SRDP model farmers should be selected to reflect ethnic 
variation, farm size, age and sex and not to just reflect 
the emergent progressive leadership. Indeed the challenge 
is to help the less progressive and not just the progressive 
farmers» 
10. Agricultural Supervised Credit - Ramisi Sugar Factory 
A supervised sugar credit system tied to the Ramisi factory 
with proportional participation from the assorted ethnic 
groups should be started. 
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POLICY DISCUSSION 
SRDP KWALEs GENERAL 
It is difficult to situate SRDP within the context of the District. 
However several things come to mincL The first and probably most important 
is the factor that the District is huge and administratively unwieldy because 
of poor.communication and undifferentiated community leadership® In this 
context, therefore? the creation of another division a year ago as well as 
addition of SRDP staff as in the Plan are welcome additions to the district. 
This will lead to closer administration,and hopefully, clari y about government 
programs * 
The second important factor is the popular attitude towards SRDP 
as another Shimba-Hills scheme cooked-up so as to settle foreigners. This 
"same" attitude was expressed with respect to land adjudication, especially 
with the switch of officers in the post. It is not just an attitude of the 
wider public but at times it has been voiced by the County Council, The 
unfortunate thing is the fact that as part of the pre-planning of the Diani 
Complex work on counting coconuts is simultaneously going on? this is similarly 
misunderstood. With closer administration these programs will be explained 
to their perspective® 
The third factor is the fact that the program had been discussed 
at District level for a long time before any visible action was taken. This 
was due to the lack of a donor nation. 
When all these factors are put together one can understand the 
cynicism the population feels about the program. However the District 
level officers have begun to push the program seriously, and they have 
drawn the politicians into mobilizing the District towards development 
in general and SRDP in particular. There are weaknesses - especially 
in Community Development and Health - basically due to new staff, or 
rapid turn-over of staff. It is time the Ministries consider longer 
tours for SRDP personnel. Agriculture has been innovative in assigning 
staff familiar with the District to SRDP duties» These recent graduates 
of the training institutes are not "fossilized" and non-innovative. This 
innovation in staffing is worth being executed by other Ministries, 
One of the perennial problems for planning from the center with 
less than perfect data is the whole problem of phasing. Several illustrations 
for Kwale SRDP are worth
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1. Mkongani probably needs water more urgently than Kikoneni. 
2. Kikoneni Water Project should have been phased :fferentlyto avoid 
the political problems (as discussed elsewhere in this paper). 
3« Infrastructural development, especially minor reads and sugar roads, 
should have commenced before the extensive agricultural program was planned. 
4® Similarly land adjudication should have been completed before the 
agricultural program® Although this may sound idealistic solving the land 
problems is an important step in development® 
5. With respect to the agricultural package perhaps relocating farmers 
to homesteads is more critical than all other innovations® A credit system 
to help facilitate this may be the single most important factor in changing 
farming patterns. 
6. Not quite a phasing problem but related is the issue of spending 
money. Once money is authorized local officials (Provincial or District) 
should be allowed to spend the allotted sums with minimum delay. (Some 
departments may have to return their house construction funds at the end of 
71/72 financial year)® 
7. These bottlenecks in phasing are the result of ignoring the 
phasing alternatives suggested try the field officers, especially at the 
District level® It is important to stress the rationality of the District 
level officers as far as phasing problems are concerned? the D.C. and his 
officers are very much aware of the need to have visible projects for 
immediate consumption by the public in the first phases, followed by more 
complicated and perhaps not so visible projects® It is based on this 
approach that within the context of the Plan all District level officers 
nast JI&0 HkOneni Water Project to be collapsed. (The details are discussed 
Iwlow,) The point to stress is that flexibility must be given to local 
officers to change phases so as to take into account the local political 
agitations. If this is not allowed in Kwale, it is possible that the 
implementation phases of most projects will fail. Building into the Kwale 
SRDP flexibility in phasing (to be determined primarily by the competent 
District level team) would be a worthwhile experiment since it would 
provide seme knowledge of how to phase planning in districts where ethnic 
groupings make projects politically sensitive® 
For Kwale unlike the other SRDP areas there will not be a detailed 
programme evaluation® We shall concentrate on partly evaluating the Plan and 
pointing out potential problem areas and conclude by presenting baseline data 
relating to a purposive sample. 
Recommendations; 
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1. Departments should assign SRDP duties to staff already with the area 
whenever possible® 
2© The process for spending budgeted money by Provincial or District 
level officers should be accelerated® 
3. District level officers should be allowed to change the phasing of 
projects to facilitate adjustment to ethnic, and political agitation which 
tends to become a serious bottleneck® The specific examples are collapsing 
of Kikoneni Water Project phasesj initiating the road projects and dips in 
Mwereni before organization of the ranch; and introduction of cattle 
improvement techniques® 
LOCAL LEVEL LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATIS OP SRDP. 
Kikoneni-Msabweni-Mkongani; 
The historical antecedents of the problem of local leadership are 
quite complicated and we will only briefly touch on them0 Probably the most 
important was Arab rule. Arab is a vague category since there were some Digos 
passing for Arab in the past who in the recent past have been busy passing 
for DigoI Of course during Arab rule and the colonial period there tended 
to be a close interlocking connection between the religious leader and the 
administrative leader (as well as community leader)® The Chiefs of Kikoneni 
and Mkongani seem to have been selected from this nexus® (The Chief of 
Msabweni was a J®A.A») The" former two are old and their lifestyle and 
dealings with the people reflect this® In interviews they maintained that 
they attend to Islamic religious duties faithfully - five times a day® All 
the chiefs (including Mwereni) perceive their duty as staying in the office 
waiting for complaints, G.P®T® etc® Usually their sub-chiefs stay in the 
office with thenu Thus they never really interact with the people® Barazas 
are held mainly in the chiefBs center® Given the poor communication and 
extensive size of the locations and sub-locations 9 local level administration 
is ineffective® 
The sub-chiefs are in general younger than the chiefs, with the 
exception of the two Kikoneni sub-chiefs, Also, they have very little 
formal education but usually they have had experience which has taken them 
out of the hold of the social milieu * Some were labourercdn Mombasa and some 
had three to five years of education® The sub-chiefs are much more outward 
looking than the chiefs® 
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Researcher Clyde Ingle in 1971 touched on the institution of village 
councils. Traditionally the Digo village councils were tied to religious 
duties. Ingle suggested that these village councils he strengthened. It is 
not clear what he had in mind hut in checking his data and groups he identi-
fied it was clear that the traditional village council (of mlango elders who 
are also socio-religious leaders) is ignored hy the hulk of the local people 
who do not view the duties of the village council as relevant® Most of the 
village councils were undercut hy the land adjudication committees which 
recruited new wazee-vijana® Since the issue of land is so central the 
adjudication committees have "become extremely important. Agricultural 
committees have been established to handle the politics of the Madhvani 
tractors as x-jell as choosing demonstration plots. Since these are new roles 
the old village council members do rJSf? suit ppaitions and the new younger 
men wazee-vi.iana, are becoming a ' UfajglUy tjfegfe 
are the other new institutions like self-hel^ -ippoup CR9J$^t±yeB tbeiagf 
planned) and a KA1IU branch whose leadership positions are lia-li-il^f 
wazee-vinana and which has local linkages with select District leadership, 
civil service and M.Ps® 
Yet probably the thing which has decimated the traditional village 
councils are the new land use patterns. Those who have previously written 
on the SRDP area have ignored this fact, It is true that the traditional 
village elders ruled communities which were small and extended only to the 
boundary of the village® With the opening of new agricultural land away 
from the villages, people are beginning to spend more time on the larger 
farms away from the village. %i is true tlpat for the majority stays away 
from the villafp^ dfce ^ e ^ o t ^ v e l y remove the person from 
the elders. This has i&'tliitig'i'b dd with adjudication; it started before 
adjudication. Erosion of the powers of the village councils was greatly 
accelerated by the movement into the area of immigrants who did not pay 
attention to the existing elders® 
Immigrants also have village councils but these are more in the 
nature of leadership of self-help groups than in the classical Digo perception 
of a village council® 
The problem of local level leadership is complicated by a very 
serious generation conflict. The young (18-25) have very strong negative 
attitudes towards their parents. They accuse their parents of failing to 
educate them and as a result relegating them to cutting cane for Madhvani. 
This attitude was forcefully put to me by all the youth I met when conducting 
unstructured interviews. It is this group which defies all village institutions 
and for which plans need to be made, e.g. adult education. This group will be 
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extremely important for the area agricultural program since some are being 
allocated farms by their parents during adjudication. 
The existence of the iiazee-vijana as a progressive emergent leadership, 
the existence of unresponsive old village communities and a young population 
questing for improvement in their lot lead one to conclude that local partici-
pation in development, is possible® This, though, has not been encouraged by 
the present local formal leadership (chiefs/sub=-chiefs) and Community Develop-
ment people have not been particularly active0 SRDP pre-planning and planning 
did not encourage popular participationo This was a mistake. It should be 
ameliorated soon by encouraging/solidifying the new leadership of wazee—vi.iana; 
starting general non-traditional community groups e®g« harambee groups; starting 
continuing education groups for the population (see education section below); 
and finally by improving administrative contact with the people - more intensi-
fied staff training in a<3ministration as well as development orientation of 
* staff officers® 
There exist old colonial-type chiefs and sub-chiefs staying in the 
office and expecting community work to be done by the old village councils® 
This is a misconception since the institution in its pure form is dead. The 
village councils have been replaced by specialized committees (land adjudication 
and agriculture and self-help groups) monopolized by a few wazee-vi.iana who are 
breaking all barriers in trade, agriculture and even lifestyle,(eeg® living on 
their farms or places other than in the villages!)® This emergent community 
leadership is ignored by the chiefs/sub—chiefs to the detriment of the community* 
One could argue that all formal leaders in the area should be recruited from 
this group® However, for strategic reasons, it may be folly to replace the 
chiefs/sub-chiefs outright since they and the traditional village councils 
may veto some subsequent activities, as District level officers clearly point 
out» It is therefore recommended that the number of sub-chiefs be increased, 
drawing recruits from this aazce-yiiana groups and, furthermore, that sub-
chiefs be made to stay in their sublocations, On retirement of the old chiefs, 
new and more development-oriented ones should be appointed* Although there is 
pressure from the immigrants to get sub-chief/chief positions, especially 
Kikoneni3 this is highly impolitic in the short run and should be discouraged. 
The experience of the Shimba locations, with their greater immigrant population 
than Kikoneni, should be a lesson® In the long run once immigrants are accepted, 
the community may choose immigrant leaders. Only then will it be possible to 
have immigrant chiefs and sub—chiefs® 
* Consult the paper "Local Involvement in the Special Rural Development 
Programme" on other ways this might be done® 
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A word about the Division level is in order« The D.O. Msambweni has 
had very little dealings with the SRDP area due to communication problems and 
(for the current officer) health problems. The SRDP D.O* Area Coordinator 
stationed at Kwale is new to the area. It is important that he covers the 
SRDP area in depth and since his job is co-ordination he must not use the 
command formula but rather a participation approach* This will entail more 
detailed knowledge of the area and of local level leadership than he has at 
the moment. It will basically involve monitoring and helping in organizing 
agricultural-oriented programs. Since there is clear evidence that the chiefs 
are not the most effective leaders he will have to use alternative local level 
leaders; the only viable alternative is the wazee-vi.iaaa. 
Finally a word about rationalizing local level leadership. It is 
clear that different ministries use different local level leaders. Ministry 
of Lands uses the Land Adjudication Committee which later may become part of 
the Land Board. The Ministry of Agriculture has the Agriculture Committee, 
and Social Services has self-help groups in Kikoneni. Although as indicated 
above the membership overlaps (wazee-viiana) it may be useful to subsume all 
these under an SEDP Committee so as to deny inter-ministerial manipulation of 
local leadership as well as acquiring a new coherent entry into the community. 
Incidentally this would also assist in consolidating new local level leader-
ship which is development-oriented and which the Area Coordinator (the ACDO-
SRDP) could use, 
Pecommendati ons; 
1. Chief/sub-chiefs should be involved in SRDP work by impressing on 
them the utility of development work outside the office. 
2. New chiefs/sub-chiefs should be recruited from the younger more 
development-oriented wa«ee—yjjaaa categeiy (as discussed)• They should be 
indigenous people. An increased number of sttk~«kiefs is desirable. 
3« The new committees should be encouraged at the expense of the 
traditional village council which probably will continue to handle personal 
life matters. These committees should be brought together under an SRDP 
Development Committee® 
4« The Area Coordinator should use the SRDP Development Committee 
in mobilizational work which will be basically agricultural. This presumes 
his greater familiarization with the area and rejection of the command model 
of D.O. behaviour. 
5* Any future planned SRDF courses should not only include work on 
agricultural technology but also social technology skills for the wazee-
vijana. chiefs and sub-chiefs and all field officers involved in SRDP., 
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FAMILY HOMESTEADS 
Another major omission in the SRDP plan is the -potential breakdown 
of village community lifestyle. Within the Kenya planning framework very 
little attention has been paid to the possibilities of planning within the 
constraints of village communities® We have accentuated the scattered 
homestead (although we wrongly call them villages) since most planning 
assumes the individual family is the ultimate unit. 
Traditional Digo/Duruma settlement patterns were villages. For 
the SRDP area this is still the dominant pattern. As mentioned under land 
adjudication, the opening of new lands population pressure, and the desire 
to break the hold of the traditional village social system have led to a 
few people beginning to build their homesteads on pieces of land away from 
the villages. These are the pieces of land where they intend to do modern 
farming® The agricultural officers in the field accentuate planning for 
these pieces away from the village first because there is not the confusion 
of farm uses found in the old farms§ second the farms are bigger5 and third 
the soils are not misused® These are valid reasons but they assume that 
the farmer will live permanently on the farm (at the moment to keep away 
wild animals but later to look after his investment)a The emerging pattern 
is that the farmer erects a temporary structure on the farm, and when it 
is not necessary for him to be at the farm he returns to the village and 
his permanent home. This then becomes a constraint on good farm practices. 
A lot of energy is wasted in commuting to the farm, etc., and it is difficult 
to be visited on the farm by extension officers etc® The problem then is 
to find ways of inducing most of the people to move to the pieces of land 
they intend to farm permanently® How do we do this? Schemes do not exist 
for providing rural housing in Kenya® For the SRDP area we might have to 
follow through the fundamental assumption about the desirability of scattered 
homesteads (in the national planning framework) and provide funds for building 
permanent homesteads for the farmers who want to move® Since the SRDP area 
is going to be adjudicated, the farmer could get credit on his title deed 
to construct a modern house. Perhaps this should be a project to be under-
taken by a commercial bank or the Kenya-Housing Finance Corporation® It 
may turn out that homestead credit is more important than any agricultural 
credit which may be encouraged® 
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Recommendat i on; 
Ways be found for extending credit for building homesteads on private 
plots away from the villages. The land should be used as collateral. 
* 
ROADS 
The roads in the SRDP area are to be .constructed by MOW. This is an » 
experiment as far as National SRDP road construction is concerned. But, very 
little has been done so far. Construction is scheduled to begin this financial 
year (72/73). 
Several points need to be made in strong language. For all practical 
purposes there are no roads in Kikoneni Location, Mwereni Location and Mkongani. 
A passable road just traverses the area. During the rainy season it is only 4 
wheel drive vehicles which can even get to the centers. The so-called sugar 
roads are critical since they traverse an area which gets flooded and it 
becomes impossible to get in or out of most of Kikoneni. Given the planned 
agricultural program it is imperative that all the planned classified roads 
be constructed soon. The specific minor roads are l) Mafisini - Vwivwini 
2) Mrima-Mamba-Mwanguda 3) Mamba-Mwananyamala 4) Kizibe-Marere 
5) Msabweni-Eshu-Eshu 6) Ramisi-Ywivwini-Kikoneni-Mwengulu-Kilimangodo-
Kanyambuni 7) Mwangunda-Mkengani-Kinangut and 8) Ndavaya-Mkengani. 
Of the primary roads, C106 has been constructed from A-14 to Kwale but the 
Kwale-Kinange-Lunga Lunga portion needs to be upgraded; . C108 from A-14 to 
Shimba Hills—Kikoneni Mrima needs extensive work, parts are.impassable even 
with rally driving on 4 wheel drive. 
Recommendations; 
1. Work on sugar roads should be carried out first since they will be 
needed for marketing this year's sugar crop. 
2. The phasing of all classified minor and primary roads construction 
be changed to emphasize first the minor roads. These will link up with the 
completed A-14. 
3. Self—help communal labor techniques should be introduced at the 
location/sub-location level to construct farm roads. 
KIKONENI WATER PROJECT. 
In discussing the Kikoneni Water Scheme with the W.D.D. trainees 
(during the month I spent in Kwale I never managed to meet the Officer in 
Charge - an expatriate), District level officers and Provincial level officers 
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the problem which has been articulated is the phasing of the Project. There 
seems to be a concesus among field officers that Phase I of the Project was 
scheduled to service Kikoneni chief's center basically for its demonstration 
effect on Digos who live around there® Initially the trenching for the pipes 
was to be dug by paid labor® This is what the people around Kikoneni Chief's 
Center were told. These plans backfired since the immigrants (Kamba basically) 
are in the other parts of the location and have been made active in trenching* 
The plan did not envisage the use of self-help labor. However, 
when the project started in April 1972 self-help labor was used for trenching 
as a result of initiative taken by the administration® Hired labor was to be 
used for the more specialized task of pipelaying® 
Major problems arose out of the fact that the Kambas of Mwanayamala 
and Digos of Kigombere (dominated by wazee-vijana leadership) who did most of 
the trenching up to about ^  mile from the chief's center are not to receive 
water until Phase II® The Digos around the chief's center were refusing to 
trench until political pressure from the Provincial and District level as 
well as MPs, was brought to bear on them. 
In the opinion of the field officers, it is extremely important 
that the major lines for Phase II and III be allowed to proceed within this 
financial year (72/73) so as to diffuse ethnic rivalries. Furthermore the 
costs of the water system could be cut by greater use of self-help labor® 
Also, all officers agree that the Water Project will make or break SEDP Kwale 
in the sense that its demonstration effect and economic benefits will be 
highly visible® They further argue that a determinant of the success of the 
program is the release of all planned expenditures in the current year, 
without waiting on Phases. Authority should be given for greater flexibility 
in the use of these funds. 
There have been unanticipated technical problems with the construction 
of the intake weir and pump® However the ¥SD®D® trainees argued that these 
would be solved shortly® Another problem is the supply of mainline pipes on 
schedule® Work on access roads, clearing sites, and ancillary construction 
is progressing. 
Be c ommendat i ons% 
1® Greater use of self-help labor for non-skilled aspects of the 
construction. 
2® Phases I, II and III to be done simultaneously so as to diffuse the 
inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic rivalries and to create a visible success® 
3. Speeding up of material supplies (substitutes of local materials). 
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EDUCATION. 
One of the ideas absent from the SBDP Han is the role of education 
in general® Of course even the portion discussing adult education is ineffectual. 
Functional education is omitted from most of the envisaged programmes and it 
should be worth raising this point at the highest levels of Governments I am 
not just talking of education for the youiig but education for all levels of 
society® Even the farmers will have to be taught to begin to farm well® One 
does not have a formally educated population to draw on as in other SRDP areas. 
Probably the most critical cohort are these aged 15-25 who have not even gone 
to school. 
A related problem is immigrants' dominance over the formal education 
system. In my opinion Ingle's data understates this. If the indigenous people 
do not begin to go to school, the immigrants will ultimately dominate the 
District. The urgency of this cannot be over-stressed. In a way, all SRDP 
programs are irrelevant if they are not coupled to education of the young. 
Bujra/Brokensha (1970) suggested that Government expand Mandarasa. 
In the view-of most local persons this would be deleterious to the development 
of the area| a view I agree with completely® The attitude toward Mandarasa was 
summed up by the Chief of Msabweni during Madaraka Day 1972 when he said; "The 
Arabs cheated us to go to Mandarasa when they were sending their children to 
modern schools® Do you see the D®0. here? Is he not an Arab? Is he not holy? 
Hoxir did he become a D®0«? It was not by going to Mandarasa but by going to 
school® Mandarasa teaches religion for the individual® You need skills which 
you can only get in school". The.view that Mandarasa should be part of Government 
subsidy of education is ridiculous® 
In the. other areas of Kenya, Mandarasa is either just a lesson during 
the school day taught by a qualified teacher or a religious leader, or a program 
after school, or a pre-school program*. The people of the area should take any 
of these options which are accepted by the Chief Kadhi as legitimate ways of 
religious training and send their children to regular school. Institutions of 
Mandarasa could be. left to self-help groups® This may be a novel way of intro-
ducing self-help group techniques to the indigenous population. 
The waaee-vijana who are battling the traditionalist village elders 
on the issue of Mandarasa should be helped by Government propaganda. I realize 
that this type of propaganda has been accelerated by the District level officers 
but perhaps the only way to make the point is to forcibly collect school fees and 
not just talk about it in barasas. 
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Re c ommendat ions; 
1. We advocate serious reconsideration of the plan to include a mass 
literacy campaign related to the agricultural programs,, This may he a worth-
while experimental addition to rural development® I.D.S. and I.A.S. could 
act as consultants in developing a completely new program suited to Kwale. 
2. Drastic government action to encourage parents to retain their 
children at school is highly recommended. Enforced payment of fees may he 
required since parents 'obey the law® hy sending children to school hut 
refuse to pay fees even when able! 
3. Relegation of Mandarasa to the realm of personal life and the use 
of self—help for the construction and maintenance of Mandarasa schools should 
be the future policy on Mandarasa. This should be a useful way of introducing 
self-help techniques to the indigenous population. 
MIERENI RANCH. 
Brokensha;s idea that three consecutive droughts had decimated the 
cattle population in Mwereni which showed that there were about 7»500 (similar 
to the March 1972 census) cattle as compared to 22,000 in the 1969/70 census. 
Furthermore his idea that the initiation of the communal ranch should have 
occurred (so as to avoid the problem of culling) at this point is well taken. 
Although people are agreed on some form of communal ranch several 
problems remain. In discussion with the District Range Officer and Group 
Ranch officials from Nairobi, it was consistently stated that all the Mwereni 
people would become le^ ftlrffiembers of the communal ranch and, furthermore, that 
loans would be made to the communal ranch with Its profits being shared among 
all the people of Mwereni." 
There are several sociological problems which may threaten any plan 
initiated under the above assumptions® We discuss these in detail. With regard 
to cattle ownership and use, one can classify the population of Mwereni into 
a) Cattleowners 
b) Cattle-users 
c) Non-cattle owners/non-cattle users, i.e. subsistence 
agriculturalist• 
There is no data to indicate the percentage of people currently in 
each group but the P.V.O. (1965) suggested that 80-85 per cent of the population 
lived off other people's cattle (by looking after them and selling the milk) 
and further that 50 per cent of all cattle were owned by 2.5 per cent of the 
population. 
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The immediate policy question is whether to make cattle-users 
members of the Group Ranch. If they are, a subsidiary question is what 
security can they offer since the cattle will belong to the owners. The 
other major question is whether to allow the subsistence agriculturalists 
(about 15-20 per cent) to become members in the group ranch. If the idea 
is to convert the area into ranch land, it may be necessary to limit 
subsistence farming and resettle those people in a specific areas 
Adjudication, which has not started,, will be done on a clan 
basiso The title will then be held by the Group Ranch,. What is to 
prevent individuals claiming land for use in other ways later? This 
needs further discussion during pre-planning involving popular participation 
and not just "explaining to people3 as some officers maintain. 
Re c. ommendat ions; 
1® Land adjudication of the area3 
2e Membership (stock quotas) be allocated equally to every person 
who can show land rights in Mwereni Location® 
3« Stock allowed in the ranch be strictly as per stock quota, This 
will force cattle owners (the minority) to either sell their excess stock 
or negotiate extra grazing quota from clansmen/others. 
4e Subsistence agriculture areas either be specifically adjudicated 
within the ranGh or outside® It is not adequate to leave it hazy as to 
whether subsistence agriculture will be allowed in the ranch® The proposal 
in the Plan for settlement in Jombo Forest does not seem to be known even 
at the District level® The Jombo Forest area is rapidly filling up with 
non-Duruma migrants® 
5s It is imperative that home sites be specified during adjudication. 
It may be worthwhile to plan villages rather than scattered homesteads since 
most of the land will be open ranch* 
AGRICULTURE - GENERAL 
The Ministry of Agriculture appears to be on top of its program® 
A tree crop census has been completed and the report was in preparation 
during field work. Demonstration plots and bulking plots (usually on the 
wazee-vijana land) are progressing satisfactorily in Msabweni and Kikoneni, 
The Madhvani tractor has been working on sugar nurseries (100 acres) and by 
June 6thj 1972 some of the land was being planted* It was argued that an 
additional tractor could be used6 The Ministry, I was informed, has ultimately 
agreed on tree crop nurseries in the SEDP area as opposed to relying on Mtwapa 
Nursery® A cattle census has been completed in the dairy/beef area (Mkongani/ 
Kikoneni),, showing 4000 cattle and in the Mwereni Ranch area 7500 cattle. 
Dam and dip sites have been surveyed and work is progressing* There are plans 
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for starting a sugar cooperative in Kikoneni® All programs are just 'beginning. 
A potential problem in Msambweni9 Hkongani and Kikoneni will be the 
selection of SEDP model farmers® At the moment the members of the agricultural 
committee (in Kikoneni) seem also to be the beneficiaries of demonstration 
plots and bulking plots. These are the wazee-vi.jana® There is a danger that 
when it comes to selection of farmers for the detailed program this group which, 
in the parlance of the Ascroft et.alo study.of Tetu? can be defined as pro-
gressive will be the sole beneficiaries® Given experience elsewhere it is 
imperative that the SRDP project farmers come from all strata to ensure a 
more effective demonstration effect. Furthermore they ought to reflect the 
proportions of the various ethnic communities if not show bias for the 
indigenous people. Selection of these farmers will be critical for the 
success of the program. 
Re c ommendat ion; 
SHDP model farmers be selected to .reflect ethnic variafitSy<. -AflMh 
size, age and sex and not to just reflect the emergent progressive leadership. 
Indeed the challenge is to move the less progressive farmers and not to just 
help the progressive ones® 
AGRICULTURAL SUPERVISED CREDIT -
RAMISI SUGAR FACTORY. 
At present the Ramisi sugar factory works at 50 per cent capacity. 
It obtains its supply of sugarcane primarily from its own plantation. Hans 
are.underway to create a group of small-farmer-suppliers, largely through 
regular (MOA) extension efforts. It seems, however, that a very good 
opportunity for intensified extension has been overlooked® 
The sugar factory has a monopoly on buying sugarcane. That is, a 
fanner with surplus sugar cane has no alternative but to sell it to the factory. 
This means that the factory can exert considerable control over the farmer's 
management practices. "If you don't do so-and-so, I won't buy your sugar"® 
The factory has an implementable threat® Monopoly also means that the factory 
can give loans without running risks, since it can deduct the repayment of the 
loan. fr9m the farmers sugar income® Chemilil sugar processing has some experience 
in this, which ought to be taken into account. 
In all, the sugarcane factory offers an ideal opportunity to introduce 
supervised credit. Several possibilities are open? 
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(1) The factory can contract farmers to grow cane under the same 
conditions as in the plantation. This implies very close supervision and 
tight control, The farmers virtually operate as laborers and make a few 
management decisions> 
(2) A second possibility is for the factory to operate with its 
trained extension staff 5 helping the farmers to grow sugarcane on their farms® 
The factory gives all the technical advice and loans for establishing plots, 
fertiliser, sprays and transport. In this situation the control of the factory 
largely consists in quality control, i.e. different prices are paid for different 
grades of sugarcane. The possibility even exists for the factoiy to set up 
co-operatives (which own lorries for transport, etc). In this situation the 
farmer is less tightly controlled® The advantage of the scheme accrueq^rom 
the intensified extension, the controlled loans and certain income.provided 
to the farmer. A condition for the scheme8s success is, of course, that 
farmers do not have more lucrative alternatives® 
An example of a successful supervised credit scheme may further 
illustrate the possibilities® BAT (British American Tobacco) had a factory 
in Nigeria which operated under the same conditions as the Ramisi sugar factory. 
It had its own extension staff which roamed the surrounding farming area. .First; 
the staff established whether an area was suitable for tobacco. If it was, the 
headman of the area was contacted and the possibilities were thoroughly discussed. 
Later farmers were contacted in barazas and the rights and duties, benefits 
and costs, of tobacco growing were thoroughly discussed. Interested farmers 
were then given some training in tobacco growing (FTC?). Next the farmers 
established nuseries under close supervision of the extension staff. The land 
was plowed by tips factory (on loan), the land was planted with the help of the 
extension staff,and sprays and fertilizer applied (on loan)-.- The farmers then 
brought the harvest to the selection center where factory employees graded the 
leaves (in public so that farmers learned what good and bad grades were). The 
farmer was paid after completing the harvest and after deducting any loans and 
advances he might have been given* The farmers made good money and people were 
eager to join the scheme. Later, i.e. when a group of farmers proved "good", 
the factory helped the group to set up its own curing barns and co-operatives 
to run the barns® Farmers now made more money since they sold the cured 
product to the factory® The factory retained quality control, i.e, continued 
selecting the leaves into grades. It also kept the administration. In later 
stages these activities will possibly also be left to farmers. At present, the 
co-operative can also buy leaves from non-members, making a profit from curing. 
B - 20 
The scheme in Nigeria was so successful that the regular extension 
staff could no longer operate directly with the farmers® The farmers would 
only accept advice from the factory extension staff as farmers trusted them 
completely® 
A beneficial scheme of this nature could easily be established at 
Ramisi. It would seem that a tightly organized scheme could easily receive 
initial financing by commercial banks if the factory does not have the.money 
for the necessary initial expenditures. A condition for the scheme is, of 
course, a good network of sugar roads opening up the farming area to facilitate 
transport to the factory. 
In the Ramisi case the tendency for Kamba migrants to control, the 
inputs from the factory should checked. These inputs should be fairly 
distributed among the ethnic groups® 
Recommendat i on s 
A supervised sugar credit system tied to Ramisi factory with proportional 
participation from the assorted ethnic groups should be started® 
EXPATRIATES AND KWALE SRDP. 
Most of the local officers. I met with at the Provincial, District and 
Divisional level are convinced that expatriates do not have a positive role to 
play in SRDP. They give two basic reasons® 
1. One of their colleagTOs had been assigned the duty planning SRDP -ur 
Kwale and he was clearly instructed that money was not a consideration. He 
produced a report which was then used by a set of expatriates connected with 
SUMP the. centre to argue against local planners. Ultimately some expatriates 
in S&DP at the centre wrote the plan-in the opinion of local staff - slighting 
local staff® 
2® The second reason is the history of one expatriate who in the late 
fifties was connected with the Shimba Hills Settlements. Lately he has been 
in the Provincial Director of Agriculture Office® He is not particularly 
popular - not only with Provincial level officers (administrative and other) 
who have-written memos clearly indicating that they would rather not have him 
around but also xdth very local J.AcAs® who worked with him in Shimba Hills. 
Beyond the purely personal, people talk about Shimba Hills as only having provided 
luxurious housing for experts and not meaningful development® 
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The other point against expatriate involvement at the local level is 
that it would $ot allow the local administrative staff to he responsible for 
implementations especially phasing of projects in relation to political objectives 
as clearly indicated in the Vihiga SRDP. 
Re c ommendat ion; 
Expatriates should not be posted to Kwale SRDP, as this would just 
generate strife. The watch dog role (for the donor) can be played from Nairobi, 
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BfTSHmff DATA 
After extensive unstructured, interviews of officers and the population 
in general in Kwale, it was. decided to attempt structured interviews. The sample 
for...'- • the "baseline® data on Kwale 3RDP was constructed.in such a way as to 
embrace the formal governmental leaders at the local level., chiefs and sub-chiefs 
as well as demonstration farmers, The demonstration farmers are not, as was 
made clear by the field officers, the people who were going to be SHDP farmers. 
One of the other two categories of people in the sample were self-help group 
leaders, who were Kasha immigrants into the area. These are the ones with 
bonafide self—help as opposed to government communal labor as in llwereni Location 
ox- traditional KLango group activity in functions like Katanga, (incidentally 
for future evaluation it maybe wise to sample leaders of Mlango groups.) The 
other group, was a random sample of the people of Bombani A - the only part of 
the SRDP area with completed land adjudication. It is an area of old settlement, 
basically Digo — there are only (1972 June) 1 5 settlers from the olher parts of 
the country, and the individual land plots are smaller than in the rest of the 
SRDP area with the possible exception of Mafisiai •=• in Msabweni Location. 
Clearly then, this is a purposive sample. Previous attempts to 
construct a random sample by various means by Ascroft had not been productive. 
The various categories of the sample were: 
Chiefs and Sub-chiefs - 11 
Demonstration Farmers - 9 (7 Digo, 2 Kamba) 
Self Help Group Leaders - 10 (including 2 Kamba 
Demonstration Farmers) 
Random Sample of Bombani A 
Farmers - 20 
We were able to interviews 
1. 11 Chiefs and Sub-chiefs 
2. 9 Demonstration Farmers (j Digo, 2 Kamba) 
3. 10 Self-Help Group Farmers (9 male Kamba, 1 Kamba female) 
4. 16 Random Sample of Bombani A Farmers. (All Digo) 
The total sample was therefore 45, 
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DEMOGRAPHIC DATA. 
The Bombard A sample contained 2 women and 14 men. 
All the self-help group officers were Kamba and one was female® All 
chiefs and sub-chiefs were males 8 were Digo, 3 were Duruma. All the demonstration 
farmers were male ; 7 were Digo, 1 was Kaml?a§ and none were Duruma * The sample 
did not catch any other trihes like Taita, leru, Nandi, Luo or Ifikuyu who are 
in the SRDP area hut in very minor numbers. Thus Digo were 67$, Kamba 26$, and 
Duruma 7$ of the sample. Of the sample 49$ were born in Kikoneni location; 7$ 
were born in Mwereni location; 12$ were born in Msabweni location; 25$ were born 
in Machakos (22$ in Eastern,Division - Kiteta or Muthetheni Location and 3$ in 
Northern Division-Kangundo) • and 7$ were born in Mkongani location. 
11$ of the sample was under 30 years old; 71$ was 30-50 and 18$ was 
over 50a 
All the chiefs were between 30-50 years old, 42$ of the sub-chiefs 
are between 30-50 years of age. 58$ of the sub-chiefs are 50 years old, clearly 
they need to be retired, 
2 of the demonstration farmers were under 30 years old; 6 were between 
30-50; and none were over 5° years old. Of the two under thirty years of age, 
one was Kamba3 and the other Digo. All are wazee-vi.lana« No chiefs/sub-chiefs 
are demonstrated farmers. 
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION. 
Of the self-help group leaders, 2 were under 30 years old, 9 were 
between 30-50 years old and 1 was over 50 years old. 
All the respondents had poor houses made of wood and mud (immigrants 
had copied the Digo construction technology), with earthen floors and wooden 
windows. The household facilities were poor. .50$ of the sample did not have 
toilets and of the rest 5$ had pit toilets* 100$ use three stones to cook upon, 
and .100$ use paraffin for lighting although only 87$ had a chimney lamp. 85$ 
had not fenced their shambas. There were seven (37$ of all stock-owners) people 
with cattle spray equipment; of these seven, 3 are Digo and 4 are Kamba. The 
fact that the only few people have spray equipment in spite of the fact that 
42$ (19) of all respondents own stock reflects the low level of livestock 
husbandry. There is no evidence that those without private spray equipment 
was public dips. The three Digos with spray equipment are some of the most 
progressive waaee-viriana. It is remarkable that they have adopted cattle. 
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They are relatively large scale farmer;/traders. 24.4$ (11) of all respondents 
have a saw; 87% (39) have a chimney lamp; 87$ (39) have a modern jembe; 78% (35) 
have a Digo jembe; and 100% (45) have a panga. (This may reflect the Coconut 
culture + Immigrant farming + Duruma herd ) 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
Sources of information for the population are also poor® 20% (9) never 
listen to the radio and only 47% (2l) of all respondents own a radio® 20% (9) of 
all respondents listen to the radio seldom and 9% (4) listen a few times a month® 
Thus 49% (22) of all respondents listen to the radio few times a month, seldom 
or never® If we add the category of who listens a few times a week, i.e. 13%(3), 
we note than. 52% do not get information through the radio effectively, 0r,~„. 38% 
listen to the radio daily or almost daily® With respect to newspaper readership 
only 4®4.% (2) read the newspaper daily or almost daily. 13% (6) read newspapers 
a few times a week® 22®2% (10) read newspapers a few times a month. 27% (12) 
read newspapers seldom; 33®3% (15) never read newspapers® Thus 95®5% of the 
sample population obtain very little information from the daily newspapers. 
100% never read monthlyor weekly magazines. Very few people travel outside the 
local area® 4®4% (2) travel to Mombasa daily or almost daily (incidentally those 
who travel are not the newspaper readers); 60% (27) travel to Mombasa seldom or 
never. From the list of names and locations we were able to show that daily 
newspapei readers and radio listening is related to good bus service® The 
good readers and listeners were at Msambweni and Mwangulu® 
EDUCATION. 
The educational level of the population is low, particularly for the 
Digc. Only 27% (12) have been beyond primary school and only 11% (5) are fluent 
(reaaing, writing and speaking) in their vernacular, Swahili and English. Of the 
fluent 11%, 4 are Kamba immigrants and I is Duruma® There aren't Di^os in this 
category® (One should note that Digos are 67%, Kambas 26% and Durumas 7% of 
sample). 46% (22) cannot read or write vernacular, Swahili or English® There is 1 to 
1 correlation between being able to read and vjrite the vernacular and Swahili and 
English® 83% of the Kamba migrants can read and write the vernacular and Swahili. 
100% of the Duruma can read and write the vernacular and Swahili. Only 23®3% of 
the Digos can read and write the vernacular and Swahili® 
Of the 12 who went beyond primary education 10 are Chri&tianby religion. 
This group is composed of 2 Duruma and 10 Kamba® In terms of ethnicity 2 of 
Duruma are Christian, and 1 is Moslem; (he is educated up to Form II)® 100% of the 
Kamba are Christian® This needs further investigation to disaggregate the correlation 
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between education and religion. Incidentally since there is no Digo Christian, 
there is, a positive correlation between Islam and lack of education. For the 
Kambas there is positive correlation between Christianity and education* The 
Kamba sample is rather small and consists only, of leaders * For the Duruma the 
sample is small and is also of leaders. However 2 Durumas under 30 years old 
are educated above, primary (Std. 8). and 33.3$ of Digos under . 30 years old are 
educated above primary (Std. 8). 100$ of the Kambas under 30 years old are 
educated above primary (Std. 8). 
Of the 12 of the sample, who have been beyond primary (Std, 8) 1 is 
Digcv 8 are Kamba and 3 are Duruma. All Kamba and Duruma have children in 
school. All the Digos under thirty years old with children, have children in 
school. 
70$ (2l) of all Digos in the sample are. between 30-5° years old. 7 
send their children.to Mandarasa and school; 3 send their children to Mandarasa 
only; 8 send their.children to regular school and 1 does not send his children 
to any type of school. 
7 of all Digos in the sample are over 50 years old. 14.4$ (l) has 
his children in Mandarasa and regular school; 1 lias his children in.Mandarasa 
only; 1 has his children., in ..regular school; and 4 do not send their children to 
any type of- school* It is clear then that the middleaged Digos, between 30-50 
years, are beginning to send children to school and de-emphasizing Mandarasa. 
This Interpretation is based on the data breakdown as well as a finding that 
the wazee-vi.jana send their children to Mandarasa as a nursery and later put 
them in regular school. Unfortunately the data cannot be further disaggregated. 
Clearly field work data revealed that the older Digo (who have school age 
children due to the marriage-patterns) do not emphasize-regular-education. 
This question should be explored further in future evaluation by checking 
number of wives and marriage times to get children spread thereby establishing 
for sure whether the Old Digos send children to school when they have school age 
children. 
Of .the demonstration, farmers 6 have not been to or past primary school 
while 4-have. Of the self-help group category 4 have not been to or past primary 
school and 8 have, -Of the chiefs and sub-chiefs 8 have not. been to or past primary; 
3 have. It is clear then that the self-help group leaders are more educated than 
both demonstration farmers and the administration leaders. Incidentally of the 
chiefs, 3 have,not been to or past primary. 1 has.(Mwereni Location chief).« Of 
the sub-chiefs, 5 have not been to or past primary; 2 have.- Therefore disaggregating 
the cbief/sub-chief does not show much difference. Both-categories have not had, 
much formal education. The sub-chiefs seem to have had greater formal education, 
basic travel and assorted jobs outside the area. 
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STRUCTURE OF OCCUPATIONS. 
Out of the whole sample we pulled out those who had two (the maximum 
enumerated) previous jobs. They were 24«4% (ll). The pattern of previous jobs 
in sequence is reproduced and does not seem to make sense® 
First job Second job Third job 
Farmer Trader Farmer 
Mechanic Mason Farmer 
JAA Clerk Chief 
Teacher (UT) Clerk Chief 
Army- Foreman Sub-chief 
Cook Forces Farmer 
Teacher (UT) CJD. Assist. Farmer 
Laborer Trader Farmer 
Army Mechanic Farmer 
LABOR USE PATTERNS. 
As far as agricultural labor i« concerned, all respondents use family 
members. 40% (l8) do not use contract labor. 64$ (29) do not use regular paid 
labor. 58$ (26) do not use self-help labor. Thus it is clear there is very 
little labor used outside the family. The lamba use all forms of labor. 
FARHIia PRACTICES. 
Agricultural practices with respect to.new crops are poor. Since 
everybody has coconuts, cashew nut, local maize, mangoes, cassava and fruit 
trees we present data on hybrid maize, cotton, sugar cane/stock (local, cattle, 
goats and sheep. Nobody keeps exotic chicken or pigs). Only 22.2^ (l0) have 
hybrid maize. 53% (24) have cotton. 58^ (2O have sugar cane. (31) have 
stock. All the Kambas in the sample have every crop other than hybrid maize; 
they argue that they can make more money with crops other than hybrid maize. 
All the Duruma have stock and. 67% have vegetables and none have the other crops 
Digos do not in general have stock and vegetables. Digo demonstration farmers 
a4»pt only a single crop, either cotton or sugar ca»e. 
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There are 110 cooperatives other than the Marlakani Milk' Scheme -
where the 3 Duruma are members. There are no. dairy enterprises® Ins pit e of 
the fact that 69$ (31) of the sample have stock (local cows and hulls and goats 
mainly)i the husbandry practices are very poor. Nobody us.es' fodder or concentrates. 
Nobody deworms or keeps records. There are no stock/dairy cooperatives. The 
watering- places for cattle are streams and ponds. Only 37$ of the stock owners 
have spray equipment. Given the shortage of public dips we can assume that they 
are the only ones who spray® Most of the respondents have never seen a veterinary 
officer. One should,note^ thafc, the general, impression of very little stock in the 
Kikoneni Location is belied by the percentage keeping stock. 
lncid.enta.lly only. 38$ (l?) have gone to F.T.C. courses while only 11$ 
(5) have gone two times or more. As far as the significance of agricultural 
officers for information is concerned, the locational (Kikoneni) JAA was nominated 
as a key Government Officer 4-times. The sub-locational (Kikoneni.) JAAs (2) . were 
nominated once each! The - respondents consistently nominated chiefs and sub-chiefs 
as more important than all other officers® 
In the nominations of the non-governmental leaders Marco Katisya 
(self—help-leader) was nominated 7 times, and Omar-i Hassan Masemo (demonstration 
farmer) 4 times. Bhakhari Easi (religious leader who was not in the sample) 
4 times® Hamisi Shee (religious leader who was not in sample) was mentioned 
3 times.. 8 others were nominated txo.ee. 55 others were nominated once. Among 
those nominated once include the local MP. No other MPs were nominated. 
Marco Katisya5s nomination is probably reflective of his leadership 
role among the Kamba immigrants and Cassia Hassan Masemomomination is reflective 
of his role as a trader/farmer/Digo political local level leader® Both are part 
of the wazec-vi.1ana» Both base their influence in their specific ettoie communities 
and do not seek to bring other ethnic groups into their- followership. 
ETHNICITY. 
Attitudes towards employing other tribes are. very interesting® 60$ (27) 
argued that people mind employing a Kalenjin (the dummy variable) as a laborer® 
24$ (ll) themselves mind employing a Kalenjin. 18$ (8) themselves mind employing 
a Kamba, 18$ (8) themselves mind employing a Kikuyu. Further checking indicated 
It was the same people® 9$ (4) themselves mind employing a Duruma.. The four were 
the same ..who minded employing Kambas, I£ikuyu, and Kalenjin® Only 3®3$ (2) mind 
employing Digos® These two are.Kambas, one minds employing only Digo, the other 
minds employing Digos and Kalenjin® Thus it seems clear that it is only the Disc 
who mind-employing persons-of other-tribes- perhaps a reflection of opposition 
to immigrants, which underlies the whole thrust of this report, that is, ethnic 
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attitudes and their manipulation for vetoing programs is a problem which will 
have to be attacked seriously before any programs can succeed. 
-
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EVALUATION SUMMARY 
QUESTION 1c Is the planning framework developed for SRDP adequate or 
effective to meet its principles and objectives? 
The Mbere SRDP Plan document represents a well-integrated plan 
for development in an area where factual information was lacking. The 
strengths and weaknesses of the Plan are very much related to the 
information available to the planning team at the time the plan was pre-
pared. The proposals in the Plan deal with (l) infrastructure and 
(2) production increasing activities® The proposals for infrastructural 
improvement are sound because the needs could be readily identified® The 
proposals for productive activities are less sound and reflect paucity of 
information about the farming systems of the area® 
Partial proposals for remedying the information gaps (through 
agronomic trials) are mentioned in the Plan, but have still to be implemented. 
There are no proposals for a systematic investigation of farming systems 
across the ecological zones of Mbere. Thus the planners did a fair job 
in preparing a plan in the absence of facts, but the attempt made to 
improve the data base for effective planning was inadequate® Instead of 
relying on existing information, the planners could have obtained additional 
information about the production situation (a.s for example, by a baseline 
survey as in Vihiga and Tetu) in a relatively short period, which would 
likely have led to a better diagnosis of production possibilities and 
constraints and suggested opportunities for useful experimentation® 
It seems that the emphasis of the crop development programme in 
* 
Mbere was unduly influenced by what little information on crop performance 
did exist, and that this is why cotton figures so large in the programme® 
At the project level, the cotton block programme was not sub-
jected to proper financial appraisal which would have shown it to be a loss 
maker even under optimistic assumptions about yields® As an experimental 
programme the cotton blocks had dubious and conflicting objectives® Although 
subject to strong and sound criticism from independent observers, the 
programme went ahead® The cotton programme on private plots was based on 
over optimistic assessments of yields obtainable under ordinary farm 
conditions which resulted in unrealistic projections of acreage expansion® 
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ITo proper attempt was made to consider the relative profitability of cotton 
vis -a -vis other crops in a whole farm system® 
It seems that the Mbere SRDP pursues the SRDP objectives but only 
adheres weakly to the SRDP principles® Experimentation is confined to three 
projects: cotton blocks, trader credit and the agriservice station® The 
first of these is not profitable enough, even on paper, to continue in an 
area like Mhere. The second two are potentially very useful experiments® 
There is a need to ensure that there is measurement the offeots of bothj 
if they are to be meaningful® It is too early to judge the replicability 
aspects of the programme. 
2. In planning the SRDP was the unexploited potential for development 
of each SRDP area adequately assessed? 
The Plan notes that Mbere is a labour scarce, land abundant area 
and correctly proposes means of raising labour productivity, and the breaking 
of labour bottlenecks, through the health and water programmes and the 
development and application of medium level technology such as ox-ploughe 
and improved hand implements® However the cotton block project with its 
emphasis on raising yields per acre with high management inputs, and cotton 
generally with its low returns to labour, is inconsistent with the basic 
resource endowments of the area® Greater emphasis might have been given 
to Katumani maize and Mexican 142 Pea Beans in order to exploit the technical 
advance embodied in them® It is pleasing to note that the AI project has 
priority in the livestock programme. 
3® Were the probable constraints preventing this potential from being 
maximally exploited adequately assessed? 
The Plan does a good job of assessing the need for infrastxuotural 
improvements® With respect to constraints affecting production, the plan 
emphasises credit needs and the physical distribution of new inputs to farmers® 
It assumes that needed improvement in extension services will come about 
merely by increasing the numbers of extension staff and/or increasing their 
mobility® 
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fa The possibility exists that the main constraints'-to farm developme.it is the 
farmer's feeling of uncertainty with respect to provision of food. With 
this in mind, a more sustained move towards the cash economy might be 
achieved, for some farmers, if the crop chosen for extension emphasis were 
Katumani maize rather than cotton. The reduction of the presently large 
yearly price fluctuations for food, which should follow wider adoption of 
drought resistant maize varieties, would encourage increased cash crop 
specialization by farmers at a later stage. Provision of tractor services 
for cash crop development may be an inferior strategy to concentrating 
on raising the productivity^labour in food production which would release 
labour for cash crops. With respect to labour and employment, it is 
questionable whether the simultaneous expansion of two cotton projects with 
their competing demands for labour would not exceed availabilities. Indeed 
the assumption that unemployment exists, other than of a strictly off-
peak type, is unwarranted. Rotational needs on cotton blocks were not 
accounted for. 
4. To what extent are SRDP projects integrated or coordinated with 
on going programmes and to what extent have on going programmes been labelled 
SRDP? 
Because there was little sustained development effort in Mbere prior 
to the SRDP, relatively few projects existed for SRDP to integrate or 
coordinate with. However, the crop programme represents an extension of 
on-going activities, and the proposals for improved distribution of 
agricultural inputs and a new credit scheme are useful. The SRDP programme 
itself is well integrated. What on-going programmes there are have not 
been labelled SRDP: most people are well aware of what is SRDP and what is 
not. 
5. To what extent are the^trategies and approaches designed to 
accelerate' rural development in SRDP areas newer and more effective than those "jsr* 
which they replace or supersede? 
Cotton blocks are not new to Mbere but the SRDP cotton block 
programme differs in important respects from, existing schemes, and is, 
therefore, not a continuation of an existing scheme. The important 
differences are (i) scale (ii) management level (iii) land is rented from 
the clan (iv) integration with the agriservice station (v) labour is all 
paid. It is doubtful whether the SRDP cotton blocks are more effective than 
those which they supersede. The traders' credit proposal is a new and useful 
departure, but its effectiveness is not yet known® 
The improved, distribution of agricultural inputs through the agriservice 
station is also a new and potentially useful proposal. The agronomic 
research programme is an important prerequisite to crop development, and 
the fact that it is a new venture illustrates the neglect that Mbere 
suffered prior to SBDP, The agriservice station through its intended 
application of medium level technology offers exciting possibilities for 
improving labour productivity at low cost. The whole infrastructure programme 
is to be commended,- and will likely have an important, if long term, impact 
on development. 
6. Are the implementation stages effective enough to try out these 
new strategies and approaches? 
The cotton block programme was implemented before all the inputs 
planned for inclusion were at hand. As a result the project has been 
declared a failure for the wrong reasons. Delays in getting the agronomic 
research programme underway have hampered progress in crop development. 
Labour to dig the trench for the water pipe was paid at first but then 
recruited on harambee basis. As a result the project, which could have 
gained local support for the whole programme, is lagging behind. Insufficient 
attention is given in the Plan to the sequence in which projects can be 
implemented to secure optimum cooperation from the people. 
7. Were the extra funds, staff, expertise, administrative costs, 
special training, equipment etc. estimated for and provided to SBDP areas 
inadequate, adequate or more than adequate? 
Staff and financial needs of the SBDP programme are by, and large 
correctly estimated in the Plan® However, nearly all the projects in the 
programme have been delayed for want of staff, part of which may be attributed 
to delays in constructing houses in Siakago and part may be because of 
recruitment from overseas. Those appointed early in the programme's life 
have been hampered for over a year by lack of transport, e.g. the beekeeper 
and the range assistants. Some of the original junior staff appointed have 
left: other have been transferred. Others do not like the heat and relative 
isolation of Mbere, which may indicate a need for inducement pay for 
"hardship" posts. Specific cur-rent needs are motorbikes for junior staff. 
The relatively large team of experts assigned to plan and implement Mbere 
SEDP is probably warranted in view of the seeming intractability of Mbere1 s 
problems, but a severe limitation of the ITOBAD team's effectiveness in 
getting the programme moving quickly was the gap of some months between the 
departure of the first planning team and the arrival of SEDP personnel to 
help implement the plan. 
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8. To what extent are the procedures, strategies and approaches 
devised for SRDP projects replicahle in the country as a whole? 
Unless cotton blocks can he shown to he profitable they are not 
replicahle in other parts of the country. Their non-profitability in 
Mbere is not due to their experimental nature. However the agriservice 
station, although itself not replicable, could lead to the introduction 
of low cost medium level technology tools and etjjtipment in other dry 
parts of Ijhe country. The findings of the agronomic research programme, 
particularly with respect to maize/beans mixture, could well be of use 
elsewhere, The water scheme is unique to Mbere but the system of payment 
for labour proposed in this report and the system of payment for water 
described in the Plan could be usefully replicated in other areas. 
9* How effective has the role of the Area Coordinators, District 
Development Committees and the Ministry of Finance and Planning in its 
capacity of overall SRDP coordinator been? 
Some of the delays in the programme may be ascribed to some 
initial misunderstanding of the whole SRDP concept by the Provincial 
administration. The switch from paid labour to harambee labour on the 
water pipe scheme is a result of direct intervention at the Provincial 
level. The District Development "-•Committee has done a good job in 
redefining the operational programme for the agriservice station. At central 
Government level, planning officers have been enthusiastic in supporting 
projects 
A u t occasionally the enthusiasm has been misplaced, as for example 
with the cotton blocks scheme. The area coordinator who arrived late on 
the scene has more than made up for lost time, and has been instrumental in pioneering the reporting system. 
( 
10. To what extent have local communities been adequately involved 
in the planning and implementation of SRDP and to what extent has this 
involvement been premature, timely or too late? 
The attitude of central Government towards people involvement in 
SRDP planning tends to have been "how can we sell the project package to the 
people" rather than "how can we get the people's reactions to our first 
ideas and incorporate them in a revised programme." Some of the failures 
to involve local people are now manifest in the slow progress of the group 
ranches, and may possibly be a partial cause of the so called labour 
problems in the clearing of land for the cotton blocks, the slow progress 
with' hafambeeT labour"in digging for the water scheme, and the limited 
involvement of local people in road construction. There is a need for full 
discussion with local people of the water pricing system described in the 
Plan, and more adequate coverage of their views before a new crop 
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priorities list is finalised. 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. That the cotton "block programme he discontinued. 
2. That the planners In central Government should apply- time discounting 
procedures in their evaluation of projects. 
3. That "axe-men" he appointed •within planning ministries whose task would 
he to evaluate projects- in stages subsequent to their initial vetting by-
planning staff. 
That the crop research programme should investigate appropriate rotational 
systems for cotton, 
5- That extension effort for cotton production on private plots be concentrated 
for the present In Mavuria location and Gangara sublocation of Nthawa, 
6. That cotton trial plots be continued in other parts of Mbere, under high 
and low management systems, and that one season cotton planted in the long 
rains be tried in Mavuria on an experimental basis. 
J, That the traders' credit scheme for insecticide and other agricultural inputs 
be Implemented, and that its impact on (a) the level of sales and (b) the 
amount of credit given to farmers, be monitored. 
8. That a selective credit programme for cotton farmers be run in conjunction 
with the traders' credit programme, -with the objective of limiting the amount 
of time agricultural extension staff spend In administering credit. 
9- That negotiations be entered into with BAT with the aim of removing the tobacco 
quota for Mbere farmers. 
10. That Katumani maize and Mexican lU2 Pea Beans be given priority in'the crop 
development programme. 
11. That the crop trials programme be accelerated by the secondment of additional 
staff, and that economic as well as agronomic data be recorded. 
12. That the proposal to appraise and plan the development of Ishiara irrigation 
scheme be Implemented, and that a system of tenure be worked out which will 
permit the eviction of tenants whose farming performance falls below agreed 
standards. 
13- That plans for group ranches be held in abeyance until land questions have 
been resolved by the clans. 
lb. That the agriservice station project be implemented in accordance with the 
objectives set out recently by the planning group, 
15- That funds be made available for the agriservice station manager to visit 
centres of research on medium level technology in other countries e.g. 
Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia. 
l6. That motor bikes be provided for the beekeeper and other AAs assigned to the 
SRDP programme. 
1T« That paid labour be used for digging the main water trench at the rate 
of shs. 1 per metre, and that laterals should be dug hy haramhee 
labour. 
18. That the proposed water pricing scheme he discussed with the local 
people. 
19. That a haseline survey of present farming systems be carried out, 
along the lines of the Tetu and Vihiga surveys, and that use be made 
of the MFEP Farm Enterprise Cost Survey data in conjunction with other 
information to work out farm plans for modal farm situations in the main 
ecological zones of Mbere. 
^ . :' - } C T COTTOIT BLOCKS 
STATED OBJECTIVES 
"An experimental cotton blocks schemes should be launched, with 
fairly big blocks centrally managed and employing paid labour. The main 
purpose of the scheme would be its demonstration effect, to educate the 
farmers in-proper farming methods and techniques with a view to raise 
production per acre but also to increase earnings per acre. Experimentation 
is needed here and one must move cautiously and very sensitively and learn 
from new as well as from past experiences." p. 17, Mbere Special Rural 
Development Programme. 
"The proposed organized cotton blocks project.... is justified as 
n 
a parallel, limited experiment in int^sification and training i.e. a benchmark 
to test the main extension effort concentrated on individual farmers. As such 
the project will be closely tied up with the Machine and Training Unit and 
with the trials and research programme discussed below. The organized 
cotton blocks will be centrally managed and employ hired labour. The purpose 
of the project will thus be to increase production per acre by improved 
management, to educate the farmers in proper farming methods and techniques, 
and in a way to provide employment and increased earnings. The technology 
used must be labour intensive and adaptable to small holders. Each block 
should be at least 100 acres so that a part time assistant manager can be 
employed." p. 33, Mbere Special Rural Development Programme. 
The blocks are to be located where population density is fairly 
high (to ensure adequate labour supply) and the land rented from the clans 
at shs 10 per acre per year. Five hundred acres are to be cleared in the 
first year (1970/71) and five hundred in the second year. The project is to 
be administered by a board of directors under the Ministry of Agriculture 
with a general manager in charge based in Siakago. 
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EVALUATION OF PROJECT AS PRESENTED IN PLAIT 
TABLE 1. Costs--Benefits of the Cotton Block Scheme 
(all figures taken from p. 34 of the Plan (£)) 
Year Benefits Capital Costs Clearing Staff Field Total Costs 
1970 - 6,590 5", 000 2,275 8,125 19,400 
1971 11,250 - 5,000 2,275 16,250 23,525 
1972 22,500 - - 2,275 I6r250 18,525 
1973 22,500 - - 2,275 16,250 18,525 
1974 22,500 - - 2,275 - 2,275 
Total: 78,750 84,840 
As the above figures show, the cotton block scheme does not break 
even in cash flow terms, even at a zero discount rate. As these figures 
are those.presented by the planning team, (although not set out in this form) 
they are guilty of not making explicit that the project on their own 
assumptions is a loss maker. 
The question arises as to whether a strictly financial analysis of 
the project is appropriate, as the project is stated to be of an experimental 
nature and one which would have demonstration effects. The project can 
hardly be justified on these grounds because the demonstration effects of 
the cotton block scheme would likely be less than if the staff employed 
used more conventional means e.g. straight demonstration plots, visits to 
farmers. In this connection it must be noted that those employed on the 
blocks would be unlikely to have private cotton plots of their own because 
if they had they would be busy with their own cotton. 
Do the employment implications of the scheme justify it? Working 
back from the labour cost figures, we see that the following income would 
accrue to labour over time: 
1970/71 shs 10.0,0(30 clearing ' shs 100,000- planting weeding harvesting 
1971/72 100,000 clearing 200,000 
1972/73 - 200,000 
1973/74 200,000 
Converting these cash figures to.jobs for casual workers, we find that 
clearing would employ about 500 people in each of two yeai^for about three 
months; the field operations would employ about 500 people for another three 
months in the first year and'1000 people-for three months thereafter. 
As budgeted the scheme would be quite labour intensive as somewhat in excess 
of half the costs of the project would accrue to labour as wage income. 
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Given that the assumptions of the planners yield a loss making 
project in financial terms; are their assumptions correct ot£ have they heen 
unduly pessimistic? The yield assumptions of 1100 lhs per acre are high 
in comparison with what has heen achieved hy individual farmers, and are 
only a little less than those that have heen achieved in fertiliser trials 
in the area. It may he that given the levels of management prescribed in 
the plan these yield targets are not too high, hut on the other hand they 
are certainly not pessimistic. More disturbing is the implicit assumption 
that cotton can be grown four years in succession on the same land. More 
land would need to be cleared if the benefit stream were to be maintained, 
because cotton needs to be grown in rotation if pests are to be controlled 
adequately and soil fertility maintained. The plan does not given any 
indication of a rotational system, which would likely reduce the stream of 
benefits. 
Thus we must conclude that while on its own assumptions the cotton 
block scheme is a loss maker, a realistic assessment of its prospects 
suggests that it would be even more of a financial loss, and that the non-
financial benefits that might be expected from the scheme are of 
insufficient magnitude tc ->t worthwhile. 
June 1969 PLiffiiixiJG CHRONOLOGY 
Main possibilities for Plan sketched by PPO in letter to Treasury, 
including expanding cotton production among other crops. ITo mention 
of blocks. 
Treasury writes to PPO to limit the role of JTORAD planning team in 
Mbere Plan preparation. 
August 1969 
Treasury questions cotton blocks and asks "should not the main 
emphasis be on extension for private plots?" 
Purpose of cotton blocks is seen to be 
(a) an experiment in hiring labour 
(b) to fit in with the agri-service station 
(c) high efficiency production e.g. as a benchmark 
for monitoring progress of private plots. 
October 1969 
J on Moris who has carried out considerable research in Mbere writes 
in private capacity to Treasury advising do not start with projects that 
have failed before, instancing cotton. 
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Ministry of Agriculture in commenting upon draft Plan proposals 
observes that Mhere is a lahour scarce, land abundant situation which 
implies need for extensive methods of production. "Cotton blocks should 
clearly be regarded as an experiment only. Since there are a number 
of technical problems involved in growing cotton, one purpose of the 
cotton block experiment should be to train people in crop husbandry." 
Treasury commenting upon draft Plan proposals approves cotton blocks 
as an experimental programme "it is known that cotton has innumerable 
problems, and any method that can contribute to solving them would be 
a breakthrough", but stresses need to monitor costs and inputs etc. 
if the experiment is to be useful. 
Ministry of Agriculture memorandum states "A cash crop production 
scheme for cotton is proposed on an entirely experimental basis, because 
for various reasons cotton blocks have not had much success. In order 
to improve management it is proposed to experiment with cotton blocks 
which will be centrally managed and employ hired labour. The purpose of 
the scheme will not only be to raise production per acre but also to 
educate farmers in proper farming methods and techniques." 
November 1969 
Meeting between HQ and Provincial Staff which reached a concensus that 
cotton on individual plots should come first, with cotton blocks as a 
limited experiment in intensification and training. 
Treasury asks who is to manage blocks? 
Ministry of Agriculture suggests Cotton Board, and prepares partial 
financial appraisal aimed at selling project to Cottons.Board, 
December 1969 
Mbere SPDP Plan comes out. 
September 1970 
Brokensha (area evaluator) noted (5) 
"The Plan favours cotton blocks managed by the agricultural department, 
but the picture has, I think, changed since the report was written. 
In the last harvest (1969) much of the cotton crop was grown on blocks 
that had been managed by a group of individual farmers under the 
supervision of the agricultural department. The system is simple and 
seems worth expanding rather than trying larger blocks that usually 
fail, especially for lack of labour at picking time. A group of 
farmers come together, sign for a loan which covers costs ploughing 
(shs 50 P e r acre + 5interest) and insecticides (shs. 68). Average 
size of these blocks in ITthawa is 20 acres. Agricultural staff 
supervise to see that weeding, spraying (seven times) and harvesting 
are done at proper time: then when the crop is sold they recover the 
loans." 
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January 1971 
Ministry of Agriculture memorandum giving evidence of cotton yields in 
Mbere from three sources* demonstration fields, fertilizer trials, 
individual farmer yields, over period 1967-1969• Figure chosen for 
blocks was 75% of mean yield on research trials. 
February 1971 
Ministry of Agriculture recalculate costs/returns from project to Cotton 
Board on basis of higher yield figures (approximately twice those assumed 
earlier). Cotton Board requested to provide capital for revolving fund, 
legal umbrella, accounting services. In return Cotton Board receives 
monies from 1T0RAD to cover costs of land clearing and ploughing costs, 
and for salaries of managers as well as revenues from the project. 
Ministry of Agriculture calculations assume that cotton yields will 
increase in years 4 to 5 following fertilizer application. Land clearing 
costs "have not been included since these will be covered by a grant*" 
March 1971 
Memorandum from Belshaw (IDS) to Treasury, criticising cotton blocks on 
following groundss 
(a) management availability not assessed 
(b) clearing costs need to be included in calculation 
of cos ts/ re turns 
(c) cotton can't be grown on same land for five years 
because pests and disease build up 
(d) replicability 
(e) need to quantify employment benefits 
(f) yield assumptions 
(g) cost/benefit ratio likely to show negative returns 
May 1971 
Cotton Board agree to administer cotton blocks. DAO to manage in 
first year. 
June 1971 
Ministry of Agriculture memorandum to Treasury seeking release 
of funds. 
"The cotton block programme is designed to test out in a relatively 
large scale operation the feasibility of certain methods of utilising 
hired labour and of organising the timely supply of inputs such as 
machinery, insecticides and so on." 
July 1971 
Land clearing begins. 
October 1 9 7 1 
Acreage target reduced to 280 acres after clans fail to donate 
other 220 acres. 
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November 1971 
173 acres cleared, 169 acres ploughed. Cotton Board declares blocks 
a failure. Land returned to clans for individuals to plant their crops. 
December 1971 
Ministry of Agriculture memorandum outlining possible reasons for 
failure. Four possibilities distinguished: 
(i) weaknesses in planning "the proposals lacked a sound technical 
base". 
(ii) overoptimistic about supply of labour, 
(iii) management was inadequate. 
(iv) agronomic assumptions vere wrong. 
NORAD memorandum on causes of failure, distinguishes five 
factors: 
(i) agriservice station not in operation 
(ii) organization was inadequate 
(iii) assistant managers had no transport 
(iv) the delay of the rains hampered ploughing 
(v) lack of spirit 
NORAD recommends (a) purchase of crawler tractor for stumping and land 
clearing (b) agriservice station should administer credit for the blocks 
(c) the scheme should be non-profitable but self-supporting with the 
objectives of (i) providing paid work for the unemployed and under-
employed (ii) demonstration (iii) produce more cotton., 
January 1971 
Ministry of Agriculture recommend that cotton block scheme should be 
abandoned because the Cotton Board is unwilling to administer it and 
there is lack of people involvement with project. Instead efforts should 
be concentrated on demonstration plots and trials for cotton and Mexican 
142 beans, and the agriservice station tractors to work on private plots. 
NORAD agrees that crawler tractors inappropriate but wants to try cotton 
blocks one more time when agriservice station is fully operational. 
EVALUATION OF'THE PLANNING' PROCESS' 
We consider here some of the limitations in the planning process of 
SEDP Mbere evidence by the chronology of events associated with the cotton 
blocks. We may note first that Treasury was concerned that the NORAD planning 
team for Eastern Province should not be too much involved with preparation 
of Mbere SEDP, The reason for this was likely that Treasury wanted the 
NOEAD team to get on with planning Eastern Province. Another possibility 
is that as an expatriate team they would have little familiarity with the 
local situation of Mbere, and hence put forward proposals unlikely to 
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succeed: An expatriate planning team might also he under certain pressure from 
their own Government to come up with projects that will allow money to he spent; 
in the language of SHOP, capital intensive rather than idea intensive projects 
would he chosen. 
We do not know how large an input the 1T0PAD team put into the Mhere 
SRDP Plan, although the Plan itself was published under the Eastern Province 
Planning TeamBs auspices. Many of the proposals in the Plan are those sketched 
in an early letter to Treasury from the PPO. He did not mention the cotton 
:.ock scheme in this letter however, and one suspects that it was the idea of 
the WORAD team. 
The reaction to cotton blocks within Government was generally luke 
But the manifestation of this lack of warmth was to emphasise the 
experimental nature of the project (after all, SRDP is experimental) and to 
;. -int out that it should be secondary to the main effort for cotton, the expansion 
/£ private plots. Even when sound reasons against the project were advanced 
• Belshaw, there was no check to the programme. Three comments on this phase 
are in order. 
In nearly all discussionsof the cotton blocks scheme mention is 
made of its experimental nature . Nowhere however is there a clear explanation 
the nature of the experiment that was to be carried out. In the next section 
•his contention is substantiated,; 
Down grading the cotton blocks scheme so that they should be secondary 
the main cotton programme was only mentioned on paper; no scaling down 
•curred. Nowhere were possible conflicts between the two programmes in terms 
::' labour, extension availability, etc noted. As an experiment the scheme 
-::,ained a large and expensive one. 
Government did not screen the project when it first came to them using 
'he techniques that are normally applied to such projects e«g. cost/benefit or 
.'.ternal rate of return calculations. Critical comments, received from an out-
sider emphasising the need for proper appraisal, as well as shedding doubt on 
j-ritical assumptions of the scheme, were dismissed, instead of motivating a 
•e-appraisalo It would seem that once a project has achieved a certain momentum 
not a very high one) it is immune to attack from outside. The reason for this 
r be that those who initially have the responsibility of appraising a project 
then become responsible for implementing it and do not care to hear adverse 
:eminent on "Their project", People who oppose a project at this stage cannot 
.. "development-minded". In this case once the Ministry of Agriculture and 
r-easury had commented upon the cotton blocks proposal they became committed to 
i: and then tried in turn to "sell" the project 
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to tlie Cotton Board. The initial reluctance of the Cotton Board to take it 
on was commendable because apparently they saw that it was not worthwhile, 
Eventually they did agree to administer the programme after it had been 
apparently demonstrated to them that yields twice those originally proposed 
could be achieved in Mbere. They too did not submit the project as a whole 
to a proper appraisal. 
After the Cotton Board had declared the blocks a failure, the 
Ministry of Agriculture began to question some of the assumptions underlying 
the project. Some of the emphasis of that enquiry was directed towards 
reasons why the blocks failed operationally (labour and management problems) 
rather than a re-evaluation of the project on paper. It is important to 
realise that the test of the project was not on the ground. It should not 
have got to the operational stage in the first place. Failure to recognise 
this may lead to additional pleas to let us have one more try "because 
before we did not have the agriservice station etc.". 
CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES 
In this section we list ten objectives abstracted from the various 
documents relating to the cotton blocks, and for each raise queries about 







An experiment in hiring labour, test feasibility of utilising 
hired labour. 
Other projects in the programme e.g. the water and roads 
projects, provide opportunities for experimenting in hiring 
labour at different rates of pay and at different times of 
the year. This is interesting if the purpose is to find out 
the supply price of labour and/or to find out if there is 
an absolute surplus of labour in the area, if, for example, 
labour can be hired at peak times at the going agricultural 
wage. 
To fit in with the agriservice station. 
To provide a partial justification for the agriservice 
station (i.e. to find something for it to do) is valid only 
if the blocks scheme is profitable and the services of the 
agriservice station are at unsubsidised rates. 
To achieve high efficiency production, increase production 
per acre by improved management. 
Economically efficient production cannot be achieved if the 
project is a loss maker, although technically efficient product-
ion might be. Eaising yields per acre may not be appropriate 
in a land abundant situation. 
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Objective. As a benchmark for monitoring progress of private 
plots. 
Query: Progress in cotton production on individual plots can be 
monitored in other ways e.g. by comparing an individual's 
production with the average, or by comparing with yields from 
demonstration plots and fertilizer trial plots, and observing 
trends over time. 
Objective: To train people in crop husbandry, a limited experiment in 
intensification and training, educate farmers in proper 
farming methods and techniques. 
Query: The training function can only be argued if it is put in a 
time perspective, with labourers on the cotton blocks in one 
year becoming cotton growers on their own account subsequently, 
as it is unlikely that farmers now growing cotton would have 
time to work on the cotton blocks. But even so it is 
questionable if the cotton block project would be a more 
effective means of extension that conventional methods e.g. 
demonstration plots. One reason is that workers on large 
scale operations do not necessarily relate what they observe 
there as applying to their own small plots. Secondly, the 
methods used in large scale operations may not in any case be 
appropriate to small.plots. 
Objective: To solve cotton production problems. 
Query: While it seems that the rules of good husbandry for cotton are 
are known, as evidenced by the relatively high yields obtained 
on trial and fertilizer demonstration plots, insufficient 
attention has been given to their application within the 
context and constraints of the small farm. Solutions are 
•-'•unlikely to come from large production units. 
Objective: To improve management 
Query: The improvement of management for cotton blocks is only an 
objective if the scheme is a success and there is a need for 
replication. Hence there is an element of circularity in 
putting this forward as an objective of an experimental 
programme. 
Objective: To test the feasibility of organising the timely supply of 
inputs such as machinery and insecticides. 
Query: To establish the feasibility of getting inputs on time to large 
blocks does not help much in knowing how to get the same 
inputs to numerous small plots. 
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9. Objective: To provide paid work for the unemployed, to provide 
employment and increased earnings. 
Query: Providing employment is a valid objective in itself but 
could conflict with the other cotton programme which takes 
priority over blocks i.e. if blocks hire a lot of labour 
this might hinder the achievement of acreage and production 
targets on private cotton plots. 
10. Objective: To produce more cotton. 
Query: A valid objective as long as the scheme is financially sound 
which it is not. 
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THE AGRICULTURAL ..LABOUR MARKET SITUATION IN RELATION-TO THE 
COTTON BLOCKS. 
This section of the report is written in response to a request 
from the Ministry of Agriculture to: 
lo Identify the major determinants of demand and supply in the 
agricultural labour market of Mbere, and in particular to ascertain the 
extent to which the apparent lack of success of the cotton block scheme 
may be attributed to labour market constraints as opposed to other factors, 
m an area generally thought to be one of underemployment. 
2. Quantify as far as data sources permit the seasonal labour 
requirements of cotton in Mbere in relation to the labour requirements of 
other crops and the family labour availabilities of typical farms. 
Demand for wage labour in Mbere emanates from larger farmers who 
have cash crops, and who often have an off-farm source of income. The 
pattern of labour requirement is determined by the agricultural calendar. 
Peak months in normal rainfall years are April and November for weeding 
and August for land clearing and preparation. The supply of wage labour to 
small scale agriculture comes mainly from small farmers who have holdings of 
two acres or less who are without an off-farm source of income, and school 
children who work to pay their fees. Unemployed school leavers generally do 
not find agricultural work attractive or consistent with their aspirations. 
Sometimes the supply of labour is supplemented by Wakamba from the drier 
parts of Machakos who have experienced crop failure. Brought in Mbere 
affects both the demand for and supply of labour: crop failure means a 
shortage of money to hire people, while food shortage means strong 
incentives to find work. ....... 
Employment is typically^on a"casual basis i.e. payment for a day's 
work, and often for piece work with rates of pay in the range shs. 2 to 3. 
Piece work rates for weeding are shs. 1 for a 10 x 10 strides area of 
middle size weeds. Rates of pay vary with the task: for example shs. 2.50 
per day for heavy weeding, shs. 2.00 per day for light weeding, and shs. 2.50 
for bush clearing. The money payment also takes into account payment in 
kind: for example, shs 2.50 per day without lunch, shs. 2.00 per day with 
lunch. People on piece work can earn as much as shs. 8 per day. In times 
of drought payment is often fixed in terms of quantities of maize or 
millet (one debe of maize per day's work) i.e. wages are fixed in real 
terms since in times of food shortage food prices rise. Only farmers with 
another source of income can afford to hire workers on a regular basis e.g. 
local chiefs, school teachers and shopkeepers. Rates of pay vary according 
to the strength of the worker (from shs. 35 to 85) and the task: cattle 
herders only get shs. 15 to 30 but these are likely to be children. 
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Children are also employed at shs. 15 per month to chase pests like ground 
squirrels and antelope. 
People from outside the division who come looking for work 
are not discriminated against, and in same cases are preferred to local 
people "as they will not go home in the middle of the day to cultivate 
their own shambas." Beer parties (wira) are held for some tasks such as 
house building and hush clearing, hut since many of those who come do 
little work and start drinking early in the day the practice is declining 
in popularity. Some farmers maintain that you get better value for 
your money employing wage labour. There is some division of tasks 
according to sex: women's tasks include collecting grass for thatch, 
cultivating, harvesting, carrying crops and water: men's tasks include 
house building, bush clearing, thatching, guarding crops at night; 
children look after cattle, weed, guard crops during the day. 
Data from the 1970/71 Farm Enterprise Costs Survey of the Ministry 
of Finance and Planning give additional information on the distribution of 
hired and family labour" inputs through the year by crop. Annual labour 
inputB for maize and beans averaged 85 mandays for a sample of 53 farms 
In Mbere. Peak months were April, August and November. Annual labour 
inputs on cotton averaged 77-mandays for 18 farms. Peak months were 
August, June, July for harvesting and November (planting). The relatively 
low labour "inputs for cotton are a reflection of the low yields, and that 
land preparation for cotton is more likely to be mechanized than for food 
crops. In the sample only three farms hired labour for maize and beans and 
no hired labour input was recorded for cotton. Cotton acreage averaged 
1.3 acres and maize 'and beans 1.6 acres. On the basis of this data a 
labour profile for a 'typical farm' has been constructed assuming a land use 
pattern of 1.5 acres of maize and beans, acre of "other crops" and one 
acre of cotton (Figure l). It may be noted that the addition of cotton to 
the food enterprises exaggerates the peak labour months of April, August 
and November, which casts doubt on whether cotton really complements other 
crops in terms of its labour requirements. Nonetheless, if we assume a 
'typical farm' family of two adults and three children,whose basic food 
requirements should be met from the maize/beans acreage,, the labour availability 
should be sufficient to cover the peak monthly demand of nearly 40 mandays, 
even when allowance is made for schooling and one child looking after the 
cattle. 
Caution is needed in using one year's labour inputs in an 
area like Mbere where the timing of the rains (both long and short) 
can change the pattern"bf labour distribution through the year. For example 
in the present year the delay in the arrival of both the long and the short 
rains meant that cultivation of food crops was late and cotton matured 
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early with the result that in May farmers were weeding their food crops 
leaving cotton unharvested. 
Attention too should he given to the existence of the two rainfall 
regimes in Mhere viz. that in the north eastern corner (Evurore) the main 
rains occur in the second half of the calendar year, which influences 
the seasonal pattern of labour requirement. 
We may conclude that in most parts of Mhere labour needed for 
work on cotton blocks has a positive opportunity cost not just in terms of 
foregone leisure but also in terms of foregone production i.e. private and 
social opportunity"Costsare positive. 
Figure 1 Labour Requirements of Cotton 
in relation to those of Food Crops 
source: MFP Farm Enterprise Cost Survey 1970/71 
For full explanation, see text. 
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To summarise, the features of the agricultural labour market 
situation in Mbere of relevance to the cotton block scheme are: 
1. There is no outright unemployment in Mbere because there is no 
landlessness. Most people work on their own shambas with smaller farmers 
occasionally supplementing their cash income at peak times by working for 
other larger farmers. Willingness to work is greater at weeding time than 
for land clearing which follows harvest. 
2. The problem of unemployed school leavers which exists in Mbere 
as elsewhere is unlikely to be solved by the cotton blocks. 
3. The local wage labour force is supplemented by migrant workers 
from drought areas on an irregular basis, and by schoolchildren in 
school holidays. 
4- The demand for labour varies with the crop calendar with peaks at 
weeding and land clearing. The crop calendar in turn varies between years 
with the timing of the rains, but cotton generally does not complement 
the existing pattern of labour use. 
5. Wages paid in small scale agriculture average shs 2 to 3 per day. 
Casual employment on a daily basis is much more common than regular 
employment with wages paid monthly® 
6. The supply curve of wage labour seems to show marked price 
elasticity. This is evidenced by the large number of farmers who congregated 
around the Kamburu dam site in anticipation of work at a daily rate of 
shs. 6.00 per day in the second half of 1971j and the progress made in 
digging the water pipe trench when rates of pay were shs 3 per metre and 
workers were taking home up to shs 10.00 per day® 
Given these considerations it seems unlikely that the daily wage 
rate of shs: 3 per day assumed for the cotton blocks in the Plan would 
attract sufficient labour, especially if planned targets for expansion of 
private cotton production were met. At a daily wage of shs 5 per day it is 
likely that labour would be readily available but this rate of pay would 
make the project even less attractive financially and lead to non-optimal 
allocation of labour within the Mbere economy. 
C 0 T T 0 I T P R O D U C T I O N O N P R I V A T E P L O T S 
STATED OBJECTIVES 
The SRDP for Mbere envisages the following rate of expansion of 
cotton acreage over the period 1969/70 to 1973/4. 
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private blocks"1" planned actual 
total total 
1969/70 2,500 - 2,500 2,500 
1970/71 3,000 500 3,500 n«3<» 
1971/72 4,000 1,000 5,000 1,747 
1972/73 5,500 1,000 6,500 
1973/74 7,000 1,000 8,000 
SEDP blocks 
The increase in acreage on individual plots is to come about 
"by a greatly improved input service and an intensified, well organized 
extension,," "The distribution of seeds and insecticides is to be 
reorganised to ensure that the farmers receive these inputs at the right 
time. To do this it is necessary to use local traders in Mbere. (New 
and additional traders) should be appointed as a sort of middlemen and 
would be within easy reach of most farmers. To strengthen their financial 
positions to make them able to keep necessary stocks and to give some seasonal 
credit to the growers, the Ministry, of Commerce and Industry is to make 
available to them short term loans for this purpose." 
On the extension side: "it will be necessary "$<5 appoint" a: 
Divisional Cotton Officer to Mbere and to increase the number of cotton 
assistants so that each looks after about 250 acres of cotton. Courses 
geared to satisfying the immediate needs of the farmers will be organized 
at District Development Centre, Embu. Field days and demonstrations will 
also be held under the aegis of the cotton blocks scheme." 
To overcome labour bottlenecks, the water scheme will release 
labour from carrying water at land clearing time, tractors from the 
agri-service station will plough land, and oxen will be used in 
ploughing and weeding. 
CHRONOLOGY 
June 1969 
Main possibilities for Plan sketched by PPO in letter to ".Treasury 
including possibilities of expanding cotton production among other 
crops. 
October 1969 
Jon Moris says "do not start with projects that have already failed, 
e.g. cotton". Meeting between HQ and Provincial planners. Agree that 
cotton plots should have priority in SEDP crop programme. 
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December 1969 
Mbere Plan appears with, ideas for improved credit and distribution 
of cotton seed and insecticides etc. through loans to traders 
administered by Ministry of Commerce and Industries. IIORAD to provide 
the money. 
November 1970 
Scheme for insecticide and ploughing loans worked out by Ministry 
of Agriculture® 
AFC to administer the programme 
1T0RAD to provide the money 
Agriservice station to do ploughing and distribute 
insecticide to traders. 
Steering Committee to make loans to traders and farmers 
(•ploughing). 
Agricultural extension staff to suggest suitable 
farmers. 
Traders to make loans or sell insecticide to farmers. 
Cotton buyers to deduct insecticide dues from sales 
receipts. 
Rationales "since the trader is the one who receives the actual loan it 
will be up to him to collect from the farmer and repay to AFC and it is i 
expected that the traders profit motive will provide sufficient incentive 
for him to do this." 
February 1971 
Ministry of Agriculture discovers that Cotton Board has been giving 
credit to cotton farmers in Mbere through the extension staff: proposes 
that present system continue, with SRDP "simply looking for ways to 
assist their operation." . 
March 1971 
Cotton Board having lost considerable money on loans to individual 
farmers unwilling to continue loans. Ministry of Agriculture return 
to original idea of advancing credit through AFC. 
June 1971 
Ministry of Agriculture present case to AFC. AFC negative: "they 
produced figures which they said showed that cotton farmers would end 
up with less net cash income if they used insecticide and proper 
management than if they simply cultivated cotton in their traditional 
way. In other words they felt that cotton was not a sufficien+ly well 
VJL 
paying crop in Mbere to made credit economic from the farmer's point 
of view." 
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October 1971 
Planning division Ministry of Agriculture proposes a 
subsidy on sprays and pumps arguing that 
(i) high inputs cotton production is high risk 
production; therefore the sponsoring agency should 
be willing to take part of the risk 
(ii) administrative costs of a subsidy programme are 
less than a credit programme 
(iii) an "economic" case can be made "because the value 
of the extra cotton is likely to be greater than 
the subsidy". 
November 1971 
The subsidy proposal fails to gain support from other 
divisions within the Ministry of Agriculture. 
EVALUATION OP. PROJECT AS PRESENTED IN THE PLAN 
The opening sentence of the section of the Mbere plan on cotton 
states that numerous efforts in the past to introduce cotton as a major 
crop in Mbere have proved unsuccessful, and that past attempts have been 
too much concerned with setting of targets, and too little in -understanding 
the situation of the individual farmer. With respect, it might be said 
that the same mistakes have been made by those who prepared the Mbere 
SRDP. 
Aldington (2) has commented in relation to the slow growth of 
cotton production in the country as a whole that "the main reason is 
simply that with current standards of husbandry and prices, farmers 
generally do not find it a rewarding crop to grow. For example, data 
in the 1969 Annual Report of the CLSMB reveal that the average gross return 
per acre of cotton was only abotit shs. 81 in 1969 implying a yield of around 
160 lbs of seed cotton, and shs 63 in 1968." The SRDP plan begins calculatio 
of grower returns from cotton by saying' that a good grower has obtained 
over 1,000 lbs of seed cotton per acre, and assumes that average yields will 
he in the range 750 to 1000 lbs per acre. These yields seem to be 
optimistically high, in view of past yields on private plots in Mbere 
averaging 200 to 300 lbs. per acre. The interesting point however is 
that even with yields of 1000 lbs an acre the gross margin calculations 
made in the Plan show a return of only shs 325 per acre without accounting 
for hired labour. If yields of only 300 lbs per acre are obtained using 
sprays and tractors then the gross margin and the return to labour fall to 
zero. That low returns from cotton are obtained in Mbere is evidenced by 
Erokonsha who comments after witnessing payments for cotton in 1970 "the 
agricultural staff were authorised to collect the loans at the cotton 
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markets, taking up to half the money received hy farmers, hut in most 
cases this amount was far too little to repay the loan-some received 
shs. 6, one got shs 2." Linear programming studies of an ecologically 
similar area (Masii, Machakos) led Judith Heyer (3) to conclude that: 
"For farmers who are preoccupied with returns in years when 
rainfall is low, cotton is hardly attractive at all, representing very 
little improvement over traditional food crop systems in the overall 
level of returns, and involving a greater year to year variability than 
these. For farmers whose main concern is with the outcome in high and 
average rainfall conditions, though, cotton represents both some overall 
increase in returns and a lower variability than traditional food crops 
do, These farmers ... would do well to grow 1 to 1-g- acres of cotton, 
together with traditional food crops, but not to give it preferential 
treatment compared with food, except when farm labour is very plentiful 
relative to land. Whether farmers will think the increase in returns 
offered by cotton sufficient to compensate for the additional work 
involved is another question, though." Discussion with the JAA for 
Riandu sublocation suggests that farmers in Hthawa at least do not think so. 
They say "If Government wants us to grow cotton why don't they pay us higher 
prices. After all cotton is a product with so many uses: for soap, clothing 
and animal food, surely they can give us higher prices. Tobacco is even 
harder work than cotton but it gives us some hundred shillings. With 
cotton one' hardly gets enough to pay taxes let alone school fees." 
As far as one oan gather the planning team did not look in detail 
at how cotton might fit into the typical farming system of Mbere, as Judith 
Ileyer did in Masii, other than by casual assertion that the labour demands 
for cotton are complementary to the existing cropping patterns. 
As we have noted in the section on cotton blocks the addition of 
cotton to present food based farming systems is likely to exaggerate labour 
peaks rather than complement them. 
Attempts to simulate whole farm enterprise situations might have 
revealed, that a crop like green grams for example, which yields twice a 
year, gives higher returns to both labour and land. Insufficient recognition 
was given as well to the difficulties inherent in introducing an innovation 
like cotton into an area which is not blessed by high or reliable rainfall. 
There is an extra difficulty in introducing new crops into an area like 
Mbere which is not found in high rainfall, high potential areas. 
In the latter areas introduction of a new crop may proceed in two 
stages. First, get the farmers to grow the crop. If they grow it they 
will likely receive sufficient returns to be attracted to it. In the second 
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stage extension workers can concentrate on raising husbandry standards to 
point of maximum return® With cotton in Mbere there is really no possibility 
of a two stage approach. If the farmer is to find cotton worthwhile he 
must adopt the crop and the correct husbandry at the same time; otherwise 
there will be low yields, failure to cover costs, and rejection of the 
innovation® 
With such low profitability in terms of returns to land and 
labour it would seem incumbent on the SRDP planners to indicate how yields 
more than twice those previously achieved could be obtained. While the 
planners seem to have identified the crucial bottlenecks of extension and 
the physical and financial availability of supplies, one is not convinced 
that the measures proposed will lead to the dramatic increase in yields 
which would in turn make cotton a sufficiently profitable crop to justify 
the projected acreage increases. One reason for- suspicion is that for 
years past the CL3MB had provided credit to individual farmers for ploughing and 
spraying; a scheme administered by the extension staff of the Ministry of 
Agriculture® It seems unlikely that the new credit scheme proposed by 
the plan would achieve a significantly greater coverage of farmers than the 
CLSMB scheme, although it would free extension staff from the time consuming 
administration of loans to their proper task of extension. 
In this connection, Brokensha and Uellis (6) have made the 
following comments: 
"Cotton loans have been given to Mbere farmers each year for the past 
several years® The details vary: in 1969/1970 for example, loans were 
available to 295 farmers for ploughing and to 523 for insecticide 
(includes farmers on cotton blocks). In 1970/71, 140 farmers have 
n 
obtained isecticides valued atshs 71 ,per carton (enough for one acre). 
The agricultural staff have already spent and will in the next few 
months continue to spend what might be considered a disproportionate 
amount of time on cotton loans, especially as the loan acreage represents 
only about 5/- of the total cotton acreage in the division. The staff 
do the following: select farmers by recommending those who have had no 
previous loans (or who have repaid past loans) and who are good farmers, 
with adequate labour supply; help recipients to buy or borrow pumps 
for spraying insecticide; this may involve pump repair and distribution; 
and recover loans at the end of the season, a highly unpopular and 
difficult task." 
Elsewhere they note: 
"One wonders whether the whole business of loans should be handled 
by another agency or agencies, and indeed the Mbere SRDP envisages an ingenious 
system of loans to approved traders who will then give credit to approved 
farmers. Under this scheme the agricultural staff will be required to 
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complete forms for all applicants fox- loans, based on the supposedly intimate 
and accurate knowledge that JAAs have of their local farmers." 
Acreage targets apart, the proposal for a restructuring of erod;t 
for ploughing and' sprays is useful for two reasons. First; tne IOS.JJS 
rv.-.io on these loans by the CLSMB who obtain the money from Ai'C have boon 
so great that they are no longer willing.to advance credit. Second, as 
we have just noted, an enormous amount of time of extension staff has 
heen used in administering credit without any conspicuous success in 
achieving repayment of loans. This is bad for two reasons: first, if the 
extension worker becomes a collector of debts he is alienated from the 
farmers he is supposed to serve; second, time taken up.with compiling 
long lists of debtors Is time noc put into extension. The proposal to 
channel credit to farmers through traders has merit in that it enables 
more traders to carry larger stocks of fertilizer, insecticide and seed, 
for which there is need in Mbere. Whether the traders will actually make 
loans to farmers in the absence of security is questionable. The experier^p 
of Migori with a.similar scheme suggests the loan impact will be slight. 
In visits to Mbere we were told that main distributors had b-.'-n 
encouraged to bring supplies to local centres, but the traders had only 
purchased, about half the AAO's estimates of needed supplies for the area. 
In Kerie we were impressed by the fact that if a farmer wanted to use 
fertilizer or insecticide then he would have to arrange to bring it from 
Irabu for himself some 30 miles away. The cotton AA in Siakago told us 
-&na"G ne usually takes with him on his visits to Ishiara a couple of cartons 
of dawa, to help improve distribution. 
Such findings bring to mind the recommendations of the Havelock 
Committee Report on the Costs of Agricultural Inputs; particularly those 
relating to distribution of material inputs e.g. That traders registered """ 
with the Ministry of Agriculture should have increased access to short~-co?r: 
credit from the ICDC to enable them to purchase sufficient stocks at the 
right time to sell to farmers. 
EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT ON"'THE GROUND 
Little if any progress appears to have been made in implementing 
the proposals for increased credit, distribution of inputs and improved 
extension. Cotton extension staff at the AA level are stationed at Kiritiri, 
Siakago and Ishiara (Kiambere?) but they are not additional to normal 
extension staffing. Acreage under cotton this year is well below target 
at about 1750 acres* of which only 1500 acres remains following drought. 
One reason for the low acreage planted this year relative to 1969/70 is 
cotton's disappointing performance in 1970/71 when weather conditions 
again unfavourable. The late onset of the long rains this year has
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that some cotton has matured early and has ceased to produce new "bolls, so 
that yields on average are unlikely to he very high. On two of the original 
non-3?J)P cotton blocks close to Siakago there is no cotton, but tobacco 
and food crops are being grown. 
A cursory inspection of stockists' stores in Siakago revealed 
an absence of insecticide. Supplies seemed to be short in Ishiara and 
Kiritiri as well. ITo stockist had been appointed in Kerie. 
As mentioned above, the loans for cotton this year have been 
restricted by the CLSMB to shs 10,000, aimed at serving the 'best' 200 farmers. 
Meanwhile the JAAs have been urged to make every effort to collect 
previous years' loan repayments. Demonstration plots continue on 'better1 
farmer's shambas but again these are part of normal extension activity. 
Last year we saw a 1T0RAD cotton demonstration plot at Kiritiri. The 
cotton officer (AA) at Siakago has recently moved after one year in post 
to be assistant manager of a well known hotel in Embu and his replacement 
is fresh out of Egerton. The AA in charge of the small cotton demonstration 
plot on the country council part of Ishiara irrigation'scheme has also 
moved "back to Embu division, although still with the Ministry. If Mbere 
is unpopular with extension personnel it might be worth paying a small 
bonus to staff there (a discomfort allowance) to encourage staff continuity, 
REC0MMEIDATI01TS 
Instead of aiming for ambitious production and acreage targets 
by getting farmers to grow cotton in all parts of Mbere, extension effort 
for cotton should be concentrated in those areas where it is known to 
grow well i.e. Mavuria location and Gangara sub-location of llthawa. 
Meanwhile cotton observation plots should be continued in all parts of 
Mbere by the SEDP agronomist with the aim of identifying other areas where 
cotton does well. Each observation plot should be subject to a low and 
a high husbandry treatment, so that the differences between potential 
and probable farmer yields may be ascertained. A limited credit programme 
should continue in Mavuria to supplement that which individual farmers 
might be able to obtain from traders. The essentials of this limited 
farmer credit programme are sketched below. 
We can distinguish three types of farmers with respect to 
credit needs: 
(a) those with sufficient income and cash flow not to need 
seasonal credit. They however are the farmers who are most 
likely to be the recipients of credit following the criteria 
set out for selection of farmers by the DA0 in 1971/72. 
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("b) farmers other than (a) who can achieve husbandry standards 
sufficient to generate income to pay hack loans and still 
give a reasonable return to their labour. 
(c) farmers who in a normal year cannot produce (because of 
management, location or labour constraints) a crop with 
yields greater than say 400 lbs an acre with material inputs. 
These farmers should not be advanced credit because they 
are unable to gain sufficient return with the use of material 
inputs to pay for them. 
Sufficient information in local agricultural files on farmer 
performance coupled with local knowledge exists to group farmers into these 
categories. Group (c) farmers could be identified in part by past 
repayment performance and JAAs' knowledge of their cotton yields. Group 
(a) farmers would inclu.de farmers who have off-farm sources of income: i.e., 
extension staff, chiefs, teachers, shop and bar owners. 
Credit would be given in the first year to group (b) farmers. 
Farmers in group (b) who failed to repay loans in the first year would 
become ineligible for further credit. Farmers in group (c) who expressed 
willingness to continue growing cotton could apply to have a demonstration 
plots. Under the present arrangements the costs of ploughing, insecticide 
and fertilizer are met by the agric. department, and these would be provided. 
If the farmer showed in the year of demonstration that he was able to provide 
the complementary inputs necessary to achieve yields say of 600 lbs an acre 
in terms of labour for weeding, application of inputs and harvesting, then 
he would be moved into group (b) and become eligible for credit in the 
following year. The only element of flexibility in the programme would be 
if there was an exceptionally poor year for cotton, in which case the loans 
would be written off as development costs, and farmers with demonstration 
plots could apply for a repeat demonstration plot. 
The advantages of the proposed system over the present arrangements 
are as follows: 
1. credit would not be given to farmers who do not need it i.e., 
those who have sufficient capital to be able to finance the 
costs of ploughing and insecticides. 
2. credit would not be advanced to farmers who have shown by past 
experience that they cannot achieve levels of husbandry 
sufficient to cover loan repayment. 
3. opportunities would be provided to farmers who have a poor 
repayment performance to demonstrate that they can achieve 
adequate yields in which case they would have one more cha.:ce 
to obtain credit and repay its 
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4= demonstration plots would "be arranged on farms where the need 
for demonstration is greatest. 
5o the extension staff would he freed of the responsibility of 
chasing defaulters; the responsibility for repayment would be 
that of the farmer in the knowledge that if he did not repay 
credit would cease in the following year. 
6. an increasing proportion of farmers would obtain supplies 
through local traders paying cash on the nail. 
OTHER ASPECTS OF TEE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMME 
STATED OBJECTIVES 
Flue cured- tobacco is grown around Sna, and air cured tobacco around 
Kanyuambora. Because the tobacco is of low quality B.A.T. have set 
quotas on the amount to be produced, arguing that they can only use 
certain amount as filler. The objectives of the SRDP programme are to 
raise yields through improved husbandry with emphasis on early planting, 
use of fertilizer, and adequate soil "preparation. The aim is to grow the •4Jf quota of 150,000 lbs of tobacco on a reduced acreage by 1974« 
Mexican 142 Pea Beans have expanded rapidly in Embu _ivision, but 
rates of adoption in Mbere have been much slower. The aim is to expand 
production in upper Mbere through improved distribution of seeds, better 
crop husbandry, provision of tractor services and loans for ploughing. 
The target for 1974 is 2,000 acres. 
Casto r is a crop presently grown on a small but land extensive 
scale in lower Mbere. Present production methods are to be encouraged 
while trials of a new variety are made. The target is to increase the 
value of production by a factor of 12 by 1974. 
Rates of adoption of Katumani maize in Mbere have been disappointing. 
/Only a quarter of the maize acreage was under Katumani in 1968. Increased 
Troducti on is to be promoted through an improved system of distribution of 
fertilizers and seed and an ox-cultivation campaign. The target is average 
yields of 1 4 bags an acre by 1974 in each of two seasons, which will 
release land and labour for cash crops. 
Ishiara irrigation scheme is to be appraised with a view to 
promoting cash crop development there. 
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Crop xrials and. research, will "be undertaken for cotton, Mexican 
beans, Katufflani_.maize, castor, groundnuts and soya beans. 'To improve 
livestock health seven new dips are to be constructed. To raise livestock 
productivity in upper Mbere an AI system is proposed. To improve 
livestock husbandry and rates of off-take, thirteen group ranches are 
to be organized. 
Improved bee keeping methods and marketing are to be encouraged. 
To this end a bee-master is to be appointed and a primary processing unit 
established at 7iia, with an initial throughput of 50,000 lbs per year. 
The purposes of the agri-service station are to promote land 
extensive methods of production in the more sparsely populated areas 
of Mbere, and the breaking of labour bottlenecks in the more fertile 
parts where cash crops are to be pushed. To these ends, ox-training and 
tractor services are to be provided. Tractors will be important in 
breaking the labour bottleneck at the time of land clearing and preparation. 
Additional functions of the agriservice station will be to assist in the 
water pipe scheme, the cotton block scheme, and tractor maintenance. 
EVALUATION 0E PROJECTS AS PRESENTED IN THE PLAN. 
Apart from the cotton programme the crop development programme 
appears generally sound, given the limited information available to the 
team of costs, yields and labour requirements, and the need to prepare a 
P'.an in a fairly short time. The emphasis on cotton may have been 
because this was the one crop that the team had some information about 
from earlier fertilizer trials carried out by NORAD. There are two criticisms 
that may be made however. The first is that given the dearth of information 
about the relative performance of different crops in the different 
ecologies of Mbere greater emphasis should have been given to an immediate 
start on crop trials in order to be able to plan with facts. As it is, 
an agronomist (without experience in Africa) only began work in Mbere at 
the beginning of 1972 and although he has made an active and encouraging 
start in setting up observation and trial plots in Ishiara and Kiritiri 
and will shortly be setting up similar plots on the agriservice station 
shamba in Siakago and has the advice and support of an SRDP agricultural 
research committee, it is unrealistic to expect recommendations to be 
forthcoming for another two years. A second crticism is that the Plan 
lacks an overall strategy for the'development of small scale farming. 
In an are a where most farmers are close to subsistence, and in dry years 
are on the margin of famine, it would seem logical to give first emphasis 
to improving the productivity of food crops. When farmers feel confident 
that they can obtain their food requirements in dry years as well as normal 
rainfall years they will give more attention to cash crops like cotton 
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or castor."1" In support of this approach one may also note that if the 
food requirements of the farmer's family can he met from a smaller 
acreage then labour is effectively freed for the cash crop activities. 
The strategy proposed here is therefore to concentrate first on adoption 
of Katumani maize with the aim of both reducing yield variation over time 
and raising labour productivity in food production. 
The AI and dips components of the livestock package are clearly 
needed developments for raising.livestock productivity. The Plan however 
is deficient in detailing and quantifying the expected benefits from group 
ranches, which presumably include more effective disease control, 
economies in the provision of livestock services, and controlled stocking 
and off-take rates. The plan also overlooks the likely difficulties in 
implementing group ranches (of a political and sociological kind) in 
relation to clan ownership of land. 
Although a reasoned case has been made in the Plan for the 
agriservice station on the basis of needs to extend the acreage of 
cleared land and break critical bottlenecks in a land abundant, labour 
scarce area like Mbere; it is clear that financially the agri-service 
station will need a heavy subsidy. 
Capital Costs Recurrent Costs Revenue 
year 1 16,000 6,040 2,000 
year 2 -• 6,040 2,000 
year 3 - 6,040 2,000 
year 4 - 6,040 2,000 
year 5 - 6,040 2,000 
Total Costs: . £46,200 Total Revenue: £10,000 
If the agri-service station can be viewed as a once and for all trigger 
and initiator of development in the area then the heavy subsidy implied 
might be justified. If however, farmers receive tractor services at a 
SaifQ "" 
low price for .a period, and tbeh^^pturned to the free market, the 
overall impact of the project could be inhibit ive. of development in the long run. • • - •i:'" '• 
It is ox course conceivable that a farmer would best provide for his food 
needs__in dry and other years by growing a cash crop, and selling it. This 
does"not seem to be the case however with the present range of crops 
in Mbere. 
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The Plan seeks to justify the agri-service station subsidy in tern of: 
- the breaking of labour bottlenecks 
- introduction of intermediate technology 
- development of improved implements and equipment 
- adoption of ox traction 
- a tractor pool for hire services and repair works 
- mobile field unit for technical assistance to self help 
groups. 
The argument for breaking labour bottlenecks using tractors for 
ploughing may be invalid unless other measures are discovered for breaking 
the equally important labour bottleneck of weeding. It is questionable 
too whether a shortage of tractor services presently exists in Mbere. 
"Hrokensha quotes rates of sis 60 per acre in 1971, which, allowing for 
travelling time are not far out of line with prices in other parts of the 
country. However the tractors from Mwea do not always arrive at the time 
they are needed. 
In the crop development programme, the agri-service station looms 
large in plans for cotton, Mexican beans (including credit) and ICatumani 
maize expansion. 
In assessing the worthwhileness of the agri-service station, the 
crucial question is the extent to which it will turn out to be simply 
another tractor hire service, offering subsidised rates, as opposed to a 
research and development centre closely linked with small scale farming, 
coming up with low cost innovations for raising labour productivity. 
This section would not be complete without mention of an 
experiment, not included in the Plan, aimed at increasing the effectiveness 
of junior agricultural staff. The procedure, which is an offshoot of the 
monthly reporting system devised by Belshaw and Chambers (4), evaluated 
elsewhere in this report,brings junior agricultural staff together with 
the AAO to allocate extension tasks for the month ahead, and to examine 
performance in the month past. Hot only are the types of extension 
activity to be carried out agreed upon, but a check is kept on which 
farmers are visited to avoid the common practice of focus upon a few 
farmers and complete neglect of others. The system goes a long way to 
providing junior agricultural staff with what is commonly lacking viz. 
a work programme and a means ; monitoring,and thereby encouraging, performance. 
EVALUATION OP THE PROJECTS ON THE GROUND AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Tobacco production fluctuates markedly from year to year with 
weather. In 1970, tobacco quotas of 100,000 lbs of flue cured and 
50,000 lbs of air cured were exceeded. In 1971 the crop was estimated 
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at only 35,000 lbs flue and 20,000 lbs air. This year the crop is 
equivalent to the 1970 crop. To what extent SEDP activities have 
influenced production is uncertaino A& a fairly profitable crop for 
the farmer it seems likely Wat production will increase without any 
extra push from SBDP. 
In order that more farmers be able to grow the crop and to ensure 
that; artificial cokings on production do not restrict expansion, we 
recommend negotiation with B .A .T , , f©r a larger quota, even if this has 
to be "bought" in return for lower prices. 
Crop trials have been recently established by the U0RAD agronomist 
who arrived January 1972. Plots have been laid out -on parts of Ishiara 
irrigation scheme and at Kiritiri. An important experimental feature of 
the trial and observation plots in that maize and beans are being grown 
in-mixtures, which recent work at Makerere suggests gives higher aggregate 
output per acre. A needed extension of this work is to carry out similar 
trials in the non-irrigated areas of Ishiara. We have noted the intention 
of cooperation between the agronomist.and the agri-service station manager 
with respect to trials iaa Siakago. Another aspect of this work which must 
receive emphasis is the -recording of 'economic' data ia-asMition to 
agronomic data: for example, labour requirements and their distribution 
over time; prices at the farm and local market levels for inputs and 
outputsO 
It is pleasing to note that with- the- setting up of an SEDP 
Agricultural Eesearch Safecoamittee for Mbere that (a) the P a n t Management 
Division of the Ministry of igriealtxase is taking an interest in the maize/ 
beans trials and (b) observation plots for a wide range of crops are being, 
jr 
set out in several areas. Basic research of this type is^eeded before 
detailed crop development programmes for each location- canrbe worked out. ; • -aah. —" 
Ishiara irrigation scheme and the county council demonstration 1 ' 1 v-
farm are still facing dome difficulties. We saw only one cash crop (•§• acre) 
on the scheae. However, the planning team is to carry out an investigation 
soon.One commonly cited difficulty is that until adjudication hews occurred 
(or until the scheme has been officially exempted and turned over to the 
WDD, for example) tenants lack security. Too much security of tenure might 
be a bad thing however and in. order to. encourage realization of the 
considerable potential Seie the managing body will ifeed to have the 
right to evict farmers. 
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Acreage under Katumani maize is estimated at 2,319 acres in the 
present season (only 576 acres of this was new seed however) compared with 
8ll acres of Katumani maize out of a total maize acreage of 3,911 acres 
in 1968. The dry period before the rains has been a good demonstration 
year for Katumani maize, and plantings are likely to he higher nest year 
as a result. The Mexxcin 142 Pea Beans acreage stands.at 9°0 acres in 
the present season (of this some 403 acres failed due to drought) compared 
with the target area given in the Plan for 1974 of 2,000 acres. 
The improved credit, and seed and fertilizer distribution systems 
have not started yet at the time of writing. 
A beekeeper (AA) moved to Siakago in March 1971. A site for his 
"improved hives" demonstration plot was cleared close to the centre of 
Siakago and some bee attracting trees planted. Later it was discovered 
that the plot, chosen by the D.C®, was scheduled to be the site of the 
new police station; that it was too close to the market place for the 
comfort of traders; and that it was too close to one of the original cotton 
blocks for the bees. A new plot on one corner of the site of the agri-
service station is now fitted with six improved hives (shs 50/- each from 
the Salvation Army (SA) workshop at Thika). Bee attracting trees are 
being planted but no bees have inhabited the hives as yet (May, 1972). 
One farmer in Kiritiri with an improved hive has got bees but there is a 
possibility that the new hives are less attractive to the bees. The bee-
keeper is collecting data on production of honey by consulting the main 
buyers of honey at the markets. Presently the price being offered by 
the SA honey refinery in Thika is less than that in the local markets for 
beer. The first stage processing plant at Ena has not been set up yet. 
The beekeeper has been very much restricted in his activities by lack of 
transport. A year after his appointment he was still hoping to get a 
motor bike. 
The livestock programme is proceeding slowly. Sites for the dips 
have been decided upon and collection of money for the harambee contribut-
ion has begun. However, until the water pipe is constructed the dips 
cannot become fully operational. Group ranches are being delayed because 
the clans are unwilling to pool their land together for fear that it 
may adversely affect their claim on it when adjudication comes. A 
similar problem with group ranches appears to have arisen with the Masai. 
Hedlund (7) reports that: "Instead of group ranches many of the Masai 
wanted all land to be registered first to individual owners and only there-
after would the owners group together to ranch their land." Brokensha (5) 
commented upon these difficulties, while in Mbere as area evaluator: 
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"In ITthawa .... the land, scramble is so intense that any group 
ranches aro unlikely to he accepted. They might have a chance in the 
southern areas. Generally I think it is had idea to have a ranch that 
crosses a locational boundary; locations are important units, and 
administrative difficulties will be created by having a ranch which 
straddles two locations... At Kiambere, no demarcation can be done 
until a few remaining boundary disputes are settled: another problem is 
the absence of water. At Machanga the position is simpler in that only 
one clan is involved, but the people seem generally more suspicious of 
the ranches. They have lost already some 5»000 acres to Kindarui..a dam.. 
The Chief of Mavuria said the people had agreed to let Meka go: a 
7,000 acre area largely planted with sisal and now derelict." 
The position with respect to AI in upper Mbere is happier. 
Crushes have been constructed at a number of central points and the 
programme is due to begin once the local bulls have been castrated. This 
operation has now begun. 
ks we have noted in the previous section, the Plan^atline of 
the Agriservice station does not give a clear indication of the priorities 
attached to its several proposed functions. A recent meeting between the 
agriservice station manager and district and provincial agricultural staff 
however has clarified the situation and indicates that the areas of 
emphasis are likely to be consistent with the resource endowments of Mbero 
i.e. the major concern is to raise labour productivity in crop production 
by means of low cost idea 'intensive innovations in hand and animal drawn 
tools and equipment. 7 
The list of objectives in order of priority is as follows: 
1. Training and introduction of Intermediate 
Technology, 
2. Testing and improvement of implements for Intermediate 
Technology. 
(i) handtools and equipment 
(ii) animal traction: oxen and donkeys 
(iii) small scale tractor mechanization 
(landmaster). 
3. Service and Maintenance Work 
(i) agriservice station equipment 
(ii) private tractors and equipment 
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4e Extended. Programme ¥ork 
(i) trials and research, 
(ii) minor roads programme 
(iii) water project 
(iv) self-help groups 
5« Machinery Hire Service 
(i) tillaging of new land and cultivated 
land 
(a) individual farmers 
(h) cotton blocks 




(vi) plant protection 
6. Transport work 
(i) water to health centre 
(ii) ranches 
(iii) spraying 
(iv) cattle dips 
(v ) roads 
(vi) distribution of seeds, 
fertilizers„ 
7. Cooperation with Other Institutions in Testing and Training 
e.g. Faculties of Agriculture at Nairobi and Makerere 
for testing intermediate technology; training of local 
people in conjuction rith Karurumo Village Polytechnic. 
Not only are the "^hjectives ranked in sensible order but 
the project integrates well with other aspects of the SUB? 
programme, notably the agronomic aspects, and has important 
experimental characteristics likely to be of interest 
elsewhere» 
Examples of the integrated and experimental nature of 
the agriservice station operations are: 
(i) the intention to carry out experiments on the effects 
of different cultivation techniques (hand vs. oxen vs. 
two wheel tractor) on crop performance. An important 
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oor.-oo. o-"1"- t? xperiment should be the rceo•:•<.!--,. 
of economic data such as labour inputs and other 
input costs. 
(ii) cooperation with the agronomist in the proper 
setting out of trial plots to ensure uniformity in 
spacing and cultivation. 
(iii) farmer training in conjunction with training of the 
farmer's oxen. 
(iv) the testing of hand and animal drawn implements new 
to the area with the possibility of modioation to suit 
local conditions (in the blacksmith's shop) and local 
manufacture in Embu under the RIDC part of the SEDP 
programme. 
( v ) the servicing of infrastructural components of the 
SEDP programme including water transport to health 
centres, ranches and dipsj use of tractors in off 
peak periods for the roads programme, and distribution 
of agricultural inputs to local stores. 
WATEB, EOADS AHD HEALTH 
STATED OBJECTIVES 
The Plan says: 
"Infrastructure has been included in the package solely because of its vital 
importance for the agricultural programme. Improved roads, water supply 
and health services are necessary for one or two main reasons:-
C - 39 
- to provide essential services, supplies and facilities for 
"both production and marketing in Mbere, i.e. to open the area 
for inputs and outputs; 
- to remove constraints or break bottlenecks due to the poverty 
of the habitat or to the low level of development in the area; 
i.e. increase labour productivity." 
The road programme objectives are to improve 86 1cm of tracks and 
roads; the methods are to he low cost and the minimum standard to be achieved 
is that the roads should be passable to four wheel drive vehicles at all 
times of the year. Once upgraded the roads are to be handed over to MOW for 
maintenance. Tasks include construction of drifts and culverts, building 
up of the road body on stretches of black cotton soil, and minor realignments 
to facilitate the passage of trucks. 
A water project is included in the programme because "without the 
provision of better water supplies in the area all development efforts will 
sooner or later cone to a standstill." Piped water supplies for consumption 
purposes will release labour from water carrying in the dry season for land 
clearing and preparation, and improve the productivity of labour though 
better health. Water is needed too for animals, the group ranches are 
dependent upon it, and greater access to water will facilitate the process 
of land adjudication. The aim is to provide water at no more than two miles 
walking distance to the major popiilation concentrations in Mbere. 
Better health in Mbere is seen as raising labour productivity and 
increasing school attendance. The plan calls for the up-grading of 
existing physical facilities like dispensaries and their extension into 
areas presently not catered for, a mobile health •unit, and increases in the 
•lumber of medical staff. Malnutrition is to be tackled through education 
and the growing of protein rich crops like groundnuts and soya-beans. 
EVALUATION OP PROJECTS AS PRESENTED IN THE PLAIT 
Although the road programme aims at linking Kerie with the outside 
world by improving tracks between Siakago and Kerie? the more obvious link 
between Kerie and Muringari and thence to Kanyambora and Isiara is omitted 
from the Plan. Also relegated from the Plan is the link between Kiambere 
and Kerio, in favour of the upgrading of the Kiambere-Kiritiri road. The 
general point is that perhaps too much attention is given to upgrading roads 
which are in fair condition and already passable by four wheel drive 
vehicles in wet seasons, ci t the expense of the creation of links which 
presently hardly exist. As we shall note in the next section the programme 
as it is being put into practice takes heed of these points. 
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The road programme is to he implemented through the creation of a 
special road rehabilitation and maintenace unit, headed hy a civil engineer 
assisted hy a supervisor, two fundis and casual labour hired from the 
areas where the work is going on. It is pleasiSg. jjo note that the Plan 
takes heed of labour market considerations by stating that "rates of pay 
should be the same as for work on the organized cotton blocks, and care 
should be taken that labour peaks do not coincide". Machinery is to be 
hired from the County Council, with the agri-service station helping out 
where necessary. 
The case for improved communications in Mbere is clear to anyone 
who has visited the area (see for example Brokensha's Mbere Notes) and one 
accepts the Plan's statement that "For obvious reasons no serious attempt 
has been made to i^ntify and especially quantify the benefits expected 
from the programme." 
The economic arguments for provision of water supplies are'Veil 
presented in the Plan, although improved health and reduced drudgery are 
themselves important which do not have to be converted into production 
equivalents to be counted as benefits. 
The total length of the water pipe will be 55*5 miles and the 
capital costs are estimated at £76,200. The Plan assumes that the digging 
of trenches and bush clearing can be do$£jky harambee labour, which would 
reduce costs by almost 10$. Water charges are to be levied at flat rates 
on shops and bars, the group ranches, and the proposed Mbere Farmers' Co-
operative Society. Separate charges will be made for metred individual 
connections. The proposal for this system of charging is put forward as 
something of an innovation on the "ability to pay" principle, with awareness 
of difficulties in collecting water rates from individuals on other schemes. 
The scheme seems good with the exception of the charge on members of the 
Mbere Farmers' Co-operative Society which could well be a strong disincentive 
to membership of a co-operative that is to be instrumental in other aspects 
of the SRDP. It is essential that the proposed method of water pricing be 
discussed with the people whom it will affect. 
The plan calculates that the value of extra production from the 
water pipe as a result of breaking the labour bottleneck in the dry time of 
year will be shs 750,000 per year, compared with annual operating costs 
including debt service of shs 156,419. This is a useful and interesting 
comparison, but it does not constitute the calculation of a cost-benefit 
ratio as the Plan states, because the principle of time 
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discounting used in the calculation of benefit/cost ratios and internal 
rates of return is overlooked. 
EVALUATION OP THE PROJECTS ON THE GROUND 
The road, progranw ^ DO gun with improvement of the Kanyuambora-
Muringari stretch (as per the Plan) and then continued along the old 
unmotorable track to Kerie which is practically finished., although 
drifts have yet to be constructed.. The work-is being undertaken by a 
D6 grader. More recently (May 20th) a second D6 also hired from the 
County Council has started clearing the track from Kiambere to Kerie. 
Ifvoiie; drives, along the (partly) cleared track to Kerie the need for 
improvement became evident, and discussions with the chief revealed 
that people from Kerie presently walk ten miles to the market at Ishiara. 
Not only will the new road assist agricultural development but also 
improve access to hospitals and increase the frequency of health visits. 
The road engineer told us that he had on two occasions taken sick people 
out of Kerie to hospital by landrover: this being the only way out at 
certain times of the year. 
The range of technical choice in road construction is obviously 
limited in much of Mbere by the rocky nature of the terrain. 
Another factor which makes Mbere different from other SRDP areas 
(e.g. Migori) in .choice of technology for road construction is the low 
population density. However drift and.drain construction and initial bush 
clearing can be done by hand, and 20 people have been recruited for this 
purpose recently. They get MOW rates. On the road to Kerie the labour we 
saw (three men and the Chief) were playing very much a secondary role in 
the construction process to the D6. The : clearing ,of the bush seemed, to 
have been done by the machine which although quicker could as well be done 
by local labour. It seemed unlikely that the road would be passable 
to other than 4 wheel drive vehicles in wet weather, but the improvement 
over the original track is vast. .Nonetheless an earth road will likely 
offer ample opportunities for labour intensive maintenance which could be 
carried out on a harambee basis in off-peak periods. 
The staff necessary for the programme are now in post. Progress 
with construction of the trench to carry the water pipe was initially 
rapid, but has recently slackened off. The reason is that labour 
(contrary to the hopes of the Plan) was initially being paid, but now the 
P,C. has decided that all labour should be on a harambee basis. The 
effects of this decision are that in the first three weeks 6.5 km were 
dugs when harambee labour was called in only 560 metres were dug in two 
monthso Clearly the procedure has got the worst of both worlds. If 
harambee labour is to be used then it is fatal to start off paying people. 
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Second, the rate of pay given for the first 6.5 mk at shs 3 per metre was way 
out of line with that indicated in the Plan, (shs 1.30 per metre) and much 
above earnings in small scale agriculture*Casual workers in small scale 
agriculture expect daily wages of shs 3 per day; workers on the trench were 
taking home sas 10 per day. Not all the differences in performance can be 
attributed to the switch from paid to unpaid labour (the demands of 
agriculture for labour at the time of planting may have had an effect) 
but clearly this is paramount. 
In this connection, Brokensha (5) (area evaluator) had this to 
say before work started on the pipe: 
"As in other areas, there is much scepticism and resistance 
to self-help, as evidenced by the laborious way in which most projects 
lurch along with little progress. Surely it would be better to have these 
tasks done by contract labour, because: 
(i) it would be so much more efficient, and reliable 
(ii) it would prevent a possible damaging association of SEDP 
with just another Govt, scheme of dubious benefit to 
wananchi. 
(iii) there is a widespread and deep conviction that one of the 
immediate benefits of SEDP will be the provision of jobs 
at various levels. Even though many are unsure of any 
benefits in terms of economic development, they reckon that 
some of the shs 10 million should find its way into the 
pockets of the people. To disappoint them initially would 
jeopardise the project". 
A small departure from the original plan is that Siakago is to 
be supplied from an inlet off the Ena at Siakago High School, which has 
meant digging a trench of about 5 kms. This has been done by harambee 
labour turning out twice a week, and looks to be almost completed. 
Perhaps the people here sense a more immediate involvement with the project 
and its benefits. WDD are carrying out work on the intake, the filtration 
plan-,; and the reservoir. 
•main 
Enthusiasm for the/pipe as manifested by harambee turn-out seems 
to be greater at the far end, but there is a risk not fully discussed 
in the Plan that the water could be used up before it.gets down to places 
like Kiambere. This has happened in other schemes. 
The health programme scheduled for implementation by June 1972 
has made fair progress. The health centre at Siakago has been extended 
and two Norwegian nurses are posted there. The mobile medical unit was 
being fitted out in May, 1972 and should be in operation shortly. 
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The mission hospital at Ishiara appears fully operational. It is not 
known whether a doctor has heen posted to Siakago yet. He would he the 
first in the divisions 
EE C 0MME1TD AT I01T S 
Since the provincial administration decreed that the digging 
of the water trench shall he done exclusively hy haramhee effort, 
progress as we have noted has heen very slow. The SEDP water engineer 
has prepared a paper recommending a resumption of hired labour. His 
main argument is that the costs of.material inputs increase over time 
and so that the money gains from using haramhee labour will be more 
than offset by the increased money costs of pipes and other equipment. 
His argument may he re-inforced by reference to the principle of time 
discounting of the expected benefit streams-water today is worth more 
than water in five years time. One may also recall the point made by 
Brokensha that one of the objectives of the SRDP programme is increasing 
employment opportunities, and the general idea advanced by Moris among 
others that SRDP in order to win the support of the people should begin 
with a success project that brings benefits to a large number of people. 
In order to speed up the completion of the water pipe it is 
recommended that a return be made to hiring labour, for the digging of 
the main trenches, hut that the digging of laterals to serve particular 
concentrations of population be done by harambee labour. Rates of pay 
should be much less than those previously paid, and in line with 
agricultural rates, as suggested in the original plan document. Roughly 
speaking a man should be able to earn say shs 3 to 4 per day, instead of 
the average of 9 shs previously, which implies a piece rate of about 
1 per metre. The reason for changing the rates of pay should be 
fully explained to the people concerned. 
The basis for this recommendation is that it is difficult to 
get people to work for free on a project if they cannot see a direct 
relationship between their effort and their subsequent benefit. In the 
case of the water pipe there are two factors that distort this relationship, 
both of which are a consequence of its size. First the pipe is a 
long one carrying water from relatively well watered areas to very dry 
ones. Hence the greatest beneficiaries are the ones at the end of the 
pipe, while those at the beginning of it are less eager to have the 
project built. Thus we find that the people in Mavuria are willing to 
start digging by harambee effort and want the surveyors to come and mark 
out the line of the trench. The second factor is that because the pipe 
will take some time to complete as it is a very long one, the harambee 
effort will be less in the initial stages then towards the time of completion. 
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This argument may he partially substantiated by the construction 
of the temporary pipeline from Siakago High School to Siakago town. The 
distance is much shorter (about 5 kilometres) and the people concerned 
in digging are likely to share in the benefits even if they do not live 
in Siakago because they visit the town frequently. This pipleline is 
almost complete after three oft four months of harambee digging. It 
must be recorded though that some of the 'voluntary' effort has been 
carried out by tax defaulters under the supervision of the local police, 
and in places the trench is too shallow and has to be redug. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
We were specifically asked "by the SRDP Evaluation Team to 
evaluate the progress and strategies evolved for the Migori Master 
Farmers and the Roads programmes. 
The 3 person group comprised: Wo Ouma Oyugi, B.A., M®A,, Doctoral 
candidate (Development Administration); Mary A0 Baily B®Ae M.A., Doctoral 
candidate (Economics); and Joe Kariuki, B„A® Sociology® 
In carrying out our assignment, we talked to various people both 
in Nairobi and at the local level, and also read a number of relevant 
documentso A member of the group spent several days in Nairobi reading 
the relevant files at the MFEP and also interviewed key ministry officials 
and the linkmen in the Ministry of Agriculture and MOW® On the basis of 
these interviews preliminary papers on the Master Farmers Scheme and on 
the Roads project were prepared and later discussed by the entire Evaluation 
Team® The subsequent work of the group was very much helped by these 
preliminary drafts and discussions® 
The group left Nairobi for the Migori-Kuria area on 7th May 
and stayed there for one full week® During this time we called on the 
Provincial Planning Officer (PPO) and the Provincial Crops Officer in 
Kisumu and held lengthy discussions on various aspects of the Agricultural 
and roads programme in Migori-Kuria® 
In Migori, we held discussions with the following officers: 
DAO (whose visit to the area coincided with ours), Area Coordinator, 
AAO Migori, Assistant Gommunity Development Officer, the Livestock Officer, 
and the Roads Inspectors, We also interviewed 15 farmers - 13 in Katieno 
sib-location and 2 in Masaba sub-location® 
We supplemented the information gathered thus far by re-reading 
the relevant files at the office of the Area Coordinator and at the PPOs 
in Kisumus Upon our return from Migori, the three of us discussed our 
findings together® One of us was assigned to produce a working draft 
as a basis for discussion, which was then discussed amongst ourselves® 
A preliminary draft was then prepared for discussion by the entire 
Evaluation Team® We later went back and rewrote the draft taking the 
Team's comments into consideration® We divided the work thus: one of us 
revised the agricultural material and also worked on the substantive 
questions forming part III of our report and another worked on the 
roads component of the report® In this Report we have endeavoured 
to reach a consensus, though the views of the three authors were not 
unanimous® 
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One week in the field is too short a time within which to get 
a correct picture of what is happening in a development situation and at 
the same time to carry out an effective evaluations Although the time was 
short, we were ahle to get most of the critical information we wanted 
either hy direct discussion or hy studying the files. For what we could 
not get hy either way, we benefited a lot from the experience of one member 
of our group who has a first hand knowledge of the Migori SRDP having 
monitored it for 2-g- years (at one stage staying in the area for a period 
of six months). We are, needless to say, very much indebted to the 
Government officers who offered us every necessary assistance. It is our 
sincere hope that the information they offered us has been used in a way 
that will benefit the programme, to the success of which they are sincerely 
committed. 
We are, 
W. Ouma Oyugi 
M.A. Baily 
Joe Kariuki 
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TEE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM® 
This section of the Report deals with the evaluation•of the 
Master Farmers Scheme developed hy the FAO Team in conjunction with the 
local Agricultural Staff, and also with its successor Scheme - the 
Selective Extension and other related schemes developed hy the Kenya 
Officers. We were restricted hy our Terms of Reference to an evaluation 
of the Master Farmers Scheme hut have extended our remit to include the 
Selective Extension and other related schemes, for the Master Farmers 
Scheme as such no longer exists. 
THE MASTER FARMERS SCHEME 
Origin: Both the 1st Draft Migori SRDP 1969 and the 2nd Draft Migori-Kuria 
SRDP June 1970, depict Migori-Kuria as an area of some medium agricultural 
potential where the average farmer, after land adjudication has taken place, 
can establish rights over some 10 acres (see for example 1st Draft p 16). 
Hence the belief emerged that the declared objectives of SRDP (employment 
creation and income generation) could best be achieved by increasing 
cultivated farm acreage, farm productivity and production. 
In the documents produced before the arrival of the FAO Team 
in the area, the emphasis was on crop expansion. In the Outline Programme 
based on 1st Draft Programme, for instance, the authors wrote: 
"The basic strategy in Migori is centred on crop 
expansion.®..o©o.o©ooo" (p.2) 
The emphasis on crop expansion was later to be toned down drastically 
by the FAO/SIDA Planning Team. In a paper entitled "Cyclical development 
through the People" dated 1.9.70, the Team leader argued in favour of 
developing the abilities of the people first. He increasingly became 
sceptical of crop targeting which on a number of occasions he attacked 
as a 'mechanical way of development'. In Nov. 1970, he produced a proposal 
for an agricultural extension experiment for the Migori-Kuria SRDP, 
in which he proposed to improve the quality of extension agents and 
their-clients - the farmers. By December 1970 his ideas had managed to 
find expression in an official document when, in the Revised Outline 
Programme, Migori-Kuria SRDP December 1970< it was stated that: 
The basic strategy is to gear the self-help group 
movement to more fruitful aspects of development, to 
build up a balanced and integrated package of 
institutions and. systems to serve the production 
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needs of farmers and to stimulate the incentive to 
produce, (p® 3)e 
The emphasis now was on institutional and human development. 
The prospective farmers were to he "developed" first before any success 
with crop expansion could be expected, so the argument ran. These 
prospective farmers were to be developed through what the team leader 
called a Master Farmers Scheme® That was the beginning of the now 
familiar but defunct Master Farmers Scheme in the Migori-Kuria SRDP. 
THE NATURE OF THE MASTER FARMERS SCHEME. 
Briefly the proposal was to establish a set of grades for 
farmers: Pupil Farmer, Improved Parmer, Progressive Farmer, and Master 
Farmero There was a set of requirements for each grade, with the bottom 
grade a little above the level of the average farmer; when a farmer met 
all the requirements for a grade, he was to be given a merit badge, amid 
fanfare® The farmers in the Scheme were to be given special attention 
by the extension agents; this was to be complementary to the regular 
extension programme® The farmers in the Scheme were to serve as models 
for other farmers® The only modification in the actual extension approach 
was a drastic increase in the level of training of the agents who come 
into contact with individual farmers® All of the JAAs and some of the 
AAs were to be shifted into jobs that did not bring them into contact 
with the farmer; they were to be replaced by AAOs and new graduate AAs 
from Embu® 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SCHEME 
The notion of Master Farmer Scheme was adopted from Botswana 
where the FAO Team leader had participated in a similar scheme before 
his Migori assignment® He began talking about the scheme as soon as he 
arrived in the area. The idea was taken up more seriously after the 
preparations of the 2nd Draft Programme in June 1970® The first time 
substantive mention of it was made was on 6th October 1970 in a 
programme proposal to the MEPF. In this letter about a project package) 
{ he talked of a master farmers scheme of the Botswana or Malawi type. 
That was not the beginning® From July 1970, it had been the 
subject of discussion between the Team leader and the Locational Agricultural 
Assistants (AAs), who played import|ht roles in the evolution of the scheme. 
They submitted their recommendations to the Team leader between August 
and October 1970 in which they outlined what they thought should be the 
criteria for grade (pupil, improved, progressive, Master Farmer) 
membership* The proposals were analysed and condensed into a working 
document hy the Team leader. The condensed version was later discussed 
at an agricultural staff meeting with the FAO Team leader in attendance. 
Three such meetings were held, before the final version of the Scheme 
was thrashed out. 
Everybody that seemed to matter in this particular case was 
either kept informed or consulted. One of the officials to be consulted 
early in the planning phase was the PDA Hyanza, In a letter dated 
19=8.70, the PDA wrote to say that the idea sounded very good and 
promised to give it""my blessing". He further advised the Team leader 
to go ahead,and work with the DAO and AAO and to keep him informed. 
An official of the USAID then attached to the PDA as his personal 
adviser on rural development matters also approved the idea. One month 
before the details of the proposed scheme were out, the Team leader 
again wrote to the Extension .coordinator in the Ministry of Agriculture 
soliciting .his opinion about the proposed scheme. In a reply dated 
21.11,70 the, officer in question wrote: 
I am in full accord with your agricultural extension 
experiment proposal ........ hope you are successful in 
implementing this experiment as it should prove to be 
a good demonstration on how to strengthen the effectiveness 
of extension wprk and'is consistent with my intentions 
and recommendations. 
Thus, when the Master Farmers Scheme came out on 11.12.70, the Team 
leader was happy that he had managed to put together a scheme in which 
both the Headquarters and local officers had been fully involved! 
That was of course in keeping with the principle of consultation -
and did fall very well within the existing machinery of the government. 
Ho negative comments or reaction against the proposed scheme were 
heard until 19 = 3<>71 when an 4DA Extension Officer attached to the Ministry 
of Agriculture wrote to the ^ MrHyanza characterising the proposals as 
"rather academic" and demanding to see something more concrete on the ground 
to justify financing the Migori-Kuria Programme. A second criticism of 
the scheme came from the MOA on 28*4°71° In a letter to the PDA, an 
official of the Economic Division of the MOA attacked the proposed 
scheme and in effect urged the PDA"to ignore the proposal and asked him 
to do what was tantamount to taking away the. agricultural aspects of the 
Migori-Kuria Programme from the FAO Team. This letter, which later 
caused a lot of confusion, was not even copied to the FAO Team leader 
or to the Area Coordinator. At the programme level, the Kenyan officers 
did not know of the struggle that had developed until much later* 
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In short, the Master Farmers Scheme cannot, as some Technical 
assistance officers in "both the MOA and MFEP have tended to portray it, 
he considered the creature of the FAO team leader alone® He involved 
those who were relevant and therefore deserved attention in the planning 
process., That criticism should have come from some officers in MOA 
several months after the Scheme had been put out despite earlier 
support from the same Ministry is a revelation that there is lack of 
intra-ministry communication, and lack of a clear "authority structure" 
for the SKDP® 
We have attempted to put the planning picture in perspective so 
that we may correct the false impression current in certain government 
circles that the Master Farmers Scheme was a one-man "show piece". We 
agree with the opponents of the scheme (as detailed below) that there was 
a lot that was unconvincing in the scheme as it orginally came out 
but we also believe that there were certain aspects that were not at all 
bad. However, outright rejection of the scheme made any improvement by 
the FAO Team rather difficult0 Instead they opted to defend the entire 
thing and in the process lost out! 
EVALUATION 
The desirability of selecting certain of the better farmers and 
giving them additional inputs to make them even better, in the hope that 
they will serve as models to the rest of the farmers, has been discussed 
at considerable length by people concerned with extension strategy in 
Kenya. We simply note here that the Master Farmers Scheme and the 
Selective Extension Programme both involve this feature. 
The ultimate objective of SKDP - as we have proposed in this 
report - is to increase the rural standard of livingo The task of the 
extension service is to inform the farmer about better farm practices and 
( 
to convince him that they will raise his income and hence his own 
standard of living® The Master Farmers proposal devoted most of its 
attention to classification of farmers and devoted little attention to 
developing new methods of getting the information across and identifying 
the reasons why farmers will not or cannot adopt innovations. A classifi-
cation system could be of value in separating farmers into groups, so that 
farmers at different levels of achievement could be given different 
extension treatment® This aspect is not discussed in any detail in the 
proposals and if it were to be an important feature, it would seem to 
be desirable to include below - average farmers as well® 
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The main emphasis seems to he on the incentive aspect. 
We question the value of thiso If the prospect of increased farm 
income is not sufficient to make the farmer adopt farm improvements, 
how likely Is it that the prospect of moving up a notch in a special 
prestige system invented hy government officials will he more of an 
incentive? The system is likely to provide only a marginal additional 
incentive, while using up the time of the extension agents in inspections 
to see if the farmers have passed the tests, etc. 
Moreover, as some officials in the MOA pointed out at the time, 
the requirements of the grades are not directly related to the objective 
of raising farm income, and some of them may even he inversely related 
under some circumstances® Even if the grades were redesigned so that 
they were perfectly suited to the objective, they would have to be 
revised frequently as conditions changedo It seems to us that the 
extension agent should focus on teaching the farmer how to optimize - -
to choose the best farm management practices for the prevailing economic 
conditions and not merely to adopt a set of rigid rules. 
The higher level of training for extension staff was presented 
as ajt experiment lib see whether the better-trained staff would be more 
effective, but the usefulness of the experiment would have been severely 
limited by the fact that such a level of training would not be 
replicable on a wider scale for .10 years or so because of the government 
policy regarding the phasing out of the JAAs. Moreover, although it 
was supposed to be an experiment, there were only vague statements 
about how one would decide whether or not the experiment was a 
successo 
The above were some of the major inadequacies of the Scheme0 
Instead of improving on thems the FAO team spent all their available 
energies defending the Scheme on the grounds that "after consulting 
with the appropriate authorities during the planning process we saw no 
reason why some people should jump in at the end of the exercise and 
tell that we have been wrong all the way". This attitude did not 
help much. By June 1971 it was clear that the MOA and MFEP were going 
to have nothing to do with the Master Farmers Scheme. Instructions were 
issued by MOA and MFEP to the local level officers (i.e., Provincial and 
below) to go ahead and prepare an acceptable alternative programme. 
They began to do so in August,. 1971® 
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LESSONS OP EXPERIENCE 
One of the points which the SRDP stresses is the involvement 
of the local-level officers in planning,, The making of the Migori-
Kuria Master Farmers Scheme to a large extent satisfied this condition* 
The technical assistance personnel (SIDA/FAO) and the local 
agricultural staff collaborated in producing it® The product was 
not good enough for those in authority to accept. It seems therefore 
that closer involvement of the local-level officers in plan-making does 
not automatically guarantee the making of acceptable plans (do not 
confuse this with good plans). If the plan does not reflect the 
thinking of those in positions of authority, it will be regarded as 
just another source of information. The Migori-Kuria experience 
does show, in addition, that'the presence of a technical assistance 
personnel in the area does not alter this fact. Hence the local level 
planners must always strive to identify the locus of authority in the 
planning process and to make sure they are closely kept in the picture 
if their plans are to be accepted when finished, 
THE CURRENT EXTENSION SCHEME 
NATURE AND ORIGIN 
The current Extension Scheme being tried out in the area is a 
direct successor to the FAO/SIDA Extension Scheme (incorporating the 
Master Farmers Scheme), It still retains certains features of the 
Master Farmers Scheme, such as improving selected.farmers performance 
via increased extension inputs and classification of farmers. 
Specifically, the Scheme involves the selection of ten farmers 
per one extension agent. (This included JAAs, AAs AAOs. Their total 
in the Programme area is 63. Hence the 630 selected farmers often 
referred to under this scheme). The selected farmers will be involved 
in the demonstration of the various farm enterprises aimed at giving 
them some visible changes in the technical and economic aspects of 
farming in the hope that: 
a) the selected farmers will adopt the recommended 
techniqueSo 
b) that they will then act as spreading agents. 
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The role of the extension agent in this exercise is seen as one 
of (i) setting up demonstration plots of various crops in collaboration 
with the selected farmers and (ii) giving the needed education to 
and supervision of the selected farmers. 
The scheme also calls upon a contribution from the selected 
farmers. His plot is to be used for demonstration field days to be 
attended by neighbours who are supposed to be influenced by his standard 
of husbandry. He should struggle to get 2-5 converts at the end of 
each growing season. He should also have the ability to address his 
fellow farmers during the field days. Above all he must adopt the 
innovation. 
To ensure that there is an increase in net income for the 
selected farmers there is a proposal for land improvement by planting 
appropriate crops, carrying out rotation and having paddock. Associated 
with this is farm management practice. This calls for timely operations 
(e.g. planting in time), farm planning, book-keeping practices, credit 
availability and closer supervision of the above by the extension 
agent. 
In short, the selected farmers will be given special attention 
in an agricultural programme designed to: 
1) promote improved crop husbandry: hybrid maize, 
groundnuts, tobacco in high rainfall areas; sorghum, 
rice, pulses, cotton in low rainfall area. 
2) promote improved animal husbandry through AI, dips, 
more emphasis on dairying. 
3) experiment with farm management and budgeting on the 
lines of the Hyeri program. 
4) intensify farmer training by sending more farmers to 
the PTC at Homa Bay. 
The selected farmers will include poor, medium and good farmers. 
The groupings will be used primarily for planning extension approaches 
and evaluating progress, rather than as incentives as with the 
Master Farmers Scheme. The Scheme is to be carried out by the JAAs 
with the AAs. and AAOs assuming supervisory roles. 
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THE EVOLUTION OP TEE SCHEME 
The planning of the Scheme started when the FAO Team was 
still in the Area. On 13/7/71 the PPO Nyanza wrote to the PAO Team 
leader informing him that "Nairobi wants us to come up with acceptable 
Agricultural programme, our previous efforts (Master Farmers Scheme, 
training proposals etc.) having not been successful". At about the 
same time the P®D.A. was also in contact with his District and Divisional 
Staff acting on the instructions from above. (See P 4 top). 
An SEDP Project Committee meeting was called on the 19.7.71. 
At that meeting the form which the Scheme was to take was discussed. 
It was suggested and agreed that a total of 630 farmers be selected, 
10 per every extension agent. The criteria of selection was also agreed 
upon. These were: 
(a) that the farmer to be selected must be willing to 
follow advice 
(b) that the selected farmer should be influential enough 
in his area to become a spreading agent 
(c) that there must be geographical spread of the selected 
farmers. 
A selection committee comprising the D.A.O., the three D.Os in the 
Area and the PAO Team leader was appointed and asked to report back 
on 20th August 71 on their selection progress. They in turn delegated 
this responsibility to the JAAs and sub-chiefs. By 24/8/71 when 
another Project Committee meeting was called and attended by the 
M.P. for Migori, the D.C., P.P.O., D.A.O., and the Divisional and a 
few District heads, 545 farmers had been selected. Some members 
raised an objection about the selection method which they argued could 
not be free from charges of favouritism. It was agreed at this meeting 
that the method would be reviewed. (N.B. This had not been done by 
the time we were in the area)® 
At this meeting the PAO Team leader was asked to cooperate 
with the D.A.O. and his staff in writing out the proposed Agricultural 
Programme (including the proposed Extension Scheme). He declined to 
assist on the grounds that "it is not my job particularly 
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as advice I have given has "barely marginally been followed" 
(his letter of l/l/2 of 9th Sept., 1971 quoted hy P.D.A. Nyanza 
in: "Agricultural Programmes - Migori Kuria SEDP", dated 11th Oct., 
1971 P 2)o 
Hence, at the beginning of September it was still uncertain 
who would write up the new agricultural programme0 The PDA and his 
staff had been reluctant to disregard the presence of the FAO/SIDA team 
in the Area, but the Team leader's letter of 9th September quoted above 
was the immediate turning point. The PDA and his staff took to 
themselves the task of preparing the Programme and by 11th October, 
only one month later, "the 1971 - 72 Agricultural Programme - Migori -
Kuria SBDP", was on its way to the Ministry of Agriculture, NBI for 
approval. The first item discussed in it is the Extension experiment 
Scheme. This Scheme was improved somewhat with the publication in 
February (12th) 1972 of "Migori Kehancha SEDP Agricultural Programmes". 
Briefly that has been the evolution of the present Extension Scheme. 
EVALUATION OF THE CUBBENT SCHEME 
In a strict sense, the purpose of an evaluation exercise is 
to produce some kind of objective evidence of accomplishment in terms 
of outputs and to set this against the cost of inputs which in an ideal 
situation (seldom realized) would have been committed in the knowledge 
of alternative methods and costs of achieving the same or better 
resultss+ We are aware too that evaluation should not be based on 
opinions. But in our case this is unavoidable since very little 
has been done that can be quantified. There is also the problem of 
achieving accuracy in quantifying inputs (e.g., staff time) and 
outputs (e.g., number of hectares planted) in a rural setting. Our 
evaluation therefore takes cognizance of these obvious limitations. 
We recognize the significance of focusing the evaluation on the 
effects of a project but also recognize the fact that equally important 
is the evaluation of the planning process and of the plans so produced. 
In the absence of action on the ground they become the foci of analysis. 
Our evaluation touches on all these aspects of the Migori-Kuria 
agricultural programme. 
+ U.N.I.T.A.E. Criteria and Methods of Evaluation: 
Problems and Approaches UNTTAB Series No. I, 
New Tork, 1969 P 20. 
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The Planning Process . In the current (1970/74) National Development 
Plan the authors.write about the SEDP: 
"It is intended to execute this programme within the 
existing machinery of Government by the application of 
additional inputs of personnel and resources to a plan 
devised jointly by field and headquarters officers 
(PP174-175) 
Prior to the introduction of the SEDP in the area agricultural 
planning was a sole monopoly of the agricultural staff. The situation 
changed somewhat in 1969"during the preparation of the 1st Draft Programme -
Migori SEDP when both the District Development Committee (D.D.C.) and 
the Provincial Planning Officer (P.P.O.) had something" to do with the 
making of the agricultural component of the Programme. But even then, 
the role of the DDC and of the PPO was just to comment on what the 
(Divisional, District and Provincial) agricultural staff altd produced 
single-handed® In talking about planning within the existing government 
machinery, that is the picture we should bear in mind. 
During our discussions with the Govejmjnent_officerg involved 
in the Migori-Kuria SEDP it became clear to us that: 
(a) The selective extension proposals were developed 
at the divisional level, and.that the details 
were inserted by the. provincial Staff,. 
(b) The rest of the a,gricultural projects were identified 
and developed by the Divisional, District & Provincial 
agricultural staff. 
ft Except for the selective extension scheme, which we have said "3? J.' . _ ' 
was born at a Project Development Committee, there was very little 
departure from the traditional agricultural planning methodology. 
One of the immediate objectives of SEDP is consultation with and 
participation of the clients in the planning process. 
The clients — in this "case the farmers - were not 
consulted. There exists a siib-District Agricultural Committee at 
which such consultation and participation should have taken place. 
Our study of the relevant documents and also our discussions with the 
officers concerned^ revealed that such consultations never took place. 
Three reasons may be offered to explain this failure: 
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(1) There was pressure from Nairobi for something to be 
produced after the FAO/SIDA Master Farmers Scheme had been turned 
down. There was, therefore, no time for such consultations. 
(2) There is of course the usual anti-consultation, anti-
participation attitude of the government staff. The argument is that 
(a) they usually gain little by such consultations (b) there is no 
need to raise the farmers expectations for nothing unless there is 
something definite to tell them. 
(3) Where the staff is oriented to consulting the clients, 
they may be limited by lack of knowing how to do this. The experience 
after three planning phases (lst Draft, 2nd Draft plus the subsequent 
proposals e.g., the Master Farmers Scheme and now the so-called 
Selective Extension Scheme) has revealed lack of consultation with 
the farming community in the area. We doubt therefore that the 
pressure from Nairobi was solely responsible for the absence of such 
consultation during the preparation of the current scheme. 
Since we found a lot of scepticism on the part of the farmers 
about the programme, we feel there is a need to find ways of co-opting 
them into the planning process. Mass participation by farmers most 
of whom are illiterate is not realistic. We suggest some form of 
indirect participation. The existing sub-D.A.C. seems to us to be 
a suitable institution which should be strengthened for that purpose. 
Its membership (as far as farmers are concerned) should not be fixed. 
Besides the elected representatives of the farmers, the A.A.O. 
should have the right to co-opt new members depending on the issues 
to be discussed. Thus, if for instance the focus of the discussion 
is to be on cotton, the AAO should be free to co-opt (ad hoc) new 
members from cotton growing areas. This emphasis on farmer representation 
is based on the belief that clientele representation is more relevant 
in this case than the traditional political forms of representation 
in the Development Committees. The SEDP Project Committee should 
however be an integral part of the agricultural planning mechanism 
but it will have to come into the picture a little later. The "Ideal" 
planning situation we visualize is diagrammed below: 
Stens 
2. 
c: J • 
r O. 
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PLHHTHIG PHQGEOTEE i AGRICULTOIIAL PROJECTS 
Nature of work 
Data Collection 
Data Analysis 
(Simple data analysis) 
Project Identification 
(in this stage participants 
identify the projects they 
consider worth including in 
the plan) 
Project Integration 
(drawing the plan) 
Discussing 1st Draft 
Plan 
Discussing the Amended 
Draft 
Producing Pinal Plan 
Pinal' .Approval 
Participants 
JAAs, in consultation witl. 
the clients (farmers) AAOs to 
random check. 
AAOs with the help of LAAs as 
needed. May call for the 
assistance of specialists. 
Sub D . A . C , whose membership 
include D . O . , A / c . , A . A . O . , 
L . A . A . , elected farmers 
representatives, and a few 
nominated farmers. 
AAOs with exogenotis assistance 
as necessary 
Sub-D.A.C. 
Project Committee (SRDP) 
AAOs, A/C with exogenous 
assistance as necessary 
Project .Committee, DDC or DDO. 
¥e are of course aware of the opposition to a 'myriad' of 
development committees at the local level hy certain government officers 
because of the fact that there is a lot of duplication involved, 
lie do however believe that in the case of agricultural planning, an 
agricultural committee with membership drawn largely from agricultural 
'constituencies' should be given the first opportunity, before the 
SliDP Project Committee, to .identify agricultural projects. The S2DP 
Project Committee in this scheme would then concern itself with broad 
integrative work (i.e. integrating the various sector projects 
(agriculture, health etc.) into the area programme.). 
In the following pages, we single out some of the major 
components of the agricultural programme (Migori-Kuria SPDP) for 
closer analysis. These include: The Extension Experiment, Credit 
Scheme, Crop Production Proposal, and Livestock Marketing. 
The'Extension Experiment 
One of the purposes of experimentation is to test with a view 
to establishing desirable action procedures. The assumption here is 
that subsequent actions will only follow if the tested procedures 
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prove successful® In this sense experimentation is innovation-
motivated and goal-oriented. 
The goals of the Migori-Kuria Extension Experiment are 
stated ass 
"To carry out demonstration - either aided or unaided -
on the 630 farms designed to give technical and economic aspects of 
crop and animal production with an ultimate contention that 
(a) the demonstrators will adopt the recommended techniques 
and 
(h) these demonstrators will act as spreading agents who 
would he ahle to exert an influence over their fellow 
farmers thereby accelerating the adoption process at a faster 
rate than the extension staff," 
Experimentation may involve trying either a new innovation 
or an old one® Usually the people carrying out the experimentation 
are clear in their minds what it is they are testing® Reading closely 
into the contents of the Migori-Kuria Extension Experiment one does not 
see what is being tested® We are not told what the demonstration farmer 
is to be told, and how his success or failure is to be measured® 
Role of extension staff® There is very little in the proposed Extension 
Experiment that is new. Considering further that the JAAs themselves 
are no better than they were before the introduction of the programme, 
one can only predict that the "experiment8 will be a mere perpetuation 
of the "familiar11. In fact we never saw anything new when we visited 
the area® Because of the size of the programme area, it is not possible 
for the AAO Migori (who incidentaly struck us as very well informed on 
the SRDP) to closely supervise the sublocations® He has in the past 
been constrained by lack of petrol but we gathered that the position 
has been improved a bit® In spite of this, he still cannot adequately 
supervise both Migori and Macalder Divisions® For this reason, the 
proposed AAO Extension Experiment should be appointed immediately to 
facilitate a close supervision of the JAAs when the implementation 
starts. 
Role of farmer demonstrator We are not persuaded by the argument that 
the selected farmer should have the ability to address his fellow farmer's 
during field days. If this criterion were to be emphasized we would 
end up with demagogues and not dependable farmers. We also do not 
think that it is the duty of a farmer to struggle to get 2-5 coverts 
at the end of each farming season as is emphasized in the proposal® 
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This will divert the farmer's attention from his farming activities. 
The farmer cannot he expected to go all out persuading potential 
converts - a job from which he does not get any material benefits® 
This mobilisation work must be done by the agricultural extension 
agents in collaboration with the Provincial administration® The 
Community Development people may also play a significant role by 
holding joint "barazas® with the extension agents0 
Ensuring net income rise for the 6,30 farmers It is considered that 
land improvement (crop rotation, planting appropra&te crops, and 
having paddock) and farm management (timely operations, book-keeping, 
farm planning, credit availability and closer supervision) will ensure 
a rise in income of the selected farmers® There is a strong possibility 
that if these measures were to be effectively taken the farmer could 
end up bette;§ off than he was before® The position when we visited 
Migori-Kuria in May - ten months after the initial selection of the 
farmers - was that nothing was being done to implement these proposals. 
With no action on the ground, it was not possible for us to identify 
the problems these proposals faced® 
Nevertheless, it can still be stated that the success of the 
above proposals depends on: 
(a) The farmer being persuaded that the proposed innovations 
are likely to benefit him® His response will be influenced 
by his past experience in similar situations. 
(b) The extension agents® (who must do the persuasion) 
oapacity to do the work® 
This means education of both the farmers and the Extension Agents. 
The education of the latter comes first® As far as Migori-Kuria 
is concerned we recommend that the P.T.C® course should be supplemented 
with localized one day seminars for the JAAs to be conducted by the 
AAOs in the programme area® This is a kind of on-the-job training and 
does not require the agent to be physically absent from his farmers 
during the period of training. 
'There may be cases where the farmer demonstrators have played the 
conversion role successfully, but we doubt its permanence in the absence 
of material incentives. 
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The approach ire envisage for Migori is one in which the 
training of the extension agents would he tied to the experimental 
scheme, and to the training of the farmers locally. This would not 
interfere with the regular F.T.C. courses for either farmers or 
JAAs. 
The Selection of the farmers Having commented on the contents of 
the Extension Experiment as currently conceived, we shall now have a look 
at the clients and how they were selected. 
did not differ at all from those devised hy the FAO/SIDA Team for the 
Master Farmers Scheme. In fact they were identical (see Master 
Farmers Scheme at p»6;° This situation may he explained hy the fact 
that for the local officers some of whom participated in the planning 
of the current programme, "the Master Farmers Scheme had neither heen 
dropped nor adopted". Another key officer in the programme told us: 
"infact the M.F.S. was really a Selective Extension", Thus, although 
the M.F.S. was a dead issue in ITairohi, at the local level some of 
its fundamentals were very much alive. The statement in the current 
Extension Scheme (12.2.72 at P.l) that the farmers were selected at 
random is not true. Given the selection procedure adopted (which was 
not random) the decision to have among the 630 selected some poor, 
medium and good farmers was difficult to realize in a situation where 
nobody knew the basis for such classification. 
Ho baseline data were available to us on these farmers and even 
if there had been, there is virtually no information about the rest 
of the 20,000 farmers in the project area so one cannot say anything 
firm about how these farmers compare with the rest of the population. 
At the time we visited Migori we were told that the baseline data 
were to be collected very soon. Since consolidation and land titles 
are not complete, and in the absence of a social scientist to help 
design data gathering, and given the exceptionally large size of 
sublocations, a full baseline survey of the area would be a 
very tough undertaking for the District Staff, nevertheless, it 
seems to us that very simple data on the selected farmers would be 
extremely useful, and since the selection of the farmers in 
August - September 1971> it could easily have been collected already. 
For example, each JAA could very easily have presented simple data 
on size of farm, major crops, average yield per acre, farm income, 
age of farmer, tribe, clan, sub-location, number of cattle etc,, 
with the farmer's name at the time of the selection. The failure 
The selection criteria which we have referred to on page D 
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to do this "was partly due to the confusion surrounding the Scheme 
preparation and the question of who was responsible for such 
initiatives — — the FAO/SIDA Team or the locals. 
We interviewed 15 of the 630 selected'farmers. Although 
our sample was unavoidably biased toward farmers who were easily 
accessible and to whom the extension agents wanted to take us, some 
of the farmers we talked to were not very clear about why they had 
been selected in the first place. The breakdown runs thus: 
Selected for influence in the area (l) 
Selected for willingness to follow advice 
from agriculture staff (2) 
Selected for their hard work (5) 
Do not know (7) 
From these interviews and also by talking to the government staff 
involved in the selection, it become clear to us that each extension 
agent chose 10 farmers known to him and considered by him to be 
cooperative and a good models to their neighbours. In some cases the 
influence of the sub-chief also counted. In such cases tax payment 
record was also taken into consideration. There was a deliberate 
attempt to avoid the "difficult" farmers. In other words the 
selection was very "politicized". Given the method by which these 
farmers were chosen it seems likely that there was a bias in favour 
of friends of extension agents and sub-chiefs and in favour of wealthy 
and influential men. (in fact in our sample there was a substantial 
number of salaried people - JAA, teachers, a sub-chief etc.) - all of 
whom would be expected to be part-time farmers. If the SKDP objective 
of an equitable income distribution is to be realized in the long run, 
the selection of the farmers must be unbiased. The way to ensure this 
is through random selection. This method does, of course have its own 
shortcomings (e.g. possibility of including in the sample the landless, 
the over-aged, rural bourgeoisie - etc.,) but in relative terms it is 
the better in that it is sure to reflect the rural social set-up. 
Furthermore it is free from charges of favouritism. 
Farmers Knowledge of the Programme The farmers we talked to did not 
know what difference it was supposed to make to them to be a selected 
farmer. The people who selected them had merely told them about 
the ir selection witlioirt explaining "to "tliem what was involved. 
Furthermore the demonstration plots which were supposed to have some 
effect in the surrounding locality were not even being visited. 
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Perhaps this was because the programme had not effectively got off 
the ground when we visited the area. A number of farmers we talked 
to give us the impression that they never even expected such 
neighbourly visits. "The only visitors we know are you people" 
one statedo This lack of awareness by the selected farmers is to 
be explained against the fact that the extension agents themselves 
did not understand the programme and did not therefore have anything 
new to tell their clients. In such a situation, the extension 
agents must fall back on "the familiar". This is clearly reflected 
in the current agricultural programme in the area. 
The Credit Scheme 
This scheme is viewed as being critical to the success of the 
agricultural programme in Migori. We concur. The programme involves 
the initial selection of 20 stockists who upon the recommendation of 
the agricultural staff would get 5-15,000/- Bank loan.- The idea was 
developed by the AAO Migori in collaboration with SIDA/FAO. The A/C 
gave it the 'push' it needed to be implemented. 
The loans are for stocking^agricultural inputs. It is hoped 
that the stockists will in turn provide character loans to farmers, 
and even if they do not, it will at least no longer be necessary to go 
all the way to Kisii (which may be over 100 miles from certain points 
in the programme areas) for farm inputs, nineteen stockists with 
20 shops had, by the time we visited the area, been chosen to receive 
loans from the commercial bank; six had actually received a total 
of shs 28,000 when we visited the area. The six are located so as to 
give a reasonable geographical spread. This scheme seems to be a 
very good one; we feel however that the loan should have been in 
kind instead of in cash to ensure that the money will be used for 
agricultural inputs. We were also disturbed to learn that the 
selected farmers had, in most cases, no idea who these stockists were. 
All the 15 farmers we talked to claim they did not know who their 
local stockist was - five months after the scheme had been launched! 
For the success of the scheme, the authors emphasise 
(a) Willingness of bank people to set good terms 
(b) Trustworthiness of their traders and their 
promptness in repaying. 
(c) How readily and quickly farmers buy these farm 
inputs, 
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We agree that all these are important factors. However, 
we would shift the emphasis. It is our strong belief that the 
success of this scheme will very much depend on the willingness of 
the farmers to adopt the recommended innovation and hence their 
willingness to buy farm inputs. The education of the farmers which 
we have recommended above is therefore very important for the success 
of the credit scheme. 
Crop Production Scheme 
The objectives of the crop production proposals are 
identified as: 
(a) To raise per capita food situation 
(b) To raise per capita farm income by improving 
agricultural productivity. 
Crop priorities are: hybrid maize, tobacco and groundnuts in high 
rainfall areas; and sorghum, rice, pulses and cotton in low rainfall 
areas. The role of experts (whoever they may be) and extension 
staff is to (a) provide knowledge and (b) provide incentives. 
The achievement of the various crop targets is tied to the success 
of the above® 
The problem with the concept of "per capita" is that it 
usually ignores the question of distribution. Thus raising 'per 
capita® food situation in the area does not necessarily mean that 
those who were in need previously will be better off subsequently. 
Some farmers are better endowed than others, and will always produce 
more. In computing per capita production, we simply divide the 
. aggregate production by the number of farm families. In terms of 
real food income per capita (i.e. per head) we are very far away 
from reality. The same argument holds for per-capita farm income 
(in monetary terms). If the question of equitable distribution is 
important (and indeed it is) then before we can meaningfully talk 
about raising per capita food situation and per capita farm income, 
we must know the status of the individual farm families in the area. 
We have mentioned already that such baseline information does not 
exist in the area. Further more we need to know the prices of the 
various crops being recommended. 
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Except for tobacco, the information that exists on crop 
inputs, outputs and profitability is based on averages in Kisii. 
Information should now be prepared based on experience in the project 
area, and where such experience is insufficient, crop trials should 
be carried out. No information on profitability was available for 
four of the seven crops that are at the heart of the program (sorghum, 
rice, pulses, and cotton). Very likely there are rough notions of the 
profitability of these crops, but it seems to us that if these crops are 
to be the main thrust of the extension program, the information should 
be readily available. Without this information, it is difficult to 
evaluate the suitability of the chosencrops. Below we comment on some 
of the chosen crops. 
Hybrid maize Hybrid maize was among the most profitable crops with 
respect to the Kisii data made available to us in Migori. The current 
programme (Migori-Kuria) proposes to increase the acreage as follows: 
Kuria from an average of 75 hectares in 1970/71 to 1000 in 1972 
Migori " 11 171 " " 1969/71 to 2000 in 1972 
These ambitious figures were based on the hope that more 
GMR loans would be taken out in 1972 and more land ploughed. To make 
sure this happened, a tractor hire service was brought into the area. 
The selected farmers and other GMR loanees were to be given priority. 
Because of demand elsewhere in the District, the tractors did not 
serve the Migori-Kuria area as intensively as the agricultural staff had 
originally hoped. Many farmers had their land ploughed but not harrowed, 
and because of District demand, the service in Migori-Kuria was not 
well distributed. No farmers in the lowland areas, for instance, 
•benefited from the tractor hire service. And even in the highland areas, 
only GMR loanees benefited from the service. The distribution of food 
and cash income from increased production that we discussed above 
could not have been realized even if the projected crop targets had 
been realized. 
The crop targets themselves seem to be rather too high and 
therefore unrealistic; 75 - 1000; 171 - 2000 hectares In our 
discussion with the agricultural staff, we were told that 50 
GMR loans for the long rains had been taken in Migori and 54 in Kuria. 
Thirty and twenty applications respectively had been received for the 
short rains. Assuming that each of the receipients had a minimum 
of 15 acres (approx. 6 hectares ), a total number of hectares to be 
planted during the year 1972 would be (154 x 6) = 924 hectares for the 
entire programme area. This is 2,076 hectares less the total target 
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for Migori and Kuria>-^ . Even if there had not "been any problem with the 
tractor hire service, and taking into consideration such things like sizes 
of land owned by individuals, cost of labour etc. it is highly 
doubtful that the figure 3,000 hecijcres could be realized. 
Tobacco There is a special tobacco promotion programme which is a 
joint venture by BAT and the Kenya Government. It is another case 
where an ongoing program has been labelled SEDP. Tobacco can be very 
profitable if extension advice is carefully followed (although there 
is some uncertainty about how profitable it is, since it has a heavy 
labor input and the only profitability figures we were able to get are 
net of labor costs; the project is planned for small plots cultivated 
by family labor)0 However, bad yields, low quality of the tobacco 
(and therefore low prices) plus slow payment by the cooperatives have 
caused a number of farmers to become discouraged with the crop. 
The crop requires close extension supervision since the yield and 
grade of tobacco depend exclusively on proper husbandry. The Government 
agreed to provide extension agents to be trained by BAT advisors but 
with the overall shortage of extension personnel, these have not been 
provided. The slow payment seems to have been caused by financial 
difficulties within the cooperatives. The cooperatives advanced cash 
to farmers for tobacco inputs, obtaining the cash on loan from commercial 
banks, with the tobacco crop as security. A number of the farmers spent 
the cash and didn't grow the tobacco; when the crop was sold to BAT., 
the commercial banks had to be paid first. This meant that payment to 
the farmers was delayed and in one case the cooperative did not have enou^. 
money to pay those farmers who had grown the tobacco. The necessary extension 
personnel should be provided and the financial arrangements of the'Vfe-?.... 
cooperatives should be overhauled (in particular, the farmers should 
obviously not be given loans in cash) as soon as possible, since this 
is basically a good programme and BAT is considering pulling out if 
things do not improve this year. 
Cotton This croj^ grows only in the low land areas (Muhuru-Kadem 
location). The target of 245-300 hectares is realistic, except that 
there are already those who are disappointed with the crop and are 
likely to abandon the cotton growing this year. This is confirmed in 
the report of the A/c where he writes 
Cotton was not well planted in Macalder Division 
as had been hoped. People switohed over to 
planting cassava (A/CS report for June 1972, P3) 
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Their disappointment arises from (i) frequency of crop failure 
(ii) poor yield and (iii) poor prices. 
Cotton has large requirements in terms of cash and labour 
inputs. A cotton farmer who has 110 money to buy the requisite farm 
inputs must expect disaster at the time of harvesting. The majority 
of the potential farmers suffer from this limitation. Furthermore, 
cotton experiments in the area have not done well in the past. This 
has had an adverse effect in many areas. Since cotton must compete 
for land with other crops (e.g. sorghum) very few farmers indeed can 
afford to live with recurrent disasters. 
Migori®s experience with cotton growing is not unique at all. 
Other studies (See Gwyer's on Mbere) also reveal that the crop i3 
unpopular. As Gwyer quotes: 
"the main reason is simply that with current standards of 
husbandry and prices, farmers generally do not find it a 
rewarding crop to grow." 
Since one of the objectives of the SBDP is to help the farmer to 
increase his net income, cotton does not therefore seem to be a 
suitable crop in Migori (Muhuru-Kadem) for realizing this particular 
objective. 
Because of the place of cotton in the national economy, we 
do, in spite of what we have stated above, recommend that the growing 
of the crop be continued. However, we suggest a government subsidy 
to cotton growers. In cases where individuals have willingly given 
their plots for demonstration purposes, they should be compensated if 
the demonstration fails. 
Livestock Marketing 
f 
This dates back to October 1970. As early as 1969 it had become 
apparent that the supply of beef cattle from Migori-Kuria to the 
KMC was steadily declining. The 'fall in the supply to the KMC has 
happened as a result of the traders'reaction to the KMC's system of 
payment; they pay the traders for the net weight of the carcass after 
slaughter. Some are destroyed if the carcass is diseased (disregarding 
the traders' purchasing and transporting costs). This is what is 
feared to have caused the traders to resort to moving their animals 
to other areas - probably across "she lake via boats to Siaya District 
and to Uganda despite the not infrequent quarantine in the area. 
The present problems of business transactions between individuals in 
Kenya and Uganda arising from currency regulations may have turned 
cattle from Uganda toward Athi River. But the long term effect remains 
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to be seen, for as the Acting Managing Commissioner KMC once observed: 
"Farmers are just like any other businessman; they sell 
to the highest market or if they cannot make a profit, get 
out of the business" (KMC April Bulletin 1970) 
ing 
Hence the Migori-Kuria Scheme is aimed at contain- the situation. 
In' the programme proposal dated ll/l0/71 it appeared to be "well planned. 
However, sometime early this year, it the 
Kurias were not keen on having a holding ground in their area. Discussions 
with some of the officers involved disclosed that the refusal was based 
on political agitations and lack of awareness on the part of the people. 
This has resulted in the two holding grounds being both located in 
the Luo part of the programme area. One of them (the Macalder holding 
ground) was nearing completion when we visited the area. We suspect 
however that these holding grounds may not be used to capacity. One 
indication is that a senior livestock marketing officer posted to the 
area specifically for this aspect of the programme had to be withdrawn is-
from the area on grounds that he was idle. We are not sure of what 
became of the slaughter house proposed for Macalder in the "1st Draft 
Programme - Migori" of 1969* If the present activities were to be tied 
to such a project, its chances of success would be more enhanced. 
If a slaughter house were to be planned for Macalder, the present 
butcheries in the area would automatically have to be supplied from 
Macalder. Of course this would be a major project with a lot of both 
economic and political ramifications. We suggest further investigations 
into this by an agricultural economist with special interest in this 
field. 
OVER ALL ASSESSMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMME 
The overall assessment of the agricultural programme must 
of necessity focus on: 
(a) its effectiveness i.e., the degree to which the 
proposed services actually reach the clients 
(farmers) and achieve their intended objectives. 
(b) equity consideration i.e., the fair distribution of 
the benefits and opportunities among prospective 
clients. 
(c) efficiency consideration i.e., the most favourable 
ratio of cost to outputs in the range of choices 
open to the extension workers. 
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We have identified the services which are heing made available 
to the farmers ast 
(i) To the extent that the extension agents intend to concentrate 
on the 6.30 selected farmers at the expense of the 20,000 farm families 
in the area, the extension service appears to he discriminatory 
against the -unselected farmers. Although the 630 are evenly distributed 
all over the programme area, they form an insignificant percentage of 
the farming community. The effectiveness of this scheme is also limited 
by the fact that the JAAs who are charged with dissemination of extension 
techniques are themselves ill-prepared for that task. Their own 
retraining (where possible) is badly wanting. 
(ii) The credit scheme for stockists of farm inputs is a good 
innovation considering the distance some farmers had to travel 
for farm inputs before it was introduced. But whether the farmers are 
benefiting from this scheme is still an open question. The fact that 
even the selected farmers (in our sample) did not know who were their 
stockists is a cause for alarm. The scheme is also eljLJist in its 
orientation. The ordinary peasant farmer does not expect to benefit 
from this scheme because in the first place the extension agent does 
not know him, and secondly he cannot qualify for even a GMR loan 
to assist improve their standards of living. Considering the situation 
before this scheme was introduced, we feel it is a good idea to retain 
this scheme but to make sure that the credit is given in kind and 
not in cash. This is the only way we can be sure that farm inputs will 
in fact be available at the appropriate time. But more Important, 
the farmers must be made more innovative than they are at present. 
(iii) The G.M.R. loan is mainly for hybrid maize. The fact 
that those who qualify for consideration must singly or jointly 
have 6 hectares or more means that it is biased in favour of the 
"landed families". But this is a national plicy which does not 
only affect the people of Migori-Kuria but also similar families 
elsewhere in the Republic. If the argument once advanced against 
(i) Extension education 
(ii) Credit scheme for stockists of agricultural inputs 
(iii) G.M.R, loans to farmers 
(iv) Tractor hire service 
(v) Fertilizer for demonstration plots 
(so he may be able to buy the requisite farm inputs) because his, larjd is 
usually less than 15 acres (6 hectares). 
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the Master Farmers Soheme by an offioial of the MOA that the size of ones 
farm has nothing to do with his farming abi l i ty is to hold then the 
G.M.R. terms must be f lexible enough to even oater for those with one 
acre of land. It i s only that way that an equitable distribution 
of the G.M.R. funds can be realized, 
(iv) The tractor hire service like the G.M.R. was also 
biased in favour of the "landed families". Since priority was given 
to the G.M.R. loanees, it means that those with less than 6 hectares 
of land had no access to it. But even for those who did, the service 
was ineffective for a number of people had their farms ploughed but not 
harrowed, which means they did not plant anything. If the G.M.R. loans 
were to be extended to include even those with less than 6 heotares of 
land, and if th§ maabir §f were b© i s @ ? e a § § 4 'fee a sufficient 
level (to be determined by the A.A.Os. in the area) this is, no doubt, a 
good scheme considering that money to hire labour input at peak seasons 
is one of the most critical constraints in the area. 
(v) The F.A.O. fertilizer scheme is an on-going national scheme. 
This is also a selective scheme and must of necessity remain so. 
However, the problem with this scheme^ in Migori-Kuria is that the 
experience of demonstration plots has not successfully convinced the 
prospective adopters that they can produce wonders by resorting to the 
use of fertilizers. We visited a few demonstration plots, but in all 
of them there; was a sense of scepticism. One old man said to us 
"look, the area on fertilizer is doing worse than the area on cow dung, 
and there is no difference between it and the area where I put nothing"; 
the J.A.A.s usually find difficulty in reassuring such sceptics. 
Because innovations are affected by such experience, the AAO farm 
management must himself closely supervise this scheme. It is a 
potentially useful scheme if well managed and we suggest it be retained, 
but that control plots be done away with. 
We have not touched on the efficiency criterion because of the 
insufficiency of data and hence the problem of computation. We have 
nevertheless pointed out that a lot still remains to be done if the 
services currently being offered to the farmers are to be both 
effective and equitably distributed. 
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the. programme may not have any impact in the area if the farmer demon-
strator aspect failse Whereas we commend the work which the agricultural 
staff have done since the FAO/SIDA left, much remains to be done, 
which is understandable given the youth of the programme®"'" 
THE ROADS PROJECT 
The construction of the feeder roads network is the most 
conspicuous activity currently being undertaken in the Migoril-JtCuria 
SRDPo The roads project was originally to be launched in March 1971 
but due to organizational delays, this was not done until December, 1971o 
Below we single out its major salient features for closer comment,. 
THE PLANNING PHASE 
The programme was designed to build feeder roads to: 
a) provide for the export of agricultural produce, 
b) allow access for government personnel, e.g0 
extension agents, and 
c) create a feeling of participation in the 
larger society on the part of the population® 
The first planning of the feeder roads in the Migori SRDP area 
took place in 1969. The result of this exercise is outlined in the 
First Draft Migori SRDP 1969, (p23.) Kuria area was not included in 
the survey then0 The planners identified some 11 tracks totalling 
75 miles which they suggested should be constructed by self|-jhelp 
labour with the government providing minimal assistance of a 
technical type8 
By the time FA©/SIDA team arrived in the area in 1970, a 
decision had been made to include Kuria in the programme area and a 
fresh survey of the proposed routes was necessary. This was done in 
May of 1970® 
All the major findings, conclusions and recommendations are 
to be found in the body of the Report, 
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The FAO/SIDA team "brought in an ILO labour-intensive roads 
expert -who had had experience "building labour-intensive roads in 
Tanzani%+to perform that task. He prepared a tentative roads plan, 
with tentative routes and priorities. His plan called for about 175 
miles of roads. The rpads were to have an 11.7ft. carriageway 
(13.65 formation width, i.e. including the shoulders) and to be very 
simple in construction, with inexpensive drifts instead of bridges 
wherever possible. All the preliminary clearing, earth-moving, etc. 
was to be done by hand. Simple relatively inexpensive machinery was 
to be used for grading and finishing; heavy machinery was only to be 
used in cases where there were large boulders that could not be remote 
by manual labour, and then it would be brought in only for brief periods„ 
About 200 men x-jould be needed at a time; how much was to be self-help 
and how much hired labour was left for others to decide. Since the 
project was experimental and new techniques would have to he developed, 
a qualified civil engineer would direct it. In the process he would train 
Kenya foremen (possibly members of the National Youth Service) who 
could apply the techniques elsewhere. Maintenance was also to be labour-
intensive. 
Members of the FAO/SIDA team surveyed the proposed routes more 
thoroughly and produced the report which was the action plan. They 
found that the length of these routes was closer to 215 miles, and 
therefore proposed that the roads be made narrower so that the total length 
could be constructed with the available resources. The 
width of the carriageway was to be 8ft. and thh formation width 11.7 ft. 
They retained the emphasis on labour-intensive methods, but recommended 
some different machinery a dozer blade and a hydraulic tow 
grader replaced the roller and tow grader originally recommended. 
They specified that most of the labour was to be self-help. A road 
only be built when the people in the area had done all the preliminary 
road preparation and signed a written agreement to maintain the road. 
The layout and priorities were very similar to those in the ILO expert's 
plan. Neither the government officers nor the local people were involved 
in the planning of the feeder - roads. 
Just at the time when implementation was supposed to start, there 
V j 
were reports of people complaining that they not been consulted over 
the location of the roads. There was a lot of fuss, but in the end 
very few changes were made. The one major change was that 2 feeder 
roads were joined to make a long loop road in Kadem and Vest Suma 
locations along the Tanzania border. The resulting road was hardly 
a feeder road, but it appears to have been much desired by the people. 
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and is "being used, and the change was in our opinion justified* 
There were also objections to the proposed width of the 
roads, (again a manifestation of lack of involvement by Government 
officers and local people in the planning stage). The local officers 
argued that self-help groups could not be depended upon for the 
maintenance of the finished roads, and that the M.O.W. should be 
brought in to maintain the roads once they were ready, A carriageway 
of 12 feet and a formation width of 16 feet was what they understood 
to be the minimum standard that the M.O.W. would accept. Therefore, 
they insisted on wider roads, and the roads that had been constructed 
up to May, 1972, were of that standard. 
BIPLEM2NTATI0N 
The start of the construction was delayed because of uncertainties 
surrounding the programme and because of organizational struggles. 
A labour-intensive roads expert was to be hired to direct all the 
SEDP roads; he was to spend a year in Migori getting the roads programme 
started and then go to the M.O.W. in Nairobi. Unfortunately, there 
was a delay in filling the post. (We gathered that such a man may not 
now be hired after all). 
In addition, the M.O.W. was afraid that it would be asked to 
take over the feeder roads in Migori. 
Money for 1970/71 was released only one month before the 
end of the financial year and was returned without being used. Funds for 
1971/72 were released in October but again returned for proper routing 
following protracted debate over who would control them. 
Meanwhile there was political pressure to get something 
visible on the ground so the construction of the roads began in 
December 1971 under the direction of a MOW roads inspector. The 
machinery kept breaking down making the work go very slowly, so heavy 
machinery was hired and brought in. Although the clearing was done 
by self-help, the rest of the road was built by standard MOW methods. 
As of May 13, about 52 miles of roads had been built. 
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Basic Objectives 
The objectives of the programme were quite consistent with the 
objectives of the SRDP. The roads were supposed to help to raise 
incomes in the area indirectly by providing outlets for agricultural 
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produce and facilitating access of government resource personnel, and 
directly Toy creating employment in an area which, had lost a major 
source of employment with the recent closing of the Macalder mine. 
The crucial question,of course, is to what extent there was a 
real need for road services. How large would the above benefits of 
the roads be? Would they justify the cost of the construction? 
There is no satisfactory method for doing a cost benefit 
analysis of a roads project. If a method existed in theory, it would 
have high data requirements. In this case, there isn't any data even 
on the hard economic costs and benefits, much less the political and 
social benefits (e.g. it is not even possible to cost the actual 
road construction). One can only make a rough judgement on the 
need for the roads in the light of the rest of the SEDP programme. 
The ILO expert who drew up the original roads plan was sceptical 
of the urgency of the need for the roads, since some old roads built 
by harambee labour had been allowed to deteriorate, and he observed 
that even where bus transport was available most of the traffic was 
bicycle, foot and donkey traffic. 
Our impression nevertheless is that the feeder roads are needed, 
and fairly soon. The first road that was built is likely to solve a 
serious marketing problem for rice-growers along the Tanzanian border 
and a local bus company is planning to start a bus route on the road. 
It was commented to us that the use of motor transport by local people 
had increased noticeably in the last two to three years. Finally the 
rest of the SEDP program will generate a need for roads, since there 
are plans to increase production of cash crops, to establish artificial 
insemination runs, and to develop a regular milk collection run. 
The Standard of the Eoads 
These roads are supposed to be feeder roads, not major traffic 
arteries. The standard of road proposed in the action plan (8 foot/ll.7 
foot width) was perfectly adequate for all the roads except possibly 
the West Suna road, a long road of greater importance than the others. 
Of course, with the development of the region, the narrow roads 
might eventually become inadequate, but they can easily be widened 
and upgraded when it becomes necessary. It would cost somewhat more to 
improve them than to build them to a higher standard in the first 
place, but not much more andrwh'en discounting is taken into account, 
it is cheaper to build them to a minimum standard in the beginning. 
Since funds are limited, there is a choice between more minimum 
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standard roads and fewer high standard roads® For the balanced 
development of the region it is better to have more lower standard 
roads• 
Maintenance 
As we said above, the main reason why the higher standard 
roads were demanded is that no one believed that the self-help 
groups would actually maintain the roads, and the local officers as 
well as the local people wanted the M.O.W. to take over the roads 
and maintain them® They believed that the M.O.W. would not take over 
the 8 fto/ll.7 ft. roads® There is no rule that says the M.O.W. cannot 
maintain unclassified roads of a low standard, but it is true that 
M.O.w would be unlikely to take over roads of the standard, but it 
is true that M.O.W would be unlikely to take over roads of the 
standard proposed® But in fact, the M.O.W., having recently 
taken over responsibility for all County - Council roads, has such 
a backlog of maintenance work 011 classified roads that it is 
exceedingly unlikely that it would take over any additional roads 
for a long time, of whatever standard® The wider roads will be more 
difficult to maintain® Therefore, we think that the rest of the 
roads should be built to the 8 ft. standard, even though it may be 
difficult to do this now that some locations have received wide roads. 
The maintenance question should be settled® The written 
agreements have not been signed, since the local officers say that 
they could not be enforced anyway® They suggest that a small permanent 
roads unit be kept in the project area for maintenance® We think that 
every effort should be made to make funds available for this. There 
is genuine reason for not wanting the maintenance of roads to be 
the responsibility of self-help groups. It is difficult to sustain 
the zeal of self-help long enough. We think that neither the self-help 
units nor the MOW can be expected to maintain the roads, and that it 
would be bad for the success of SRDP to build the roads and then 
have them to be impassable because of poor maintenance. 
Self-Help Versus Paid Labour 
The benefits of roads may be significant hut they are 
indirect, and people usually do not perceive them to be as important 
to them personally as the benefits from schools, dispensaries, cattle 
dips, etc. This is a drawback to generating the enthusiasm needed 
for successful self-help effort, 
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We have already raised this issue with respect to maintenance. 
Although the original plan for self-help maintenance has not worked, it 
seems that the use of self-help for road preparation has been quite 
successful so far. However, this is deceptive. Most of the roads that 
have been built have been based on deteriorated old roads, so the 
clearing was relatively simple. Some self-help leaders say that it 
won't work when there is a lot of heavy work to be done. We think 
that this is true and that the project should plan to rely mainly on 
paid labour. 
Construction Methods 
The question is whether or not the construction of the rest 
of the roads should be by relatively labour-intensive methods as originally 
planned or by the relatively capital-intensive methods that have been 
used so far. 
There is a strong bias in the MOW against labour-intensive 
road building. Relative prices are distorted in Kenya. An overvalued 
exchange rate and no tariffs on "essential" machinery make capital 
goodslook cheaper than they really are relative to the cost of labour. 
When the different methods of building a given road are costed, the 
costs may not be that different in money terms, even though in social 
terms the labour-intensive methods are cheaper. Moreover, there is more 
uncertainty about the cost of a labour-intensive project. There is 
expertise in Kenya in capital-intensive road-building. Fewer management 
problems arise, because it is easier to manage a bulldozer and 
10 men than 200 men. Labour troubles may make the actual cost of a 
labour-intensive project greater, particularly for the first few projects 
when the new methods are being tried out. There may also be a conflict 
between such experimentation and rapid completion of the roads. If the 
value of the knowledge gained for future application is taken into 
account, such additional costs and delays may be justified but it 
looks awful on the MOW books so the MOW doesn't want to do it. 
It seems to us that although the MOW may be reluctant to 
undertake such experiments on its own, it should be willing to cooperate 
with the SRDP experiments. A labour-intensive road-building experiment, 
financed by outside funds which are making an investment in Kenyan 
organizational ability instead of machinery can show the MOW engineers 
that such projects can work (if they can) with a minimum of risk or 
trouble to them. 
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The local SEDP staff and the MOW roads inspector think that 
it has already "been demonstrated that the labour-intensive plan was a 
failure and that "big machines have to he used, since the machinery 
broke down. This an understable interpretation from their point 
of view. But the machinery recommended by the FAO/SIDA team was 
different from that recommended by the ILO expert and was not suited 
to the task. The dozer blade was not suitable for any kind of 
roadwork; the current ILO expert says that the only thing he can 
think of that it would be good for is shovelling snow. The hydraulic 
grader is a sophisticated and fragile piece of equipment; the front 
wheel of the tractor has to be taken off and the grader fitted in 
between the front and back wheels. The grader recommended in the 
original was a cheaper, simpler and sturdier piece of equipment which 
was pulled behind the tractor and required much less expertise to 
operate. Thus we think that the failure of this unsuitable machinery 
should not be taken as a failure of labour-intensive road-building. 
Furthermore ' the fact that the machinery was ordered for a much 
narrower road should also be taken into consideration. 
Labour Supply 
An important question is the availability and reliability of 
labour. Labour management problems will be lessened if there is keen 
competition for the jobs and unsatisfactory workers can be easily 
replaced. There is good reason to believe that there is a large pool 
of labour available. During the July 1970 registration of the unemployed, 
it was estimated that between two and three thousand job-seekers 
registered in Migori and Kihancha. When workers were hired to work 
011 the Macalder holding ground, many times the required number applied 
for the jobs. There is an agreement that the 10 unskilled labourers now 
used by the roads unit will be hired from the sub-location in which the 
road is being built. These jobs are great prizes which are awarded by 
the sub-chief as a member of the sublocational committee. There was 
a great outcry when the roads inspector tried to bring in workers from 
another sub-location for an emergency repair. One of the agricultural 
staff said that when the big machines were brought in some people 
said, why are they bringing in these machines? Why don't they hire us 
to do the work? 
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The road-building work must be seasonal since it cannot be 
done during heavy rains. The work is already planned so as not to 
conflict with agricultural labour demand peaks because of the self-help 
labour component. The supply of labour seems to be great enough and the 
timing of the demand for road labour such that conflicts with the 
demand for agricultural work would not be;-a problem. 
Wage rates. The agricultural wage in the area is 2/- to 3/-
a day. Everyone we asked in the project area itself said that there 
would be no difficulty whatsoever in getting 200 people within 
walking distance of the road works at a wage rate of 5/- o r 6/- a day. 
At this time, the roads unit is paying a wage of 200/- a month to the 
10 unskilled labourers. Formerly they were paying 120/- a month and 
there was an excess supply of labour at that wage; then they were 
told by the provincial accountant that they had to pay the government 
minimum wage of 2G0/-. This is far too much. Wo queried this in 
Nairobi, at the MOW,' dn4"-were told that there is no minimum wage for 
casual unskilled labour on road works, and that such wage rates were 
usually determined in consultation with local leaders, Since the 
workers must be changed on a casual labour basis at a wage rate of 5 / -
or 6/- a day. Of course, the damage has already been done, to some 
extent, in that it will be very difficult to lower the wages now. But 
if the construction methods ax-e changed, and the labour force is 
significantly enlarged it would probably be possible to re-define the 
job and conditions of employment so that wages can be lowered without 
an outcry, 
When we talked to the current ILO expert in the middle of May, 
he was intending to restore the experimental labour-intensive aspect 
to the roads project. It was not definite whether the project 
would be run by a roads inspector supervised by him from Nairobi, or by a 
qualified roads engineer. We think that the value of the project as an 
experiment would be greatest if it were run by a qualified engineer 
who believes that labour-intensive road works can work and preferably 
has experience with them. The man should have technical expertise 
since it will be necessary to develop appropriate techniques. If the 
project is run by someone who thinks that the only way to build a road 
is with heavy machinery, it is very likely to fail. 
Costs 
We had hoped to prepare a simple cost comparison of the two 
methods with and without shadow-pricing of foreign exchange. This is 
not possible; the necessary information is simply not available. 
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One of the most important, contributions this project could make is to 
provide some hard data on the costs of relatively lahour-intensive 
road-building in Kenya so that the choice of techniques could be made 
on a rational basis0 
There is a study at the HOW comparing the cost of roads made 
entirely with labour to roads made entirely with capital equipment, 
showing that the first costs four times as much as the second. But it 
should be strongly emphasized that at no time in the history of this 
project was it suggested that no machinery at all be used. Rather, 
the idea was to experiment with a different mix of men and machines -
one that was more heavily weighted toward the use of manual labour 
than present methods. It seems to us very likely that such a mix 
would be cheaper in terms of social cost, and might very well be 
cheaper in actual cost as well. 
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The departure of the FAO/SIDA team from the area in November 
1971 marked the end of the protracted organizational struggle. Things 
began to happen immediately. The feeder roads construction began within 
a month of their departure. The conclusion which can be drawn from 
this is that if the FAO/SIDA had not been in the area in the first-
place the delays which the programme experienced might not have been 
there. But now that the project is off the ground the major question 
is, will it contribute to the realisation of the SRDP objectives? 
Our observation is that it has the potential to do that provided 
that other complementary schemes (such as intensfied crop production, 
A.l runs etc) are tied to it0 
+A11 the major findings, conclusions and recommendations are to be 
found in the body of the Report. 
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felspscmc QUESTIONS FOR EVALUATION ; 
These answers to questions given in OUT Terms of Reference are 
not exhaustive. The reader is strongly advised to read the main body 
of the Report, for further elaboration on these. 
Question 1: 
IS THE PLANNING FRAMEWORK DEVELOPED FOR SRDP ADEQUATE 'OR 
EFFECTIVE TO MEET! ITS PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES? 
f 
In Migori-Kuria, the D.D.C. is not institutionally very much 
involved in SRDP planning. A number of District departmental heads 
are; however^ involved on an individual departmental basis. Hence 
the "real" planning framework developed for the SRDP in the area 
tends to push the D.D.C. into the background. 
What has emerged since February 1971 is a system of .Divisional 
committees similar in membership and functions to the District 
Committee. These are the Project Advisory Committee (Divisional 
heads of departments, local MPs and County Councillors) and,the 
Project Standing Committee (only divisional heads of departments). 
The latter is the more important.. It meets every month, and 
when it was first formed it used to meet fortnightly. It is at 
this committee that the SRDP projects are identified and estimates 
discussed. Discussions at these meetings (one of us has attended 
a number o^them) are more thorough than those at the DDC. Depart-
mental problems are viewed in the context of an integrated programme 
and Divisional heads of departments are more willing to discuss 
their departmental problems than the District heads used to at the 
DDC. This is partly due to the fact that they are closer to the 
problems involved^and can discuss them meaningfully. It is also 
partly due to the fact that the Area Co-ordinator who chair&these 
committees is, unlike the D.C. in the D.D.C., capable of helping 
his divisional colleagues solve the bottlenecks in their respective 
departments. He has certain access and resources for the programme 
which the D.C. does not have for the entire district. One tends to 
deduce,-, therefore-that the planning framework developed for the 
Migori-Kuria SRDP is an improvement over the old system (§L»e». 
isolated planning of the programme by the individual heads of depart-
ment with the D»D.C. merely giving final approval). 
The Migori-Kuria system satisfies certain principles and 
objectives of the SRDP." Closer participation by the divisional 
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heads exposes them to planning and therefore gives them experience 
in planning matters. Tiro things are satisfied: the principle of 
replication and the more immediate objective of strengthening the 
Kenya machinery and personnel on development matters. But the other 
more ultimate objectives such as employment creation, income 
generation and the improvement of the quality of rural life 
cannot be expected to be achieved by the existence of an adequate 
planning framework. These can be attained by the existence of not 
only adequate and effective planning framework but also effective 
and adequate implementation frameworks 
Questions 2 and 3: 
Iff PLANNING TEE SRDP WAS THE UNEXPLOITED POTENTIAL POP. 
DEVELOPMENT OP THE AREA ADEQUATELY ASSESSED? WERE THE 
PROBABLE CONSTRAINTS PREVENTING THIS POTENTIAL PROM 
BEING MAXIMALLY EXPLOITED ADEQUATELY ASSESSED? 
In Migori-Kuria as in any other SRDP area, the unexploited 
potential of the area seems to have been wrongly assessed and 
identified. This comes out very clearly as one looks through the 
pages of the 1st and 2nd Draft Programmes Migori-Kuria. In the 
first Draft, Migori was depicted as an area of high potential 
where each family could establish rights over at least ten acres 
of land® This was said without any survey having been carried 
out in the area to, confirm the assumption. Furthermore, ecological 
variations were not taken into consideration. The second Draft 
Programme did address itself to some of these weaknesses but still 
fell short of coming out with the correct assessment when the 
authors identify the major unexploited potential of the area to be 
the peopleo 
The problem with land use is not that it is unexploited 
but rather that it is exploited uneconomically so the problem is 
one of increasing acreage productivity rather than expansion of 
acreage under plough. On the people issue, the history of self-
help participation does reveal that they have been "maximally" 
exploiteda There are several projects which they have successfully 
completed and also those they have been unable to finish. The 
bottleneck, therefore, seems to be one of how to increase produci-
iivity. 
Some very fundamental limitations arise. Acreage produc -
:.ivity cannot be increased unless the extension scheme succeeds. 
Loans to prospective farmers are also limited by the lack of title 
deeds * GMR loans (in which title deeds are not considered) helj 
only maize growers, especially those with more than 6 hectrcp 
(15 acres). 
Question 4» 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE SRDP PROJECTS INTEGRATED OR 
CO-ORDINATED WITH ON-GOING PROGRAMMES AND TO WHAT 
EXTENT HAVE ON-GOING PROGRAMMES BEEIT LABELLED SRDP? 
The only visible project in the area is the roads. There ae 
are, of course, the holding grounds and the input credit projects 
but these are co-projects tied to other projects which have not 
taken off. The roads project is not integrated or co-ordinated 
with the regular M.O.W. road building programme. There is a 
regular M.O.W. representative in the area stationed at Migori 
township but he does not even know which are the SRDP roads. 
M.O.W. is in a way responsible for this state of affairs since 
from the beginning they have been reluctant to "adopt" the 
SRDP roads. The funds being used for the SRDP roads are not 
managed by the local M.O.W. officers but by the Area Co-ordinator. 
There are some regular sub-on-going projects which the 
SRDP proposes to intensify and which in the process have been 
labelled SRDP. Thes include UNICEP supported water schemes, 
tobacco production, dip construction etc. Most, if not all, 
of these predate SRDP yet they are all being labelled SRDP 
today even though SRDP funds are not supporting them. (For 
this indiscriminate inclusion see "The SRDP Progress Report, 
31st March 1972" EFD 237/010 dated 12th April 1972). 
Question 5* 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES TO 
ACCELERATE RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SRDP AREA NEWER 
OR MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THOSE WHICH THEY REPLACE OR 
SUPERSEDE? 
Regarding the projects already on the ground, there has been 
"Sery little departure from the old practices. The agricultural 
extension experiment being conducted in the area contains no new 
elements in terms of approaches and message to the farmers. The 
roads construction which was originally hoped would adopt a 
labour intensive strategy has thus far not done so. We did 
not notice any marked change in development strategy. 
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Question 7' 
¥ERE THE FUNDS, STAFF, EXPERTISE, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
ETC,, ESTIMATED FOR AND PROVIDED TO SRDP AREAS ADEQUATE? 
(a) Funds; There was delay by SIDA to commit herself formally 
to the financing of the Migori-Kuria programme. Because of this, 
the G®0»K. was also reluctant to release funds for the programme 
without any firm reimbursement guarantee. The G.O.K. managed at 
last in May 1971 to release the funds but too late to get the 
programme launched in July 1970 as had been expected. Enough was 
released but not spent because of its being released only a month 
before the end of the financial year. SIDA has now formally 
committed £540,000 to the programme for a period of five years 
beginning July 1971= Of this about £70,000 had been spent by the 
end of May 1972. One would think that the funds which have been 
committed to the programme are more than enough considering the 
question of replication 
(b) Staffs Progress has been rather slow. Departments like 
Community Development still do not have the critical personnel they 
needo About three locations in the area have no Community Develop-
ment Assistants. M®0®¥® has not been able to second to the area 
a qualified roads engineer. As a result, a roads inspector, who in 
effect is an administrator, is being used in place of an engineer. 
Department of Co-operatives has only one person in the project area. 
He has a TJ. but no driver. The AAO, Kuria had no vehicle and 
therefore is immobile. The additional agricultural staff approved 
in the 1971/72 estimates has not been engaged® The picture is the 
same in almost every department. 
(c) Expertise: Generally speaking the programme can be 
managed with the present level of expertise available. There 
are, however, certain areas which require special attention, 
for instance a need to upgrade the quality of agricultural 
extension agents. The roads project also requires periodic 
engineering advice, especially where an entirely new routing 
is involved® Otherwise we are convinced that the present 
level of expertise available at the Divisional level is adequate 
provided it can be supplemented with occasional advice from above. 
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(d) Administrative Costal She terms of reference of the 
FAO/SIDA were not clear. Authority relationships in the planning 
and administration ef the programme were also unclear. There 
was a lot of stepping on peoplrtB toe» as a result of this. In 
part, that was responsible for the delay in launching the programme. 
(e) Sp&SLal Training: This has been proposed for the 
extension staff in agrioulture but not stuck ha» bee» done in 
this regard. 
(f) Equipment: Road construction suffered momentarily 
at the beginning. This was mainly due to the breaking down of 
the small machinery which SIDA-FAO Team had ordered. A. later 
decision to expand the width of the roads by another 4 feet 
may also have brought additional strain on the machinery. The 
Area Co-ordinator was, however, quick to correct this by hiring 
heavy machinery for the construction work. 
Question 8: 
HOW EFFECTIVE HAS THE ROLE OF THE AREA CO-ORDINATOR, 
DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES AND THE MFP IN ITS 
CAPACITY OF OVERALL' CO-ORDINATOR BEEN? 
(a) The Area Co-ordinator: The institution of Area 
Co-ordinator is a positive innovation. In Migori-Kuria, he 
has turned out to be the backbone of the programme. He gets 
the officers at the various administrative levels on the move 
by"trouble shooting, chivying etc. In a number of cases he has 
solved problems for the departmental heads. In one instance, 
he drove a landrover from the headquarters to the programme 
area after there had been a long delay in its release and handed 
it over to the head of department concerned. In another case, 
he prepared a draft programme for a department whose head had 
been unable to do so. The roads projects would hot have 
gotten off within weeks after the departure of SIDA-FAO from 
the area had it not been for the effective leadership of 
Ben Wanjala - the Area Co-ordinator. What has made him more 
effective in discharging his duties is his colleagial -approach 
to the problems facing the programme. 
D.D.C. For comments on the DDC see Question 1 above. 
(b) NRDC (Secretariat) A study of the relevant files in 
both Kisumu (P.P.O.'s office) and at Macalder show that the 
Secretariat has had some surveillance over the programme. But 
they could have done still more by helping the lower level officers 
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to get the Ministries to release the approved funds in time. 
The Area Co-ordinator Migori-Kuria has had to make several 
trips to Nairobi to iron out certain bottlenecks in the Ministries. 
This is a job which the MFP (SBDP Unit) should do, releasing the 
Area Co-ordinator to concentrate on local level problems which 
equally demand his attention. 
Question 9? 
TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE LOCAL COMMUNITIES BEEN ADEQUATELY 
INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING AMD IMPLEMENTATION OP (SBDP) 
AND TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THIS INVOLVEMENT BEEN PREMATURE, 
TIMELY OR TOO LATE? 
At the start of the programme the MPEP tried to discourage 
what they called "premature involvement", their position was that 
people should not be involved unless there was something tangible 
to tell them® The officers at the local level, on the onther hand, 
would have liked to get people mobilized right from the start. 
The one single project in the area which required closer 
consultation with the local communities during the course of its 
planning is the roads project. This is so because it relies on 
self-help labour for pre-construction work (bush clearance, 
removing of stumps, stones etc) and for post construction main-
tenance. Yet throughout the time the routes were being identified 
by SIDA-FAO, no local communities were involved. When construction 
was about to start, the mistake was recognized and corrected. This 
obviotisly delayed action on certain routes. In the end, as a 
resultof adynamic campaign by the newly arrived Assistant Community 
Development Officer - Philemon Oluoch, the self-help groups were 
organized and involved. This was inevitable if implementation of 
the roads project was to be a success.. 
Question 10: 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES 
: DEVISED FOR THE SRDP PROJECT REPLICABLE IN THE 
COUNTRY AS A WHOLE? 
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It would be premature at this time to come up with any firm 
recommendation about replicating Migori®s experience considering that! 
(a) The roads project has only been on the ground for 
eight months and does not even have in it anything 
experimental to replicate. 
(b) The agricultural programme has not ever shown any 
sign of having started save for the selection of 
the farmers. There are however, new services which 
have been introduced such as tractor hire service 
but some of these are not necessarily SEDP initiated. 
With respect to the committee structure, we would strongly 
rocommend that the Divisional Development Committees be strength-
ened. Migori®s experience as outlihed above (Question l) 
shows that this is the most appropriate level to plan for 
divisional development. Relative to the D.D.Cs, the Division-
al Development Committees,,, are closer to the local problems 
and are therefore in a position to come up with realistic 
proposals assuming existence of qualified staff. 
GENERAL 
In sections I and II we discussed the agricultural and roads 
projects respectively. In this section we have attempted to 
answer the specific questions for evaluation focusing our 
comments on Migori-Kuria. For the national outlook, the reader 
is referred to Part III of this Eeport which is a synthesis of 
views from all the SEDP areas. 
Again we wish to reiterate that the Migori-Kuria experience 
can be "read" within a broader national context. We do not 
claim to have raised all the issues involved in the Migori-Kuria 
SEDP. We could not even if we wanted t©. The only way to under-
stand these problems is closer monitoring of the programme. We 
suggest that this be done not only by outsiders but by local 
level officers as well® 
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The T e t u r e p o r t e v o l v e d i n a v e r y d i f f e r e n t way f r o m t h e 
o t h e r a r e a r e p o r t s w h i c h f o r m t h e append ices t o t h i s SBDP e v a l u a t i o n . 
Due t o a v a r i e t y o f u n f o r e s e e n f a c t o r s , i t was n o t p o s s i b l e t o g e t an 
independen t e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e T e t u SEDP p r o j e c t s u n t i l t h e g roup was n e a r l y 
a t t h e end o f i t s w o r k . Thus t h e r e p o r t t h a t f o l l o w s was w r i t t e n on t h e 
b a s i s o f papers by t h e IDS r e s e a r c h e r s i n v o l v e d i n t h e T e t u SEDP, and 
a p r e l i m i n a r y paper w r i t t e n by E„ Baum s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r t h e SEDP e v a l u a t i o n . 
The a u t h o r s do n o t have f i r s t hand knowledge o f f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s , o r 
much independent ev idence on t h e T e t u p r o j e c t s concerned , b u t i t was f e l t 
t h a t s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n was a v a i l a b l e i n t h e numerous IDS r e s e a r c h e r s ' 
papers and i n t h e Baum pape r , f o r i t t o be p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r t a k e a T e t u 
r e p o r t i n t hese c o n d i t i o n s . I t i s hoped t h a t i t j u s t i f i e s i t s e l f as a 
w o r t h w h i l e c o n t i i m t i o n 0 
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THE OUTLINE Pr.OGRtl-3.IE 
The SPDP objectives laid out in the Outline Programme for Tetu 
prepared in 1969 were "to enable small scale farmers to break out of 
subsistence cultivation and larger farmers to develop and provide employment." 
The hope was expressed that "economic diversification and the development of 
infrastructure will present employment opportunities and improve the 
amenities of rural life", (l, p»2) The initial thrust of the programme 
was to centre on agricultural production and marketing. The programme 
strategy to achieve the objectives was stated as follows: 
"An intensive extension effort, concentrating on 
farm management and credit, will be mounted 
for farmers selected for their potential for 
response to these inputs. Written materials 
including a farm management manual, will 
increasingly be used to exploit the high 
literacy rates in the areas The capacity of 
the Wambugu Partners' Training Centre will 
be expanded. A campaign for the extension of 
4K»elubs for young farmers will be launched.. 
Special attention will be given to hybrid 
maize cultivation, In addition tea, pyrethrum, 
coffee, pigs, dairy and beef will be improved 
and extended as and when possible. Institutional 
arrangements for co-operative marketing will be 
rationalised*.a„" (1, p. 2) • 
We were asked specifically in our terms of reference to look at 
the Tetu Extension Project, the Parm Management Project, and the 4K Club Project. 
This paper centres on the Extension Project, but it also includes a brief 
section on the 4K Club Project* The evaluation team was not able to cover 
the Parm Management Project at allc Each of these three agricultural 
projects in Tetu has evolved its strategy independently and operates 
independently® We have referred to this in our overall report where we 
recommend the integration of related projects such as these » 
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EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGY 
The detailed definition of the strategy of the "intensive extension 
effort", evolved over a considerable period of time through a series of 
meetings between Government officials at all levels and researchers from 
the Institute for Development Studies (IDS). Before these discussions 
started, however, a baseline survey was carried out, towards the end of 
1970, under the supervision of the IDS researchers. 
The 1970 Baseline Survey and Initial Strategy Outline 
The primary purpose of the baseline survey, which was exploratory 
in nature, was to record facts about the Division on which strategies could 
be based. The survey was also designed to collect initial information as 
the first part of an experimental process in which the effects of different 
strategies would be measured. The survey produced information on the 
adoption of new crop and livestock enterprises and their accompanying 
husbandry; sources and extent of communication linkages; types of extension 
contact; farm level resources; and characteristics of the farm family, 
particularly the decision-maker on the farm. 
Aiming at greater equity among the rural people, the concern of the 
researchers was with mere widespread adoption of income-producing activities. 
They felt that this could be achieved by improved extension. As they put it: 
"How can rural development innovations be put into practice as 
forcibly as possible? It is our contention that the solution 
rests to a very large extent with the government extension 
personnel who are the principal agents of change in the rural 
areas." (2, p»2) 
This initial concentration on extension services to the exclusion 
of all else has been the subject of criticism, particulary in academic 
circles. The researchers responded to this criticism by acknowledging it 
in later papers, by adding the provision of inputs and by encouraging and 
calling for research on other factors. Ina paper written in October 
1971(3), the researchers raised the issue of exclusive concentration on 
extension. They stated "while extension training and retraining are 
necessary for achieving SEDP aims (increasing per capita production) they 
are by themselves not sufficient". (3, p.9). In that paper they identified 
as in need of attention other factors such as: 
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(1) family planning and population control; 
(2) agricultural diversification; and 
(3) diversification of rural employment 
An intensive study of marketing opportunities and the packaging, distribution, 
advertising and local retailing of agricultural inputs was also recommended. 
Information was gathered on 354 farms, which were randomly 
selected® Analysis of the collected data took two forms. The first was to 
list the adoption of various practices, procedures, etc., according to 
sub-location. Secondly, the 354 farmers were ranked according to degree 
of progressiveness and divided into four categories: most progressive, 
upper middle progressive, lower middle progressive and laggards. These 
categories formed the basis for presenting data showing variations between 
the farmers of each category6 More details on the baseline survey and the 
method by which the progressiveness levels were formulated appear in Section 
II below (jp E - 22,23). 
Early in 1971, draft tables in which the data were presented by 
sub-location and progressiveness, were produced. The way in which these 
were used is described by the team of researchers as follows: 
"Before publishing these results in Nairobi, 
however, the team went to Nyeri and presented 
them to provincial, district and divisional 
officials, explaining the findings, cross-checking, 
the conclusions and drawing attention to the diagnosis 
of -low adoption and inequity as bottlenecks to further 
development.".............. 
and 
"The meetings held to present the data proved 
very important for strategy developments Not 
only did they create familiarity and confidence 
that the researchers would not run off with 
the data without contributing to Tetu, they 
also allowed the researchers to collect feed-back 
on their initial interpretations® Naivetes and 
misinterpretations were thus avoided® 
However, the main function of the meetings 
was to provide an opportunity for local officials 
to brainstorm within the content of the baseline 
findings and their general implications for rural 
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development. And it was those brainstorms that 
led to the break-through which provided the 
nucleus of a practicable strategy." (14, p. 30 
and 31). 
The first report (2) of the research findings and their 
implications for strategy development was written after these meetings. 
The report contained an outline strategy the basic elements of which had 
emerged at the Hyeri meeting. Its instrumental objective was "educating 
extension personnel in the techniques of reaching all sections of the 
community with maximum efficiencies and minimum expenditure of additional 
costs, effort and time" (2, p.39) in order to increase the rate of 
adoption of income - producing innovations thereby increasing the income 
of all sections of the cammunity. 
The instrumental objective of educating extension personnel 
was geared to the immediate objective of increasing the adoption of income-
producing innovations by all sections of the community, the emphasis 
being on equal emphasis on all sections to correct the prior bias towards 
the more progressive. It was thought that that this would lead to an 
increase in income for all sections of the communityo Alternative 
strategies to increase total income do not appear to have been 
seriously considered. It is possible that by conentrating on the most 
progressive more total income will be generated and even the income generated 
for the poorer sections of the community through increased employment both 
on the progressive farms and in service industries will be greater. It was 
assumed that the desired state would be increasing incomes through income 
producing activities on every individual® s own land® In addition, it was 
assumed that extension was the right instrument to use, and that a more 
equitable distribution of extension services would lead to more equitable 
and higher distribution of income. 
The first stage of the strategy, based on the belief that neither 
PTC teachers nor extension personnel are trained "how to teach what content 
to whom with what effect'^  called for the entire rewriting of the existing 
curriculum at Wambugu PTC. The proposed new curriculum would actually 
consist of four separate curricula, one for each progressiveness groupe 
In this first stage the teachers at Wambugu PTC would receive training 
by university staff in both teaching content and teaching methods. 
In stage- two of the strategy the PTC teachers, newly trained and prepared in 
teaching the new curricula would hold classes for the field extension 
staff, the purposes being to give the PTC teachers experience in using the 
/ 
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skills taught and to pretest the efficiency of the new stratified curricula* 
The training of farmers was stage three* Farmers were to be selected in 
homogeneous progressiveness groups, each group receiving instruction for 
its level of progressiveness using the appropriate new curriculum® The 
farmers would be followed up by JAA® s each of wham would have a list of 
their clients who had attended the newly designed courses® Once a farmer 
had adopted the practices recommended at the FTC course for his level of 
progressiveness he could return to the FTC for the curriculum developed 
for the"next progressiveness level® Thus, he would progress through the 
series of innovations until he reached those associated with the most 
progressive farmers® Finally, stage four of the overall strategy was the 
evaluation of the effect of the treatment® 
Draft Strategy Proposals October« November 1971. 
A draft strategy proposal (3) was prepared for discussion with 
local officials in Nyeri in October 1971o In this proposal it was assumed 
that the FTC staff were conversant with the technical skills which they 
were teaching, and that the missing ingredient was skill in teaching techniques . 
Another point that was stressed was the need to make extension staff 
familiar with the level of progressiveness of their clients, and to this 
end a simple Farm Record Card was tp be drawn up enabling them to classify 
their clients into progressiveness categories. Details concerning farmer 
selection for training at the PTC were left open, although it was envisaged 
that the Farm Record Card would also be used for thise 
Further elaboration on the strategy, appeared in November 1971 in 
a paper entitled "Accelerating the Plow of New Ideas to Rural Peoples 
A Proposal for a Pilot Extension Training Effort in Nyeri" a This paper (4) 
was presented at the Workshop on Co-ordinating Education for Rural Develop-
ment, through Mass Media, Kenya Board of Adult Education, Nyeri^ 29th 
November --3rd December, 1971« 
The idea of waiving FTC course fees appears for the first time 
in this November proposals The creation over time of multipurpose 
curricula is envisaged although the initial effort is 'so be directed to 
the agricultural component of the curriculum® 
To enable farmers attending the newly revised courses to adopt the 
recommended practices, small quantities of trial samples are to be provided 
free of charge® The free provision of such input supplies as seed, 
fertilizer and pesticides was to enable the farmers to experiment on 
a small plot, without incurring a financial risk. 
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A completely new dimension was added in the November proposals 
the ranking of field extension workers. The proposal called for objective 
measurement of a field worker'£ effectiveness. Research was to be 
carried out to determine the present performance of field extension workers, 
particularly identifying the characteristics and extension techniques of the 
more successful versus the less successful.' This research would lead to 
developing a measure of productivity which would be used in classifying 
field workers into levels matching the categories already developed for 
farmers. It was then intended to identify less sophisticated field workers 
and get them to specialize in simpler, more elementary agricultural techniques. 
This aspect of the strategy was not to be implemented at the beginning of the 
Extension Pilot Project, but it was proposed as a component to be added at a 
later stage. 
The Pre-Implementation Strategy 
The details of the strategy as it stood at the end of 1971 
were (15)s 
(1) Curriculum Development: 
The technical information was to be based on recommendations in 
the Ministry of Agriculture "Crop and livestock Manual". 
The contents were to be broken down into courses designed for 
different levels of progressivene ss.0 The teaching methods part 
of the curriculum was to be developed by the IDS researchers 
in conjunction with the Institute of Adult Studies, PTC 
teachers, and the field staff. 
(2) Training PTC Staff in Communication Skills: 
IDS staff were to carry out the training of PTC staff. 
Once the curricula were completed, the PTC staff were to practice 
on JAA's who would attend courses as indicated in (3) belowc 
(3) Training JAA1 ss 
The newly developed curricula were to be pretested on the 
JAA11 s (a) to give PTC teachers an opportunity to try out 
their newly acquired skills; (b) to acquaint JAA's 
thoroughly with the material in the curricula to ensure 
effective follow-up; and (c) to give JAA's the chance to 
modify the curricula if necessary in the light of field 
conditionsa 
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Indexing Farmers on Progressivenesss 
Using the scale developed in the baseline 
study, all Tetu farmers were to be given 
progressiveness scores. The JAA®s were to 
collect the information required to obtain 
the progressiveness scores, using the Farm 
Record Card designed by the IDS researchers. 
Central Registry of Farmersg 
All data collected in (4) above were to be 
stored in a central registry in the District 
Headquartersc This was to be used as a basis 
for selection for FTC courses, and for other 
purposes0 
Recruiting Farmers; 
Farmers would be selected by the District 
Headquarters staff, using the central 
registry, but recruitment-persuading the 
farmers to come-would be done by JAA's0 
Free courses were'to serve as an enticement. 
Training Farmers; 
One-week courses were to be held, providing 
for a maximum capacity of 130 at one time 
Provision of Free Inputs; 
Participants in the FTC courses would be 
given small quantities of free input 
supplies, appropriate to the content of 
the course,. 
Follow-Up by JAA8 ss 
JAA's would be provided with lists of 
clients who had attended particular courses. 
They would then ensure that participants in 
the courses followed, the recommendations 
that had been taught0 
Evaluation; 
The project was to receive careful 
monitoring and evaluation to assess its 
effectiveness and to allow for the 
possibility of replication. 
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This plan relied fairly heavily on university staff for 
training and curriculum development, and on some outside agency for 
evaluationc It included a system of indexing of farmers and storing 
the information centrally ? which would involve a substantial administrative 
loadff Free courses were included on the grounds of experimentation and 
the notion of free samples like industry gives was based on a misconception 
of the amount neededo Both were incorporated without serious consideration 
of replicability or finance 0 It was envisaged that JAA® s would be Involved 
in follow-up without taking into account the feasibility in relation to their 
other duties. These problems became evident in the implementation 
process0 
BEPIEMEHTING THE PLAIT 
Jjaoaaflg FTP Teachers, 
The one-week training course for the 7 teachers from Wambugu 
PTC was prepared jointly by the IDS research team and the director and 
members of the Institute for Adult Studies0 The course was held at 
the Adult Studies Centre, Kikuyu, from 14th-19th February. The course 
was based on the following principles? 
1 o it was to concentrate on pr&cti@§il teaching 
skills which could be used in the FTC. 
2. It was to maximise participation by FTC 
teachers, that is, they were not only to be 
told how to do things but always to be given 
a chance to do them themselves. 
3o the course itself was to be an example of the 
very teaching methods recommended in the 
training;, and 
4® the course was to use a non-directive approach 
to teaching, whereby participants themselves 
discover answers to problems instead of being 
told what they are supposed to do (15, pa36)0 
The first two days of the course centred on an introduction to 
communication principles, information about the problems of adult 
learners, and the process of adoption of new ideas0 The third day focussed 
on teaching techniques such as discussion groups, role playing and 
visual aids. The FTC staff took over the class on the fourth day to 
present their own case studies., role playing, demonstrations and lectures. 
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The final day covered the selection of different teaching methods when 
planning lessons and the role of feed-back and evaluation9 
The course was viewed as very successful both by the participants 
and by MOA observers» A similar course for all ETC teachers involved in 
JAA. Training Programmes was requested by MOA, and this replication took place 
from 5-9 June 1972. Thus an important part of the Tetu Extension Project. 
was replicated at a very early stage. 
Nyeri Meeting 25th April, 1972 
At the request of the SEDP Linkman in MOA (letter 17th March, 
1972) specific proposals on further implementation of the Tetu Extension 
Project were prepared by the IDS research team in March-April 1972c These 
were presented in a Working Paper (7) for a meeting held at Nyeri, 25th 
April, 1972. The paper outlined the strategy which had been developed and 
reasons for it5 action to date; and then focussed on the next steps and 
presented a time-schedule for finalising these. The next steps weres 
curriculum development, farmer selection, and JAA. involvement. Arrangements 
still had to be made for the financing of fees, free input supplies," and 
farmer transport® The researchers proposed that an initial start be made 
with a curriculum for farmers in the "lower middle progressive" category 
who had not adopted either hybrid maize or grade cattle. 
The meeting of 25th April was chaired by the PTC and consisted of 
the PDA and other provincial^ district and divisional officers from MOA and 
MFP; Nairobi based persons in MET, and MOA; and university personnel from 
IDS and IAS. The main recommendations and decisions taken weres 
1« The first experimental courses would be aimed 
at below-average farmers from Upper Tetu, 
where advantage could be taken of the G-athano 
growing season which was said to start in 
July® 
2. The curriculum, was to cover hybrid maize and 
livestock management and aim at farmers who 
had never grown hybrid maize or kept grade 
cattle0« ® o o o ® «The technical points to be 
covered by the curriculum for a one-week 
course were to be worked out by the PTO 
and the technical staff at a meeting on 
2nd May 3 The IAS and IDS would then take 
over to prepare a draft teaching curriculum 
which was to be discussed by PTC teachers and 
JAA's on 18, 19* and 20 May®.®.®»®®®.®® 
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Course fees were to be reimbursed to the PTC in the 
form of bursaries totalling K shs 3,750o The Treasury 
was to be approached about these funds by officials 
present at the meeting0 
4o Although the working paper had suggested that the short 
rains in lower Tetu should also be utilised during 
the experiment, the meeting counselled against this 
because of the -unreliable nature of the short rains. 
Therefore, the meeting decided that only farmers from 
the ten sub-locations with high lands would be considered. 
Twenty-five farmers from each of 8 sub-locations and 25 
from two sub-locations with only small high areas, 
totalling 225 farmers, were to be trained in 4 courses 
of 50 farmers and one course of 25. The dates were set 
for five one-week training course keeping in mind 
completion of courses before the start of the season on 
1st Julyo 
5° Samer selection would be carried out by the AAO and his 
staff in the Division (AA! s and JAA's),, They would 
be briefed by IDS personnel on the revised Farm Beeord 
Card at the PTC on 2nd May0 It was decided that the 
sub-chiefs of the sub-locations in question should also be 
asked to attend the briefing. 
6 „ The free sample supplies were to be enough for acre of 
• hybrid maize and % acre of fodder crops. It was felt 
that 112 acres of hybrid maize would be a tangible result 
of the experiment.ooooo The sample supplies would consist 
of 5 kg 613 C hybrid maize seed, 50 kg 20-20-0 compound 
fertiliser, 2 kgDDT dust, cuttings of Napier grass 
and fertiliser lor the Napier grass. Exact requirements 
for this fodder crop were to be decided.... 
(15, PPe 37 - 38). 
Thus the intention was to make a start with a programme 
for below average farmers from Upper Tetu0 Parmer selection was to be 
done at the Divisional not the District level, as the central registry 
plans had not yet been followed through. The decision to start 
with hybrid maize and livestock management was based on a discussion 
of various alternatives. 
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Meeting 2nd May„ 1972 
Prior to the meeting with the extension staff and sub-chiefs 
the researchers revised the Parm Record Card which was to be used for 
collecting data on the basis of which the farmers were to be selected and 
data to which the PIC teachers could gear their teaching„ But, with 
the first course scheduled for the 24th May,, it would be impossible to 
collect information on all the farmers in Upper Tetu, using the Card* 
Another method of selection of course participants had to be devised. 
At the meeting on 2nd May, attended by the researchers, the PTO, 
AAs, JAAs and sub-chiefs, the participants decided that "no hybrid maize" 
and "no grade cattle" should be the criteria for selection and that the 
selection should be done by a locational committee of sub-chiefs, AAs and 
JAAs, (SeepE 25 for more details). 
In recruiting the farmers, no mention was to be made of free 
supplies, since this was still tentative, A free course and free 
transport from a central collection point in the sublocation were to be 
used as incentives in the recruitment process. 
Also, at the meeting an important alteration in the timing of 
the courses had to be made. It emerged that the Gathano season, 
previously assumed to begin on 1st July, begins on 15th June, Since 
farmers would benefit much less from instruction beginning after the 
start of the season, the time-schedule had to be collapsed, and it was 
decided that each course should last for only 3 days* Thus, the total of 
225 farmers were to receive instruction from 24th May - 14th June, 
Curriculum Discussion 18th - 20th May, 1972 
The meetings of 18 - 20th May were attended by the PTC principal, 
all PTC teachers, and AAs and JAAs of Upper Tetu. The Pazm Record Cards 
on the 225 farmers, which had been completed by the JAAs, were analysed. 
The purpose was to acquaint those at the meeting with information about 
the participants of the forthcoming courses. 
IText a draft of the curriculum was discussed in detail» This 
draft had been a combined effort ofs 
a) the PTO and technical staff preparing a list of topics 
to be covered on hybrid maize and livestock management. 
b) members of IAS, IDS, and MOA® s extension advisor having 
developed the curriculum based on the technical points. 
The discussion brought out weaknesses in the proposed 
curriculum and time-schedule; the major one being that 
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due to the transport situation only 2-g- days were available 
for classes, and the time allocated for the different 
subjects was too limited to allow for demonstrations. 
Thus, the decision was made for the training course to be 
entirely dtvoted to hybrid maize growing. 
Another problem emerged0 The strategy called for JAA follow-up 
on planting, dusting and storagea Since all course participants would be 
planting at approximately the same time, and this coincided with the time 
all the rest of the JAAs" clients would be planting, including members of the 
SEDP 4K Club project, and with preparation for the Nyeri show, the JAAs felt 
that they would be unable to cany out the follow-up which was called for 
course participants. No solution was found so the PDA's advice was to be 
sought. 
Meeting 24th Hay, 1972 
As the first class was being held, a meeting of the PDA, PTO, 
Pro#S£S&l Crops Officer, DA.O, AAO (Tetu), the AAs of Upper Tetu and one 
of the researchers was feeld to discuss the problem of follow-up. The 
conclusion rean>S?toe(i in the addition of another dimension to the Extension 
Experimento Farmers from a given sub-location would divide into groups 
(of 4-8 persons) at the end of the course; each group would work together, 
on a rotational basis, to plant maize on each group member® s holding and the 
JAA would attend when planting began on the first farm. Thus, the JAA would 
be required to visit each group once. The additional rationale for these 
groups was that they would re-inforce the impact of the teaching received at the 
PTC, ensuring that information was remembered, that the recommendations were 
correctly applied, and so on. 
The PDA raised another issues was the intent to provide the input 
supplies free in keeping with SEDP principles? The meeting reconsidered this 
part of the strategy. They concluded that the supplies should be given 
as loans, which would amount to shs 49.25 per farmer 0 This modified another 
element of the experiments from the provision of free inputs to the very 
different proposition - inputs on credit, with all the loan collection 
machinery and sanctions that that implied. 
The PTC Cource May-June 1972 
The course began by asking farmers "what do you know about hybrid 
maize", to learn of the information-level of the participants,, Then, it 
proceeded to a discussion on the differences between; 
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(a) growing local maize^  
(b) local maize with fertiliser, and 
(c) hybrid maize with fertiliser. 
The following sessions covered land preparation, fertiliser 
application along with a field demonstration and practical exercises, pests 
and weeds (again including a demonstration and practical) and storage of 
maize. Throughout the course the teachers used a variety of visual aids 
and teaching techniques® Hand - outs written in Kikuyu were made 
available about the material covered® At the conclusion of the course 
the farmers formed themselves into groups quite willingly, and set out 
rules such as anybody who did not come for group work or who sent someone 
to replace him would not be helped on his farm (9). 
Prom 24 May-14th June, a total of 217 farmers attended the course, 
3C£> of these being women® All the farmers accepted the condition of 
the loan and all but one of these actually picked up supplies® The JAA's 
attended the course along with their clients, which was a deviation from 
the original plan according to which they were to be trained by ETC teachers 
as a form of pre-testing the curricula and acquainting them with the 
material to be taught to their clients® It is not clear whether the 
intention was that they attend only the first time a course was given, 
but it is important to consider how crucial their attendance was to building 
up a relationship with the farmer participants and ensuring effective follow-
up® 
ffollow-Up 
So far, only the first part of the follow-up, on planting, has 
been monitored® Eollow-up on dusting and storage was also in the plan® 
According to evidence gathered by an IDS researcher in August 1972, all 
course participants seem to have been reached, in groups, in the planting 
demonstrations. It also emerged, however, that 21 of the 47 farmers 
interviewed at that time said that their groups had ceased to function as 
groups i.e, that they had only come together for the planting demonstration 
(15, p, 66 ) . 
loar Collection 
The details of the machinery for loan collection have not yet 
been finalised. The collection of loans may be done through the farmer 
groups® Chiefs are to convene meetings to assess the groups' views on 
repayment. It has been decided officially that the chiefs will be responsible 
for collecting the money, and the question remains to what extent they 
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will use the farmer froups. All repayments are to he banked in an SRDP Tetu 
Revolving Fund Account. (l6, p.5). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Tetu Extension Pilot Project abides more closely with SRDP 
principles, particularly the principle of experimentation, than any other 
SRDP Project studied by the evaluation group. Considerable effort has gone 
into keeping the project consistent with SRDP principles, and the project 
has been reasonably successful in this respect. Credit for this must be given 
both to the Government officials who were instrumental in the planning 
and implementation of the project and to the IDS researchers who played 
a considerable role in getting the SRDP principles understood. We have 
cited one instance in which a Provincial officer objected to the proposal 
to supply inputs free of charge on the grounds that it was not in keeping 
with the SRDP principle of replication. The university researchers were not 
always the ones to ensure that the project developed in keeping with the 
principles of SRDP. 
There has been less conscious effort to ensure that the Extension 
Project retains its connection with ultimate objectives all the time. 
It has been assumed that progressiveness is closely related to income and that 
an increase in progressiveness (adoption of more innovations) will lead to an 
increase in income. The objective of increasing income has tended to be 
overshadowed by increasing progressiveness. It is important that the 
connection be established. It is not self-evident that a higher progessiveness 
score is associated with a higher income. There are many examples that could 
be quoted where this obviously is not the case, e.g. a farmer who is encouraged 
to diversify too much, getting a lower income as a result; off-farm income 
playing an important role; and so on= We strongly recommend that the objective 
of increasing income be retained in all discussions of the Tetu Project so 
that alternatives are discussed with income as well as progressiveness in 
mind. We also recommend that the link between income and progressiveness be 
investigated, perhaps as part of the final evaluation of the current phase 
of the experiment (See Section II). 
The strategy so far implemented as the Tetu Extension Project 
has undergone a process of continuousmodification not only in the planning 
but also in the implementation stage. It is of interest to note that some 
novel features emerged in response to implementation problems solved by 
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local officials closest to the conditions in the field® The collapsing 
of a one-week course into a course lasting 3 days. the decision to concentrate 
on a single enterprise in the course - hybrid maize; the last minute decision 
to supply inputs on credit rather than free; the decision to encourage farmers 
to form groups so that follow-up work was manageable; the decision to opt 
for a simpler selection process (even though the particular one chosen 
did not work very well); are all examples of innovative changes brought about 
by the existence of implementation problems, These changes all appear to 
be in keeping with SEDP principles and none involves a modification of the 
project out of keeping with its objectives® Other modifications, however, 
have had negative effects,. The selection process substituted for that 
initially proposed did not work and the selection criteria substituted for 
the progressiveness score had a different meaning. Both of these attempts 
to simplify execution of the plan in the field did not succeed in reaching 
their desired goal so that other methods will have to be tried. The single 
full treatment has not been accompanied by different combinations of 
treatments to compare different components; it is hoped that this will occur 
Put 
soon .in subsequent treatments® / the Tetu experience suggests that 
continuous modification can make a positive contribution provided that 
those involved fully understand the principles and objectives of SEDP* 
This runs counter to the Vihiga experience in which modifications 
nearly all substantially altered the objectives of the project and violated 
the SEDP principles, because neither the principles nor the objectives 
were sufficiently well understood by those involved in the modifications® 
(For further information on the Vihiga experience, see Appendix P)s 
The evolution of the strategy in the Tetu Extension Project 
brings out the possibilities of a successful dialogue between outside 
personnel (the IDS researchers) and Government officials at the local level® 
It is interesting to note that the outside researchers involved in this 
case were not resident in Tetu, and do not appear to have dominated the local 
officials in the way that those in some other SEDP areas have done® There 
has been a meaningful dialogue with positive contributions coming from 
both sides throughout. This appears to have been an important factor 
in ensuring the awareness of SEDP principles and objectives that is evident 
among officials in Tetu, It has also been an important factor in ensuring 
that the researchers' ideas are modified and corrected where local 
conditions and opinions warrant it. 
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It appears to us that the critical questions that remain ii 
relation to the strategy that evolved regard replicability,and xperimentatici-.. 
We deal with the experimentation issues in the next section. Here we 
consider replicability„ The question of replicability centers on the free 
ETC courses, and the ability to work out a successful credit repayment 
scheme (neither of which may be such important aspects of the strategy 
anyway), the ETC curriculum development, and the involvement of the 
JAA® s. Particularly Important are (a) the curriculum development: could 
it be repeated in the absence of IDS researchers or other supplementary 
personnel? and (b) the involvement of the JAA'ss could they be sufficiently 
involved in every course to ensure adequate follow-up? And at what 
opportunity cost to other projects in Tetu? 
There is also the question of emphasis on a single factor: 
extensions We do not doubt that extension is one of the important and 
hitherto neglected factors critical to Tetu's development. What does 
concern us, however, is the possibility that other factors such as technical 
research, economic research, market opportunities, and so on, might get 
neglected in the enthusiasm over extension on its own0 We urge that 
extension not be allowed to exclude everything else from the main development 
effort. 
Finally, there are problems associated with the fact that 
implementation has only just started. The overall strategy is broad, but 
at present that part of it that has been implemented might be subjected to 
the criticism that it concentrates on one group of 217 farmers and on 
one enterprise only. Provided the rest of the overall strategy is 
implemented; more enterprises are added and, other groups of farmers 
included, these criticisms will fall awaye Only if the project stops 
at this point will these criticisms stand. 
Some successful aspects of the project appear evident at this 
stage. The experiment has so far shown that attendance at the FTC course 
«sa,pared favourably with normal attendance figures. It is difficult, 
though, to identify the exact causes(s) of this0 In addition, the 
recruitment of persons from the same sub-location is a great improvement 
over recruitment at district level because courses can be oriented to 
specific problems at the sub-locational level and because farmers know 
each other and can re- iaforce each other in new practices, formally 
or informally, when back in their home area. Other positive 
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contributions of the experiment have been to advance the ideas of (a) 
courses geared for specific progressiveness levels, (b) courses for 
homogeneous groups, (c) courses for farmers not usually reached by PTC, 
(d) to have follow-up closely associated with the course and (e) to have 
groups of farmers to economise on extension burden and enforce the value 
of PTC teaching. 
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THE EXPERIMENTAL COMPONENT OB' THE PROJECT 
The strong experimental component of the Tetu Extension Pilot 
Project singles it out from other SRDP projects® No other SRDP project has 
been so consciously designed for experimental purposes,, In no other SRDP 
projects has the experimental component been maintained to such an extent in 
the process of iaiplementa-Sdft, Indeed it was the hope of the researchers 
involved, "that the proposed pilot project functions as a proto-type which 
demonstrates the usefulness of carefully executed "test projects" aimed at 
increasing the impact of government policy" (4, po15)o It is for the same 
sort of reasons that we consider the experimental aspects of this project to 
be of particular interest in our evaluation 
The Tetu extension experiment is far from complete® Only a small 
part of the proposed experimental treatment has so far been administered® 
Por the treatment that has been administered, starting in June 1972, it is 
too early to evaluate the results® But some monitoring of the immediate 
effects has been carried out, and this, together with the experience that has 
been accumulated in the process of bringing the experiment to this stage, 
provides us with many useful lessons that can be applied elsewhere® The 
experiment has already demonstrated much of wider relevance although it is 
still incompletes 
the experimental pfocegff in Tetu involves the following 
ste^ Sf*-* 
(i) the collection of "before treatment" or 
"baseline" information on variables which 
might be used as criteria for the success or 
failure of the experiment; 
(ii) the application of a treatment or 
set of treatments designed to influence 
chosen variables; 
(iii) the collection and interpretation of results 
the application of the treatment(s) to see 
how much the treatment(s) have influenced the., 
chosen variables® 
As we have shorn in describing the evolution of the Tetu strategy 
(see Section i), the researchers designing the experiment started with 
the proposal for an "intensive extension effort" contained in the Outline 
Programme® This, together with the researchers® own bias towards communication 
science, determined the focus of the experiments Thuss 
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"The research was slanted to the primary area of speciality 
of the researchers; namely, communication science with 
particular emphasis upon extension methods of diffusing innovative 
income generating ideas and practices within the small-farm 
sector". (4, p.15)o 
It was acknowledged that many other factors also play an important part 
in influencing the diffusion of innovations, but for the purposes of 
the Tetu extension experiment it was decided to focus on improving the 
communications system. 
Thus, the variable that was chosen for influence by the 
treatment, and as a measure of the success or failure of the treatment(s), 
was adoption of innovations. It was argued (in relation to the 
classification of farmers on a socio-economic continuum) that adoption 
of innovations was a reasonable alternative to income which was much 
more difficult to measure (2, ps8)e 
The hypothesis for testing was that the provision of an improved 
system of communication would have a positive influence on the adoption of 
innovations, and more specifically that the provision of carefully designed 
ETC courses, follow-up attention by extension staff, and the provision of 
supplies would influence the adoption of innovations positively„ 
The experiment was originally designed not only to prove the hypothesis true 
or false, but also to separate out the different elements in the package 
and to obtain some quantitative estimates of their relative influences 
(4). Insufficient attention was paid to the link between adoption and 
income. Implicit in the experiment was the assumption that adoption 
could be used as an indicator of success because it led to increased 
incomeo But this needs testing also. We strongly recommend investigation 
of this relationship as part of the final evaluation. 
THE COLLECTION OP BASELIKE INFORMATION 
The baseline survey which was used as a basis for designing the 
Tetu strategy, was also used to collect the "before treatment" information 
on the key variables. The information collected included the information 
necessary to obtain an "adoption of innovations index", information which 
was used to test the validity of the index by seeing how it correlated 
with other socio-economic variables, and information useful in designing 
the basic strategy. 
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The random sample was selected using as a sample frame 
the Land Registration files, which contain a list of all farms registered 
in the Division*, The files show that there are between 12 and 13 thousand 
farms registered in Tetu Divisionc They exclude landless people living in 
villages in Tetu; there are some cases of registered holdings that have been 
sub-divided without changing the records in the register; and there are 
other cases in which one owner has several farms registered separately® 
It was decided to oversaiiiple, initially selecting 380 farms to obtain a 
sample of at least 350 farms after allowing for normal attrition. The 
sampling procedure involved selecting every farm on the Land Register, taking 
a randomly selected farm as a starting point. The sample from which 
information was gathered contained 354- farms, most of the attrition being 
attributed by the researchers to the registration of more than one farm per 
farmer. Where this occurred, the farms were amalgamated into one unit for 
the purposes of the surveya Interview schedules were administered on the 
354 farms by four specially chosen agricultural assistants who had received 
instruction in interviewing techniques, the administration of the particular 
questionnaire that was to be used, and the theoretical concepts underlying 
the questions. The researchers reported; 
"The quality of returned interviews was extremely high with hardly 
any incidence of missing data. We attribute this excellent return 
to the fact that the four interviewers became ego-involved in the 
study to the extent where gathering accurate information 
became more important than getting the jobs done quickly." 
Innovation is defined in diffusion literature as 
"the extent to which an individual is relatively 
earlier in adopting new ideas than the other members 
of his social system"(Eojers, 1962, quoted in 2, p»9). 
In the Tetu experiment the term "progressiveness" was substituted 
for "innovativeness" as more consistent with Kenya usage. The degree of 
progressiveness was defined in the Tetu experiment by the number of years 
since first adoption of; 
(2, ppe 13-14) 
THE "ADOPTION OP HTNOYATIONS" INDE7 




5. certified potatoes 
6. ms .damia nuts 
7* grade cows 
8. pigs 
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The particular innovations included in the index were chosen after 
extensive consultations with Ministry of Agriculture field staff, 
(15, p«12)» The progressiveness scores of fanners were obtained as 
follows; 
"Each farmer was asked how long he had been engaging 
in each of these eight practices and his progressiveness 
score is acquired by summing across all eight 
innovation:^ !1 (2, p„15). 
Farmers were then ranked according to their progressiveness scores 
and this list was used to classify them into four categories. The 65 
farmers with scores of zero were classified in the lowest category, labelled 
"laggards"» The othexswere classified into three more groups, (an arbitrary 
decision: it could have been 2, 4 or some other number), to get two either 
side of the mean.* Farmers with scores between 1 and 9 were classified as 
"lower middle progressives". This group contained 102 farmers. The 97 
farmers with progressiveness scores between 10 and 19 were placed in the 
"upper middle progressive" group, and farmers with total scores ranging from 
20 to 74, a group of 94 farmers, were classified as "most progressive" 
(4, Appendix 1)« 
There are problems with the progressiveness index, most of which 
are acknowledged by the researchers involved but not subsequently taken care 
of in the design and use of the index. The researchers mention the fact that 
it is heavily influenced fcy the relative weight of the innovations available 
early (particularly coffee' and grade cattle in Tetu); the fact that it does 
not take into account the size of the enterprises; and the fact that 
"all new ideas and practices" (? all products) get equal weight (4, Appendix 
1), One might well want to discount some of the innovations available early, 
An old man who started growing coffee 25 years ago would classify as 
"most progressive" even though he had done nothing since. And although the 
researchers dismiss such cases saying their index will always result in some 
mis-classifications,it is felt that there may indeed be quite a strong bias 
for this reason. Similarly, there are different reasons for attaching 
different weights to different innovations - some may represent more 
radical departures from the past, seme may represent more single innovations 
in terms of husbandry, and so on. 
* The principle of classification used was to minimise the variance within 
each group and to maximise the variance between groups (4, Appendix 1), 
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The researchers pay some attention to environmental conditions: 
the fact that In some ecological zones some innovations are Inapplicable. 
This has been investigated further as reported in (10) and in (6, 14 and 
15)o The further work shows that the index is much stronger if disaggregated 
by ecological zones0 The aggregated index that ignores environmental 
differences is still being used, but perhaps there will be a chance to 
control for ecological zones at a later stage 
A factor that is not explicitly mentioned is the influence of 
the age of the farmer? one would' expect the index to be influenced by the 
date when he started farming0 Younger farmers would have smaller chances 
of getting high scores and vice versa. Although the researchers did not s 
find a high degree of correlation between the index and age, this could 
still have biassed the index quite considerablya 
Finally, and as important as any is the economic position of the 
farmers his resource availabilities, land, labour, capital, skills, and 
his objectives. These determine his optimal farming pattern,and are likely to 
result in some of the innovations being uneconomic and thus inapplicable 
to hims This is likely to be the most significant pjrofcleia of all® The 
index results in high scores for farmers producing a wide range of 
products - *5iere£3 i^ he more astute farmers may do well to specialise. 
The ind,ex -avcurs farmers whose economic conditions are such that diversification 
is worth whileo 
• ;• /J**- • claim 
®ie researches that the index "works" i.ea, that it is closely 
correlated with other socio-economic variables that could also have been 
used as indicators of the socio-economic continuum: variables such as 
extension contact, mass media exposure, wealth and education*, Their 
conclusion is valid only to the extent that they have defined correctly the 
other indicators that could have been used to measure socio-economic levels, 
and to the extent that the correlations are statistically significant. 
Information is presented in a tabular form in (2) on the relationship 
between progressiveness and (a) acreage, (b) fragmentation, (c) water supply, 
(d) family and hired labour (c) extension contact of various kinds, 
(f) membership in local organisations, (g) mass media exposure, and 
(h) "cosmopoliteness" or geographical mobility0 However, there is no 
indication of the statistical significance of the correlations between 
the progressiveness index and these other variables, nor is there any 
discussion of what is meant by "the socio-economic continuum" that all 
of these indicators are supposed to measure. We feel that the particular 
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progressiveness index used In the Tetu Extension Project, which could 
have been considerably refined to take account of many of the problems 
mentioned, may not be identifying the farmers one would really want to 
call "progressive" „ 
THE TR'RATMMT 
The original intention of the researchers was to subject 
different groups of farmers to different treatments and to compare the 
results, Por each progressiveness category, 5 different groups of farmers were 
<r 
to undergo 5 different combinations of treatments so that the separate 
effects of the PTC course, the follow-up and the provision of inputs 
could be identified. Thus, for each progressiveness category, the 
following treatments were proposed (4, Appendix 2): 
1: PTC course + Follow-up + Supplies + Unplanned Inputs 
2; FTC course + Supplies + Unplanned Inputs 
3: Follow-Up + Supplies + Unplanned Inputs 
4: Supplies + Unplanned Inputs 
5: Unplanned Inputs 
This proposed list of treatments was later amended to: 
1: FTC + Follow-up 
2: Inputs on Credit 
3: FTC + Follow-up + Inputs on Credit 
4s Hone 
The only treatment that is being administered so far is the full 
combination of all three elements of the package, starting with the FTC 
courses in June 1972, The intention was to administer this treatment to 
one progressiveness group, but the implementation process chosen led to 
farmers being selected from every progressiveness category. 
April 1972, it was decided to start the experimental treatment 
by taking "below average farmers" in Upper Tetu for a short FTC course, 
follow-up from JAAs, and hybrid maize inputs for -§• acre on credit, The 
identification of below average farmers posed the first major problem. 
The original suggestion, which was to obtain scores on the progressiveness 
index for all farmers that might be eligible, had to be abandoned because 
there was insufficient time to do this® Instead it was decided to classify 
farmers according to simpler criteria: no hybrid maize and no grade cattle. 
(See section 1, p E-13 )• ^he selection process was undertaken by a 
committee consisting of the subchief of the location, the AA, AHA, JAA 
and JAHA, The committee used its pooled knowledge to decide which 25 farmers 
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were eligible according to the selection criteria0 The 25 farcers 
selected were either visited individually and asked if they were willing 
to attend the course, or called together in a group and asked. Those 
unwilling were replaced by other farmers selected by the committee as 
meeting the selection criteria, until 25 per sublocation had agreed to 
come to the course (15, 39, 56-57). 
The farmers participating in the first round of PTC courses 
totalled 217, in five consecutive courses,, Roughly 9 per cent of those 
originally asked refused to agree to come0 A further 8 per cent of those 
who agreed did not turn up„ This resulted in a total of 206 farmers, 
which was supplemented by 11 last minute replacements, making the final 
total of 217. All of these 217 are undergoing the full treatment; PTC 
course plus follow-up (not completed) plus inputs on credit. 
Each participant had a farm record card filled out for him. 
Prom the information thus gathered it was possible to determine how 
successful the selection procedure had been in identifying farmers satisfying 
the two selection criteria and in terms of the progressiveness index 0 It 
turned out that the procedure was not satisfactory in either respect: the 
selection committee either did not know enough about the farmers in their 
sublocations to make accurate selections (15, P«63), or did net think it 
sufficiently important to stick to those criteria. Of those selected, 68 
per cent had already adopted grade cattle (well above the Divisional average), 
and 15 per cent had adopted hybrid maize (which was below the Divisional 
average)„ The conclusion of the researchers was that a different selection 
procedure will have to be found (15, p.64)« 
The selection criteria chosen represented a departure from the 
original proposals in that they did not consist of total progressiveness 
scores£ Using information from the Parm Record Cards it was found that 
the progressiveness scores of the farmers participating in the experiment 




Host Progr. 48 26 
Upper Mid. 33 27 
Lower Hid. 14 29 
Laggards 5 18 
Total 100 100 
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Thus, in addition to being unsuccessful in obtaining fanners without 
hybrid maize or grade cattle, the selection process was also unsuccessful 
in obtaining below average farmers. The participants did emerge as having 
well below average contact with FTCs, however, so at least a different 
group of farmers from those normally recruited for PTC courses was reached. 
(15, p, 65). 
Given the difficulties involved in selecting farmers without 
bias, it may be necessary to go back to a large scale interviewing process, 
obtaining progressiveness scores for large numbers of farmers and selecting 
objectively. It is tempting to txy to avoid this and select in a simpler 
fashion and it may be possible to do this more successfully by ensuring 
compliance with criteria carefully specified, using a local selection 
process similar to that tried. 
The treatment was accepted by the farmers. There was considerable 
success in persuading farmers to come to the PTC course, despite the 
problems normally facing PTC recruitment® There were several reasons that 
could have accounted for the success; the course was short - 3 days; no 
fees were charged; free transport was provided; and special efforts 
went into the recruitment process. According to the researchers; 
"... we cannot say exactly whether the success was 
due to the free courses, to the transport, to the 
method of recruitment or to the interaction of 
all three * Pield Officers, including the PTO 
(Provincial Training Officer), feel that the 
success is due especially to the free courses." 
(15. p. 57). 
Ho attempt has been made to disentangle the separate effects in this 
case. The researchers were probably right in deciding that it was not 
worth setting up a specific experiment designed to separate these factors, 
although it would be useful to know how important were the PTC fees. 
It might be possible to check on this in a less rigorous fashion, through 
careful interviews in Tetu. 
After the PTC course, follow-up procedures were initiated. There 
is evidence suggesting that all participants were reached in the planting 
demonstrations that constituted the first part of the follow-up. The 
offer of input supplies for acre of hybrid maize on credit was taken 
up by every participant except one. Thus, the feasibility of the treatment 
was demonstrated in the sense that it was acceptable to all farmers 
involved once they had turned up at the PTC. The only significant drop-outs 
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were those who were not willing to come to the ETC, and this was only 
about 10 per cent® 
THE PAY-OPE; MONITORING- M P INTERPEETBIG THE RESULTS 
A full evaluation of the results of the treatment has not yet been 
undertaken, partly because it is still too early to judge the treatment's 
results. It will be possible to compare the group of farmers (from mixed 
progressiveness categories) that has been to the PTC course, had the 
follow-up, and accepted the inputs on credit with a control group of farmers 
that has not had any of these treatments0 But, it will not be possible 
to separate out the effects of the different elements of the package, 
without administering further combinations of treatments® The fact that 
the treatment has been applied to a mixture of farmers with different 
progressiveness scores is not a serious departure from the original 
experimental design as it will still be possible to analyse the result for 
each group separately during the comparison. The 48 per cent who turned out 
to be "Most progressives" can be compared with a control group consisting 
entirely of "Most Progressives" and so on/ 
Having gone this far, it would be a great pity not to do the 
final evaluation, and although there has been no clear mention of plans to 
undertake it, we strongly recommend that it be undertaken starting soon to 
get the immediate results of this planting season. In the evaluation we 
recommend that consideration be given to measuring variables other than 
adoption - particularly to the income question - and that care be taken in 
not talcing the results from too short a time - period® A careful evaluation 
will be extremely valuable in demonstrating the value of the experiment itself, 
whatever is discovered about the degree of success of the particular 
treatment 9 Having gone this far-we strongly recommend that the evaluation and 
be undertaken/that it be undertaken carefully to obtain the full value 
from the experiment 0 
What has been completed is a very quick monitoring of 
immediate results that took place in August, 19729 One of the University 
researchers spent one week interviewing 47 of the 217 farmers subjected to 
treatment® Care was taken to interview only one farmer in each of the 
faimer groups formed at the PTC® Information was gathered on the farmer him-
self and from him on the other members of his group, so that a large 
proportion of the farmers was covered in some degree® 
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According to the 47 farmers, all farmers subjected to treatment 
had planted'the maize and applied the fertilizers, except for 
possibly one individual; the dubious case was visited by the university 
interviewer who established that that farmer had planted also. Some had 
made slight alterations to the instructions, and in same cases seed did not 
appear to have been properly treated by the seed company, and this had 
resulted in heavy losses due to pests. 
It appeared to the researcher that the farmers involved in the 
experiment had had considerable influence on neighbouring farmers. Thus, 
"Participants became well-known personalities in their 
sublocations, as the researchers discovered when 
they went to visit the participants. Many were 
asked to teach others." (15, P067) 
The 47 farmers interviewed claimed that an average of 5<7 non-participants 
had observed the planting demonstration for each of the 47 farmers visited by 
the researchers. The farmers interviewed also "claimed that a number of 
other (farmers), ranging between 4 and 27, had bought their own seed and 
fertiliser and adopted as a result of their influence. The average per 
farmer interviewed was 2.4 adopters........" ( 15 , p»67)» This evidence is 
also quoted by the researchers as suggesting that the supply of inputs on 
credit was not a very essential part of the treatment. One does not know how 
much the farmers interviewed were trying to exaggerate their own importance, 
nor does one know how much of this would have happand without the experimental 
treatment anyway9 But these sorts of effects will have to be measured in 
the final evaluation in which we would expect to find some positive evidence 
of this kind.. 
This evidence is certainly insufficient to constitute an evaluation, 
but it is quoted as some indication of the immediate effects and the way in 
which the treatment is proceeding. 
One cannot estimate the pay-off without some idea of 
costs„ The researchers attempted a cost benefit evaluation (8, pp 68-'70) 
but it was based on dubious data and the results must be interpreted 
accordingly. Further attempts to estimate costs and benefits should be 
undertaken as part of the final evaluation. We recommend consideration be 
given to this in deeiding the form the final evaluation should take. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Thus, considerable pains have been taken to inject an experimental 
component into the project, but much of that component has not yet 
materialised. Only one treatment - the full package consisting of PTC 
Training, Follow-up, and Inputs on Credit - has been undertaken. It 
will be possible to compare the farmers receiving the treatment with a 
control group of farmers that has not had any of these treatments. But, 
only through implementing the other treatments, thus separating out the 
various components, can the most effective and efficient treatment for 
accelerating the adoption process be identified. 
An evaluation of the degree of success of the treatments after 
they have been administered must be carried out. For the 217 farmers who 
underwent the first treatment it is important to start the evaluation 
as soon as possible after the end of this growing season. 
There is no doubt that a great deal has been learned up to now 
from the Tetu experience, which has been very honestly reported by those 
researchers involved. It is hoped that the experience in Tetu will make 
it easier to conduct future experiments. With the Extension Pilot Project 
having set a precedent future-experiments should not be 
so difficult or so costly to carry out. The final proof of the experiment, 
however, can only -come after the final evaluation is complete. It is 
hoped that the experiment will then be proved to have been worthwhile. 
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THE SPEGIA1 4-K CLUB PROJECT III TETU SRDP* 
The Special 4-K Club Project in Tetu exemplifies the need for 
co-ordination of different projects within an SEDP area in an overall plan, 
The 4-K project plan at present overlaps with more direct approaches to 
the same objective being undertaken through another project in Tetu SHDP, 
Strangely enough, the original objectives were not similar to the 
Extension Pilot Project, and it is only through a series of expedient 
decisions that the present superfluity of the 4-K project has come about, 
BACKGROUND 
When the national 4-K movement was launched in 1963, Tetu 
Division registered 23 clubs* Further growth was slow, though, thus 
mirroring the national situation. In 1969 with 39 clubs registered in 
Tetu Division as part of the Special 4-K Project, a new recruitment 
effort was aimed at bringing in 1,000 more members during 1969/70e 
When implementation of the main project began in 1971/72 there were 58 
clubs with about 1,800 registered members0 The baseline survey in 
December 1970 (2) showed that only about 1C$ of the families included a 
4-K member; of these, 54$ (19) were from the "Most Progressive" families, 
26% (9) from the "Upper Middle", 17$ (6) from the "Lower Middle", and % (l) 
from the "Laggards" s Mr. Wamugi discovered that some, of the members were 
over age (above 23) and that these were generally more successful, 
i,e. gained most monetarily from their projects in 4-K. 
PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The 4-K Project description (North Tetu Rural Development 
Project - 1970-1976s 4-K Clubs Programme, 1969) stated the project objective 
as follows? 
(a) To interest the youth in production of high 
protein foods, as well as storage, food 
conservation and preparation of nutritious 
diets, 
(b) Practically involve the youth in rational 
production of nutritious food crops for the 
home use and for marketing. 
* This report is based partially on research done 
by J.K. Wamngi under the direction of Dr. N® Holing. 
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(c) Involve youth co-operative groups, hence, make 
them have experience and the benefit of mutual 
and co-operative effort and participate in 
Income producing activities, this will help to 
reduce the problem of unemployed school leavers. 
(d) Involve the youth in family and society development, 
(e) To strengthen the training effort of the personnel 
available in the Ministry of Agriculuture. 
(f) To prepare the youth to be complete and useful 
members of the society through national and 
practical leadership training 
(g) To prepare the youth to take the role of 
leadership in the future and become knowledgeable 
men and women in their developing society, (p.3) 
The attention to youth was also justified later in the 
paper on the grounds "that youth influence the adult in causing change 
especially where adults are adamant of throwing away the traditional 
methods". Thus the indirect influencing of adults to change may be 
taken as yet another objective, The list of objectives is long and 
not necessary achieveable by a single project. Hone of the objectives 
except the last implicit one have been included in the implemented 
plans High-protein food gave way to hybrid maize, co-operative plots to 
'"pllais^ o^lr" cooperative marketing were substituted by appeals to the 
parents to help the children sell their cropland the objective to 
involve unemployed school leavers was replaced by inclusion of primary 
school students. One of the decisions leading to the alteration in crop 
choice is found in the 1969 project description; they would grow beans 
and hybrid maize, which does well in rotation with beans and which is 
more amenable to group marketihgbecause local demand is high. The move 
to individual plots instead of the usual group plot near the school 
was probably intended to increase the demonstration effect for parents. 
And, since 4-K Clubs have always found it difficult to recruit or keep 
school leavers, it was probably more expedient to focus on primary 
school students, 
THE PROJECT PLAN 
The Special 4-K Project was set up to give loans for, and 
training in, hybrid maize cultivation to 4-K members. The original 
criteria for selection of participants were age (15-18 years old), 
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access to land (a| - acre plot), "dependability" (active participation 
In 4-K over the last 3 years), and "willingness and competence" (as judged 
by extension staff in charge of the local 4-K)* These criteria were substantially 
modified? most Tetu children in that age range were in secondary school 
(which have "Young Farmers" Clubs" instead) so the majority of participants 
were 10-14, and members who had remained in 4-K for 3 years were few® The 
acreage requirement remained, and there was a strong bias towards selection 
of longer-term members, 15 clubs with 300 members were given training and 
loans in 1971/72, and 1,000 members are to be trained by 1974s It was assumed 
that the member's would continue to plant their half-acres with hybrid maize 
(without repetition of the loan) so that one result of the project would be 
500 more acres of hybrid maize grown in the Division by 1974® 
Training is done in a 4-week course at Wambugu ETC, Faced with time 
constraints, the 4-K planners considered 2-week courses, but decided they 
would be insufficient® The loan (from TJ17ICEF) given to each participant is 
for one season only, and is provided in the form of materials - 5 kg,, hybrid 
maize seed, 50 kg9 fertilizer, 2 kg. insecticide, and a jembe and a panga 
(the latter hardly seem necessary), Repayment is to be in cash and after harvest. 
In March 1972, 125 out of the first 300 to receive a loan had repaid it® 
An unknown number of crops had failed, partially accounting for the low 
repayment ratee In addition, a change in the plan for marketing the maize made 
repayment less likely. The original plan for group marketing organised by the 
agricultural staff had been dropped. Instead, parents were supposed either 
to buy their children's crop or to help them sell it® 
The training and loanwere supplemented by additional extension 
attention by JAA®s connected with 4-Ks Special 4-K staffing has already been 
extended to each location but the location&l officers do not have 
transport and the JAA'' s complain that their 4-K and regular duties compete 
greatly for time, 
EVAT.TTATION OF THE PROJECT 
The project strategy appears to have needed more careful designing. 
Examination of the Tetu Baseline Survey data shows that of the 35 family 
with 4-K members interviewed, 21 (60$ of twice the Divisional average) had 
planted some of their acreage to hybrid maize that year (1970). Of these 
21, 18 were spacing the hybrid correctly, all were using chemical fertilizer 
on it, and 14 were using insecticide. It is apparent that the project resources 
are being, expended on children from families which already use the practices 
it is intended to teach them* This trend is accentuated by the half-acre 
land requirement, which children of poorer and less progressive parents 
cannot meets 
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But is this the best way to reach the objective of dissemination 
of improved faming methods? Considering the total Tetu SBDP programme, 
we find that a second project - the Tetu Extension Pilot Project - is going 
on simultaneously, which is providing the same resources more directly to 
the adult faimers and getting at least as good results e Only 15% of the 
participants in the Tetu Extension Project had grown hybrid before, and it 
is probable that future selection procedures will succeed in choosing 
only those who have never grown hybrid maize. Three days are spent in 
training at Wambugu PTC for each group of 50 farmers, and they are grouped 
for easy follow-up by the JAA so extra demands on his time are minimal , 
Assuming that some of these factors - selection of participants, 
training time, etc - could be worked out, the 4-K project should still not 
be running simultaneously, in the same area, with the Extension Project. 
Since both aim primarily at the same immediate objective - increased hybrid 
maize cultivation - it would be extremely difficult to separate out the 
effects of one project from those of the other, if both function successfully« 
The two projects should be tested in sites far enough removed from each 
other so that the expected diffusion effect would not be exerted on the 
same neighbours. 
The experience gained in 4K Club may be a positive influence on 
youths in regard to their attitude towards farming. The particular husbandly 
practice being learned, as in the case of most any practice, will probably 
be widespread by the time these youths are old enough to have their own faim. 
It is the experience and attitude acquired which are important for the school 
children. But, school children from Tetu Division, especially if from progressive 
families, are likely to stay in school until 18-20 years of age; thus 6 to 10 
years will pass between this demonstration of methods and benefits of farming 
and a choice for or against an agricultural career. The degree of success 
in imparting a pro-agricultural and pro-modern attitude to the participants 




Extension Project Strategy 
1 s Give the degree of continuous modification that occurs during the process 
of implementation as well as planning, we recommend that continued 
efforts be made to ensure that those involved are fully aware of the 
significance of SEDP principles and objectives, so that these are 
adhered to through-out the process of strategy development„ 
20 We recommend that further topics for PTC courses be selected with care. 
In the selection of enterprises particular attention should be paid to 
the relative profitabilities of the different alternatives for the 
group of farmers concerned,, Serious consideration should also be 
given to the question of whether to offer sir gLe enterprise or multiple 
enterprise courses, the latter probably being more suitable for the more 
progressive farmers0 
3o We recommend that the selection criteria used to obtain homogeneous 
groups of farmers for PTC courses be refined,. It may be necessary 
to use total progressiveness scores in the end, but efforts should be 
made to find indicators that act as efficient substitutes for these. 
4. We recommend modifications in the selection procedure for obtaining 
homogeneous farmer groups. Farmers satisfying the selection criteria 
need to be identified, and then a number from among those satisfying 
the criteria needs to be chosen. The procedure used in Tetu proved 
inadequate to obtain farmers satisfying the selection criteria, and 
no provision was made to select systematically from those who satisfied 
the criteriao 
5. We recommend that more consideration be given to the question of ensuring 
effective follow-up on the part of the JAA5s in future courses. Once 
the JAA® s stop attending the PTC courses with their clients, and as 
the follow-up process becomes a matter of normal routine, it may not 
be sufficient to leave it to take its own course. There may be a need 
for some further action to ensure that follow-up is taken seriously. 
The Experiment 
60 We strongly recommend that the final evaluation of the experimental 
treatment so far applied be carried out. This is necessary to decide 
whether or not the experimentation has been worth while. 
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The success of the experiment needs to he distinguished from the success 
of the experimental treatment® If the results of the experiment simply 
confirm the general expectation that the strategy has a positive impact 
on the rate of adoption of hybrid maize, then the experiment itself 
will not have contributed very much® If, on the other hand, the results 
are unexpected, the experiment will have made a positive contribution® 
If the results show that the whole treatment has had very little impact, 
the experiment will have been valuable in showing that a strategy that 
— ; 
was thought to have a strong likelihood of success did not work after 
all, should be dropped, and something different tried® The experiment 
will have had a very positive value, although the treatment has not. 
If the results show that the treatment has had an impact very different 
from the one expected, or that components of the treatment which were 
thought to be marginal turned out to be crucial, this will also be 
valuable® The experiment will have made a positive contribution. 
The success or failure of the experiment, as opposed to the success 
or failure of the treatment, depends on the extent to which it produces 
unexpected results® 
7® In the evaluation of the results of the treatment, we recommend that 
the following points be covered* 
a) The group that received the PTC training, follow-up 
and inputs of credit should be compared with a control 
group from outside the diffusion area to avoid the 
possibility of the control group farmers being influenced 
by the treatment through the diffusion process® 
b) In the evaluation, the results from farmers from different 
progressiveness levels should be analysed separately® 
The treatment was designed specifically for below average 
farmers® If it had relatively little impact on above 
average farmers this is hardly a failing as far as the 
treatment is concerned® Indeed it would be of some concern 
if the treatment designed for below average farmers proved 
to be most successful for the very progressive® 
c) The evaluation should start soon to get the results of 
the current season, but it should also cover longer-term 
effects® Some farmers might discontinue hybrid maize 
and revert to their previous practices once the 
immediate impact of the treatment has worn off® It would 
be important to include this in the evaluation. 
d) The evaluation should include a careful assessment of 
the diffusion effects of the treatment, and not confine 
itself to the direct effect on farmers participating® 
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e) Part of theevaluation should include an investigation 
of the relationship between "progressiveness" and income® 
The success or failure of the experimental treatment 
should be judged in terms of income as well as progressive-
ness* It is also important to determine whether progressiveness 
is a suitable variable to operate on if income increases are 
the ultimate objective. 
f) The evaluation should cover the rate of loan repayment, 
and an overall assessment of the success of the credit scheme® 
g) The evaluation should include an estimate of costs, and 
a comparison of costs with benefits® 
8® Pending the results of the final evaluation of the first treatment, 
we recommend that other combinations of treatments be administered so 
that the separate effects of the different components can be estimated® 
It is of considerable interest to know whether the PTC course plus follow-up 
is sufficient, or whether the inputs on credit make all the difference, 
for example® When the evaluation has been completed, it will be possible 
to decide how worthwhile ...the experimentation is, and whether it should be 
continued or expanded to include other progressiveness categories 
(for whom other PTC courses and follow-up will have to be designed) 
and more treatments for the progressiveness category already treated in 
the first phase of the experiment. 
The 4K Club Project 
9 , It is felt that 4K could fill a vital need of rural Kenyan youth, and 
experimentation within its structure is a valid SEDP concern® However, 
the present hybrid maize emphasis for the 4K project and the strategy being 
used does not appear to be the most viable® Thus it is recommended that 
a return be made to the original objectives (especially the less vague 
(a) through (c)) and strategies be devised based on the characteristics 
of the 4K constituency (young, of progressive families, and those with 
little present access to land, etc®), and that these strategies be 
subjected to close scrutiny and testing in an SEDP area® 
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OOTLME. 
The purpose of this brief introduction is to outline the structure 
of this evaluation of the Vihiga Maize Package8 and summarise its principal 
findings and recommendations.-- • 
The initial review of the resource endowment of Vihiga (Section Xl) 
shows that in spite of efforts to collect useful information, misinterpretations 
regarding the relative abundance ofr,labour,, and the uniformity of conditions 
in Vihiga were permitted to materially influence the design of the project«. 
This error may be attributed in part to inadequacies of the baseline survey, 
and also to material contained in earlier studies having been overlookedo 
The Section concludes that attention should be paid to experimenting with 
strategies which will increase returns to labour as well as to land, and 
that the diversity of farm types in Vihiga should be given explicit recognition 
through the inclusion of a variety of strategies in the Vihiga Programme„ 
Section III outlines the way in which the Maize Package emerged in 
Its present form out of the early formulations of the Vihiga Programme. In 
particular it examines the influential role of the donor, US AID, in creating 
an implementable project involving the provision of tied credit to smallholders, 
backed up by intensive extension supervision, and directed at the objective of 
self-sufficiency in maize production. It shows that during this process the 
actual target of the project as implemented (giving assistance to a select 
group of producers) became divorced from its original objective (giving 
assistance to all types of producer). 
Section IV and V form the core of the report, the former containing 
an evaluation of the content and direction of the production programme, the 
latter containing an examination of the attitudes towards the marketing infra-
structure and the proposed changes in marketing. Section IV commences -with 
an examination of the objectives of the project, concluding that? 
(1) the target of self-sufficiency in maize production had not 
emerged from serious consideration of its possible economic 
benefit to the area? 
(2) the detailed work necessary to show how self-sufficiency 
could be attained economically was not carried out, even 
although the design of the project depended on this. 
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(3) the relationship between increased hybrid maize production 
and the desired increase in incomes (an early formulation 
of the objective of the project) was not specifieds nor 
was improvement in incomes made a criterion for evaluation 
of the scheme. 
The appropriateness of encouraging a single crop for Vihiga is also 
questioned as well as the narrow concentration on tied credit as the appropriate 
strategy3 in view of the nature of the resource endowment and the difficulties 
of reaching those who were supposed to be the target of the project. It is also 
pointed out that the success of the project in terms of increased maize production presently 
is questionablej and that the project/does not constitute a model capable of 
replication at the national level. 
The argument of Section V has two principal strands; firstly, the 
mechanism of implementation of the credit scheme as it presently stands dis-
regards the commercial principles of entrepreneurs involved in supplying inputs, 
who are obliged to participate in the scheme; secondly, the further intention of 
replacing existing intermediaries with a system of co-operatives which would also 
administer the provision of credit betrays a disregard for- the present and 
potential contribution Of these and Other intermediaries in the inputs and maize 
markets in Vihiga. 
Section VI concludes the report® It contains the principal recommendations 
emanating from the earlier sections. The most important of these is that before 
the project is extended to more producers it should be radically modified in order 
to ensure that it becomes consistent with the.principles and objectives of SEDP. 
Diversification of the programme is advocated, together with more careful speci-
fication of the objectives of particular projects. Recommendations in favour of 
taking a longer view of the development of projects, introducing a continuous 
evaluation procedure (to guard against modifications creeping into the project 
and defeating its purpose, amongst others), and ensuring that, where appropriate, 
liaison is maintained with technical specialists, complete the list. 
It should be pointed out that this evaluation exercise has not covered 
fully the agricultural extension service provided to the recipients of credit 
in Vihiga. It was felt that its inclusion would necessitate a very different 
approach than the present one which rests on already available documentary 
evidence. 
THE VIHIGA RESOURCE EtTDKrilSITT 
The resource endowment of Vihiga has been chosen as the starting-
point in order to show the kind of information which was available for planning 
purposes, and to show that this information supports two conflicting inter-
pretations of its significance for project design, 
Vihiga is typical of Kenya8 s rural areas in having limited and 
fragmentary information on the resource enlevement® Indeed, it has several 
advantages over some of the other SRDP areas in this respect, in that a base-
line-survey -the 600-famer survey (l) - exists« This is undoubtedly a valuable 
source of information, although it opts for a wide coverage of many aspects 
of the agricultural and social environment, rather than a more penetrating 
analysis of a narrow range of topics0 Many of the economic data are missing, 
and others can only be inferred. Numerous other sources, such as the Outline 
Programme (2), contain impressionistic summaries of the Vihiga resource 
endowmente Inconsistencies emerge when the various sources are compared. 
Some of the detailed information that was available in earlier planning 
documents appears to have been overlooked at the later planning stages. 
A single comprehensive summary would have been very useful at the outset, in 
advance of SRDP plannings 
Resource Endowments 
The resource endowment has a, number of dimensions; the human population, 
the climate/land complex, the capital stock, location, and the institutional 
^gnomic structure within which these factors interacts 
Papulation - The most frequently emphasised population characteristics 
of the Division are the high population density and the distorted sex and age 
composition of the population resulting from the high rate of adult male out-
migration from the Division,- The population density is estimated at 2*18 
persons per acre (5s58 per hectare) (3, Table lg p¥6?); a slightly higher 
figure may be inferred from the survey data on family size (l, Table 5 and 6). 
Estimates of the incidence of adult male outmigration vary; it has: been estimated 
that 65 per cent of all adult males are absent (2, p3lj no source quoted)c 
However, if it is assumed that Vihiga would otherwise have the same 
sex composition and adult/child balance as the Republic as a whole, and If 
female children in Vihiga are used as the base of the calculation as they axe 
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the least likely to be involved in any outmigration, the figure comes closer 
to 30 per cent» The survey data show that 36 per cent of the farm heads 
(persons with farm decision-making powers) were absent during the survey 
(1, Table 1), which supports the lower figure. 
The Climate/hand Complex » The Division is described as being of 
"reasonably high potential" (2,p„,le This assertion is not substantiated)c 
Apparently no rigorous evaluation of the agricultural potential of the Division 
has been made* The rainfall of 65 inches (1651 mrmo) per year (2,ptl) is said 
to be well distributed throughout the year, but averages over the last 5 years 
show a range of 61 to 84 inches (1549 to 2034 m«m») per year according to 
location within the division (2, ps6l), Variability (12 per cent over the last 
five years) and reliability are rarely mentioned, although these are generally 
important factors in the agricultural environmento The farms have been described 
as hilly and rocky (5, pd)® The survey results show that an average of less 
than 3 per oent (a negligible amount) is "too rocky, too steep, too wet, too 
acid" (1, Table 17) o It may be presumed that while only a small proportion 
comes into this extreme category, variations in the physical condition of the 
greater part influence productivity» Soils vary considerably, as the following 
quotations suggests 
"Volcanic soils are potentially rich but exhausted c-./fag 
heavy use without fertiliser,,,«.,,,,,,«,au (25, pt2)> 
"The natural potential,<,.«••»•«.»<>•*.,,o,9 varies considerably 
in soil fertility. There is a great difference between 
volcanically-derived s o i l s e - a n d the older granite-
derived soils, * ..»....»o,.Unfortunately some of the highest 
population densities border on the less fertile soils; since 
they are also the oldest settled areas, the soil fertility 
has been depleted .coo" (26, pp, 1, 2)„ 
Farms in Vihiga are smalls 39 per cent are less than two acres 
(0®81 hectare); 83 per cent less than 5 acres (2,02 hectares); and only 5 per 
cent are over 9 acres (3c63 hectares)*® A high proportion of the smaller farms 
is probably on the poorer soils since the process of fragmentation is likely to 
have gone further in the older settled areas referred to above. The size 
distribution of farms has considerable significance as will be clear from the 
discussion belows 
+ In the Republic as a whole, female children constitute 24.-8 per cent of the 
population, and adult males 24o4 per cent® If it is assumed that the actual 
number of female children in Vihiga (82760) would amount to the same percentage 
if no out-migration had taken place, then the inferred number of adult males 
would be 81425o The actual number of adult males in Vihiga is 57460 or 70,6 
per cent of the inferred number, implying a 29,4 per cent "shortage" due to 
outmigration,, 
* The 600-faimer survey was conducted in acres, not hectares0 
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The Capital Stock - Vihiga is not outstanding relative to the other 
high potential areas with respect to capital investment in the farms® There 
Is substantial investment In housing, but relatively little in permanent crops, 
cattle, land improvements, etc., except on the few relatively large farms. 
There are apparently substantial cash flows into Vihiga - remittances from 
employees working outside Vihiga have been estimated at Shs; 40*00 to Shs.100c00, 
per farm per month (30, p05)« Apart from financing consumption, education 
appears to be the principal form of investment carried cut with these funds. 
The extent to which funds could be available for investment in agriculture may 
depend on farmers becoming sufficiently convinced that it would be worthwhile 
to divert resources from Investment in urban-oriented education. Otherwise 
a higher level of savings would be necessary if more investment was to take 
place in agricultures 
location - Vihiga is located within easy reach of Kisumu and 
Eldorete A first class tarmac road from Kisumu to Eldoret passes through the 
centre of the Division, and this makes transport to the nearby towns relatively 
cheape But Vihiga is far from export markets and the larger urban markets of 
Hair obi and Mombasa® The Uganda market is of some importance to Vihiga, much 
of It Illegally® 
The Institutional Economic Structure- This is the least well 
documented aspect of the Vihiga resource endowment, and yet it it. probably of 
gr«&t«et potential value for the understanding of the economic conduct and 
performance of the area, and therefore for improving on the diagnosis and 
prescription of appropriate development projects. 
The Significance of the Resource Endowment; 
The conventional interpretation of a high population density in 
the context of a small farm system is a relative scarcity of land, and a 
relative abundance of labours A very high degree of land utilisation is 
expected. It is urn-ally argued that the type of agriculture that should 
emerge is one which uses The '.and intensively, with the emphasis on labour-intensive 
methods. When the physical conditions and location are also favourable, high 
value per acre products are to be expected. Generally the emphasis is away from 
food, although some food crops can give very high per acre returns. 
A superficial assessment of the Vihiga resource endowment would 
support the conventional view, but on closer examination the situation is 
less clear cut. Much depends on the identification of a high population density 
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with a high labour availability per acre, but one does not inevitably follow 
from the other® The dependency ratio is also high, with the large proportion 
of adult males absent from the Division and. a,large proportion of children in 
schools According to the 600farmer survey, the average farm has a labour 
input equivalent to between 2*8 and 3®4 "full time" workers, of which between 
15 and 23 per cent is hired (l, Tables 69 and 70), despite an average farm 
family size of 7® The typical picture is for full time labour to be provided 
by the farm heads and their wives, or by the wives alone (l, Tables 1 - 4)° 
The incidence of.part time and seasonal involvement of family workers is 
apparently large., but inadequate., and a significant proportion of labour is 
hired. Even among those described as full time there appears to be a 
considerable involvement in non-farm cash activities (8, p.5)» It appears 
that there would only be a relative abundance of labour, or a relative shorn:age 
of land, if it were not possible for outmigration to occur, and for part-time 
non«farm occupations to be found. It may well be that the majority of Vihiga 
farms are being farmed in conditions of effective labour shortage, rather than 
abundanceo In other words, at existing prices and returns agriculture is at 
a comparative disadvantage with respect to alternative forms of employmenta 
The current pattern of land use should be examined in the light of 
this interpretation® Almost 50 per cent of the average farm is devoted to 
maize (l, Table 34)» 9 per cent is unused (l, Table 16) although this may be 
used for livestock^ and 3 per cent is unusable (see above). Several commentators 
have remarked on the fact that in spite of the heavy population densities and 
the small sizes of. the farms1, there appear to be considerable areas of unused 
land? much of it in the lower valley bottoms. Moock, on the other hand, feels 
that after allowing for the space requirements of the homestead and roads there 
is little left (10, p»6). There is no complete land use information on Vihigas 
but the 600-farmer survey (which specifically lists only maize and.cash crops) 
shows small amounts of coffee, tea, groundnuts, certified potatoes, and improved 
beans en a small proportion of the farms (l. Tables 39 - 62). Bananas, cassava, 
sweet potatoes, beansa sorghum and millets are apparently also grown in sizeable 
quantities for domestic consumption (27? p.2). 
Maize yields are low, averaging less than 6 bags per acre (1334 Kg® 
per hectare) according to the survey (l, Table 34). This may be an underestimate, 
but the true figure is unlikely to be much higher. Two crops are possible, but 
even so there may be a maize deficit in the Division. The average .requirements 
of a family of eight are held to be 15 bags (1350 kg.) per year (6, p.3) and if 
one assumes that lower yielding local maize is.used more frequently for the short i 
rains crop (l, Tables 32 - 40), the deficit might be about 15 per cent. However, 
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there is a prociem with this definition of the maize deficit . The average 
requirements of maize for a family depend on the extent to which maize is 
supplemented by other foods In the diet. Fifteen bags per family per year 
may be required if the family relies almost entirely on maize for its starch, 
but if millets, sorghum, sweet potatoes, cassava., and bananas are also eaten 
the "requirement" of maize is likely to be much lower0 The extent to which 
other foods such as pulses, vegetable, meat, fish, poultry and dairy products 
are consumed also influences the "requirement" of maize0 People may prefer to 
rely less on maize than the 15 bags per family suggests0 It may be economically 
attractive for them to rely less on maize; it may also be nutritionally desirable 
for them to rely less on maizee The whole notion of maize requirements on Vihiga 
needs rather careful definition,, 
There xs a cyclical pattern to maize prices which range from Shs; 30.00 
to ShSo 70300 per bag (Shss 33»30 to Shs.77<,81 per 100 Eg.). The fluctuations 
are accounted for by the need to obtain cash for school fees at harvest time 
(low prices), the need to buy maize at other times of the year in excess of 
local production (high prices), and the shortage of storage (6, pe3). It would 
be valuable to know more about the cyclical pattern of sales and purchases. 
Whatever the precise position, however, the fact that local maize, which would 
not be regarded as a high value per acre crop within agriculture generally, is 
predominant may be explained by the attitudes towards alternative non-farm 
pursuits, and by the local resource availability (in particular labour) for 
agriculture. 
In view of the needs of the farm residents, the small size of farms, 
and the opportunities for non-farm employment (despite the difficulty of 
obtaining it), it could be that low intensity maize production is the most 
rational way of farming consistent with maintaining an ancestral home, using 
local educational facilities, and not exerting oneself for too low a return0 
possibly in this sense many Vihiga farms are being farmed optimally at present. 
There appears to be a clear propensity among the majority to regard farm 
employment as a last resort in the absence of other opportunities. The 
pressure to obtain education and the nature of the education system reflect 
the view that education xs the avenue into non-farm employment. A high 
proportion of the remittances that come into the Division is used to perpetuate 
the cycle of obtaining education to facilitate outmigration. In essence, 
Vihiga can be viewed as a child-bearing, rearing and educating base, financed 
by transfers from urban areas as much as from income generated within the 
Division,, That its value is high in this function is evidenced by the high 
land prices (8, p«6) which do not appear to be related to any possible present 
value calculation based on existing or even future productivity. Even the 
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farmers apparently do not view themselves primarily as farmers8 hut more in the 
nature of allotment holders, for whom the agricultural income supplements what 
they can obtain from elsewhere (10, p.2). 
While much of this is true of the majority, important groups in the 
Vihiga farming population are in a quite different position., The diversity of 
the agricultural structure of Vihiga heeds to he considered as well. Vihiga 
farms do differ substantially from one another as do farms in other.areas. The 
most important sources of differences in this context are farm size, soil and 
climate9 availability of,entrepreneurial resources, and inflows of financial 
resources from elsewhere, all of which materially affect the income distribution 
pattern.. The situation is complex; it is by no means clear, for example, that 
the small farms belong to poor families. Evidence of the Vihiga agricultural 
structure is inadequate; the 600-farmer survey is the only substantial source 
of information here and it is incomplete in this respect. In the survey 
"progressive" farmers are defined according to the earliness of adoption.of 
six selected crops; hybrid maize, coffee, groundnuts, certified potatoes, tea 
and improved (Mexico 142 and Rosecoco) beans. Of the "progressive" farmers, 
79 per cent,had adopted hybrid maize (although only 65 per cent were growing 
it in 1970), 64 per cent coffee, 41 per cent groundnuts, 28 per cent certified 
potatoes, 17 per cent tea. and 16 per cent improved beans. "Progressiveness" 
thus defined is only a weak prosy for entrepreneurial ability because earliness 
of adoption is influenced not only by entrepreneurial ability but also by the 
age of the farmer, the resource situation of the farmer - his labour, land and 
capital, the local physical environmental conditions, and so on. The core 
assumption that production of these "progressive" crops is economically worthwhile 
may not always be valid. However, the early adopters do appear to have some 
distinguishing characteristics in Vihiga - they tend to have larger farms, 
composed of a larger number of fragments than average, which.implies a. 
connection between "progressiveness" and expansion through purchase (l, Tables 9> 
12 and 13). They tend to have larger resident families, and also employ consider-
ably more paid labour.than average. It appears that for such "progressive" 
farmers it is worth investing in-more land and employing paid labour because 
they are getting sufficiently high-labour and land returns. These farmers 
probably suffer from a shortage of capital as much as anything else. 
Although there is a distinct association between "progressiveness" 
and the above factors^ the correlation is not complete;, there is a significant 
minority of "progressive" farmers with veiy small farms, small labour forces, 
and so on. It is possible that some of these are farmers have not yet 
expanded their size of operation, or that these are farmers with substantial 
off - farm occupations in which they also do.well. The picture above does not 
cover ail "progressive" farmers by any means. 
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There are all the different grpups of "non-progressive'.' farmers to 
consider as wells those with small farms, those with large farms, those with 
ample labour, those without, and so on. 
It would be valuable to have more information on the agricultural.. 
structure in Vihiga. All we can do at present is to recognise its diversity, 
and to recognise that the diversity encompasses several distinct variables. 
The importance of diversity in this context is; 
(i) that it raises the question of specialisation; and 
(ii) that it raises questions of income distribution. 
Because of the diversity of the agricultural situation one would expect the 
emergence of specialisation according to comparative advantage. Some farmers 
might specialise in growing the maize that Vihiga needs, othersperhaps in 
legumes, bananas, or horticulture, or in combinations such,as tea and dairying. 
Complete specialisation may not be economically worthwhile, but some special-
isation should be encouraged. This involves the design of programmes to suit 
different.groups of farmers. Secondly, diversity is not solely a question of 
farm size, but also of farm resources other than land. This needs to be borne 
in mind in considering income distribution, which is often assumed to be 
closely related to farm size. This is quite clearly not the case in Vihiga 
where the situation is particularly complicated by remittances and other 
non-farm income. 
To summarises 
1. Information on the Vihiga resource endowment needs to be 
brought together and interpreted carefully. There are 
inconsistencies, both factual and interpretative, which 
need to be reconciled; there are important contributions 
in earlier documents that appear to have been ignored in 
later planning. 
2. The general interpretation that Vihiga is a traditional 
land-shortage case needs to be re-examined. The above 
analysis of such material as is available suggests that 
there is an alternative interpretation. It is hoped that 
this analysis, stressing 
(a) the possibility that there is an effective shortage 
of labour and a comparative disadvantage of existing 
employment opportunities in agriculture on many farms, 
00 the diversity of the agricultural structure, 
can be brought to bear in future Vihiga planning. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEE MAIZE CREDIT PACKAGE. 
THE CONTENT OF THE VIHIGA SPECIAL 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. 
First mentioned as a possible pilot area in March, 1968, on account 
of its heavy population density and "high to medium agricultural potential" 
(289 p0l)9 Yihiga was selected- as a first phase area in March, 1569. The . , 
initial plans for the Vihiga programme were prepared towards the end of 19691 
and are summarised in the. Outline Programme of January, 1970o This contains 
proposals for.the development of production of maize,-fruit and vegetables* 
dairy produce, pigs, poultry, coffee and tea, together with improvements in 
the supporting services. Emphasis was to he placed on maize, fruit and vegetables 
and dairy.production. The objective for maize,was to be the attainment of self-
sufficiency in that crop, on a reduced acreage, releasing land for other uses. 
As part of the agricultural programme a "carefully monitored experiment in crop 
extension techniques, emphasising an attempt to reach all different types of 
farmers; adult men working outside the area, women at home in charge of the 
farms, male farmers on the land8 school leavers, and.others" was also proposed 
(25, p®6)0 The provision of credit was given a role, in the encouragement of 
pig, poultly? and dairy production. Credit was to be supplied through I.D.A. 
(loans against land titles), and the Lindquist Co-operative Credit Scheme 
(loans to financially secure co-operatives)® 
This production programme has been criticised for containing little 
that WfS news it closely resembled the existing programme^ the Ministry of 
Agriculture in Vihiga. It has also been criticised for being too broadly based, 
giving little indication of priorities, and paying little attention to the 
relative profitabilities of the.selected products. Although some quantification 
was attempted, even very rough cost-benefit calculations were precluded due to 
data inadequacies^ and little justification was offered for preferring the 
particular ingredients chosen for the programme to others. Mich of this is 
understandable given the resources that were devoted to the initial planning 
# 
process, and the amount of time available. It was argued at the time it was 
important to get some plan written as a basis for starting the programme and 
that there would be considerable modification as the programme gained momentum. 
Similar comments have been made in other areas. See, for example, 
Kapenguria Report, pages A3 and 4° 
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EMERGENCE OP THE MAIZE CREDIT PACKAGE. 
The Vihiga programme started officially on 1st July, 1970? "but little 
happened^©r several months0 US AID had expressed an interest in supporting the 
programme and a US AID adviser, Harmon, arrived.in June 1970 under contract to 
survey the programme with Kenya Government officials and to assess the.contribution 
that could be made by US AID. Harmon reported early in September 1970, and his 
report formed the basis of the US AID proposal for a Vihiga Programme that went 
to Washington at the end of September 1970o 
< 
Harmon felt that maize should be given priority initially9 writing. oee 
"considering the maize shortage in the Division, the most urgent and practical 
primary objective of the agricultural programme should be an all-out effort to 
increase maize production^ ," (17, Pe3l)o But he stressed the need for realistic 
farm profitability estimates for maize as well as.other products, and he gave 
limited support to programmes.to develop, dairying, Improved coffee husbandry, 
and high quality vegetables, pending farm profitability estimates and noting 
the market constraints involveda He felt .that meeting feed requirements would 
be a problem for livestock enterprises such as poultry and pigs® 
Harmon emphasised the importance of the agricultural extension service, 
regarding it as the critical element in the success of any agricultural production 
programme for Vihiga. He recommended extensive on-the-job training for JAAs; 
improvements in their supervision; adaptation of recommendations to suit local 
conditions; much more upward mobility within the extension experiment in the 
Outline Programme; and improved methods of contacting all types of farmers. He 
recommended that the Vihiga agricultural programme be directed to "progressive 
and unprogressive farmers whose land holdings range from largest to smallest. 
The only requirement should be that the farmer desire to cooperate." 
Harmon also recommended a pilot programme of closely supervised production 
credit® He emphasised that this was "especially needed by small farmers who. require 
money to hire labour and to buy insecticide9 fertiliser and hybrid seed." But there 
was a contradiction in his statements on.credit<> He noted-that there was more cash 
available than might. appear 9-and that much of the cash coming back from migrant 
labourers employed outside Vihiga was not being invested in agricultural activities. 
He concluded his credit proposal with the remarks "If people themselves do not have 
enough faith to put money into farming the Government should not do it either." 
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Following Harmon9s report, maize was selected as the focus for the 
first year's programme, in the US AID Project Proposal. This US AID Project 
Proposal also marked an important stage in the development of the structure 
of the maize credit project, though the idea of Harmon that credit could "be 
offered for the.payment of hired labour was dropped® Moock wrote at the end 
of October 1970s "The maize campaign during the first year planting season 
(February - June 1971) of the proposed 5~yeor programme gives some time for 
the US AlD-supported economist to study the profitability of various farm 
enterprises under differing conditions". Maize was being considered as only 
the first step in a multi-product programme for Vihiga, and it was expected 
that other products would be added fairly quickly.- In the.event, maize was 
still the only product in the second year of. the programme, and in the third 
year, 1972/1973 only a small tea programme and fruit and vegetables are to 
be added. 
THE EEEERIKENTAL ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAMME. 
Plans for the extension experiment described in the Outline Programme 
were underway meanwhile0 In July 1970 US AID proposed to select 100 progressive 
farmers per location (through sub-chiefs) and 50 poorer farmers per location 
(at random) for the experiment. At a meeting of US AID officials and Government-
officials from Vihiga, Kakamega and Nairobi on 24th August 1970, it was decided 
to select 100 farmers per location, 60 "large progressive" ead-40.'*siaail progressive", 
giving a total of 600 from the 6 locations. But there was a <?oafliott»g recommend-
ation that "there must be a complete cross-section of farmers", including "new faces 
and a number of-women"® Responsibility for selection was given to the D»0<> Vihiga 
who was asked to complete the selection by 15th September 1970e Having written 
to chiefs asking them to begin thinking of names prior to a meeting.with him, he 
found on visiting them that they had already gone a long way in making their own 
selections, and had actually informed some farmers that they had been selected* 
A meeting in,the D.0«es office followed on 5th September 1970 at which the two 
Vihiga D.O's, the Area Coordinator, representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture 
"Including the newly appointed PDA, and Moock and Ascroft from IDS, were present. 
It was agreed that the earlier decision should be reversed and that random 
selection should be adopted because it was the fairest and most impersonal 
method available. The random selection was handed over to Moock and Ascroft 
who completed It by mid-October® The next step was to administer a farm level 
survey as a data base and as training forAA's. .By the end of October the AA9s 
had been trained to administer the questionnaire, it had been tested and tried, 
and the farm survey startedo It was completed in January 1971® The first results 
were available in June 1971® 
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The .random selection of the 600 farmers should have made possible 
experimentation with different treatments given to different groups of farmers 
and comparison of the results0 The objective of the experiment was to compare 
ways of increasing hybrid maise production®, The treatments envisaged were 
intensified extension advice , farm planning;, fertiiiser demonstrations, and 
credit9 All 600 farmers were to be given extra extension advice® All farms 
of 3 acres and above, about half of the 600s were to get farm plans« Fertiliser 
demonstrations were to be given on 100 of the 600 farms, the 100 being selected( at 
random® Some of the 600 farmers were to get short-term credit. 
In the event, little attention was paid to the design of the experiment. 
Indeed, few saw the programme as experimental at all. The different treatments 
were applied in ways such that no conclusions could be drawn from monitoring of 
the results, had arty arrangements been made to monitor them® 
The 600 farmers originally selected for the extension experiment were 
all given special attention in the form of extra extension advice® Those viith 
farms of 3 acres and over had farm plans drawn up over the year October 1970 -
October 1971« Each involved determining field average size, drawing lj,p a 
rotation scheme,, and discussing management aspects with the farmer. (6, p«2). 
Ho attest was made to link-farm planning with credit, Johnson, an adviser 
from US AID reporting in August 1971$ felt that the most valuable aspects of 
the farm planning exercise for the farmer were information provided on field 
size, crop rotation, fertiliser use, hybrid maize seed and weed control. Some 
farmers commented, that "while the plan was .satisfactory it takes money to 
implement it <~ particularly he fertiliser, seed and insect control recommend-
ations" (6,.p,2). Bice, another US AID consultant who reported towards the 
end of 1971» felt that the exercise was a complete waste for those who did not 
receive credit to follow it through. 
Fertiliser demonstrations were planned for 100 farms, .which were 
supposed to be selected randomly from the 600* Unauthorised eliminations 
by field extension staff reduced the number to 8§9 and unauthorised 
substitutions resulted in a group that was not entirely a random selection, 
although the distortion-was relatively minor in the end.« The farms on which 
demonstrations took place had a one exghth of an acre plot with.fertiliser 
treatment and a one eighth of .an acre control plot. Fertiliser, seed and 
insecticides were provided free for those plotsc 
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The credit package as originally formulated involved the provision 
of supplies of [hybrid maize seed, fertiliser, and insecticide on credit to 
some of the farmers participating in the crop extension experiment, against 
the security of the maize crop. The package comprised 1 packet of hybrid 
maize seed, 50 kg, of double superphosphate or 100 kg, of single super-
phosphate, 100 kg, of ammonium sulphate, and an appropriate quantity of DDT -
the amounts recommended for 1 acre of maize. The total value -was intended to 
be Shs;105o00 per acre® The farmers receiving loans were to be visited a 
number of times by agricultural extension staff, who were to give detailed 
recommendations on soil preparation, planting date, spacing, fertiliser 
application rates and methods of application, and the use of DDT® 
Although the original intention behind the credit package was 
experimental, the criteria that were finally developed for selecting farmers 
to receive credit emphasised credit-worthiness more than anything else. Thus 
the treatment became? short-term credit for creditworthy farmers wanting to 
participate in the credit "experiment"® The selection criteria were: 
(a) growing a minimum of 2 acres of maize, 
(b) farmer considered to be creditworthy - even although the 
growing crop was to have provided the necessary security, 
(c) farmer accepts the loan conditions, i.e. that he will accept 
advice on growing the crop and that he will repay, 
(d) farmer turns up to sign the documents on the appropriate day® 
Of the 600 farmers in the sample only 54 satisfied those criteria. 
A further 22 were selected for the same treatment from outside the sample, on 
meeting the above conditions. The procedure for providing the loans was for 
the selected farmer to be provided, with a document, an Authority to Incur 
Expenditure, which could be exchanged for stated quantities of inputs by 
stockists who had been forewarned of the scheme. These documents were then 
submitted to A.P.C® to effect payment to the stockist. 
In 1972 basically the same programme was undertaken on an expanded 
scalee It was generally felt that the programme had been successful for those 
involved, and spectacular increases in yields were quoted as evidence of 
success ( 7 ) . Attention was now focussed on the question of how to extend 
the programme to larger numbers in a short space of time. 
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The 1972 programme -was to involve around 300 farmers, as this was. 
the number the extension officials felt they could handles In the event 370 
farmers were selected.- Criteria for selection were similar to those adopted 
for 1971 but spelled out in more details 
(a) minimum of 2 acres of maize; 
(b) maximum of 4 acres of maizej 
(c) good character; 
(d) creditworthiness; 
(e) readiness to follow recommended practices; 
(f) capability of cultivating maize acreage; 
(g) repayment of 1971 loan, where applicable; 
The major additions .to the 1.971 criteria were (b), (f) and (g)» 
The loan package was the same, though prices and fertiliser analyses were 
now stipulated. Group extension activities were to be introduced and tested 
to enable more rapid expansion of the programme in later years. 
most of its 
By 1972 it is clear that the programme had lost / experimental 
content. (See Part I of the Report for a discussion of the principle of 
experimentation). There was no hypothesis to be tested; there were no 
alternative treatments with which to compare credit; there were no alternative 
credit schemes to compare; there were no control groups; there was no systematic, 
collection of data that might have provided the basis for an objective evaluation. 
The programme had become a straightforward development programme for Yihiga. 
However9 this is not the way it is. seen'In Nairobi, currently. It Is still 
hailed as "an experiment of national importance" extending far beyond the 
boundaries of Vihiga. It is said that the Vihiga maize credit programme 
has demonstrated .for the first time a successful way of handling credit for 
small-scale maize producers in Kenya, and as such it is an experiment of 
potential significance for all small-scale maize producers in Kenya» More 
will be said about its 'success8 later; in the discussion here it is simply 
its experimental component which is questioned. As far as can be seen it has 
not demonstrated anything, nor, because of the way it has been set up, is it 
capable of demonstrating very much. 
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THE CURRENT STATE OE THE VIHIGA SPECIAL 
SURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. 
In mid-1972, the situation appears to be as follows: 
An expanded maize credit scheme is proposed for 1973, involving about 1,000 
farmers but because the appropriate institutional framework is inadequately-
developed there is still some uncertainty about whether it will materialise. It is 
anticipated that the programme will be expanded to 3,000 - 6,000 in the following 
year or two0 Questions that are preoccupying those involved concern the 
administrative and organisational problems of handling large numbers: how to 
administer large numbers of loans; how to expand the extension coverage; and so on3 
These problems are not yet solved® There is little indication of any questioning 
of the fundamental rationale of the programme, however. Little attention has been 
paid to the questions raised by the monitoring of the first year programme, 
P, Moock collected information on the first year credit recipients, and 
analysed it briefly (20)s He showed clearly that those who received credit had the 
already adopted most of /recommended package before they received any credit, and 
he compared their results with a similar sample and suggested that the increases 
in yields were quite assail 8 Moock" s report apparently never came into discussions 
of the sepond year of the progresame in which the preoccupation was with doing what 
had been done in the first year a.bit better, nor has it been considered in 
planning for the third year4 Too often there is insufficient data to form the basis 
of substantial adaptation. In the Vihiga case the data were available, rather 
unusually, but they were not used® This is a serious criticism of the Vihiga 
SEDP. Quite substantial amounts of data became available over the course of time, 
but little use was made of them in modifying plans, 
A credit programme to develop tea production is about to be launched in 
1972/73« This involves loans to encourage the establishment of larger acreages 
of tea® Eelatively small numbers of farmers will be involved. Vegetable 
production and marketing, pig production, and poultry production programmes are 
at the planning stage and some of these are expected (optimistically) to get off 
the ground in 1973, There is a training programme for extension officials, which 
lias not been investigated adequately in this studye Land adjudication, dips, 
credit for grade cattle, rural industries, water, and village polytechnic 
programmes are continuing but they are only SBDP in so far as everything is SBDP, 
Eoads, health and family planning programmes are being planned as part of 
SEDP. and plans for these are likely to develop substantially in the coming months® 
Possible additions that are being discussed include electricity information^ , 
education and other programmes, but plans for these are still very tentative, 
Thus the only substantial SEEP programmes that are on the ground at the moment are 
the maize programme, and a general programme of extension training. Many other 
programmes are under way in Vihiga but these are not financed by SEDP, and none 
of them seems to be attributable to SEDP, although some of the ongoing programmes 
have probably received added impetus through the Vihiga SEDP, 
EVALUATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FSQGRAM-E 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 
One conclusion of the section of the report on the resource endowment 
of Vihiga was that although the Division is densely populated^ there does not 
appear to he either a marked, or a general, abundance of labour® At present 
the land resources are not intensively utilised^ despite the limited size of 
individual holdings5 probably because the returns to labour from more intensive 
use are insufficient to compete with alternative opportunities, given that 
education is considered to be the most rewarding allocation of such investible 
resources as are available. An appropriate programme would therefore appear 
to be one which can bring higher returns to land and labour, explicitly 
acknowledging the difficulty of obtaining adequate supplies of labour for 
farm work, and of attracting those seeking other opportunities to commit 
themselves (or their resources) to agricultural employment® 
A second conclusion was that attention should be paid to the need 
to cater for the many different types of farmer? the diversity of the 
agricultural structure should be taken into account in the planning of the 
agricultural programme. In the preceding section it has been pointed out 
that this was indeed the original intention of the programme - all types of 
Vihiga farmers were to be catered for, both large and smallg "progressive" 
and "non-progressive"® However, it is apparent that the programme has 
developed In a way which concentrates attention on the "progressive" and 
the larger farmers There appear to be two principal reasons for this 
development; the first is the choice of products, and the second is the 
measures which have been adopted during the detailed formulation of the 
strategyj particularly the credit measures. Hybrid maizes grade cattle and 
tea are unlikely to be suitable for poorer entrepreneurs lacking knowledge and 
skills3 or those with few resources. The same criticism is applicable to 
horticultural crops? pigs, and poultry? indeed most of the other elements of 
the programme. In the execution of the programme the natural desire for results 
seems to have led to a bias in favour of skilled entrepreneurs, against "non-
progressive" farmers and those with very small holdings which are often 
considered to be unviable,. The maize credit package, despite its earlier 
promise, is available only to farmers growing between 2 and 4 acres of maize, 
and credit-worthiness is a test of entitlement to the loan® So far the 
programme has done little.for the average farmer, the small farmer, and the 
poor entrepreneur. 
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THE MAIZE CREDIT PACKAGE. 
'There are two distinct parts of the maize credit package which are 
discussed separately! (l) the encouragement of hybrid maize productior 
(2) the use of tied credit provision as a means of encouragement e It is 
felt that the appropriateness of the emphasis on hybrid maize is quite 
separate from the issue of whether or not the provision of tied credit was 
the right way to encourage it® Before examining these two separate issues, 
the objectives of the maize credit package are considered. 
The Objectives; 
The immediate objectives of the maize credit package have been 
variously stated ass 
1. "Promotion ofao intensification of smallholder production 
of»o & o« hybrid maize (through improved availability of seeds and fertiliser 
and demonstration of proper planting techniques) to raise yields and reduce 
total maize acreage" (2, p.2)5 
20 "To achieve self sufficiency in maize through increased yields; 
to reduce acreage for transfer to cattle and pig production" (23 p»8); 
3® "«» maize should be encouraged only to the point of self 
sufficiency for the family» This would require about 15 bags per year 
(per farm)" (6e p<>3)j 
4« "Its primary purpose (is) to make Vihiga Division self-
supporting in maize" (15, p.l)$ 
5o "»» self sufficiency of the area in the production of maizeVoo 
(12, p.5)j 
These objectives need further clarifications The question of self-
sufficiency is confuseds is it envisaged that'each family will be self-sufficient, 
or that the Division as a whole will achieve self-sufficiercy through specialisation 
within the Division, or is self—sufficiency envisaged on a wider or narrower 
basis than the Division} the ®area9? Secondly, there is the question of the 
reduced acreage of maizes is it intended to reduce the maize acreage because 
it is not profitable to produce a surplus beyond that required for self-
sufficiency however defined? This is related to the question of which alternative 
products are to accompany maize; that is "the rest of the programme which so 
far has been insufficiently developed® 
B - 20 
The instrumental objective of the package has been stated ass 
To create " e o. an experimental smalls-holder credit schemeeo3(the) loans 
to be secured by the harvest of the borrowers*' (13, p©5), backed up by 
an intensive extension effort0 
It has already been pointed out that the practical problems of initiating 
such a scheme have led to the emergence of a marked divergence between the intended "'Hi ~ 
form of the package and its actual achievement. The experimental features of 
the package have been lost, partly due to a failure to spell out the implications 
of the instrumental objective at an early stage. Had this been done, it would have 
become clear that there was a conflict between an experimental package, and a 
package that could be justified on grounds acceptable to the agencies chosen to 
implement the scheme0 These points are discussed further below0 
The ultimate objective is also worthy of considerations 
"optimising the level of income received by the average farmer in 
Yihiga" (14). 
The link between attaining self-sufficiency in maize requirements and 
improving the level of income in Yihiga is not elaborated upon explicitly in 
any of the documents® Nor is any attention devoted to the distributional aspects 
of the package„ The stated objective of attaining self-sufficiency for each 
and evezy individual farmer has a clear distribution association, but there is 
no analysis of the likely outcomes of the programme and whether they are 
consistent with the distributional intentions of the package. The alternative 
formulation - self-sufficiency through the specialisation of the few - evidently 
has a very different implication with regard to the distribution of the gains 
from the package, though in the long run it is not necessarily less equitable 
than the other approach,. 
It is evident that the objectives of the maize credit scheme have been 
imprecisely specified, a deficiency stemming in part from the poor factual basis 
available to the planners, but also from their apparent disinclination to examine 
the wider implications of the project in terms of individual and overall behaviour. 
The micro aspects of the project have been poorly bonded to the macro dimensions 
of the objectives0 
The Choice of Maizes 
Three reasons appear to underlie the choice of maize: Yihiga is 
considered to be a deficit area; it is considered to possess a physical 
environment suitable for hybrid maize; and it is felt that a densely populated 
area should feed itself* In the first place, the basis for considering Yihiga 
a deficit area has not been stated in any of the documents® 
The most satisfactory way of establishing whether a deficit exists is through 
the collection of simple market information. Possibly the Division imports 
maize from other areas to make up for a shortfall in its domestic production, 
but there is insufficient information to establish this® Sources, quantities, 
prices, and the market mechanisms which affect this are not mentioned,, It is 
possible that maize is sold at one time of the year and bought at another, and 
there would be no deficit at all if adequate maize storage facilities were 
available in Vihiga® The alternative way to calculate the deficit is from 
estimates of the consumption requirements of the population and actual 
production in the Division, but this approach raised serious problems. It 
involves a strong assumption regarding the desirable proportion of maize in 
the diet of Vihigans, and it is critically affected by the accuracy of the 
estimates of maize acreages and yields® In section II it was suggested that 
there may be a deficit estimated in this way, but the weaknesses of this method 
of estimation were also stressed® The collection of appropriate market inform-
ation is recommended to establish whether or not there is a maize deficit„ 
Vihiga does appear to possess a physical environment that is well 
suited to the production of hybrid mstiz© © What is questionable, though, is 
the desirability of focussing so heavily on maize at the expense of other 
alternatives „ 
The question of self-sufficiency is most perplexing; should a 
densely populated area feed itself? It has been argued that because Yihiga 
is a 'bedroom9 community, and Yihigans are interested in farming to satisfy 
only their food requirements, it is logical to devise a programme to encourage 
food production, enabling Vihigans to produce their food instead of purchasing 
ito However this confuses the desire to increase the availability of maize or 
other foods in the Division with the objective Of achieving this through 
increased maize production,, Apart from the question of whether it is additional 
maize or additional foods of other kinds that are needed, there is the question 
of whether it might be cheaper to import maize in exchange for other farm produce 
than to produce it directly,, It is not always worthwhile to produce all of one9s 
food supply locally. The alternative of producing more of other products that 
can be exchanged on the market for maize, is generally open, and may increase 
the availability of maize more than by increased maize production. It is 
possible that there already is a substantial trade in maize between Vihiga and 
other Divisions and Districts; this may be the most economic way of obtaining 
maize for consumption,: If it is to be worthwhile for Vihiga farmers to produce 
more maize, returns to both land and labour must be attractive relative to other-
alternatives • Simple comparative return figures for alternative possible products 
do not appear to have been estimated at any stage, although they are crucial to 
farmers' desires to expand maize rather than other lines of production Unless it 
can be established that maize offers one of the most attractive labour and land 
returns, it should not be encouraged* 
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If it is worthwhile to produce maize for domestic consumption, it 
nsy also be worthwhile to produce for other markets in Kenya or elsewhere, 
rather than drawing the line at local, self-sufficiency 0 However, once the 
local consumption market is satisfied it is to be expected that the price 
will fall to take account of transport and other costs involved,, If export 
is involved then the piice would fall to the export parity price; if the 
utilisation of maize for stock feed is contemplated then the price would be 
even lower., What level of production of maiae - and therefore supplying 
which markets - will provide a sufficiently high return to land and labour? 
The prices vary considerably over time and between markets0 At the moment 
local prices are said to range between Shss ?O0OO and Shss 30o00; the buying 
price of the Maize and Produce Board is at present about Shss 00; the 
export parity price might be about Shss 20®00; the value as stock feed 
could be as low as Shss 15®00o The range is sufficiently wide to suggest 
that at the same price level within the range alternative products will 
become more profitablea 
There is also the question of whether all farmers should be encouraged 
to grow hybrid maize or only some; the objectives of the maiae credit package 
are not sufficiently explicit as to whether Vihiga is expected to become self-
sufficient through specialisation or individual self-sufficiency on each farm. 
At present an average of one acre of maize per farm is grown, but the 
productivity increases were envisaged as sufficiently high to allow self-
sufficiency to be achieved on a smaller acreage than at presents The loan 
for the recommended inputs for one acre of maize amounts to shss 105a00s 
The price of maize at the time when the loan has to be repaid is apparently 
shss 30*00 or less0 Thus, at least 3o5 bags of maize are required to repay 
the loan3 If self-sufficiency is to be achieved, at 15 bags per family, 
18e5 bags per acre need to be produced on the present acreage, more if the acreage 
is to be reducedo This represents an increase of 10-12 bags per acre over the 
present mean of 6-8 bags, without reducing the acreage0 This requirement is 
reduced to the extent that maize requirements per family are overestimated at 
15 bags, and to the extent that a second crop makes some contribution to the 
maiae supplya However, it is clear that very much improved husbandry techniques 
would be required to achieve individual self-sufficiency, and this requires a 
level of labour and skills which not all farmers have0 
The second formulation of the objective requires rather different 
responses o Self-sufficiency for the Division could be achieved through a 
higher degree of specialisation (though not the creation of a. monoculture) of 
some farmers in the production of maize for sale in addition to home consumption. 
It is quite likely that some farmers in Vihiga are already doing this0 The 600-
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farmer survey show, that a minority of farmers have very high- maize yields (10 
per cent had yields over 16 hags per acre in the 1970 long rains), and a 
minority grow relatively large acreages of maize (11 per cent grew more than 
2 acres in the 1970 long rains), (l, Tables 34 and 37)® If these two groups 
coincided, and if the means for this group were 3 acres of maize and a yield 
of 18 hags per acre, a farm belonging to this group could provide sufficient 
maize to meet the subsistence requirements of 6 families (at 15 bags per 
family per year) including the farm family itself a If 16 per cent of the 
farms fell into this group, Vihiga could be self-sufficient with no maize at 
all on other farms, provided that the surplus maize could be purchased by 
those not growing maize on their own farms® In practice of course some maize 
would probably continue to be produced on most farms, for some time, reducing 
the required degree of specialisation0 The implications of this approach 
might include the need to devote more acreage on the specialising farms to 
the production of maize instead of reducing the acreage; it might also 
involve the encouragement of the specialising farms, i.e® possibly an 
acceleration of a process which is already going on. Unfortunately, there 
is very little information on the existing pattern of grain movements in the 
Division, consequently it is not possible to assess the extent to which there 
are already incentives towards specialisation in maize production® However, 
it is evident that the approach to meeting the maize deficit through the 
specialisation of a minority of farmers is a distinct alternative that would 
require very different policies on the part of the Government® 
Finally, there is the choice of hybrid rather than local or synthetic 
maize® Hybrid is not necessarily superior to local or synthetic maize varieties 
for all farmers® Hybrid maize needs a high standard of husbandry and an intensive 
use of complementary inputs to be a successful competitor to local maize® It 
may be a suitable product for skilled entrepreneurs and for those with ample 
resources® It may not be suitable for others® In 1970, 47 per cent of all 
farmers in Vihiga grew hybrid maize, and 59 per Ceni iyied it at one time 
or another (l, Table 23, 24)« It could be that 47 per cent is about the 
proportion for whom it is worthwhile, (although there may still be some room 
for expansion)® Perhaps the remaining 53 per cent would do better to continue 
with the local maize variety or take up synthetic maize. Synthetic maize, 
which is less demanding than hybrid maize in terms of husbandry and complementary 
inputs, and which has the advantage of meeting its own subsequent seed requirements 
appears not to have been seriously considered recently (33)• The possibility 
that for quite a large number of farmers local maize might be superior to hybrid 
maize appears not to have been considered in Vihiga SEDP discussions. It may be 
that hybrid maize has now reached most of the farms on which it is worthwhile, 
and that it would be a more productive use of resources to turn to something else 
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•OT" that the hybrid maize "plateau" has been reached. This possibility should 
be seriously considered* 
In summary, it is recommended that hybrid maize continue to be 
encouraged in Vihiga, but not for all farmers and not exclusively» The extent 
to which the production of hybrid maize is to-be encouraged should be reconsidered, 
and several other products should be added quickly to accompany maize„ Promotion 
of hybrid maize alone is unlikely to benefit all farmers, and even for those who 
are encouraged to grow hybrid maize it may be appropriate to combine it with 
other products; these are also in need of encouragement. It in strongly 
recommended that the active promotion of additional products of relevance 
to large numbers of farmers in Vihiga should become a central component of 
agricultural programme. These additional products could bo identified 
initially through the collection of farm profitability estimates, and through 
onsultations with agriculturalists familiar with Vihiga conditions, a point 
developed below. 
The P.ecommended Input Package; 
The husbandry and input practices recommended in the maize credit 
package appear to be satisfactory, apart from the fact that the rates of 
application of fertiliser are substantially lower than those recommended 
by Kitale. The overestimation of acreages compensated in part for the use 
of the lower rate in the first year, but in the second year acreages were 
nore accurately measured and the error may have been more serious. The 
Kit ale recommendation was 60 lbs. P^ O^  and 75 lbs . IT per acre; the loan was 
foi approximately |6 lbs. of each per acre. This meant that low application 
rates were achieved, but it also meant that farmers may have been seriously 
misinstructed over use of fertiliser, and this could be regarded as a 
very damaging criticism, although it is possible that the economically 
efficient package does indeed involve lower rates of application than the 
technically efficient package that might emerge in recommendationsfrom an 
j-agricultural research station* This possibility should be actively 
considered® 
+ Technically efficient recommendations are often geared to maximising 
yields per acre whereas economically efficient recommendations involve maximising 
returns to other factors as well as land® 
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Questions should also be raised as to the extent to which the 
recommended inputs are already being applied by farmers, and the extent to 
which further encouragement is needed. In the 1970 long rains, 47 per cent 
of Vihiga farmers were growing hybrid maize as already mentioned! 41 per 
cent were using chemical fertilisers, not necessarily both the recommended 
ones and not necessarily the recommended rates; and 20 per cent were using 
insecticides5 (l, Tables 23, 24, 29 and 31)® Thus, both fertilisers and 
insecticides were already used by substantial, numbers of farmers . The 
advisability of encouraging the extension of their use is not open to 
question, but this has been overemphasised in some of the Vihiga documents, 
and relatively little attention has been paid to the fact that substantial 
numbers of farmers already use these inputs. Therefore it is recommended 
that the emphasis be shifted awav from the .most progressive farmers who 
already use the inputs „ to the less progressive farmers who do not. 
The Mechanism for Getting the Package Adopted; 
The second major issue is the use of tied supervised credit . 
provision as a means of encouraging the adop£4a®t a f &&M& and ffce 
recommended inputs,. Assuming that it is import afffc' t<J get jwojle 
growing hybrid maize and using the recommended package of inputs (which is 
questionable), there are alternative methods of achieving this.. Should the 
emphasis be on extension (what kind of extension?), farmer training, demon-
strations, subsidised inputs, or credit (what kind of credit?) provision, 
or on a combination of these and other alternatives? The Vihiga programme 
relies heavily on tied - credit provision and intensive extension contact 
for the few* There are also fertiliser demonstrations which are part of a 
larger programme organised by FA0„ Most of the discussion relates to the 
credit programme as there has been no opportunity to look into the extension 
programme at all fully. 
Is the provision of credit the most appropriate method of encouraging 
the further adoption of hybrid maize? It always seems to be popular with 
those who want a tangible agricultural development programme, and it seems to 
be a favourite with donors who want to spend funds. But it is rarely made clear 
what credit is-, or under what conditions a lack of credit constitutes a constraint. 
The essence- of credit is that it provides an opportunity to defer payment for 
goods and services, an opportunity which is attractive because the incurring 
of costs has to precede the receipt of revenue by the duration of the production 
and marketing processes (in agriculture a relatively long period). It is a 
cash-flow problem, a problem of timely availability of funds which gives rise 
to the need for credit, and since this is common to virtually all agricultural 
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•recessest it may be inferred from the active pursuit of existing enterprises 
Vihiga that many cash—flow problems are somehow surmounted. Possibly the 
producer retains a larger cash balance betx^ een sale of one crop and purchase 
of the inputs for the subsequent ones; possibly he may ensure that remittances 
of non-farm income coincide with these expenditures; possibly he borrows; 
possibly he reduces consumption. However,- it is invalid to infer from the 
mere fact that an innovation has not been adopted, or that a higher level of 
output has not been attained that the cash-flow problem, and therefore lack 
of credit3 is the operative constraint. The further information has to be 
provided that the farmer is sufficiently confident that additional resources 
will yield a positive net return in a particular use, taking due account of 
the risk and uncertainty, and that lower-cost or more attractive internal 
solutions to the cash-flow problem are not available. One reason for the 
non-provision of credit may be the lack of demand for it due to the producer's 
perception of the non-profitability of an innovation, or of the non-profitability 
of an expanded level of output of a particular product s 
There are other reasons for the non-provision of credit? one is the 
absence of effective security, (it has to be effective; a land title may not 
be effective security if it is unlikely that the creditor will be permitted to 
dispossess the owner in the event of non-repayment). Generally credit of the 
Mse®&-tii»e to harvest" type - i.e. to meet current outgoings, not capital 
~ l i t t l e ig. t h e way of security, but much in the way of 
e f f i c i e n t a d a i a i a t f a t t e n ® Security is confidence, and reputation is the 
ooawsational guide to confidence where there is no history of credit repayment. 
But this can only be put to effective use if there is an intricate network of 
credit agencies capable of assessing credit-worthiness. 
Another explanation of the apparent absence of credit-provision is 
that there is no market for it - not simply that there is no demand for it, 
but that there is no demand at commercial rates» and therefore no incentive 
for the creation of the network of outlets necessary to establish the optimal 
allocation of available funds. This brings the argument back to the profitability 
of the enterprises which could potentially be users of credit. Due to the many 
alternative uses of funds the provision of credit to a particular use is not 
without its costs; the concept of free or subsidised credit is a distortion of 
reality, and is certainly not replicable on a national level. It is a moot 
point that where a network of credit agencies has not become established the 
subsidisation of credit provision may 'be an appropriate measure, but such a 
subsidy should be directed towards the lender, not the borrower, if a replicable 
scheme is to be developed. Prom the above discussion the following conclusion 
P - 27 
emergess the provision of credit in Vihiga is justified if it is directed to 
those producers for -whom the cash-flow problem is the principal reason for not 
talcing up hybrid maize and for whom hybrid maize jjroduction is sufficiently 
profitable after allowing for the cost of the credit. It goes without saying 
that if the immediate objective is the increased adoption of hybrid maize then 
it should go to the producers in this category who have not yet grown hybrid 1. 
maize © This may not be necessary if the objective is simply to increase the 
production of maizeo 
There is a second justification of the provision of credits if the 
constraint is the lack of appropriate husbandly skills, and the strategy to 
make good this deficiency is intensive extension supervision, it may improve 
the impact of this input if credit is also offered. It is argued that credit 
provides the excuse to concentrate on a few farms, that it gives an entree 
into the farms and a means of putting pressure on the farmers, and that it 
raises the morale of the extension officials and farmers involved. These 
may be sufficient grounds for ignoring the requirements of the preceding 
justification, and giving credit where there is in fact no credit constraint. 
In addition to the increased impact of the extension services achieved in this 
way there are also benefits to be derived from the fact that the credit provided 
probably displaces other funds and permits their allocation to other uses. So 
the second conclusion is that the provision of credit in Vihiga is justified 
if it is directed to those producers selected as being likely to benefit most 
from intensive extension supervision, i.e. those for whom the principal constraint 
in the production of hybrid maize is the lack of the appropriate knowledge, and 
who are likely to respond to the "bribe". 
There is no evidence to show that either justification of the provision 
of credit guided action in Vihiga. The absence of any profitability estimates 
regarding the adoption or increased production of hybrid maize has been remarked 
upon already, so those for whom the lack of credit was a constraint could not 
be identified. Credit was obtained by some who would not be regarded as experiencing 
a shortage of internal funds - though that in itself is not positive proof that 
they do not "need" the credit, since it is in the nature of things that when 
individual's command over resources is limited the offer of more, particularly 
when it is free, is rarely refused. However, it is quite clear that some of 
those qualifying for credit had already adopted hybrid maize and were already 
applying the recommended practices5 their inclusion in the scheme is certainly 
not justified on the grounds of their need to obtain the extension supervision. 
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The inevitability of this outcome is discussed below, in the course of examining 
the details of the scheme« 
The type of credit chosen for Vihiga is short-term "seed-time to harvest", 
and it is tied to the purchase of specified inputs® The implications of this choice 
should he considered® Firstly there is the assumption that the constraint is the 
absence of funds to meet current outgoings2 and not to purchase capital assets 
(storage facilities, for example). The implication is that such an injection 
would have to be repeated annually, but in fact this issue was never discussed. 
Indeed it may be that the rationale underlying the project was to permit the 
producer to raise his productivity to a new higher level which would permit him 
to be self-sufficient after the first injection. If this were the case it may 
well justify the provision of credit at less than commercial rates, and this 
arrangement might be replicable over the whole country, a small area at a time. 
It is strongly recommended that this issue be given consideration, in order to 
establish whether the credit should be provided on non-commercial terms (as in 
the first year when no charge was made) or commercial + terms (as in the second 
year). 
Secondly, it is tied to material inputs of specified types (as well 
as to intensive supervision), and is not available to finance other current 
expenses such as the hiring of labour. These complementary inputs have to be 
found and paid for by the farmer himself® This reveals the implicit objective 
of the project, and the particular interpretation of the resource endowment of 
the areas 
its purpose is to "benefit farmers with a surplus of family labour 
but with insufficient funds at planting time to purchase..®®... 
seed, fertiliser, and insecticide" (l6, p.l). 
It should be pointed out that the original proposal by Harmon 
(US AID) included labour as eligible for credit; this was later ignored or 
'X 
dropped © 
Thirdly, the loan is in kind but repayment has to be in cash implying 
that at least part of the crop must be sold for cash, or cash must be diverted 
from other uses to repay the loan. This conflicts with the idea of individual 
self-sufficiency and nil dependence on a local maize market, but not with the 
idea of self-sufficiency for the Division through individual specialisation. 
+ Strictly speaking, less than commercial terms; there were apparently 
no attempts to cost the exercise or to compare interest rates with those 
determined under commercial conditions® 
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Fourthly , the concept of a growing crop as security for a loan is 
self—contradictory% the crop must he consumed or sold, and either way the 
security can disappear while the obligation to repay remains. Only if the 
crop is marketed through a parastatal authority is control retained when the 
crop is disposed of on the market, and only then can the crop be employed as 
security against a loan. Under these conditions a broadly-based credit 
scheme is possible, paying little attention to selection criteria, but even 
then there are problems of black markets, and what to do if output fails. 
However, in the Vihiga case no control is maintained over the marketing of 
the crop; consequently alternative means of enforcing or encouraging repayment 
are required. To this mistaken view of the security offered by a growing crop 
may be attributed the restriction of the credit scheme to producers who satisfied 
fairly stringent and restrictive criteria, and the emergence of a group of 
recipients for a proportion of whom the provision of credit appeared to he-
justified on neither of the grounds discussed above. The minimum maize acreage 
requirement of two acres eliminated a large proportion of Vihiga farmers from 
the schemes only 61 per cent of the farms have a total acreage of two or more 
acres, and only 13 per cent grew two acres or more of maize in the 1970 rains 
(l, Tables 13, 34-) * Some farmers may have been able to increase their maize 
acreages and therefore qualify for inclusion, but for the vast majority the 
two acre rrdnimum must have been either uneconomic or physically impossible. 
P. Moock pointed out that "The average self-declared farm size of loan 
recipients is nearly seven acres..6." (32, p.5). Among the 22 farmers 
selected in the first year from outside the SOC—farmer sample were one chief, 
two sub-chiefs, three AAs, and several teachers and traders. In the second 
year both the selection procedures and the outcome of the selection process 
were criticised by P. loock. The sub-chiefs and the AA5s were supposed to 
publicise the fact that loan applications would be received from anyone 
wishing to apply, and to make known the days on which loan applications 
would be accepted at the locational or divisional offices, but according to 
Koock few farmers knew of the yearns programme or the opportunity to apply 
for loans, let alone the particular days on which applications could be made-
Among those selected were several "farmers who clearly do not suffer from any 
financial constraint in the purchase of maize inputs, (and who are not) in our 
opinion,.e®®®e in most need of the intensive supervision extended to credit 
recipients" (19, p.l)» v.;io Koock's impression was that a number of sub-chiefs, 
and some AAs as well, exercised their discretion about who should be informed.. 
Considerable screening also apparently took place at an informal level before 
applications were presented to the formal committees® 
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As would "be expected from the great selectivity of the scheme as it 
was implemented a high proportion of the loan recipients had already adopted 
many of the hybrid maize recommendations, 
"Of the 56 farmers who signed loan agreements and (were among the 600 
initially surveyed); 
(i) .. 79 per cent had already adopted hybrid maize 
(ii) . • 61 per cent grew hybrid maize in the 1970 Long Rains 
(iii) oa jO per cent were already using chemical fertilisers 
on hybrid maize 
(iv) 18 per cent were already using D.D.T. on hybrid maize" 
(16, P.2) 
Fifthly, in the first year of the scheme no attempt was made to 
recoup any part of the cost of the provision of crcdit, but in the second 
year this was amended to an interest charge of 12 per cent per annum (l6; p.2). 
Possibly this reflected the conflict of views on subsidised credit noted above; 
"The provision cf loans must be recognised as necessarily 
containing a large element of Government subsidy. (Stops should 
be taken to ensure that it) does not amount to a waste of public 
funds" (16, p.2) 
"Subsidisation of credit is not recommended because-~it t e n d s t o 
produce an enterprise that may not be able to stand on i t s - o w n 
feet" (17, p.40 A donor report!) 
The earlier discussion suggested that subsidisation of credit was a 
wrong strategy where annually repeated injections were envisaged, on the grounds 
that such a strategy was not replicable on a national level, but that there 
might be a place for it if a once-and-for-all injection could lift the producer 
permanently onto a sounder economic footing, having implemented the other part 
of the package. However, just as the question of whether the injection should 
be repeated or not was never thoroughly examined, neither was the issue of the 
subsidy element in the loan - ignoring for the moment the even greater subsidy 
involved in the intensive supervision. This issue is directly related to the 
concept of credit-worthiness, which, as one of the selection criteria, has taken 
on considerable significance. Ideally it should mean "worthy of receiving credit 
that is, being rated a low risk of non-payment. In deciding who qualify there 
is obviously on inherent bias in favour of the already-successful, and against 
potcr.tic.l.ly-oucc2osfnl producer if creditworthiness is the test. However, 
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the choice of the "non-progressive" and the low productivity producer as the 
target of the scheme does not necessarily imply that non-creditworthiness 
(i.e. the likelihood that the producer will default) should become the 
criterion; instead it requires the introduction of a procedure which will 
identify the potentially - creditworthy among the present "non-progressive" 
and low productivity producers. So again the critical issue is the producer's 
view of the profitability in use of the inputs and the husbandry skills 
provided by the package. However, if the credit is subsidised then there 
will be a distortion of the profitability of the crop and more will be 
encouraged to grow it than market cost/return relationships allow. As pointed 
out already, if the credit is a one-shot "funds for take-off" type which will 
not be repeated in subsequent years then the distortion will not be considered 
and those who are on the margin of profitability will presumably revert to 
traditional crops and practices in the subsequent season. But if the provision 
of subsidised credit is to be a permanent feature of the production system the 
distortion may become considerable, and the production of high-cost hybrid maize 
become a problem to be encountered in the future. It has also been pointed that 
the continuous provision of subsidised credit is a non-replicable strategy, and 
therefore inconsistent with the principles of SRDP. 
A final comment is due on the failure to see credit as only one of a 
number of alternative ways of encouraging the adoption of a hybrid maize package. 
It would appear that the alternatives, such as different types of extension,. 
demonstrations, farmer training, production grants, have not been considered, 
still less subjected to experimentation. A discussion of alternatives was 
initiated by Harmon, but appears not to hav£ been taken seriously by anyone 
else respc&sible for the development of the Vihiga programme. The exclusive 
concentration on credit provision may explain the reluctance to amend the 
scheme in the light of the results of the performance in the first year, 
despite signs of apparent ineffectiveness of credit cf the type provided. 
Of the 76 farmers whose applications to receive credit were approved, 63 
used the credit - two refused the loan after signing, six received inputs 
but invoices were not submitted by the stockists for repayment, and for the 
remaining five the reason was not known. The repayment rate as of May 1972 
was 72 per cent (31, p»l) a low figure despite the fact that the loan was 
interest free; in October 19719 after the harvest when the loan was to have 
been repaid, the repayment rate was only 2<S per cent (15, p®6). To this may 
be linked the fact that the actual increase in yields attributable to the 
application of the packatge may not have been very large, though it is 
difficult to be conclusive in this.respect. Yields of first year recipients 
ranged from 11 to 33 bags per acre, averaging 21 bags; yields achieved without 
credit by an admittedly non-representative group of "progressive" farmers 
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surveyed "by Po loock, the Area Evaluat or , averaged 18 hags per acre using the 
two fertilisers recommended, and 16 hags using only one of them® It is signif-
icant that five of this group used local §eed plus nitrogen,top-dressing and 
achieved an average of 19 hags per acre (32, p®5)® Of course, it may he 
appropriate to argue that the poor improvement in yields which can he attributed 
to the credit package was a direct result of the selection criteria-picking out 
producers who were already growing hybrid maize fairly well® However, that does 
not then permit the conclusion that had the "non-progressive" producers been 
selected their yields would have reached these levels® It is likely that producers 
already involved in hybrid maize found it profitable, and had no serious difficulty 
in finding the appropriate complementary inputs; it has yet to 'be established 
that this is true of the producers who are not involved in the credit scheme 
at the moment, or of the so-called "non-progressives"® The lack of success of 
the maize credit scheme.to date underlines the need to develop the experimental 
nature of the programme, and, if hybrid maize has still to be encouraged, to 
test other strategies for encouraging its adoption0 The fact that there is 
some evidence that neighbours of farmers in the credit scheme have adopted the 
whole of the package without credit suggests that, apart from the obvious point 
that for them the constraint was not credit, there may be a role for simple 
demonstrations as a means of encouraging those who feel that hybrid maize is 
profitable to commence production® In addition it is also questionable whether 
the distribution of extension advice was the optimal one; the considerable extra 
burden which the extension staff has to bear in servicing the loan recipients, 
many-of whom patently do not need their services, must have 'been the; expense'; 
of applying their.skills elsewhere® It has been said that the Vihiga ex tens ion 1 
services.were so under-utilised before that the other farmers are not losing 
anything, and the introduction of the credit scheme has mobilised this resource; 
however, the opportunity cost of this particular allocation of their time should 
be assessed not in relation to what they once did, but what they could now be 
doing insteado 
A principal conclusion is that considerable lessons can b© learned 
from the experience since the inception of the maize credit package® It is 
vitally important that the lack of success in terms of the objective of the 
project is not made a justification for writing off this experience, even if 
the project itself is discontinued® It is better to learn from experience 
than,to discard the project and pick up another in which the same errors are 
made, once more to no avail® The following are suggested as topics for carefully 
considered reflection on the Vihiga experience; 
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No strategy can "be blamed for wrong selection of the objective of 3 
project - the profitability of.maize production has to be. examined, 
the appropriate level of production of maize for Yihiga selected, 
the group of producers considered to be the target.identified,.and 
the availability of complementary inputs, in particular labour, 
within that group verified. 
Much of the experimental nature of.SRDP stems from the.willingness. 
to consider a number of strategies, and combinations of strategies, 
rather than to depend on a single change agent. Though much of the 
foregoing discussion has centred on credit - since this was the 
chosen strategy - the possibility of using various strategies 
simultaneously within a particular area in a way designed to 
establish which are the most suitable for replication should not be 
overlooked. The use of a variety of measures necessitates careful 
experimental design in order to be able to ascribe results to particular 
strategies. In the project as it is currently implemented it is not 
possible to establish whether credit or the extension advice which 
is given to credit recipients is the more effective. 
The choice of the provision of financial assistance should be seen 
to emerge frpm the identification of a short-run or long-run cash-
flow problem, which in turn nes§ssj$«te» an examination of the. 
present "internal" sOturcefc. of funds for the purchase of inputs, and 
principal expenditure flows which might compete with agricultural uses. 
It may be necessary to reconsider lending money to enable producers 
to hire labour® 
The need for loaned fynds having been established and the potential 
recipients identified, the next consideration is the choice whether 
to create what might ultimately become a permanent facility through 
which credit or other types of loans would be offered, or provide 
one-shot "take-off" injections of finance. This would include a 
review of the most appropriate repayment schedules, in the light 
also of (3) above. 
The final area of choice concerns the alternative ways of introducing 
the loaned funds into the production system, bearing in mind that if 
the ultimate requirement is,a fairly permanent: credit structure 
adequate effective security, not to mention administrative competence, 
is required. Should it be', funnelled directly to the producers over 
whom, in. the case of maize, there are no sanctions in the event of 
non-repayment, or should it be provided via the marketing 01- input 
supply commercial channels, over whom there may be a greater degree 
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of control? Even if credit extended to input stockists was not passed 
on to the producer the availability of supplies of inputs might well 
he improved® Indeed the improvement of commercial services complementary 
to agricultural production would have important consequences in that 
sect ore 
OTHER COMPONENTS OF TEE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PROGRAMME, 
One of the serious problems with the Vihiga agricultural production 
pi1 o^ ramrne xs its emphasis on a single product, hybrid maize® It .lias certainly 
been the inte-ition throughout that other products will be added, but in the 
third year cf the programme, 1972/73, the only product that is being added to 
maize as an SRDP activity is tea® Other products under discussion or somewhere 
in the process of planning include cattle, vegetables, poultry and pigs, but 
none of these has yet reached the filial planning stage. The failure to develop 
additional production programmes, and the limited range of alternatives presently 
under discussion are sources of considerable concern. In 1970 Harmon stressed 
xhe need for simple farm profitablity estimates to enable the development of a 
broader programme.. At that time it.was understandable that these estimates did 
not exist, but now, two years later, there is less excuse for these figures still 
not being available. Given the crucial importance of farm profitability calculations 
to assist in the selection of additional products for the agricultural programme, 
it is disturbing to note that no attempt has been made to start collecting this 
information® Substantial quantities of survey data have been collected in the 
600 farmer survey, but no parallel exercise has been undertaken to provide farm 
management information. It is recommended as a matter of urgency that attempts 
• c nacle ".o .start collecting simple farm management information perhaps with the 
assistance of the Farm Management Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture, which is 
just starting a national recording system for similar purposes. 
In addition to farm profitability estimates, there is a need for further 
discussion with agricultural scientists familiar with the Vihiga environment to 
see if there are any additional products that might be worth developing. The 
current discussion is confined to the products listed early in the planning of 
the Vihiga programme. There is a need to widen the range of alternative products 
under discussion. This should be done with the assistance of agricultural 
scientists and those involved in the collection of farm management information. 
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Among the products under discussion at present, none looks promising 
for more than, a small group of farmers with ahove average entrepreneurial skills, 
and ahove average resources of other kinds. There are the farmers also eligible 
for the maize credit package. There is little indication that any of the production 
programmes currently under discussion will help the majority of Vihigans. Unless 
the majority is consciously planned for, it does not look as if SRDP will he 
significantly different from what has gone before in emphasising the small 
minority of well-endowed farms and leaving the majority alone. 
There are some problems with the proposals for tea and dairy cattle, 
and with those for other products that are at earlier stages of planning. 
However, the main criticisms are those given above; many ethers are similar 
to those already spelled out for the maize credit packages for example, to 
encourage the development of tea through the provision of credit again ignores 
the labour problem® It is not intended to pursue any further evaluation of 
the other individual production projects in this paper. 
F - 56 
GMUATICASR OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ABRANGEAIEISITS 
FOR MARKETING AID CREDIT 
The following comments are directed at the institutional arrangements 
chosen to he the vehicle for the provision of credit to selected maize farmers. 
Earlier in the report it was pointed out that the information available on the 
institutional framework of the Villiga economy is limited, and this is now 
discussed in relation to the marketing arrangements. The central theme of this 
section is that the maize credit package has not been grafted onto the existing 
.market structure; instead it forms an over-lay largely independent cf the local 
marketing system® Fcr this reason it may be a less efficient system than one 
which uses existing marketing resources to the full. 
OUTLINE CF THE INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE 
The institutional arrangements chosen for the provision of credit to 
maize producers in Vihiga involve selected existing stockists of agricultural 
inputs as agents of the Government rather than as profit-maximising enterprises 
in their own righto This results from the nature of the credit instruments or 
"Authority to Incur Expenditure", issued to successful loan applicants, which 
entitles them to specified quantities of hybrid maize seed, fertiliser, and 
insecticide up to maximum monetary value free of chargec On being presented 
with this document the stockist is expected to supply these inputs to the farmer. 
He then submits signed invoices for the inputs supplied to A.F.C. KakgrASga for 
verification, and repayment is subsequently made through the A.F.6..office in 
Nairobi. The administrative timelag which results from this procedure means,that 
the stockist is obliged to provide free credit to the producer (or to A.F.C., 
depending on how one looks at it) between supplying the inputs and receiving 
payment from the AoF.C. In the first year of the scheme, 1970/71, the 
producer was not required to pay interest on this credit, but in the second 
year a charge of one per cent per month was introduced. But although the 
credit is provided, by the stockist until he is paid for the inputs - at which 
time the A»E60«. effectively makes a loan to the producer - none of this interest 
payment accrues to the stockist, even though it is charged for the entire period 
between the producer accepting.the conditions of the scheme and receiving the 
authority to incur expenditure,and.repaying to the 4.F.C. It is little wonder 
that some stockists refused to honour the authority, and complained-that the 
time taken to effect payment (apparently 30 to 60 £ays) tied up their limited 
capital for an excessively long period of time (15, p.6). 
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The selection process, and the means whereby the stockists obtained 
supplies do not appear to have been discussed at all.. The incentive to encourage 
stockists to take part in the scheme is presumably the potentially higher level 
of sales of the inputs which they could realise, though this can/^e^ichieved 
through the carrying of a higher- level of stocks; itps.not clear whether these 
are obtained on cash or credit terms. If they were responsible for obtaining 
these additional stocks on cash terras then their availability of capital would 
be an important factor influencing both their willingness to participate and 
their degree of co-operation. Presumably proximity to the participants in the 
scheme was also an important consideration, rather than other characteristics 
of the stockists such as efficiency or size. It appears, however, that their 
co-operation involves a modification of .their normal commercial behaviour's in 
the first year of the.scheme the total value of the loan was calculated at 
standard input prices, but as there are apparently no list prices for fertiliser 
supplied in small lots up-country, there was substantial variation in the prices 
charged by different stockists. Although this may be a normal characteristic 
of the inputs market, it was considered to be a deficiency of the scheme since 
it meant that lower application rates resulted for those producers who were 
obliged to purchase inputs at higher prices than those at which the credit 
requirement had been calculated. (The fact that input price variation alters 
the economically-optimal package appears to have been overlooked)® Therefore 
in the second year stockists were expected to supply inputs at specified prices, 
Irrespective of cost differences and variation in profit rates among different 
types of fertiliser. 
However, there appears to be room for improvement in the service 
provided by the stockists. Some appear to have little knowledge of the 
appropriate fertiliser application rates (15, P«9-)s and the apparently wide 
range of bag.sizes and fertiliser analyses is probably an inefficient mix. 
nevertheless, where co-operation is sought it is inappropriate to endeavour to 
make good these deficiences by edict rather than through the creation of the 
necessary incentives• It is 'understandable that stockists were not happy about 
participation in a scheme which showed such disregard for their interests. 
THE EXISTING MARKETING STRUCTURE. 
e 
In suggesting fuller participation by the existing marketing institutions^ 
it is recognised that planners are handicapped by the limited amount of information 
which appears to be available on these institutions. There are apparently several 
different types of participants in the Vihiga marketing structure for agricultural 
inputs and outputs; (l)_agents of the Maize and Produce Hoard; (2) shopkeepers 
who buy maize, store it, and sell it in Vihiga again; (3) input stockists''4) coffee 
cooperatives® 
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(1) The agents of the Maize and Produce Board are supposed to step into 
ia-s maize market to purchase at the Board buying price (the floor price) when 
there is a surplus of maize. However, it is frequently stated that Vihiga is 
a maize-deficit area, and that the role of the Board is therefore very limited 
in this respect. In 1971 no maize wastblivered to the Board and according to 
the Beard this is the normal position. If the area is a deficit area, the 
Maize and Produce Board might be expected to meet the deficit by selling 
maize in Vihiga once a ceiling price is reached. There is little evidence 
of the Maize and Produce Board's activities in this respect, although one 
would net normally expect them to use their buying agents for the sales. 
(2) The shopkeepers who buy maize, store it, and sell it again perform 
two functions. They provide a ready cash market for the crop at harvest, 
when cash requirements are apparently high, and they store the maize crop 
until it is required for consumption, at which time it commands -a premium 
reflecting the,producer's desire for ready cash, the cost of storage, losses 
during storage, and the cost (including transport) of obtaining supplies from 
elsewhere when necessary* Apart from that there is little information on , 
their functions. It is not clear whether all farmers sell at harvest time, 
whether those who sell buy back later, or how the flows go. Nor is it clear 
whether,the price differential would be reduced by.the provision of more 
storage, either at shops or on farms. Furthermore, it is not clear whether 
they would benefit or suffer from a substantial increase in maize output. 
These questions require investigation. 
(3) As has been pointed out above the role of the input stockists is 
an important one but very-little analytical work appears to have been carried 
out; indeed there is a paucity of information even of a descriptive.kind — 
how many stockists are there, how big are they in terms of turnover, how many 
customers does each have, what are the capital requirements of their businesses 
with which other activities in the agricultural or commercial sector.are they 
integrated? Few of these questions can be answered, and therefore little can, 
be said about the determinants of their performance. It would appear that 
since their function is to derive a living at least partially from the sale of 
agricultural inputs they are potentially in a position to both estimate 
the probable extent of the market for fertiliser, and identify those 
producers who are considered to be worthy of credit.® Indeed they may already 
provide inputs on credit, but it is open to question whether they can adopt 
a more risky policy of identifying the potentially creditworthy, rather than 
those who are already successful, and therefore good risks. 
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(4) An existing marketing channel vJiich provides some of the envisaged 
functions such as credit and input provision is the coffee co-operatives, 
which should be mentioned as an alternative form of institution which may 
have a role to play in the development of the maize package. There are four 
such co-operatives? concentrated, naturally, in the coffee producing part of 
the Division. At least one of them already provides hybrid maize inputs as 
an alternative to cash for coffee deliveries. However, in relation to the 
large indebtedness of members to the co-operatives and in turn the indebtedness 
of the,co-operatives to the co-operative union, and the very low sales per 
member, the following comments were made; 
"oo. it would appear the existing co-operatives are not financially 
capable and do not have satisfactory management to handle the 
business of making and collecting loans now or in the near future. 
The societies have a bad reputation of losing the members® money, 
something most .undesirable for a society making loans ; or accepting 
deposits." (15, p.16). 
Both their- location and their own internal, problems make them dubious channels 
for the maize project, but there are lessons to be learned from their experiences. 
It would be extremely useful to have a more detailed knowledge of how 
the Vihiga agricultural marketing structure operates. To what extent is the 
provision of inputs an integral part of the crop marketing arrangements? Are 
inputs already financed by credit against the maize crop? The- Division is said 
to be a deficit areas as we pointed out in Section II additional-marketing 
information would establish whether this is so. Are additional supplies 
channelled into the area? At what prices? When and where from? How are 
fertilisers supplied to the area at present? And so on. 
THE ENVISAGED MARKETING STRUCTURE. 
The eventual., enlargement of the scheme to include very many more 
farmers (600 in 1972/73 and 6,000 eventually) is intended to be accompanied 
by the development of new cooperative societies (15, p.12). This proposal, 
iiaplicity rejects the present marketing structure for this purpose, without 
seriously considering the reasons for which it is inadequate. The only 
justification for new cooperatives seems to be the usual textbook argument 
which presumes the instantaneous and cost-less creation pf an efficiently 
managed and. versatile structure providing credit, inputs, savings bank 
functions, crop storage and marketing services -all the services "necessary3 
for the up*=take of the production scheme which the farmers are unable to 
provide themselveso No attempt has been made to cost this proposal. It is 
F - 40 
interesting to note that the principal comments made about the inadequacies 
of the present market structure relate to its poor performance as,an instrument 
for the provision of the inputs under the maize production scheme, hut as has 
been pointed out there is no evidence that the functions the marketing system 
•was required to perform in this respect were commercially oriented in the 
first place. 
In the absence of any critical evaluation of the existing marketing 
system it is not possible to assess the merits of the proposed new cooperative 
structures. The functions which it is expected to perform are comprehensive 
(15, Pel4)j but there is no indication of the steps necessary for the creation 
of such a structure, the resources that are required, and the management 
organisation necessary for its efficient operation. The proposal appear9 not 
to have benefitted from the experience of the coffee societies in Vihiga, and 
others elsewhere attempting to organise marketing and provision of credit and 
inputs on a cooperative basis. There is an implicit assumption that the 
injection of funds, and a small amount of supervision,from the A*F&C«ris 
sufficient to engender a strong spirit of cooperation, and an unlimited 
supply of mangerial talent from among the farmers themselves. The words of 
caution in an. earlier donor report appear to have gone unheeded: 
"For some reason developing countries are. always excited by the idea 
(of cooperatives)® Theoretically, they appear to be such a simple 
and practical solution to their problems. It is enough to look at 
their record® Even in countries where qualified managers are 
available and where farmers are sophisticated, it has not been good. 
e.® The Vihiga Program makes reference to "organising farmers9 to 
do various things, but current evidence is that they resist this. 
Their past experience with such organisations as the Coffee 
Societies provide ample reason for them to be wary® The P.A.O. 
Fertiliser Program has had no success in organising groups in the 
Division to purchase fertiliser and maize seed. The reason for 
this needs further study before attempting to create marketing or 
purchasing cooperatives". (17, pp.37338). 
/ i -
It is not, of course, assumed on an a priorxbasis that cooperatives 
are.the wrong form of marketing organisation® The principal point of the 
argument is that too little attention has been devoted to,the mechanisms 
involved in the creation of a completely new organisation, and that too 
little consideration has been given, to the possibility that the development 
of the existing marketing structure, possibly including existing co-operatives, 
might provide a cheaper and more efficient alternative to the creation of a 
new one® 
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EXPERIMENTATION IN MARKETING. 
Although the approach adopted to problems of marketing inputs and 
outputs has displayed certain novel features, none can be attributed directly 
to a desire to experiment«, Indeed, the novel features appear to emanate from 
a reluctance,to devote effort to the analysis of the existing institutional 
arrangements, and a reluctance to design the package in such a way as to 
involve the intricate system of suppliers, and marketing intermediaries 
which appear to exist in Vihiga. Far from attempting to employ appropriate 
incentives to encourage the desired, conduct and performance of these institutions, 
the adopted approach has been to regard them either.as an adjunct of the , 
extension services, to behave in accordance with Government direction (or, more 
correctly, expectation), or as redundant institutions, to be replaced at the 
earliest convenience by totally new structures to perform their functions. 
(1) Inputs% It has already been pointed out that stockists of inputs 
were obliged to carry the burden of part of the credit extended ^  the producer, 
due to the administrative organisation of loan financing. They were also expected 
to stock the appropriate inputs, and charge uniform prices. They were expected 
oo bear the risk of financial loss if the increase in demand for inputs did not 
materialise. The "experimentation" may therefore be identified as the dependence 
on the goodwill, rather than the commercial judgement, of the stockists in 
question. The economics of supplying inputs is nowhere analysed. 
(2) Outputs? The lack of attention devoted to any analysis of.the maize 
marketing system in Vihiga is regrettable as this could have firstly, quantified 
flows and prices necessary for planning, purposes; and secondly, identified 
functions and performance of different types of intermediaries, and the kinds 
of obstacles which they encounter. In turn this could have led to the package 
being directed to a more-appropriate group of producers, and to incentives being 
built into it to guarantee the supply of supporting services in. the marketing 
field. Analysis of this area could have provided clear evidence as to the 
overall desirability of a maize programme in the first instance. 
An explicit form of experimentation would of course be involved in 
the replacement of the existing marketing framework with some new cooperative 
body performing its functions® The trouble with this proposal is that it lacks 
any evaluation of its likely success on the basis of available .-managerial resources 
and expected levels of member discipline. It- is an experiment insufficiently 
checked, as to likely success or failure in the first place® 
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The adoption of a more experimental approach with regard to the use 
of the existing market structure is recommended. This could have two functions? 
firstly to indicate the most appropriate type of production programme required 
in Vihigaj and secondly to act as a commercial vehicle for bringing innovative 
packages to the producer. It has already been pointed out that the understanding 
of the present structure,of the market in Vihiga is very limited. However, if 
this were to be improved, and the various intermediaries in marketing and input 
provision employed as a source of the requisite.information on product and input 
flows - instead of relying, as so often happens, on the producer to provide all 
the necessary information - then it might become possible to talk more meaning-
fully about the "maize market" in Vihiga, and to identify opportunities to be 
exploited (such as marked differences in supply and demand conditions between 
areas within Vihiga leading to different recommendations regarding increased 
and decreased production of maize), or bottlenecks to be removed. A lack of 
storage facilities may be an important issue, and. one in which existing 
intermediaries have a vested interest; possibly there is scope for longer-term 
loans to them for the provision of storage, the organisation of which could 
incorporate a producer credit scheme, if such were to be necessary following 
the emergence of a more rational price profile during the year. 
In the same way as the maize credit scheme encourages producers to 
respond to the incentive of credit by adopting hybrid maize, the improvement 
cf the various services offered by the intermediaries could be effected by the 
introduction of a system of incentives operating in their part of the market. 
The provision of credit to input stockists through the fertiliser market or 
the hybrid seed market could be a welcome development; its effects could be 
various § extension of credit to producers, improvement in the stocks of inputs 
available to the farmer, or cost reductions and improved efficiency in the 
distribution of these requisites are some of the possibilities. Indeed there 
may even be scope for trying out subsidised inputs to test the effects of the 
existing overall marketing organisation for fertilisers and seeds. It is also 
likely that any measures which heighten the degree of competition in the local 
market between intermediaries are likely to benefit the producer;.on the other 
hand it might be possible to devise measures to b^ing about a reduction in the 
number of participants in this part of the market, and the amalgamation of 
particular functions (such as maize buying and input provision) in order to 
foster the development of normal trade credit, and in turn a more prosperous 
commercial component of the area which would be attractive to financial 
institutions. It may also be possible to.explore experimental ways of 
'bringing these functions closer to those of the Maize and Produce Board, 
whose involvement in Vihiga appears to be of peripheral importance at the moment. 
A particularly simple development might "be the organisation of the 
provision of market information to the producers and to the. intermediaries; 
that a system of sorts exists is undeniables reports of considerable amounts 
maize being sold green from the field, and much early mature maize being 
taken to markets at some distance by taxi-in 1971 - suggests that there is 
already a fair flow of market information* The question concerns its adequacy. 
The idea of involving the marketing and the input-supplying inter-
mediaries is not altogether new; the local maize speculators have already been 
proposed as a group which could become the channel for credit offered by the 
K.j?.A. (18). However, as long as the objective remains to increase the output 
of maize, it may be necessary to seriously question the compatibility of the 
three functions they are envisaged as performing - maize speculation, supplying . 
fertiliser, and supplying credit. A substantial increase in .the output of maize, 
brought about through increased adoption of hybrid maize and increased utilisation 
of fertiliser bought on credit, could upset the balance struck at the moment 
between the level of output and the speculative functions! If there were no 
floor in the market, both the post-harvest price and the end-of-season price 
would fall - the former more than the latter if there was a shortage of storage 
facilities — and the speculative earnings would, remain the same. But since there 
is a floor in the market made effective by the Maiz§ and Produce Board purchasing 
maize when the price reaches the intervention level, the outcome might be a very 
much reduced turnover for the speculators, and a narrower price range throughout 
the season as the Board would be required to perform the storage and resale 
function provided by the speculators. Therefore if the Maize and. Produce Board 
were to become of more importance in the maize market in Vihiga, it would, be at 
the expense of the present maize speculators ~ they would therefore oppose this 
trend by refusing to encourage a substantial increase in maize output. The 
alternative would be that they would be forced tc keep the price above the floor 
by competing with the Board.for.supplies, but this could lead them into an over-
bought position, the end-of-season price would, reflect thSfe (due to the need to 
find other markets at that time) and a drop in price would lead to a diminished 
economic performance by the speculators. 
A further sensible experiment would be t° identify the principal local 
and more distant markets for agricultural produce, to collect price information 
on a range of crops, those already grown in Vihiga and these not, and ascertain 
the extent to which there is an untapped market for Vihiga produce at these prices 
This in turn implies an ability to evaluate the profitability to both the produce 
and the merchant of a particular line. ,There may well be opportunities to r tden-
r.lise the organisation of these markets, even providing existing intermediaries 
with incentives to extend their functions beyond their present range. 
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IffiCOMMESTOATIONS 
There arc many recommendations implicit in this report; only the most 
important are listed here. As far as Yihiga is concerned it would appear that 
those involved in the planning process are either out of touch with the principles 
and objectives of S«H0DOP&? or too willing to relinquish control over the design 
of a project leaving,it to the donor. The need for outside financial assistance 
may well he pressing, hut there is a clear divergence of interest between the 
Kenya Government in S^ RoD.Pc and the normal objectives of donors. As has been 
shown in the main body of the evaluation report, the essence of S.H.D.P. is to 
discover effective development strategies of wide application and minimal 
dependence on external resources through a process of experimentation,, I ndrs, 
on the other hands usually wish a project to be a successful development in its 
a right. A successful experiment may not be a successful developments the 
criteria of success are quite different. The former is judged by the aipount 
(inch is learned about a given situations the resources involved in it, the 
way in which it works, and, above all, the ways in which it can be changed in 
a given direction* The latter is not concerned with this knowledge per so but 
with the attainment of immediate goals such as increased output or incomes. 
It is vitally important that this distinction is borne in mind when considering 
the recommendations which follow. 
It. is. .recommended that the Vihiga experimental maize credit package 
-^e substantially,modified...light of the experience of the last two seasons 
before it is extended^to more,.producerso 
It is evident from the preceding sections of this report that at the 
moment the experimental design of the maize credit package leaves a lot to be 
desired; nevertheless the experience of the last two seasons can be made to 
yield much of value for the future. The component s of, a, well-organised 
experiment ^iculd r.ow bo much clearer? 
(1) an understanding- of the principal intern-relationships 
affecti og the selected area - not simply the collection 
of a voluminous quantity of data- but an assessment of 
+hc- resource base sufficient to suggest possible objectives 
and strategies for specific projects; 
(2) careful and. precise specification of the ultimate and 
immediate objectives appropriate to the needs of the area; 
(3) careful, and precise specification of the most appropriate 
strategy or strategies that can be expected to lead to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
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(4) the. formulation of the strategies as consistent experimental 
projects from -which lessons can he learned; 
(5) a monitoring procedure to check on the experiment tos 
(a) check during implement at ion. that the understanding 
of .the..resource base, production and marketing 
processes is correct; 
(b) check that the perception of the needs of the area 
is correct; 
(c) check that the.strategy is. not modified in the course 
of implementation to the extent.that it loses value 
as.an experiment or becomes divorced from its original 
objectives; 
(d) identify and.effect the necessary "running repairs" 
to the project, in the light of the information 
collected under (a), (b), and (c)« 
(6) collect and analyse the results of the experiment, and draw 
conclusions regarding the success or failure of the project 
in terms of the S.R-.DaP. principles and objectives. (See 
Recommendation 5 below). 
One of the most.obvious practical problems is the extent to which the 
donor can be expected to co-operate in the modification of the project now that 
it has become apparent that the. project is deficient in terms of the S.R^D.P. 
principles-and objectives. It would be understandable if a donor resisted 
modification on the grounds that the project is already successful according 
to its own criteria (which might include criteria such as numbers of farmers 
receiving credit) and that a proposed change.is likely to lead-to a deterioration 
in performance according to its own.criteria. If it were not.possible to count 
on the- willingness of the donor to co-operate in extensive revision of the project 
in line with the principles and objectives of SBR.D*P»r then its future as an 
integral-part of S.R.D.P. would be in jeopardy. It is not anticipated that this 
difficulty will arise with regard to the maiae credit package, though detailed 
discussion will be required as to the specific manner in which, the package is 
brought in line with S«R<cD.®P0 aims.- Specific recommendations need to emerge 
from deliberations involving the Government and the donor; here it is appropriate 
to elaborate upon the ways in which the project could be modified to make it 
more consistent with the objectives and principles of S.ReD®P. 
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A e The, Jbfiectives s 
The maize package requires a more specific production objective, 
to replace the ill-defined "self-sufficiency in maize"® For example the 
original spirit of the objective, of the maize package was to increase the 
nco®.es of the existing low-incme- producers, through, improved, maize husbandry 
and increased .'maize' production® If the attempt is made ,to recapture this 
spirit and develop a specific objective for the project, the relationships 
between farm• and non^farm income, between maize and other enterprises, and 
between production and marketing of the crop will all need to be considered* 
All of these affect resource availability and resource, allocation decision-
rakiiig-a Resource use„ production, and sale of output must all be ."a--.^-- of 
the objectiveo 
The Strategyg 
It follows from the above comments on the char-act eristics required 
the ob jective that the chosen strategy (or strategies) should relate to 
t-r.e perceptions of resource bottlenecks among those producers to whom the 
project is directed® Doubt has been cast on the general validity of the 
"labour surplus" interpretation of the resource endowment-of Viiuga| 
consequently a strategy of providing assistance for the purchase of. material 
inputs may be frustrated by the.-lack of complementary labour® -In. the absence 
of more precise information on. the nature of the bottlenecks it may be fruitful 
to experiment with various, strategies representing different interpretations 
of producer resource constraints® 
Either the strategy should remain as it is in broad outline, but 
attempts be made to identify those producers for.whom credit and extension 
supervision are bottlenecks to hybrid maize production, i et. producers for 
whom hybrid maize would, be profitable and.who. have surplus labour resources 
coupled with a cash»flow problem and a. lack of hybrid maize knowledge* At 
this moment- it is not possible to tell how big.this group.might bo (it might 
be quite small), but farther analysis of the 600»=farmer survey may assist here® 
If solutions were to be found to such problems as lack of.security and. ineffective 
distribution of material inputs s 
i 
solutions which still satisfied the requirements of replicability on a larger 
scale, this would constitute an important breakthrough in the provision of 
producer credit 0 
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Or alternative strategies could, be desired for different types of 
resource constraint, such as extension unaccompanied b.v credit, further 
demonstrati9ns of hybrid maize in appropriate places, producer group extension 
experiments, and various others* These could be compared with credit provision, 
and, if appropriate combined with credit provision if this-were felt to increase 
the impact of any one of the other strategies. 
Or the strategy of credit provision should be radically redirected 
to involve the commercial sector, and aim at the increased efficiency of input 
provision and,-maize marketing, The provision of financial assistance to the 
commercial sector might lead to,the extension of credit-to producers, as the 
customers of the intermediaries, but if..it did not this- need not constitute a 
deficiency if there was a concessit ant improvement in the complementary services ® 
i 
It would also be an improvement if.the fertiliser wholesalers (presumably the 
K.PoA.) were drawn into the scheme, to ensure that the.question of the avail-
ability of appropriate supplies is thoroughly examined, in the light of the 
relative costs of different types and packagings. The extension input could 
still be directed to those producers who are likely to derive benefit from it. 
It is vitally important that if encouragement is to be given to the 
commercial sector it must be consistent with their interpretation of the market 
and their own objectives® However, since they are dependent on the agricultural 
sector for their own livelihood, it should not be impossible to design a scheme 
in such a way as would provide for the improvement of both producers' and 
intermediaries11 economic welfare® 
2® It is. recommended that serious attention be given to the identification 
of _nej_ projects for inclusion in the Vihiga programme for different groups of 
The interpretation of the resource endowment of Vihiga contained in 
Section II of this report - in particular the. stated need. to. increase-returns 
to labour as well as to land, the.need to cater for th$ differing requirements 
of the various types of farming groups in the Division, and the prospect of 
encouraging some.degree of.specialisation - should be used as a starting point. 
In this regard it will be valuable to analyse further the results of the 600-
farmer survey, and possibly to supplement it, in order to illuminate the nature 
of the agricultural structure of Vihiga0 The target should be the construction 
of a realistic stratification of farm types for which, different . programme:-will 
be needed® The next step should then be to devise suitable programmes for the 
different groups.;, the starting point for this should be farm profitability 
estimates appropriate to each of the different farm types, and consultation 
with technical specialists who may suggest new products« 
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It slwuld be stressed that this is not a recommendation to shift the 
emphasis Trora maize to one of the other 23 or so items in.the original Outline 
Programe5 hut rather a suggestion that consideration should he given to new 
products and projects not hitherto considered in the Vihiga contexts 
3o It is recommended that, great care,he taken in the specifioation of 
the object Ives. both ultimate and .immediate, of every pro.iect considered for 
inclusion in the-Vihiga, programme,, and that great care be taken to ensure that. 
every, project conforms, '-hr> SoRaD*P. principles. 
i 
Firstly, the need for this is particularly marked with respect to new 
projects not yet included in the programme because their content and design 
depend on the choice of objectives, Secondly, the objectives of existing 
projects should also be reviewed in the light of the experience with the 
maize credit package. It might be worth asking relevant variations of the 
quest!9n "How much of What is to be produced by Whom and sold to Whom at What 
prices8 leaving What level of profit, or net income?" of each production 
project. A standard procedure should be determined so.that there is no 
possibility that a project with virtually unspecified objectives reaches the 
implementation stage. Similar care should he taken to ensure that the project 
conforms with S.H.D.Fe principles at every stage. 
4s It is recommended that in planning the -programme a longer view 
embracing the integrated nature of the projects be taken, as well as a short 
•view of their objectives. 
With the.Vihiga maize credit package it is very unclear what the long-
run perspective is; some consideration of the longer run evolution of the 
programme, and the development of the area after the termination of the 
programme, should be included in the process of planning. This is another 
way of saying that the ultimate objectives of the programme must be shorn to 
be"organically" related to the immediate objectives of each of the constituent 
projects of the programmes 
.5» It is recommended that a procedure for continuous, evaluation caJJablo 
cf j.xecipitating action where necessary be developed; 
-Such a monitoring system as sketched,out already under recommendation 
(l) is recommended for several reasons e First, it appears that during the, 
planning process the original project can be changed out of all recognition, 
so that by the time that it is ready for implementation it no longer serves 
the objectives for which it was designed; this happened to the maize credit package 
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Secondj information and experience gained daring the early years of implementation 
provides a valuable "basis for improvement! it should be possible to modify a 
project, or a programme, quite drastically in the light of experience, In Vihiga 
the information was available to permit fundamental modifications.of the credit 
package following,the first year of its implementation® Third, conditions 
themselves change, and by the time a project gets under way more attractive 
alternatives may have become available» 
For these, and other reasons, continuous evaluation should be used 
to contribute to the successful development of the programme* 
6s It is recommended that where technical (e «g-„ agronomic) information 
is required closc liaison be developed with specialist institutions® 
It has,been pointed out earlier in this report that there appeared 
to be room for improvement in the technical recommendations® With specific 
reference to maize the Kitale. research station staff should be requested to 
visit,Vihiga to conduct a more precise technical assessment of potential for, 
maize, and develop more precise technical recommendations. At the same time, 
however,':; the prospect of conflict between technical and economic efficiency 
should be borne in.mind in the undertaking of such an exercise? Specialists 
should also be bro'gight in to discuss selection of new projects, to solve 
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IITTROBUCTIOI-T 
THE RATIONALE FOR niVOLVEMElTT 
Satisfactory levels of rural development can be achieved without 
"people-involvement"o This has "been exemplified in the United States and 
Canada, where the developer takes a couple of hundred acres which have 
been deserted by migrants to the cities, runs machines over them, and 
comes out with a few thousand bags of wheat„ Whatever we may think of 
this model of "rural development" it is hardly feasible in independent 
Kenya, 1972. If there are people on the land and you plan to develop 
it without evicting them they are inevitably involved, at least in the 
end result* But men are not machines and they will also involve 
themselves in the process of development one way or the other. Thus, 
unless they are purposefully involved by the planners, they can easily 
sabotage it, through: 
1, miscomprehension of the use or maintenance of a new structure, 
e0g0 of the need to bring all cattle weekly to the new dips; 
2o suspicion of the motives of the developers, e®g. reluctance to 
stake their lands against loans for inputs to start new crops 
for fear of a plot to steal those lands; 
3° opposition to the aims of the projects or to even minor aspects 
of them, e3go a Muslim community told to raise pigs to supplement 
their diets0 
4° development of total dependency9 i0e«, of apathy and expectation 
that government will do everything, including maintenance. 
Without local consultation, the developers can also sabotage their 
own work through: 
10 planning with insufficient data, e0g. planning for a district -
wide stockmarketing programme on the basis of a short survey of 
oattle in an aberrantly overstocked sublocation; 
20 failure to anticipate local resistance as illustrated above and 
to move to correct it, e.g. assuming that people will welcome 
the idea of a marketing cooperative and have enough organisational 
skills to carry it on after several years' support although the 
programme does not provide for local training in such skills. 
3° failure to fully mobilize local potential - creative ideas, 
labour for implementation and maintenance, skills and tools, etc. 
- e0g0 retarding a roads programme because of high labour costs 
based on wage rates three or four times what local labour- expects 
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to be paid, or costs for work which locals would be willing to 
do voluntarily in order to get the roads. 
Sudden development efforts by external developers often raise 
unrealistic expectations, which are inevitably dashed, leading to local 
suspicion of the whole effort. Local involvement in planning and implemen-
tation dampens these unrealistic hopes as they arise by making clear to 
the people the constraints of time, labour, money, and other resources 
which impede local and national development. 
In Kenya, the Harambee movement has proved that local people -
ranging from a few villagers to many - can organise themselves to 
advance their own development in significant ways. Local interest 
groups - from coffee cooperatives to clan advancement leagues and women's 
handicraft groups - have the motivation and discipline to select 
projects, commit resources, and carry them out on a massive scale 
never dreamt of under the old colonial administration;, 
LOCAL nrTOLVEMMT A2ID SRDP 
Maximizing local involvement in SRDP should aim at three 
objectives: (l) success of the SRDP projects, whatever they may be, 
through maximum useful local assistance and information; (2) integration 
of the local self-help efforts with the national goals, without 
killing local incentive and enthusiasm; and (3) training of local 
leaders and their groups in improved methods of planning to produce 
continuing integrated development consistent with the constraints of local 
resources® 
"Local people" is herein taken to mean resident non-officials 
and low-level " idigenous staff at sublocation and occasionally 
locational levels® Attention is focussed on "local interest groups", 
local people who have organised around a common factor - Harambee 
committees, Maendeleo ya Wanawake groups, high school students' 
associations, indigenous age sex work groups, kinship—based improvement 
f societies 
village committees, locational councils, or other functional committees 
(e.g. church, school)® It is believed that these groups have the 
greatest potential for discussion, planning, and implementation in 
their own spheres at the local level® It is also maintained that 
the higher the level at which a local leader operates, the less he knows 
of his constituents. The district head of an organization is usually 
elected as & result of compromises and thus seldom can clearly 
represent an issue; he also moves within the district elite circles 
and loses contact with the non-elite® 
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SRDP planners are expected to make their own plans, "but also 
to consult sufficiently with low-level local leaders to ensure that local 
constraints - either resources or popular opposition - can he overcome. 
(An additional benefit of this process is that the leaders will inevitably 
add local refinements to the plans which will increase their chances 
of success®) Once SEDP has been given open publicity, submission of 
locally-initiated plans for either SRDp/local/combined implementation 
should be encouraged for consideration by SRDP planners. The SRDP-cum-
district group and the local groups should work on their separate plans 
and criticize and improve each others', the SRDP staff should decide 
where their activities will merge; and local and SRDP groups should 
work together on implementation of a project. Minimization of external 
inputs and consequent replication elsewhere can only be made possible 
through constant bias towards local consultation, planning training, and 
implementation. And only through this bias can SBDP create an area that 
will continue to develop when the special staff and inputs have been 
removed. 
A SCHEME OF IFTOL VEHE1TT, WITH ALTERNATIVES 
The following four phases of activity may be isolated from the 
flow of SRDP: pre-planning, planning, implementation, and evaluation. 
In reality after the first few months a little of each activity should be 
proceeding simultaneously, but for each project the phases should be 
discrete (with re-planning following evaluation in many cases). 
Two-way information transfer continues throughout, but in two discrete 
phases. In the past initial publicity about SRDP has occurred before 
anything else. This is a tactical error, since the delay between SRDP 
announcements and implementation has usually brought about a hardening 
of staff and local prejudices about the promised projects, a spreading of 
rumours, and disillusionment with the SRDP potential. Pre-planning and 
initial planning exercises should occur without publicity or Government 
commitment® After initial data gathering, leaders of local interest 
groups should be invited to seminars for training in methods of planning, 
and for consultation about the possibility of Government aid to local 
projects if they are well presented® Initial planning by local groups 
should then continue on the basis of these possibilities® After enough 
plans have been presented, vetted by local people and SRDP staff, accepted, 
and have secured allocation of Ministry funds, then a public announcement 
can be made with the usual fanfare, followed immediately by implementation 
of various projects. After this public commitment of funds to special 
local development a second phase of information transfer begins® 
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Below are discussed the place of local involvement in each phase, 
the shape it should take, and the benefits it brings. Information 
transfer is crucial to much of the process and is thus discussed in 
detail at the end. This section forms a frame of reference against 
which the actual area performances are discussed in Part II0 
1° Pre-planning,i.e., the gathering and analysis of data and 
identification of feasibilities for each area. Such collection of 
information should involve the local people to a great extent. At 
present even junior officials associate more with the elite of their 
area and draw their impressions of local wealth and potential from them 
(for an example see the Tetu paper on extension selection procedures), 
and as socio-economic surveys of rural areas are scarce this limits 
the base on which data and impressions are collected. Thus the first 
priority of SRDP must be a random household survey of the total 
population, to gain a true picture of area resources and subareal 
variations. This could be carried out by JAAs, with strict sampling 
instructions and a few days training. 
SEDP planners shoula depend heavily on local opinions for 
identification offbasibilities. One of the items surveyed by the 
JAAs could be spot reactions to a list of tentative projects, to 
discover which of them local people have strong feelings about, one 
way or the other. But, most importantly, local low-level staff and 
leaders of local interest groups (c£f.Information Transfer) should be 
consulted to determine local needs and priorities and to get more 
detailed local assessments of the chances of the tentative projects. 
Some local opposition, if known," can be dissuaded by appropriate 
arguments in public forum; some may require scrapping of otherwise 
appealing ideas lest the whole programme suffer. 
2. Planning, i.e., the identification of project and gtjal 
alternatives and priorities, of available resources, and of major 
resource constraints. In this phase every possible local group -
Locational and Divisional Development Committees, Country and Area 
Councils, subchiefs' barazas, self-help groups, cooperatives, market 
committees, churches, womens® groups, etc. - should be invited to 
extend the list of proposals already made by the SRDP planners and 
to debate drawbacks, benefits, and priorities. Leaders of each group 
should send in reports and these should be summarized, circulated 
among SRDP planners, and sent back to the local groups, so that the 
latter will realise the conflicts and try to resolve them in Development 
Committees or barazas. The effects of this are the provision of 
practical local training in the development of criteria for choice 
between projects (enabling future non-SHBP development), open 
commitment by local people to the projects chosen, and specification 
and commitment of local resources to the projects. The presence of 
government experts (Livestock, Veterinary, Agricultural, Health, etc, 
Officers) is essential, especially at the early stages of debate, 
to point out defects in a plan before commitment goes too far. 
This could be achieved by announcing their availability for consultation 
to leadership seminars and barazas. All officers should come to 
seminars and introductory chiefs' barazas and give brief descriptions and 
examples of the relevance of their expertise (e.g., without proper 
disease control a cattle marketing scheme will not work) to motivate local 
groups interested in a project in their field. In the final case, 
3PDP must decide which of the local projects it will support or execute 
itself, and with which it will merely avoid interfering. 
Specific planning of SHDP projects must also involve local 
low-level staff. These people have a valuable contribution t o make., 
provided, the problems are presented to them in a sufficiently specific 
format. They are the experts on the degree of agricultural, health, 
market-rules knowledge and knowledge-application among different 
sectors of the local population. They have a more general view of 
their speciality than local laymen and a more area-specific view than 
ITairobi or Provincial bosses. And they are willing to put much more 
.into 
effort into a project which they have helped to plan than / one wished 
on them by their superiors. 
3• Implementation, monitoring, and maintenance. Involvement 
in this phase is through whatever local inputs have been decided on 
in the previous phase® The more the local inputs, the lower the cost 
to Government, the greater the capability of the local people tc 
maintain the established structures3 and the greater the local 
commitment to make full use of the structures. But failure to include 
people in planning and to present comprehensive information to the 
people about the function of a project cannot be redeemed by local 
labour "participation" at this stage® 
Local inputs are self-help groups (and coordinating sub-
chiefs and chiefs), hired local labour (skilled/unskilled), borrowed 
or rented tools (tractors, mules, lorries, brick-making devices), cash 
contributions, and local consultants ( c, ft planning phase). Hired 
labour (a) reduces (by its cost) the number of people who can participate, 
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and ("b) raises external inputs (Government costs). Self-help labour 
(a) lacks special skills, and (b) runs the risk of being over-allocated 
on the assumption that the supply is infinite (this applies to all 
local contributions). Over-allocation in the face of the protests of 
strained local people can destroy an area's self-help movement for 
years. 
The relationship between SRDP and on-going self-help projects 
deserves consideration. Sometimes project x in area y - e.g. dips 
or water - has already gained a workable momentum before SRDP 
enters, and any interference with it is a waste of SRDP resources, 
besides risking decreasing rather than increasing project momentum. 
SRDP must be idea-intensive in its relationship with the Harambee 
movement, creating new types of projects or improving the efficiency 
of old ideas that are failing, rather than aiding old projects which 
are continuing successfully or which have already reached their appro-
priate goals. (See Case Study on Tetu in our report for more specific 
recommendations). 
Under the Kenyan system the only Department responsible for 
integrated development on the sub-divisional level is the Community 
Development Department. The CDO/CDA is basically a registrar of 
projects and a liaison agent between small - and medium-scale self-
help groups and other Ministries' experts and funding agencies. Some 
CDOs discuss local wants and what to do about them with local people 
informally and formally. The CDO is less important under the SRDP 
involvement plan as outlined here, since there are many other channels 
of communication and discussion. But when SRDP leaves or plans break 
down, the CDO is the person specifically assigned to continue the two-
way flow of communication and to superintend, encourage, and co-ordinate 
the self-help development effort. Thus his position under SRDP should 
be upheld rather than undermined. 
Monitoring and maintenance are an essential follow-up to 
implentation, but are often ignored by planners. If a dip is built no 
one worries — for a while-whether it is being used properly, or is 
falling apart. Either low-level local staff or leaders of the relevant 
groups must monitor the use of the structures and call in repair crews 
(or repair it themselves) when parts start to break, erode, or rust. 
But even where a plan calls specifically for local maintenance -
e.g. of Migori roads - no one has given thought to how to achieve this. 
The local group must commit itself to monitoring and maintenance in 
full knowledge of the processes and time it entails, and they must know 
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-./here to go for help in extraordinary cases such as when delivery of 
dip fluid stops, or a gully too deep for local tools to fix develops in 
a road. Some kind of reporting system must he established - e.g., the 
local water - pipe leader reports the state of the line and pump 
to the Locational Development Committee once a month. Kenyan 
Ilarambee groups have generally not been involved in routine maintenance, 
but that does not mean they cannot be. 
4e Evaluation: once a year, each local group which was active 
in planning, or which has surfaced as important since, should be 
invited to write a report on its opinion of programme implementation 
to date - what has or has not gone according to schedule and 
why, what has failed to be done or to be used once finished, what 
planned projects they think should be revised, eliminated, speeded up, 
etc. These reports should be summarized and spread through the 
information channels,, and further feedback based on them encouraged 
at meetings and through revised group reports. A final summary report 
should be called for in the reporting system. This process will lead 
to a better on-going SPD? programme, to a more precise understanding 
by the local people of the development process and generation of 
internal development impetus beyond the 5-year plan, and to increased 
self-reliance in the rural communities. 
5. Information Transfer. SEDP should experiment with various 
channels of communication, always bearing in mind that the second most 
important aim (after pure information to public) is to stimulate return 
information from local sources. Some of the channels listed below are 
inherently two-way (a - d, j and k) and some can easily accomodate 
local individual comments (eand g). The channels are divided into two 
•k'f 
groups: the first three are usable throughout SEDP (and after) and the 
rest only after initial public announcement of SEDP in an area. The 
basic objective is to reach all the people - old men, youths, isolated 
.' farm workers, illiterates, and all. 
The following arejaozt-public channels: 
a) Development Committees permit more intensive discussion of 
overall SEDP plans with SEDP staff, and continue during and after 
SEDP to co-ordinate local self-help efforts. But even lay members 
of the District Development Committees are unlikely to be in touch 
with local non-elite aspirations. One way to get around this is to 
build up the DDCs from a hierarchy of sub-locational, locational, 
and divisional committees, each group selecting members to serve on 
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the higher body and providing it with suggestions. A permanent 
sub-locational body seems to be unnecessary, as sub-locational barazas 
meet frequently and with little inconvenience to the farmers. 
Another way would be to scrap the District committees and 
require the proposed new District Development Officers to attend 
Locational and Divisional Development Committee meetings (and to help 
the CDO to create or reactivate the committees where they do not meet) 
and co-ordinate their plans in a district framework. 
(b) Leadership seminars and training have an inherent defect, in 
that the identity of the leaders is specified by SRDP, but with 
careful identification of local interest groups this can be overcome. 
This forum provides a more formal training in methods of planning and 
constraints and benefits of specific project types to key local people, 
but it is necessary to guard against its tendency to minimise discussion. 
Local interest group leaders should form a firmer base for compromise 
between interests than consultation of elected general leaders who are 
already the result of election compromises. 
(c) Opinion leaders' consultative committees are an informal structure, 
existing as a list, in the SRDP offices, of people to contact if a quick 
check on local reality or opinion is needed. Membership would encompass 
those in the leadership seminars and possibly go beyond it, to include, 
for example, leaders from urban workers' groups. 
The following are public channels: 
(d) The baraza has gained a bad reputation at. the grass-roots level 
in several areas of the country, but is still useful for transferring 
information. The sub-chief's baraza has usually been a forum for 
earnest discussion of plans and rectification of complaints, but the 
chief's baraza is usually addressed only by recognized local leaders, 
and at the Divisional/District levels the only local participation is to 
sit in the hot sun and clap when visiting dignitaries have finished 
lecturing in a strange language. SRDP barazas should be held at the 
locational level; there are too many sub-locations for SRDP staff to 
visit all of them on a regular basis, and a Divisional baraza is too 
big and allows 110 chance for non-leader participation. Baraza moderators 
(the chiefs/SRDP head) should be convinced of the need for discussion 
and compromise between the aspirations and constraints of different 
groups and projects. Baraza leaders should concentrate on information 
transfer from SRDP and amongst local groups, and on identifying new 
emergent interest groups. Optimally, the original chiefs' meetings after 
the first public announcement should be held at the beginning of the 
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least "busy agricultural season, followed "by sub-location meetings 
continuing tlie discussion. 
-.lid 
(e) Radio cannot he isolated to the SRDP area^ is limited hy 
the number of radios in the area, and by the uncertainty of tuning 
in at the correct time of day for the programme. Thus, if it is to be 
used, it should convey information of general rural interest which can 
detailed within a fifteen-to-thirty minute programme and repeated 
several times during the month; for instance, an exposition of 
required dip strengths and the consequences of failure to maintain 
them, or a description of a new marketing outlet for handicrafts in 
Nairobi which will send out an agent if written to by an interested crafts 
group. 
(f) Mobile cinema is limited by the expense of producing cinema 
programmes for a limited circulation. Its advantages are visual impact 
and probably a larger audience within the area (presuming it is well 
publicised). Cinema audience peculiarities should be noted, e.g., in 
some areas women are not supposed to go out at night. The cinema should 
be used for teaching about all aspects of a project in the hope that if 
it works, that is the people carry out their part of the project better 
than before, the film can be exported outside the SRDP area. One problem 
with visual media is that, since the actors and scenery should be local 
for maximum impact, its effect diminishes and even warps as a film is 
moved farther from the home area. The teaching benefits of a film 
should bo weighed against its costs and the probable range of impact. 
To avoid blunders about cultural symbols in all the media (e) through 
(i), locals should be involved in planning films, programmes, article 
wording, etc., as well as in acting, speaking, being interviewed, etc. 
(g) A local newsheet allows a near-simultaneous exposure to a 
wide variety of projects and plans and so furthers popular recognition 
of the need to choose between projects in planning. A, newsheet is 
always available for reading but a radio must be listened to at a set 
time, daily/weekly. A newsheet can be truly local. Finally, the written 
word is often found to be more influential thaft tke spoken one. 
Low levels of literacy are found in the same areas as low 
levels of radio ownership. In the 1968 SRDP baseline survey, literacy 
was more prevalent than weekly radio-listening in all 6 areas, and 
newspaper-reading more than or approximately equal to radio-listening. 
It is our contention that newspaper—reading (or being read to) will rise 
significantly if a local newspaper is available. That newspaper-reading 
equals or surpasses radio-listening when the only newspapers are urban-
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oriented., non-vernacular, and hard to obtain in rural areas indicates 
the power a local paper could have. 
The newsheet need not he more than two to four pages issued 
bi-monthly and pinned to a tree or shop in a central place in each 
village. It should include occasional articles by SEDP or other 
Ministry staff, but should primarily contain articles by local leaders -
from chiefs to village committee heads to womens' leaders - describing 
the overall progress of their constituencies and making any suggestions 
they would like discussed. Supplies and personnel would involve 
mimeograph machine, paper and ink, and the part-time services of a typist 
and someone trained (even if only for two weeks) in composition and 
editing skills - perhaps a special DO's clepk. The paper would have 
to be published in the major local languages, one or two in each area. 
(h) Posters and leaflets are unique-purpose versions of the newsheet, 
and use the same resources. They aim at a smaller group or single 
project, and theoretically provide greater impact on either. 
(i) Visual aids, if used creatively, can be highly valuable in 
motivating and training illiterates, semi-iiterates, and even literates, 
"One picture is worth a thousand words" but it has to be the right 
picture. There are three major forms of static visual model: (l) the 
simple drawing, (2) the photograph or complex drawing, and (3) the three -
dimensional model. Each holds possiblities of violating local sensitivities 
through improper use of a cultural symbol, e.g. depicting friendship by 
two people embracing in what locals consider an obscene manner. The 
meaning of the simple drawing is the most quickly conveyed; the 3-D 
model attracts the most prolonged attention and can be the most overpowering, 
but also holds the most possibilities for unintentional symbol violation 
if local people are not consulted in creating it. A11 example of the 
simplest 3-D model is a small-scale stick model, of a house and farm; of 
the most complex, a real-life demonstration farm. 
(j) Discussion in schools, can be carried out by teachers and 
visiting officials to train pupils in planning principles useful to them 
in the future (and possibly communicable to parents), and to pass on 
information to parents about specific projects. Agriculture classes, 
health education classes, or general assemblies can serve as forums. 
(k) Discussion at meeting places - markets, schools, hospitals 
and health centres, dip days, cooperative pay-outs, PTC courses, etc. -
can involve people not otherwise reached through the above channels or 
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draw special attention to the connection between SEDP and the activity 
for which they are gathered at the tine,, 
CASE STUDIES 
This section attempts to present how these concepts have been 
operationalized in the SEDP areas. The discussion of each area 
confronts a different problem. In Tetu data was collected through 
questionnaires and extraction of relevant information from official 
files. In the other sites researchers contacted a number of non-
official key informants, used a wider and looser format for interview, 
and observed in the area. Key informants were selected from categories 
of progressive farmers, chiefs and sub-chiefs, heads of development 
committees and self-help groups, large traders, and leaders of 
cooperatives. In Kwale, an additional sampling of ordinary farmers 
was made. The descriptions below must be read while remembering that 
they are the perceptions of the people interviewed. If most people 
interviewed said that SEDP in their area had nothing to do with dip 
building, this belief is taken as fact, even although it may be mistaken. 
The belief rather than the actuality is what we are interested in 
discussing in such a case. 
TETU 
The Tetu data for this report was collected in a controlled 
experimental design to answer the question: to what extent is SEDP 
affecting incidence and type of development projects in an area: 
XT5 ^©XrVX6<WGcL 
Key informants were '^ " and official files analysed to provide 
lists of all projects found in a random sample of sub-locations 
(over half) in Tetu and two neighbouring Divisions - Mathira and Othaya, 
He focussed specifically on self-help as the most obvious form of 
locally generated involvement in development. 
The self-help movement has been vigorous in these areas for 
many years. Mathira has had 201 projects in eleven sub-locations up 
to the end of 1971) Tetu 193 in thirteen sub-locations, and Othaya 110 
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ill eight. Mathira shows the greatest variety and innovativeness in 
purposes of groups - water tank and pullover buyers, men's houses, etc.-
but Tetu groups have adhered more to the economically or communally 
related projects such as tea picking and pig-rearing groups, a social 
hall, and bridges. 
The evaluation report on Tetu SEDP pilot extension project 
(Appendix E) exemplifies involvement of the local staff, at various 
stages. 
Number of Self-help Groups; 
The advent of SEDP in Tetu has coincided with a decline in 
numbers of new self-help groups. Before 1968 77 projects had been 
started, and in the next two years there were 65, but 1970 saw only 
22, rising to 29 in 1971. Erom 1968/69 to 1970/71, the number of new 
water, nursery school, and women's groups (the latter involved in 
better-homes construction) declined sharply, and number of churches 
and dips rose to a somewhat lesser extent. Pour medical centres 
were added in those two years where none existed before, and the number 
of new dips and churches almost doubled. But only one water project 
and one women's group were added to the large number of earlier 
projects. 
In Mathira, at the same time, from a base of 76 projects 
registered up to 1967? 65 were added in a two year period 1968/69? 
rising to 38 in 1970 and then declining to 22 in 1971» Water projects 
increased sharply between the two-year periods (1968-69 and 1970-71), 
while primary and nursery schools declined greatly, with dips somewhat 
less. 
In Othaya the growth in numbers of projects was constant through 
1970, and then dropped drastically in 1971 • New schools, water, 
womens' groups and dips declined, and only new bridge projects 
increased. 
Effect of SEDP on Specific Projects? 
Using Mathira and Othaya as controls, we can deduce something 
of the influence of SEDP. Tetu had 33 dip projects by the end of 
1971) Mathira 20, and Othaya 11, thus indicating that the rise in 
Tetu projects concomitant with the Mathira-Othaya decline was not due 
to an earlier start in dips in those areas. This suggests that the 
dip-encouragement project is having an effect. But whether this was an 
efficient use of SEDP - whether they need so many dips (33 in 13 
The number of water projects in Tetu has declined, while that 
in Mathira has risen. SEDP has only "taken over the older projects 
in this area, a takeover which is sometimes nominal (all external 
contributions supplied by UETCEF, etc.), and sometimes a replacement 
of earlier committed donors by SEDP. 
S E D P in Tetu - and in other areas - is "integrating itself 
into on-going programmes" too well in the area of self-help. Before 
adopting an on-going self-help project (such as dips) the planners shoxild 
step to consider: (l) is this project already well enough accepted locally 
so that it can reach its desired goals without our help? (2) has it 
perhaps already reached the desired goal? (3) are the funding sources, 
sources of needed skills, and local understanding of the maintenance 
process good/efficient enough so that our interference will not improve 
them? and (4) will locals regard Government takeover as a sign to cease 
their own contributions? If the answers to these questions are "yes", 
S E D P should not become involved in the project. And, after helping 
old projects in the ways noted above, SEDP's role with respect to 
self-help should surely be an idea-intensive one. Publicity and 
advice should be given to small projects that seem to fit into the 
SEDP goals (such as pig-raising groups), and possibly they should 
publicly© projects from other areas or other countries in $lie hope 
that local groups will be formed to pursue them. Success and failure 
(ftiid reasons why) of such projects should be publicized in the area so 
that each village will learn from others' experience0 Such an experimental 
progr&ffljae is cheap and if considered a success can be easily replicated 
elsewhere. It depends primarily on an active Community Development staff 
and the use of media as outlined in the section 011 "Information Transfer", 
There is adequate baseline data in Community Development Piles to allow 
it to be evaluated under the SEDP principle of experimentation. 
the Effect of S E D P on j Variety of Projects and the Harambee Spirit: 
The 1970/71 decline in Tetu in incidence and variety of 
total projects, and especially in the incidence of new small-scale 
projects (nursery schools, women's home-improvement groups, miscellaneous 
farming and small stock-keeping groups, etc.) leads us to suspect that 
the grass-roots self-help movement there has lost impetus. The same 
thing may have happened in 1971 in Mathira and Othaya. 
The Area Coordinator remarked that self-help in Tetu has been 
overtaxed by the large number of Harambee projects pushed by aspiring 
politicians in the last few years, e.g. the huge hospitals, reticulated 
water schemes, and new technical institutes. These are piled on top of 
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an already keen competition among sub-chiefs and chiefs to have the 
greatest number of mini-projects in their own areas. Poor farmers can 
only contribute a limited amount to development, but the politicians do 
not recognise this local problem in their struggle for national 
recognition. Field workers report that there are in fact a number of 
new self-help groups forming in these areas, but they are avoiding 
registration so that their project is not expanded by politicians or 
administrators beyond what they can afford. 
This is a serious situation, and SBDP in Tetu should experiment 
with ways to rectify it, since it is occurring and will continue to 
occur in other parts of Kenya as well (already the newspapers are full 
of reports of similar problems with respect to the Coast). The only 
effective solution to a problem of this type is an on-going planning 
board (Development Committee) for (predominantly) non-politicians at 
the Locational and Divisional levels, with regular consultation with and 
the sub-chiefs1 and chiefs' barazas,^ with the authority to set priorities 
for projects above sublocation level. For example, if the Divisional 
Development Committee vetoes an HP's pet idea he can take it to a chief's 
meeting to have it restored, but the existence of a DDC veto will keep 
people from feeling they will be called traitors if they vote against 
the idea. 
As yet there is no Development Committee in Tetu below District 
level, and the SBDP meetings held for or by the chiefs only told them 
and their people what was going to happen and what they would have to do. 
The fact that there is no SEDP money yet released except for staff and 
a few water projects only increases the local feeling that they are 
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VIHIGA 
The Vihiga programme demonstrates some of SEDP's weaknesses with respect 
to people-involvemento The first news non-G&vernment people received of the 
programme was as in other SEDP areas at an introductory baraza held by the PC, 
at which they were told SEDP was coming to raise their incomes and increase 
their opportunities for employment,, As in other SEDP areas, a long period 
of inactivity followed, during which people plied their local extension agents, 
with questions, and officials came around to urge people to contribute to dips, 
without explaining what Government would contribute in return^ On a higher 
level, however, Provincial, District, and a few Divisional staff were involved 
in making plans and trying to find out where the funds would come from. At 
first chiefs (and MPs?) were excluded from the Planning Committee; but were 
later admitted. The establishment of such a Committee is yr.> However, 
during the present combined planning - and - implementation period, the 
Locational and Divisional Development Committees and County and Area Councils 
are avoided by the Area Coordinator, who prefers instead to link up with self-
help projects through the chiefs0 The weakness of this linkage in the past has 
caused widespread failure of projects in the western section of Vihiga0 
At the introductory baraza the people were promised incomes and 
employments, Aside from the long delay between the promises and the beginning 
of activities, when projects finally started they were apparently not concerned 
with incomes and employment, according to local definition,, Hybrid maize, MOW-
built roads, a HDD-built water project, and grade cattle may be defined as 
raising income and employment by Nairobi 
.and may do so in the long-term, but in local eyes 
the agricultural programme only raises home consumption and the others, while 
making life more pleasant, do not raise cash income0 Employment of local 
people on the projects might change their minds0 So might the various cash 
crop (and cash stock) schemes being considered for later stages but not yet 
announced to non-Government people^ It might be useful to hold seminars on 
the concept of cash versus total income, to establish whether the local people 
really want cash above all else when it is explained to thema 
A serious problem is the great amount of publicity given to the 
Vihiga programme both nationally and internationally0 Vihiga residents and 
migrants read these articles and compare them with reality0 Even if the Vihiga 
programme was going exceedingly well it could not compare with the panegyrics 
written about it. The comparison impairs any confidence the local people may have 
in the programme as a valid attempt to develop their area* 
If there had "been a greater emphasis on local communication, the 
maize credit package which is the centre of SRDP activity might have been 
substantially modified® At present it does not satisfy those eligible for 
it® Several first-year loanees did not reapply; there are perceived 
conflicts between the repayment of cash loans and the perceived purpose 
of maize as a subsistence crop only; and local stockists are extremely 
unhappy with their role® Neither farmers nor market committees have been 
consulted by the project planners® (Consult the report by Hay and Heyer, 
Appendix P for further discussion of the maize credit package®) 
There seems to have been a great deal of apathy and/or bad 
feeling connected with Government® In the popular view, original SRDP 
promises were broken as to time-table, income, and employment. The 
self-help movement in the past has not been properly controlled, too 
many unstaffable schools and health centres were built, and local 
opinion blames Government and local self-help leaders for this breakage 
of promises Government never made but politicians assumed® The situation 
has somewhat improved recently with a better record in respect to dips 
and water schemes, for which funding agencies (UNTCEF, SIDA, CDD) have 
always provided materials within a reasonable length of time® Self-help 
should now have sufficiently revived to be useful in other SRDP projects 
(such as roads, cooperative share-the-risk new stock/crop ventures, etc®) 
if only they will be proposed, and particularly if the people are allowed 
a voice in deciding on the types and choice of projects to be initiated® 
But at present farmers, traders, cooperative heads, Councillors, teachers, 
all seem, to regard the dips, water, and minimal hybrid credit projects 
as the most they will ever get out of SRDP® 
Vihiga self-help is composed of a number of temporary structures. 
Instead of permanent bodies accepting and co-ordinating suggestions, as 
in Migori, there are a number of committees for special projects® If an 
idea is presented by an official or a local person at a baraza, it is 
discussed and, if accepted, a committee is elected for it. The only common 
element seems to be the sub-chief, who is usually on every sublocational 
committee. His role is to legitimise and enforce the collection of funds 
from unwilling individuals; the less the plan has been discussed before 
at the baraza the more of these individuals there will be, and the more 
unsavoury the self-help reputation will become0 Relationships between 
Government and people based only on the sub-chief link have proved in-
adequate, and a strengthening of Locational Development Committees would 
be useful. 
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MIGORI-KURIA 
Migori SRDP has made a good start towards institutionalisation 
of local involvement, though the idea of grass-root involvement in 
planning was not acceptable to the planners and the lack of it is still 
I-.ving. effects. SRDP came to the area with the usual open-baraza and 
VIP fanfare in which discussion was severely discouraged, after which 
it withdrew into planning sessions of officials. Chiefs and Development 
Committee heads were included in the Planning Committee and Locational 
extension agents were called to meetings - at which, however, they 
apparently only received lectures. ITo one below this level was consulted, 
and even now the people we talked to - a chief, a Development Committee 
head, farmers, traders, cooperative officers - seem to know nothing of 
SRDP plans. One result of this is a vague resentment that SRDP is 
"doing nothing" (as they see it) about agriculture, the major form of 
local economic activity. The roads, dip, and water programmes are appre-
ciated, but there seems to be no confidence that these will work, or s 
expand beyond the early beginnings. Part of this may be due to a history 
of highly limited development funds and frequent promises by politicians, 
but part is also due to a lack of communication of the potentialities 
of SRDP as a whole. 
Under the second Area Coordinator and a new Community Development 
head, the SRDP emphasis shifted from non-involvement (in planning) to 
involvement (in implementation). To do this they strengthened a 
local structure which had been lying dormant for several years: an 
institutional hierarchy of development committees. The base is the 
traditional village committee of respected older men, which makes 
suggestions for new projects to the Locational Development Committee. 
The latter is comprised of one representative per village ( about 
200 families) elected within the sublocation barazas. Village suggestions 
are investigated and then fitted into the local scheme of priorities, and 
the LDC plans roads, dips, health, education, and any other inter-village 
affairs. Implementation is handed over to special committees, almost 
always with the Chief or Sub-chief to enforce the majority opinion 
against dissenters. The Locational and Divisional Development Committees 
were almost dormant when the new SRDP staff came and reactivated them 
by the simple procedure of requiring minutes of their meetings from the 
CDA's. We suspect that the prospect of obtaining government funds to 
help in carrying out their projects had a great effect also. At the same 
time, long-inactive local dip and airstrip projects are finally being 
brought to a successful conclusion. This revival of the grass-roots 
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available for only a very short time it is considered that this is not 
an indication of failure. The roads projects have been much discussed 
in the LDCs, but few villages have yet begun to do the actual clearing 
work required to implement them® The three roads under construction are 
all old ones offered to SEDP to improve*, Increased local involvement in 
planning the basic programmes is needed to convince the village committees 
to commit themselves to the development programme. The first step should 
be consultation at the LDCs and sub-chiefs' barazas on the planning of 
the as-yot locally uncommitted agricultural programme. (See appendix D 
for further information on the Migori SEDP.) 
MBEES 
Hithin the last year Mbere SEDP has seen large changes in 
staff attitude towards local participation,, Ultimate effects of these 
changes are still uncertain, but indications are good for a strong SRDP 
programme in future® 
All early SEDP studies and plans for Mbere stressed the 
reputation of Mbere people as conservative and hostile to development. 
Thus when the programme started there was little inclusion of the 
people in planning; self-help and administrative structures were 
ignored in favour of the clan elders in order to gain access to land 
and labour, and labour for a pipeline was paid instead of self-help. 
Cotton blocks failed, in some part because of the feeling that they were 
government projects and therefore to be charged the highest rental and labour 
rates possible, (Further elaboration on the failure of the Cotton Blocks 
Project appears in Appendix C.) The first group ranch was 
scheduled for an area that neither wanted nor needed it. Anothei 
pipeline was built by "harambee" labour that included some coercion. 
Most successful self-help projects were carried out in the realm of 
primary education, i.e. away from the influence of SEDP or other external 
government. 
Within the last year there have been critical changes of 
staff in the Area Coordinator and Community Development offices, and the 
situation described above is changing. Locational barazas have become 
forums for the making and discussing of local suggestions for projects; 
sub-chiefs' barazas' suggestions are passed on to SEDP for consideration; 
self-help committee members have lists of planned projects they hope to 
start work on as soon as present ones are finished,, On the administrative 
side, other Ministries have been persuaded to accept the help of Community 
Development in their spheres beyond Kenya-traditional limits. Communal share-
the-risk fields have begun to appear among the individual demonstration 
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plots set up "by Agriculture, and the infrastructure for A.I. has been 
quickly set up. It is uncertain at this time how much increased effort 
is being given to Harambee road-clearing and trench-digging tasks. It 
seems, however, to be much greater in the lower areas. These areas are 
poorer in infrastructure and agricultural potential. The richer, higher 
zone seems less willing to spare its labour, though more willing (and able 
to contribute cash. The labour constraints in the north-west should be 
more fully investigated and further self-help plans be biassed in terms 
of money/labour contributions accordingly. Another possible cause of 
upper-zone reluctance is the greater autocracy of the Chief, whose 
barazas are perhaps less "discussion-oriented". 
Local knowledge of SRDP present and future plans is quite good 
all over Mbere, and there seems to be widespread confidence that 
suggestions raised at barazas - for new roads, help with locally conceived 
projects, etc. - will be forwarded to government, seriously considered, 
and implemented. Probably this confidence will decrease as the level of 
infrastructure rises and choices have to be made - e.g., when 5/6 
sublocations all wanting a health centre realize they are not all going to 
get one, or, if they build it, get it staffed. This can be partially 
avoided through the process of getting people involved early (now) in the 
economics of decision-making at the Locational barazas. 
The Mbere self-help structure is removed from the clans or any 
other permanent body. Usually SRDP officials tell the Chief and sub-
chiefs about a campaign and the promised aid, and the latter call 
sublocation barazas at which it is discussed and committees are elected. 
A committee must represent each village but is otherwise open to all. 
In four committees there were a few ordinary farmers, sub-chiefs, 
traders, churchmen, teachers, "women", and councillors. Sub-chiefs 
interviewed insisted that clans are not concerned with matters of 
development and that there is no need to make sure all are represented. 
One said (approximately), "when I go to a clan meeting I am a member 
of my clan, but when they (the elders) come to mine they are just people". 
Since the clans are not involved in modernization (except insofar as it 
touches on traditional realms of authority such as land) efforts should 
be made to institute a new decision-making body - Locational Development 
Committee - to provide permanent co-ordination and planning of local 
In Kwale the problem of indigenous participation is an extremely 
difficult and important one® Kwale is divided between the indigenous 
majority Digo (and Duruma) and ever-increasing numbers of up-country 
immigrants, especially Kambao The latter have the education, co-operative 
skills, and progressive motivation to seize and hold SEDP attention. But 
the majority Digo object strongly to their mere presence, and will totally 
destroy the SEDP programme if immigrants pre favoured over indigenes -
even though most Digo do not understand the benefits to come from the 
various projects. Already many Digo are apparently convinced that "SEDP" 
is a code word for a Kwale immigrants' improvement plan. This suspicion 
has been voiced in County Council,* 
At present involvement of the people is being done on an ad hoc 
basiso Almost all projects mentioned were initiated by Administration 
and SEDP, via chiefs and/or local Ministry Officials. One of the two which 
are "locally initiated" is Kamba. The chiefs appoint leaders, or village-
elected leaders are approved by Administration, and then everyone except 
those immediately involved shirks the work. This is made easier by the 
fact that chiefs and sub-chiefs generally stay in the chief's office and 
wait for complaints, rather than go out to superintend projects. The 
traditional village committees are perceived locally as primarily religious 
bodies. Some of the younger Digo have identified themselves with the modern 
sector and form land adjudication and agricultural committees, but these 
progressive farmers tend only to work for their own group,, 
As yet self-help is used only for dips and the Kikoneni water 
project. The roads project needs to be accelerated but as a matter of 
policy no self-help labour is being used. Self-help has been very 
successful in the Kikoneni project. It was commendable that district-level 
staff was given authority to shift the phasing of projects when local 
political or ecological constraints make the original plans difficult 
or dangerous to execute. (This problem also came up in Mbere, with respect 
to group rancheso) 
Most Digo do not understand the benefits to be derived from the 
water or ranching schemes, and consequently ignore them or oppose them 
as immigration schemes. 
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The Community Development Department is weak because of 
recent and rapid turnovers of staff. 
Digo youths are increasingly rebellious and angry at their 
parents for not having educated them. Many of them will acquire their 
own land at adjudication. It is proposed that SEDP take advantage of 
this and concentrate on the younger generation. By agreeing publicly 
with the local belief that the elders' councils are for religious matters 
only and by saying that the elders should not be forced to change their 
old way of life, SEDP officials can legitimately concentrate on 
teaching and involving the young and middle-aged (who also show some 
signs of progressiveness). This involvement should be spread beyond 
the present progressive farmer group to avoid the creation of a small 
Digo elite which could cause problems later when other Digo try to enter 
the same sector. One possibility to be explored is a special agricultural 
training programme for youth, to concentrate on farming the new plots 
outside the villages, and to be located on one of these farms within 
the area. Agricultural instructors could be seconded from the regular 
extension agents or PTC teachers on tour, and room and board could be 
provided as in a camp - tents and minimal cooking facilities - so that 
costs could be brought very low. (Por further discussion of political 
and immigrant - indigenous elements, see the Kwale report, in Appendix B) 
KAPMGUEIA* 
Kapenguria presents as difficult a problem in involvement as 
Kwale, but (politically) a less urgent one, as the uninvolved and 
neglected group has little desire to change that state of affairs. 
The difficulties of bringing a pastoral people, minimally involved in 
any part of the modern sector, into an SEDP programme are enormous, 
nevertheless we suggest that at present they are not being approached in 
the right way. Emphasis should be placed 011 the presentation of project 
ideas to the Pokot elders and youth leaders, and a commitment to 
projects should not be made until they have such local consent. It is 
easier initially to simply impose projects - roads, improved catt"1 e 
markets - you think will have the effect of increasing receptivity to 
change, but the reaction to this imposition can nullify all hoped - for 
effects. Under recent policies in Kapenguria the effect of project 
imposition has been magnified by a failure to even notify the pastoralists 
+ This report was researched and written before the present Area Co-ordinatoi 
was appointed. It is confidently expected that the situation has changed 
of coming events. To the people of Sook a road meant more police 
coming to arrest their cattle-raiding activities, "but SEDP barazas 
to discover their needs and offer to help with them were scheduled 
for after completion of the road. When tractors appeared unannounced 
and began to cut down their trees, the Sook objected vigorously; 
police were sent to guard the tractors and the antipathy to the road 
(and possibly SEDP) was consolidated. Land acquisition for a holding 
ground project in one pastoral area was begun before the people under-
stood clearly what it was for, and MP's and Councillors joined in the 
protest against "Black Colonialists" stealing their land. In Kapenguria 
from the beginning the jobs of DO and Area Coordinator have been combined, 
and this has probably made it impossible to involve the pastoralists 
voluntarily with the law-enforcing SEDP. In order to draw the pastoralists 
into the programme, there must be a highly visible shift of policy away 
from imposition of projects, away from involvement of SEDP staff with 
administrative police, and towards solicitation of wants (or even demands) 
from the pastoralist leaders. Attention should be given to identifying 
leaders of different interest groups - youth, women, middle-aged, elders -
and to playing these off against each other to break the solid front of 
antipathy to the old style of SEDP„ Projects such as-the holding ground 
marketing system should be fully discussed at local leaders9 meetings, 
to work out its future implications and make compromise modifications 
in accordance with local ideas. Many officials say that pastoralists are 
incapable of such consultation, but it has never been tried more than 
halfheartedly, and the Kapenguria SEDP experiment is less likely to 
succeeed without it than with it. 
The agricultural area of Kapenguria - the Southeast - is more 
typical of other SEDP areas, and is receiving the most staff attention 
because it is so much easier to deal with. However, there is some tendency 
at. all levels to equate SEDP projects with those of the Community Develop-
ment Department, no doubt the result of the effectiveness and hard work 
of the CDO and AC/DO in Kapenguria « 
The integration of the self-help movement with SEDP objectives 
has proceeded quite fast, though not altogether smoothly. The dips and 
roads programmes have been proceeding very rapidly, but the dips in 
particular have suffered from a lack of expertise. The agricultural zone's 
goal is one per village (20-30 homes), which is surely excessive. Once built, 
some dips are filled with understrength chemicals which cannot protect the 
cattle, and some dips have been abandoned. The difficulty of getting 
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sufficient staff to Kapenguria is probably largely responsible for this. 
The chief from one of the two agricultural locations and the 
SRDP staff told us that many SEDP barazas involving local people in 
discussions had been held in the locations - even, in the chief's area, 
twice in each sublocation. However, others we talked to - traders, 
co-operative heads, a sub-chief - did not remember these or anything 
else about SEDP. An agricultural co-operative which provided the only 
supply of hybrid maize outside the main market had been notified (though 
not consulted) about the hybrid demonstration programme. 
It is debatable whether it is necessary to create more awareness 
about SEDP, since no one seems upset that it is not (in their perception) 
operating in Kapenguria. There is a need for more integrated local 
planning and consultation of experts in the agricultural zone, and, as 
we have discussed above, the pastoral zone- approach needs redirecting in 
a major way. Further elaboration of this appears in Appendix A. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Eecommendations on involvement in future SEDP areas are to be 
found in the section, "A Scheme of Involvement"*, The recommendations below 
are framed for use in thepresent SEDP areas, taking into consideration 
the past history of involvement and non-involvement. Although it is 
recommended that all areas strive to improve their relations with the 
local people, Vihiga, Kwale, and Kapenguria need the most effort in this 
field. 
PUBLICITY 
1. (a) Use barazas and leadership seminars to clarify the local perception 
of SEDP activities in the areas where it is confused, i.e. Kapenguria and 
Migori. 
(b) Eeduce the level of publicity on Vihiga, locally, nationally and 
.internationally. Tone down claims of major money inflows, great successes, 
as this tends only to disillusion the local people who do not see the 
claims reproduced on the ground. 
20 Experiment with a news sheet in Tetu (60 per cent of farm managers 
literate according to Ascroft et. al. baseline survey) and Vihiga (56 per 
cent Moock 600 - farmer survey). Collect literacy figures for Migori and 
Mbere (one in three literate should be enough). The news sheet should come 
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"be in the vernacular(s) and emphasize articles by local interest group 
leaders 011 plan successes, failures, and suggestions. 
3® Continue the cinema experiment in Tetu, and expand it (where 
relevant) if it workse 
C OITSULTATI01T 
1. Hake a highly visible change in policy towards local 
consultation (especially Vihiga, Tetu, Migori): choose an activity 
for which future plans are not impossible to change (e.g., agriculture 
in Migcri), inform local interest groups that it is intended to 
open the area to public discussion in order to make the plan more 
responsive to local wants, call locational barazas to publicize the 
tentative SEDP plans and invite the public to discuss their reactions 
and proposals at sublocation and interest group meetings and to 
forward suggestions, call all report-submitting leaders to discuss 
contradictions, and get their (or an active Divisional Development 
Committee's) consent to the final plans® Ensure that Ministry staff 
competent to advise 011 constraints are present at the leadership 
meetings, so that the government can abide by the final decision® 
2® (a) Have the Community Development staff and other local extension 
agents submit lists of as many local interest groups as they can think 
of, in rough order of influence. Invite leaders of these groups -
in order of influence if too many - to seminars on planning techniques 
as related to on-going SRDP and later local development® Reveal future 
plans for the area and discuss them. Tell the leaders to discuss them 
further with their groups and forward suggestions. 
(b) llote which local interest groups are most active in forwarding 
proposals and critiques and occasionally send a staff member to their 
meetings to discuss directly with them. 
3. Use local (sublocational and locational) staff meetings to 
brainstorm new ideas to deal with the old administrative/extension 
problems (transportation, etc.) and to criticize SRDP plans from their 
point of view. Ensure that a planner from the relevant Ministry 
attends all these meetings at the initial stages of the programme 
and occasionally thereafter. 
4. Set up annual evaluation sessions: invite all local interest 
groups to submit evaluations of project schedules, successes, failures 
(to complete projects or to utilize the structures afterwards), and 
future plan modifications. Summarise and distribute them within SEDP 
and throughout interest groups and among local officials. Ask for 
further comments, and work out a compromise evaluation at leadership 
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or DDC meeting® 
ESTABLISHMENT OP LOCAL CO-ORDINATIITG BODIES AND SELF-HELP IN SEDP 
lo Create Locational Development Committees in Vihiga, Tetu, and. 
Mbere (plus Kapenguria and Kwale as local involvement grows) by election 
of representatives at sublocation barazas. Make them the main link 
between SEDP and Harambee efforts and encourage frequent meetings through 
frequent consultation and attendance by the CDAs. n 
Train them in i/tegrated development planning. Experiment with a 
Divisional Development Committee elected by these groups but drop it if 
the summary of local interest group reports starts to disagree seriously 
with it. 
2. Have a planning bias towards using self-help labour and other 
contributions. But take into account the past history of Harambee in 
the area. Has it been pre-empted by the politicians to the extent of 
popular resentment? Have the people shown a preference towards 
contributions in cash instead of labour or vice versa? 
3. Before committing SEDP to a specific self-help project, ask: 
(a) has it already established sufficient momentum to continue unaided? 
(b) has it already acquired sufficient funding sources, skills, and 
comprehension of maintenance needs? (c) has it perhaps even'already 
reached the desirable goal? If the answers are yes, avoid the programme. ( 
If no, help in the way indicated. Will government takeover be 
regarded as a signal to stop local contributions and responsibility? 
4. Experiment in Tetu, Migori, Vihiga and Mbere with expanding 
the variety and success of self-help projects through publicity to 
local and non-local experiments (pig-breeders, group pullover-knitters, 
broom marketers) and throLigh technical advice to struggling groups 
trying such new ideas. Evaluate and replicate publicity and advice for 
successful projects elsewhere in Kenya. 
5» Experiment with self-help maintenance in several areas, e.g., 
explain the processes and frequency of road maintenance necessary to 
Mbere self-help groups (and Migori, if feasible) and inform them that 
the roads will be unusable again within X years if they do not 
maintain them, because MOW cannot. Establish a monitoring/reporting 
system whereby the local group leader checks and reports each month on 
the condition of his dip or waterpipe or road section and on the action 
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1. Co-ordination of publicity efforts, getting appropriate staff 
to local leadership meetings, etc., should he carried out "by the Area 
C o-ordinator. 
2. Implementation of involvement recommendations should he 
r a e i l i t a t o d by their inclusion i n a proper soqucn.ce in the reporting 
-cm . 
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empowered to change p h a s i r ^ of the original plijis where local constrain 
indicate. Red tape delaying such changes should be minimized by activc 
Ministerial co-operation when requested by the Area Co-ordinator. 
SPECIAL AREA RECOMMEITDATIOITS 
(areas are included here because SRDP face special prcbi-.ras in 
involvement not found elsewhere.) 
1. Kwale youth should be given special consideration and drawn 
into the SRDP project - proposal process, through some form of youth 
organization, possibly based on cultivation of the new farms being 
established outside the towns. Sub-chiefs should be sent out of the 
chiefs' camps to take responsibility for stimulating interest in self-
help and for rccruiting and assisting self-help leaders. Representativ 
institutions to co-ordinate self-help and leadership seminars should be 
added as local interests rise. 
2. Kapenguria pastoralists should be consulted immediately about' 
their wants and opinions of present projects, first through consultatic 
of the widest possible selection of local interest group leaders, and 
then through discussion at the meetings which these leaders should be 
asked to c a l l , At all c o s t s official barazas are to be avoided. Some 
un-uniformod o f f i c i a l - CDA, Veterinary Officer, or whoever - with 
experience i n pastoral areas and a positive attitude towards pastoralis 
might be chosen/posted to form the main contact link between the Area 
Co-ordinator and the pastoralist sector of Kapenguria. 
3. In Tetu self-help has been oadly overtaxed. Try to rescue the 
movement by establishing a procedure for vetting all projects above 
sublocation level by Locational Development Committees to counteract !.'.. 
p o l i t i c i a n s ' demand for more and more projects. ITote there are local 
self-help projects in that area where the participants have specifical1 
rejoctod outside interference and support. Try to minimize the demands 
large projects make on Tetu people, 
